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Abstract 
 
 
This study aimed at contributing to the current debate on the regulation of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), through providing important inputs for evidence-based policy dialogue 
and decision making, particularly on the issue relating to whether MFIs should be regulated 
and supervised and how they should be regulated. Using the case of Namibia, it entailed a 
critical evaluation of the potential impact of regulation on MFIs and hence on the 
microfinance sector. Through an application of the Rationale-Objectives-Indicator (ROI) 
methodology, an analysis of a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) was performed at two 
levels, namely an ex-post level using a case study of a deposit-taking MFI that has been 
regulated under conventional banking law and an ex-ante level of the likely impact of the 
proposed microfinance regulatory framework. It was found that regulation has generally had 
a positive impact on the operations of the regulated MFI, as reflected in improvements in 
most of its performance indicators (profitability, portfolio quality, liquidity and access to 
finance, given substantial increases in the number of savers and borrowers) during the post-
licensing period. The ex-ante RIA of the proposed new microfinance regulatory framework 
also pointed towards a greater probability of the envisaged regulatory framework achieving 
its intended regulatory objectives. This will however depend on the degree to which 
regulatory requirements are going to be enforced and the prevailing macro-economic 
conditions in the country. As such, it was concluded that, while necessary, regulation alone 
may not be sufficient to attract relevant players into the microfinance sector and develop the 
sector, given the structural weaknesses of the Namibian economy. Broader policy and 
reform initiatives, including additional incentives, might be required to spur the development 
of the country’s microfinance sector.  
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SDFN    Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia 
SMEs    Small and medium enterprises 
TIPEEG Targeted Intervention Program for Employment and Economic 
Growth 
WSBI    World Savings Banks Institute  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In addition to unemployment and high poverty rates, a lack of access to finance and financial 
services has been identified as among the key challenges faced by developing countries for 
many decades. Traditional banks and other conventional financial institutions typically serve 
only a small percentage of the population, estimated at approximately 30 per cent1 in the 
developing world (IFC, 2011). This leaves the remaining majority of the population and small 
businesses unserved.  
 
The emergence of the microfinance industry four decades ago has been considered an 
opportunity to extend financial services to the excluded majority. In particular, microfinance 
is increasingly seen as an important instrument in the effort to alleviate poverty. In fact, 
poverty reduction has been the main focus of microfinance, although the provision of credit 
by this sector has also been viewed as a way to generate self-employment opportunities for 
the poor. The earlier role of microfinance institutions (MFIs) of ‘credit extension only’ has 
transformed into a much wider role, such that MFIs are now providing additional services in 
the form of savings and money transfers, among others. This changing role comes with 
greater responsibility and accountability, given the risks involved, including the possibility of 
loss of savers’ money. There is therefore an increasing interest internationally in terms of 
whether MFIs should be regulated and supervised (CGAP, 2012).  
 
Differing views, both for and against the regulation of MFIs, have been raised in the process. 
Advocates of regulation have argued that regulation and supervision2 will improve the 
performance of these institutions, protect depositors in the case of deposit-taking MFIs and 
ensure their sustainability as well as the soundness and stability of the financial system, 
                                                          
1 The International Finance Corporation, in its 2011 publication Toward universal access: Addressing the global challenge of 
financial inclusion, indicates that almost 70 per cent of the population in developing countries has no access to formal financial 
services.  
2 The Oxford dictionary (no date) defines ‘regulation’ as a rule or directive made and maintained by an authority, and 
‘supervision’ as the role of observing and directing the execution of a task or activity.  
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especially in the case of significant MFIs.3 However, the uniqueness of these institutions, in 
terms of the clients they serve and the nature of the products and services they offer, has 
also raised opposing views to their regulation. These include the possibility of regulation 
creating barriers to the efforts of increasing access to financial services and the possibility of 
regulation curtailing the ability of MFIs to allocate financial resources efficiently, and thereby 
the potential to dampen their development. What has also become clear from the 
discussions on this issue is that there are differing objectives being advanced for regulation 
(CGAP, 2000).  
 
According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (2000), these objectives 
range from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with microcredit operations wanting to 
be licensed and regulated to access deposits from the public, MFIs believing that regulation 
will promote their business and improve their operations, and governments and donors 
wanting financial licenses to be more widely and easily available in order to expand savings 
services for the poor, to donors and governments expecting that setting up a special 
regulatory window for microfinance will speed up the emergence of sustainable MFIs. In the 
case of Namibia, the government, in particular the central bank, in realisation of the need to 
develop the microfinance industry to address the lack of access to finance by individuals and 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), has considered that regulation would create an 
environment that would entice investors to invest in the microfinance sector. This view is in 
line with some of the above-listed arguments for the regulation of MFIs. 
 
Given that the experimentation with microfinance regulation and supervision is recent, and 
the fact that individual country situations vary greatly, confident general conclusions are not 
easy to make on what the reasons for regulations ought to be (CGAP, 2000). However, there 
seems to be a general understanding among most policy makers, donors and private 
investors involved in microfinance that there is a great demand for financial services by the 
poor, and not just for credit, and that “the ability of the market to respond to this demand 
depends not only on providers developing sustainable, low-cost ways to provide such 
services, but also on having an enabling policy and regulatory environment” (CGAP, 2012: 
vii). According to CGAP, it is based on that realisation that the relevant question generally 
being posed nowadays relates to the kind of regulation and supervision that will help achieve 
the intended objectives of increasing access to finance (CGAP, 2012). With the above in 
                                                          
3 According to Hardy, Holden & Prokopenko (2002), in some countries (especially in very matured markets), there are MFIs 
with so many borrowers and depositors such that their balance sheets size is comparable to that of a commercial bank.  
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mind, this study evaluated the case of Namibia by looking at its experience with MFIs and 
regulation. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
Namibia is a country faced by high unemployment and poverty rates. The 2012 Namibia 
Labour Force Survey estimates the unemployment rate at 27.4 per cent (NSA, 2012a), while 
the Namibia Poverty Dynamics Report of the same year indicates a 28.7 per cent poverty 
rate (NSA, 2012b). The informal sector and SMEs, like in many other developing countries, 
have been playing a role in generating employment. While no comprehensive estimate has 
been done for Namibia so far to determine the contribution of SMEs to employment creation, 
the latest indication4 from two studies (Stork et al., 2004, and Arnold et al., 2005) cited by 
BoN (2010b), that focused on SME development, gave some indication of SMEs’ 
contribution to employment of approximately 20 per cent in both 2003 and 2004. These 
sectors have however remained undeveloped because of a lack of finance, as evidenced by 
the World Bank Enterprise Survey of 2006 (the latest on Namibia), which indicates that only 
16.2 per cent of surveyed firms5 had a bank loan or line of credit (World Bank, 2006). This is 
despite the existence of a relatively well-developed formal financial sector, which has 
considered those sectors too risky to finance. FinMark Trust (2011) also estimated the 
financial exclusion rate of Namibia at 31 per cent. This is a potential market for MFIs to 
serve, given the reluctance of commercial banks to serve them. At the same time, there is 
currently a limited number of ‘true’ microfinance service providers in the Namibian market 
that can provide microenterprise lending, microsavings and other financial services 
specifically targeted at the lower end of the market.6 In this situation, the Namibian SME 
sector cannot expand to create the much-needed jobs to reduce unemployment and poverty, 
while the majority of low-income earners of the population will continue to live in poverty.  
 
The increasing drive to alleviate the financial constraints of the poor has been noticeable 
globally. This has followed the general acknowledgement among financial sector 
practitioners, policy makers and regulators of the need to do just that. At the same time, 
there has been realisation that the alleviation of financial constraints may require the 
                                                          
4 These are just indications, because at the time the estimates were made, there was no sample frame; hence the inability to 
conduct nationally representative business surveys.  
5 The scope of the survey was 329 manufacturing firms. 
6 There is actually also no clarity with regard to who is regarded as an MFI in Namibia, such that some calls have been made to 
define MFIs.  
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existence of a diverse spectrum of financial institutions with different risk and cost profiles, 
and there has therefore been a concurrent acceptance of microfinance as the medium that 
can ensure access to finance for the poor and as a powerful tool for sustainable 
development (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). This acceptance has been based on the 
fact that during its existence, microfinance has proven to have made a difference in 
facilitating access to finance by the poor, and therefore in the lives of those who were once 
considered to be too risky to qualify for conventional banking services, through applying non-
traditional credit risk-mitigating measures.  
 
The Namibia Financial Sector Strategy (NFSS) 2011–2021, a recently developed ten-year 
roadmap for the transformation of the Namibian financial sector,7 has recognised the need to 
develop relevant financial institutions, such as MFIs, that will facilitate the growth and 
development of the SME sector and ensure financial access to the majority of the country’s 
poor. Regulation has been viewed as one of the ways to develop the microfinance sector 
through providing an enabling environment that would entice more entry into the sector. In 
this regard, the country engaged consultants that assisted the Bank of Namibia (BoN) in 
creating such a regulatory framework. In its communicating the objective of the engagement 
during the process of stakeholder consultations in 2013, the BoN indicated that it sought to 
increase access to finance for SMEs and low-income individuals in Namibia through the 
development and deepening of the Namibian formal financial system by creating an enabling 
legal, regulatory and supervisory framework for microfinance. As such, the main objective of 
the BoN in creating a regulatory framework for MFIs is actually to develop the MFI sector in 
Namibia, which will enhance access to finance for SMEs and low-income people. This action 
is adherent with the notion of ‘regulation leading the market’. 
 
The need for a regulatory framework for MFIs is not unique to Namibia, but occurs in other 
countries around the globe too. This is because, while the history of microfinance globally 
evolved outside a regulatory framework, in the form of informal savings and credit groups 
(CGAP, 2006), and this environment has enabled MFIs to innovate and engage approaches 
to the provision of financial services that are distinct from traditional approaches of 
conventional banking, the scope and scale of microfinance have evolved beyond the 
traditional microcredit (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). While initially microfinance meant 
the extension of traditional micro loans of small and smallest amounts to the rural poor, it 
has evolved into providing financial services for all the unbanked in emerging and 
                                                          
7 The NFSS has been developed as a result of the realisation of the role the financial sector can play in the economic 
development of the country (Republic of Namibia, no date). 
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developing markets, and the process has also involved a widening of the product range and 
customer base and a change in the way of serving them (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 
2012). Microfinance has therefore expanded and is growing into a more commercialised 
industry (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). This has come with risks and as such, the 
issue of regulation of microfinance has been a discussion in one country after another 
(CGAP, 2000).  
 
In Namibia, in the absence of a regulatory framework that cater for DMFIs, one MFI has 
been licensed and regulated under the Banking Institutions Act (BIA), Act No. 2 of 1998, as 
amended, i.e. the law that regulates and supervises commercial banks. This means that it 
has to adhere to the same prudential guidelines, including minimum capital, reserve and 
liquidity requirements, as well as non-prudential requirements, as conventional commercial 
banks. In the meantime, work on a new regulatory and supervisory framework for MFIs had 
been finalised at the time of this research where BoN was in the process of amending the 
BIA to provide for the regulation of MFIs.  
 
Given the existence of alternative forms of regulating MFIs, experience in other countries 
and/or regions is worth looking at. CGAP (2000: 13) indicates that in countries such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines, “the availability of a special legal charter with low capital 
requirements brought forth large numbers of private rural banks”. It further reveals that the 
Latin American region, with longer experience than other regions in regulatory windows 
created specially for microfinance only, had only 16 per cent of the total multimillion dollar 
market coming from institutions licensed through microfinance-oriented windows, while the 
bulk of microfinance had been provided under licensing through other windows (CGAP, 
2000). This is evidence of the fact that a general one-size-fits-all conclusion on which 
regulatory approach a country should follow is not easy to make. This study therefore posed 
the question to the specific case of Namibia, i.e. is the regulatory framework (in both the 
existing form and the anticipated amended form) the right approach that will help Namibia 
achieve the intended regulatory objective of developing the microfinance sector to increase 
access to finance in the country? The researcher believed that this question could only be 
answered by undertaking a regulatory impact assessment (RIA); hence the current study, 
which is equivalent to evaluating both how the existing regulation has impacted the regulated 
MFIs (ex-post assessment) and how the anticipated special window created through 
amending the existing regulation is likely to impact the development of MFIs, and hence the 
provision of microfinance in Namibia (ex-ante assessment).  
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While the importance of MFIs in filling the financial services gap in the Namibian market has 
been recognised, as stated above, there is a need to direct efforts at comprehensively 
examining the unique nature of these very institutions, so as to map out evidence-based 
policies that will position them better to perform their expected role of facilitating access to 
financial services for the poor and SMEs. For instance, the efforts by the BoN to provide a 
regulatory framework for MFIs through amending the BIA are good regulatory intentions; 
however, the outcome of any regulation is not guaranteed, as regulation could have either 
positive or unintended negative impacts.  
 
To ensure positive regulatory outcomes, other countries (especially OECD [Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development] countries, but increasingly also other countries) 
have been performing ex-ante RIAs, and Namibia is doing one through this study. Ex-post 
regulatory assessments are also performed to determine what the exact impact of regulation 
had been after its implementation. This current study also entailed an ex-post assessment of 
a currently regulated MFI under the BIA, to gauge the impact exerted on it by being 
regulated under commercial banking law, which should provide good insight and lessons for 
the country. This is especially necessary, given the above stated viewpoint that MFIs should 
not be blindly subject to the same regulatory framework as conventional banks. Therefore, 
the question for Namibia is whether the BIA (in its current and anticipated form) is the 
appropriate legal instrument for regulating MFIs.  
 
Staschen, Dermish and Gidvani (2012: 2) explain that “conducting structured impact 
assessments provides regulators with the analytical toolkit to systematically think about 
impact, carefully design policy and critically evaluate existing policies”. In the same vein, the 
aim of the ex-ante assessment of this study was to inform the design of the policy in the 
future, while the ex-post regulatory assessment was premised on the need to assess the 
validity of some views, including those that MFIs should not be regulated by the same 
regulatory frameworks used for conventional banks because they are unique institutions. 
There is also an argument that states that regulated MFIs are likely to perform better, as the 
licensing requirements spelled out in the regulations would provide clear performance 
targets for them (CGAP, 2000). Both views are worth finding empirical evidence for and this 
study sought to do that for the case of Namibia.  
 
The study entailed an impact assessment of the regulatory and supervisory framework (both 
existing and anticipated) on the microfinance sector in Namibia. The main goal was the 
provision of information that should inform the process of how best to create an environment 
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that enables MFIs to effectively and efficiently play their expected role. The study was 
therefore based on the following key questions:  
i) What is the nature and state of the microfinance sector in Namibia? 
ii) How has the current regulatory framework (the BIA) affected MFIs? 
iii) Will the proposed amended BIA meet the overall objective of developing the 
microfinance sector in Namibia? 
iv) Should the microfinance sector be regulated and supervised, as proposed by the 
amended BIA?  
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The main aim of this research was to review the regulatory framework of MFIs in Namibia 
and assess its potential impact on the provision of microfinance in the country. To be able to 
perform a meaningful assessment, it was important to have a clear understanding of the MFI 
sector itself as well as the existing regulatory and supervisory framework and how it is 
applied to the sector. The specific objectives of the study that embodied this view were 
therefore as listed below:    
i) To obtain a better understanding of the nature and state of microfinance in Namibia 
ii) To obtain a better understanding of the regulatory and supervisory environment for MFIs 
in Namibia 
iii) To assess the existing and potential impact of regulation on the Namibian microfinance 
sector  
iv) To make policy recommendations based on the results of the study. 
 
Below is an elaboration of these four objectives: 
 
To obtain a better understanding of the nature and state of microfinance in Namibia 
 
Understanding the nature and state of institutions regulated and/or to be regulated was 
important, as it would ensure a meaningful analysis of the impact of either an existing 
regulation or potential regulation. It was deemed that this process would provide the 
necessary information on the characteristics of the existing MFIs, and reveal any diversity in 
the type and form of available MFIs in the country. The information is important at the stage 
of making any policy recommendations, which may need to be tailored to the specific types 
of MFIs.   
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To obtain a better understanding of the regulatory and supervisory environment for MFIs in 
Namibia 
 
The aim of this objective was to ensure that the regulatory framework is properly understood, 
as a pre-requisite for undertaking any meaningful impact analysis of such regulation on the 
MFIs. The process identified the weaknesses, strengths and/or gaps in the regulatory 
framework, and how those have possibly and/or would potentially affect the MFIs. It is on 
that basis that any recommendation can be made, which could be, for example, in the form 
of proposing changes to the regulatory framework. 
 
To assess the existing and potential impact of regulation on the Namibian microfinance 
sector 
 
Firstly, this objective aimed at assessing the impact of existing regulation on the MFI 
currently regulated together with normal banks under conventional banking law as a case 
study. Secondly, the objective also aimed to further assess the potential impact of the 
proposed regulatory window for MFIs, being provided for under the amended BIA, on the 
development and growth of the microfinance sector in Namibia and the enhancement of 
access to finance.  
 
Facilitating access to finance through developing the microfinance sector has been the 
overarching reason for creating the MFI regulatory window in Namibia. The assessment 
process yielded answers pointing to whether or not the new MFI regulatory framework would 
address the identified weaknesses constraining the development of the microfinance 
industry in Namibia. It also identified and assessed whether or not other additional regulatory 
and supervisory objectives of this window would be achieved; and whether the ultimate 
position of the expected regulatory benefits and costs would likely be a net benefit or net 
cost.  
 
To make policy recommendations based on the results of the study 
 
This objective ensured that the study makes recommendations based on the findings of the 
other three objectives. The aim was to facilitate evidence-based policy formulation and 
decision making and hence the nature of the recommendations made under Chapter 9 of 
this study. 
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1.4 RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In the literature, much of the impact assessment research done has been limited to case 
studies of successful MFIs in developing countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa, mostly 
focusing on the micro-economic impacts and relationships between MFIs and their clients 
(Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Khandker, 1998 and Wood & Sharif, 1997, cited by Chiumya, 
2006). Very little research on issues pertaining to the regulation and supervision of MFIs has 
been done, especially in Africa. In fact, it can be concluded from the literature reviewed that 
research on the impact of regulation on the development of the microfinance sector is still in 
its elementary stages. Most of the work done in this area has focused on descriptive country 
case studies, presenting the experiences of selected licensed MFIs (Churchill, 1997; Drake 
& Rhyne, 2002 and Rock & Otero, 1997, cited by Chiumya, 2006), except for a few that 
assessed the impact of regulation on the MFI sector, including that by Randhawa and 
Gallardo (2003) for Ghana and Tanzania, Chiumya (2006) and Okumu (2007) for Zambia 
and Uganda, respectively, as well as Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch (2009), who 
performed an assessment of a total of 67 developing countries. The findings of these studies 
can only be generalised to a limited extent, because of the heterogeneity of environments in 
different countries. Variables such as the maturity of the microfinance sector, the relative 
strength of different interest groups in the legislative process and the responsiveness of 
clients and MFIs to regulatory changes are country-specific and would usually determine the 
regulatory impact. This study therefore adds to the body of knowledge relating to MFIs by 
focusing on the regulatory impact on the microfinance sector, using the Namibian case.  
 
Moreover, as indicated earlier, little research has been undertaken on the Namibian 
microfinance sector, especially on the regulation of the sector. Most of what has been done 
focused on describing the state of affairs of the sector. To the researcher’s knowledge, there 
has not been any study that has performed a RIA on the MFIs in Namibia. An attempt that 
analysed the sector based on a regulatory perspective is that by Mushendami, Kaakunga, 
Amuthenu-Iyambo, Ndalikokule & Steytler (2004), which examined the role of regulation and 
supervision in promoting microfinance activities in Namibia, but like other studies, this was 
more descriptive in nature. The current study therefore contributes useful detailed 
information and provides insight into the state of regulation of MFIs in Namibia, as well as its 
current and potential impact on these institutions.  
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The research findings are necessary information for policy makers and regulators whose 
course of action may include amending the regulation, stimulating new reforms or seeking 
deeper understanding. Further, as challenges faced by developing countries in this field are 
believed to be similar, the study also contributes to the current debate on the regulation of 
MFIs. Ultimately, the conclusions of the study should provide important inputs for evidence-
based policy dialogue and decision making in the area of microfinance.  
 
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: After Chapter 1, which has given the 
introduction and background to the study, Chapter 2 focuses on the background to the 
Namibian economy with special emphasis on the financial system. It contextualises the 
subject matter of the research (i.e. microfinance and regulation), in terms of both the macro-
economic situation of the country (i.e. economic growth, poverty and employment, etc.) and 
the status and scope of the financial sector. To that effect, the chapter reviews the structure 
and performance of the financial sector and its contribution to the economy, and identifies a 
gap in the system which microfinance is supposed to fill so as to justify Namibia wanting to 
develop its microfinance sector.   
 
Chapter 3 is an in-depth literature review with emphasis on the theory and empirical 
evidence of financial regulation and supervision. It begins by looking at the link between both 
the broader financial system and microfinance to the economy, followed by a discussion of 
issues relating to financial regulation and how the aspect of regulating microfinance is 
analysed in literature. It therefore looks at issues relating to, among others, which MFIs to 
regulate and how to regulate them, what approach to follow (i.e. self-regulation or external 
regulation) and what type of regulation to apply (prudential or non-prudential), before it ends 
with a discussion of the empirical findings relating to the aspect of microfinance and 
regulation.  
 
The remaining chapters (4 to 9) are structured as follows: Chapter 4 describes the research 
methods and methodology for this study, followed by Chapter 5, which presents an analysis 
(trends, scope, structure, etc.) of the microfinance landscape in Namibia. In Chapter 6, the 
regulatory and supervisory framework in Namibia is discussed. The impact of regulating and 
supervising MFIs (using a case study of a regulated MFI) is presented in Chapter 7, while in 
Chapter 8 an assessment of the potential impact of the envisaged new MFI regulatory 
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framework is presented. The key findings of the study, conclusions, limitations, policy 
recommendations and suggestions for further research are contained in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO THE NAMIBIAN ECONOMY WITH SPECIAL 
EMPHASIS ON THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the Namibian financial system with a view to identifying 
the existence of any gaps in the system. To that effect, the chapter reviews the strengths 
and weaknesses in the processes of the sector playing its intermediation role in the 
economy. For contextualisation purposes, the discussion begins with an overview of the 
economy in terms of its achievements and challenges since the country became 
independent in 1990 as well as the opportunities that have presented themselves, especially 
those having an impact on the financial sector.   
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE NAMIBIAN ECONOMY: ACHIEVEMENTS, 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Namibia turned 24 years old on 21 March 2014. The country’s fourth National Development 
Plan (NDP4)8 adopted in 2012, alludes to government having inherited a dual economy with 
four interrelated challenges of low economic growth, an inequitable distribution of wealth and 
income, high unemployment and a high rate of poverty (Republic of Namibia, 2012.). While 
the country has recorded positive economic growth averaging at approximately 4.2 per cent 
since independence (refer to Figure 2.1 below), this has not been sufficient for the required 
employment creation, poverty reduction and achievement of greater income equality. In fact, 
the gross domestic product (GDP) has increased at a higher rate than the increase in 
population (of approximately 2 per cent on average), resulting in the country achieving a high 
per capita income that has led to its classification as an upper-middle income country since 
2009 (Republic of Namibia, 2012). This status does not augur well with the prevailing high-
income inequality in the country. With a Gini coefficient of 0.59 (NSA, 2012b), Namibia is 
estimated to be among the highest income inequality countries of the world. This is however 
an improvement from 0.74 in 1993 (UNU-WIDER, 2011), when the country was considered 
                                                          
8 NDP4 is Namibia’s fourth National Development Plan after having had its three predecessors (NDP1, NDP2 and NDP3). The 
plan’s implementation period spans from the fiscal year 2012/13 to 2016/17. 
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to have been the highest unequal society in the world. The level of inequality remains higher 
when compared with Gini coefficients of some other selected countries9 in the region.  
   
 
 
Figure 2.1: GDP and GDP growth 
Source: Statistics Division of the BoN10  
 
Unemployment, particularly among women and the youth, has been a serious challenge for 
the country. The 2012 Labour Force Survey estimated the country’s unemployment rate at 
27.4 per cent (NSA, 2012a). It should however be encouraging for the country to have 
observed that unemployment improved remarkably when compared to the rate of 51.2 per 
cent in 2008 and 36.7 per cent in 2004. The high unemployment situation has been 
attributed to the inadequate and volatile economic growth, coupled with a shallow economic 
base (Republic of Namibia, 2012). It is further attributed to the fact that the growth 
experienced mainly originated from the capital-intensive sectors of the economy, such as the 
mining sector, which virtually dominates the economic activities in Namibia but only creates 
a few jobs (as shown in Figure 2.2 below). Further, the country’s manufacturing base is very 
                                                          
9 The 2011 World Income Inequality Database of the World Bank indicates Gini coefficients of other selected Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries as follows: Lesotho (0.58), South Africa (0.57), Botswana (0.54), Swaziland (0.51), 
Zimbabwe (0.51) and Zambia (0.51).  
10 The data was obtained from the administrative records of the BoN through an e-mail by an official of that organization, Mr 
Abiatar Andreas on 15 April 2014 [Available e-mail: abiatar.andreas@bon.com.na]. 
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small, resulting in its abundant natural resources (minerals, fish and beef) being exported 
raw, therefore also not making the required contribution to employment creation through 
value addition. At the same time, the country has been importing even the basic consumable 
goods. The current economic structure has hence not been able to generate sufficient jobs. 
Government has always made clear its desire to diversify the economy through the 
promotion of value-addition activities. Meanwhile, the informal sector and SMEs, like in many 
other developing countries, have played a role in generating employment,11 despite being 
undeveloped due to the many challenges they encounter, the key being the lack of access to 
finance. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Employment creation by sector 
Source: NSA (2012a) 
 
Namibia has also lagged behind in its Human Development Index (HDI). In 2012, the 
country’s HDI was estimated at 0.608, which is higher than the average of 0.475 for sub-
Saharan Africa but below the world’s average of 0.682. The country ranked 128 out of 187 
(UNDP, 2013). This is an indication that despite its upper-middle income country status, 
                                                          
11 Statistics on the SME sector is currently very sketchy, but available statistics show that the sector contributes approximately 
12 per cent to the GDP and 20 per cent to employment (BoN, 2010b)  
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there remains much to be done in getting the country to its desired level of a developed 
nation in accordance with its Vision 2030. 12   
 
Poverty (measured as the proportion of the population living on less than a $1 per day) has 
been rife in the country, estimated at 28.7 per cent in 2012, with the share of severely poor 
individuals standing at 15.3 per cent (NSA, 2012b). Poverty has however improved from a 
rate of 69.3 per cent and 37.7 per cent in 1993 and 2004, respectively. Given these relatively 
high poverty levels in the country, the country has engaged programmes aimed at reducing 
the poverty level in accordance with its Poverty Reduction Strategy. The observed reduction 
in the poverty rate might be a reflection of some successes in the implementation of the 
programmes of the Strategy, although more still needs to be done to reduce the proportion 
of the severely poor to below 10 per cent by 2017, as desired by the NDP4. 
 
Given the above socio-economic challenges, Namibia has continuously reviewed its five-
year NDPs, which are the essential implementing plans for achieving the country’s overall 
ambition articulated in its Vision 2030. Despite some observed progress,13 reviews have 
revealed persisting challenges and weaknesses, as discussed above. This has led 
government to change strategy, placing emphasis on the prioritisation of economic sectors 
and initiatives that should make maximum impact towards the achievement of Vision 2030. 
In this regard, four sectors have been prioritised as ‘strategic high-growth sectors’, namely 
logistics, tourism, manufacturing and agriculture. While other sectors of the economy are not 
necessarily to be neglected, the focus over the NDP4 period (2012/13–2016/17) is on these 
four sectors, i.e. more investment is to be made in these sectors. It is believed that planned 
strategies regarding these sectors “will create momentum for higher economic growth and 
set the country on a path to achieve its Vision 2030” (Republic of Namibia, 2012) if 
implemented effectively. With this prioritisation approach, the country aims to achieve three 
main goals by the end of the NDP4 period (2017), namely:  
 high and sustainable economic growth;  
 increased income equality; and 
 employment creation.  
 
By assessing and determining whether or not the newly introduced MFI regulatory window 
will create an enabling environment for MFIs, the current study serves to catalyse action that 
                                                          
12 With Vision 2030, Namibia aims to be an industrialised country with a high income by the year 2030. 
13 In addition to having created a stable macro-economic environment, Namibia is said to have made progress in critical 
institutional areas such as good governance, the rule of law and protection of property rights (Republic of Namibia, 2012). 
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will contribute to the achievement of the three goals listed above. This is because an 
enabling environment in which MFIs flourish and facilitate access to finance for productive 
economic activities will stand to contribute to employment creation and the economic growth 
of the country. It will also complement efforts towards reducing the prevailing high income 
inequality through wealth and assets creation for previously disadvantaged citizens. 
 
2.2.1 Policy reforms 
 
In order to mitigate the socio-economic challenges experienced by the country discussed 
under the sections above, the country has initiated several policy and structural reforms. The 
most notable ones, which are relevant to this study, are discussed below. 
  
2.2.1.1 Targeted Intervention Program for Employment and Economic Growth  
 
To address the high unemployment rate coupled with the realisation of the far-reaching 
consequences that prolonged unemployment can cause (and therefore the urgent need to 
create job opportunities), government, through its National Planning Commission adopted a 
programme called the Targeted Intervention Program for Employment and Economic Growth 
(TIPEEG) in 2011. This is a short-term (three-year) programme aiming towards creating 
temporary employment in an attempt to arrest the situation in the shortest possible time. 
Despite its temporary nature, it is believed that the programme “will go a long way in 
enabling beneficiaries to have better prospects for long-term employment” (NPC, 2011: 4).  
 
The programme is structured in such a manner that it supports the strategic high-growth 
economic sectors of the NDP4 period mentioned earlier (i.e. logistics, tourism, 
manufacturing and agriculture). To that effect, government has aimed to deliberately make 
more investment in these sectors (NPC, 2011), especially in terms of allocating resources to 
high-labour-intensive projects. In terms of this policy reform, not only does the programme 
have to create jobs in these sectors, but the design of the programme also embodies the 
element of speedy implementation, an aspect that was lacking in previous programmes 
(NPC, 2011). While it cannot only be attributed to the existence of the TIPEEG, the country 
has experienced a recent significant reduction in the unemployment rate to 27.4 per cent 
from 51.2 in 2008 (NSA, 2012a). 
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2.2.1.2 New Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework 
 
In an attempt to address the highly skewed income distribution situation in the country, 
government has initiated a policy framework called the national broad-based New Equitable 
Economic Empowerment Framework (NEEEF). The ultimate objective of the framework, 
which (at the time of this research) was yet to come into effect, can be summed up as the 
creation of an equitable and socially just society (OPM, 2015).14 NEEEF entails a set of 
policies aimed at encouraging the private business sector to become more equitable and 
make a greater contribution towards the intended goal of national economic empowerment 
and transformation. Government aims to use its procurement programmes and licensing 
regimes as promotional tools for transformation and empowerment of especially the 
previously disadvantaged citizens,15 and has identified six empowerment pillars, as listed 
below, through which transformation is to be promoted (OPM, 2015):  
 Ownership, where a more equitable and balanced ownership of businesses is 
envisaged through assisting previously disadvantaged Namibians to either buy into 
existing businesses or establish new businesses 
 Management control and employment equity, where it is expected that the 
management structures and workforces of businesses in Namibia should more 
accurately be reflective of the demographics of the population; this is to be achieved 
through means including the introduction of sectoral legislations that will make it a 
requirement for boards of directors and top management in certain categories of 
companies to be fully reflective of the Namibian demographic make-up  
 Human resources and skills development, where Namibian businesses are to be 
encouraged to play a greater role in training and skills development in the country, as 
this is viewed as key for effective empowerment and transformation 
 Entrepreneurship development, under which government envisages to enhance 
entrepreneurship among the previously disadvantaged Namibians through the 
procurement process, taking into consideration the extent to which businesses 
wanting to engage in business with government have assisted previously 
disadvantaged businesses through procurement, mentorship, joint ventures, etc. 
 Corporate social responsibility, which aims to encourage good corporate citizenship 
in the country through making it part and parcel of the business environment; 
                                                          
14 This policy, while discussed at some point by the National Assembly, was still undergoing public consultations at the time of 
writing this research. 
15 Previously disadvantaged citizens are that section of the population that was discriminated against under the apartheid South 
African regime that ruled the country before independence.  
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accordingly, NEEEF will require businesses above a certain size to devote at least 1 
per cent of after-tax profits to community investment, while government also 
undertakes to reward businesses that establish operations in depressed communities 
 Value addition, technology and innovation, which aims to transform the economy by 
encouraging manufacturing, value addition and export instead of trading and 
extraction, as well as sharing of knowledge and technology among entrepreneurs; 
the aim of NEEEF is therefore to make value addition a requirement for licencing of 
new enterprises while existing businesses would be required to achieve value 
addition to a certain level of processing by a certain defined date. 
  
As an incentive-driven framework, NEEEF is to be applied on a scoring basis mechanism, so 
that it is ensured that the companies that fail to comply with the set targets would be 
excluded from tendering for government- or state-owned enterprise contracts. While 
participation is on a voluntary basis, it is the wish of government that all businesses would 
embrace the policy and be participants. Once it becomes effective, this framework is 
expected to make a meaningful contribution to the country’s goal of becoming a more 
equitable society16.  
 
The researcher is of the view that, if implemented effectively, the strategies devised in the 
TIPEEG and NEEEF discussed above should foster economic growth, which will facilitate 
the process of addressing Namibia’s socio-economic challenges of unemployment, poverty 
and income inequality. 
 
2.3  OVERVIEW OF THE NAMIBIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
This section of the chapter provides a review of the Namibian financial sector, pointing out its 
strengths as well as examining the gaps and constraints identified in the process of the 
sector playing its intermediation role in the economy. This is not only relevant for the 
contextualisation of the subject matter of this study, but also necessary, given the existence 
of a link between financial development and economic growth advocated by economic 
theory – an aspect that is elaborated on under the literature review section of the study in 
Chapter 3. 
                                                          
16 Stakeholder consultations on NEEEF were still ongoing at the time of this research.  
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2.3.2 The structure of the financial system in Namibia 
  
The formal financial system of Namibia consists of commercial banking institutions and a 
range of non-bank financial institutions (i.e. pension funds, insurance companies, asset 
managers, unit trusts, micro-lending institutions, a stock exchange and stockbrokers) 
(Republic of Namibia, no date). The activities of these categories of institutions are overseen 
and supervised by two regulators, one for the banking industry and the other for the non-
bank financial industry. Specialised and development finance institutions also exist in the 
country, while in recent years the sector has also witnessed the emergence of private equity 
and venture capitalist funds, although this segment of the industry is still relatively small. 
While a small number of government financial institutions came into existence, especially 
after independence, most financial institutions are private institutions with strong ownership 
links to South African institutions. A summary of the current status of each of these 
categories is provided below. 
 
2.3.2.1 The structure of the banking sector 
 
At the time of conducting this research, the banking sector comprised six commercial banks, 
of which four are traditional commercial banking institutions (namely First National Bank 
[FNB] Namibia, Standard Bank of Namibia, NedBank of Namibia and Bank Windhoek), while 
two were specialised banking institutions that entered the market three- and one year 
respectively, before this research started in 2013, namely FIDES (International Finance for 
Social and Economic Development) Bank Namibia, which is a microfinance deposit-taking 
bank that entered during 2010, and the SME Bank, that joined in 2012.17 With the exception 
of one commercial bank, three of the traditional ones have strong ties with South African 
banks in that they were previously branches of South African banks before their recent 
incorporation as fully fledged Namibian banks. The BoN 2014 Annual Report indicates that 
there is also one representative branch of a South African bank (Absa Bank), mostly 
handling enquiries and administrative issues on behalf of the bank. A most recent entry to 
the banking industry has been in the form of an e-bank (also called EBank Namibia), which 
was licensed in 2014 (BoN, 2014). The Bank’s form and mode of operation are purely 
electronic. Although its operations have not taken full effect yet, expectations are that this 
bank will add to the increasingly changing face of the banking industry in Namibia. There are 
                                                          
17 This information was listed on the corporate website of the BoN at the time of conducting this research (BoN, no date). 
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prospects for more banks entering the industry, as evidenced by the observed expression of 
interest through applications for licenses made to the Central Bank in recent years.  
 
The 2014 annual report also revealed that the Namibian banking sector was well capitalised, 
sufficiently liquid and profitable (BoN, 2014). Data obtained from the annual reports of the 
BoN for the period 2004–2013 show that total assets of the sector have grown substantially 
by 229 per cent over a ten-year period (2004–2013). They represented 63.4 per cent of the 
GDP in 2013, an increase from 54.8 per cent of the GDP in 2004. Figure 2.3, however, also 
shows that the pace of growth has reduced in later years of the decade relative to the 
beginning of the same period. 
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Figure 2.3: Banking sector assets and growth 
Source: BoN annual reports for periods 2004–2013 
 
 
The largest portion of bank assets (approximately 70 per cent) is loans and advances 
extended to the various sectors of the economy (BoN, 2013a). Loans extended to the private 
sector increased significantly by 193 per cent from 2004 to reach N$59 322.9 million at the 
end of 2013. This shows that the banking sector has been actively lending in the economy 
during the decade under review. The value of loans extended by commercial banks to 
various sectors of the economy amounted to 48.8 per cent of the GDP in 2013 (the ratio was 
47.4 per cent of the GDP in 2004), which is testimony that the sector has, in actual fact, 
been a primary source of financing for the Namibian economy. Figure 2.4 below depicts the 
growth in credit extended to the private sector for the period 2004-2013. 
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Figure 2.4: Bank private sector credit and growth 
Source: Statistics Division of the BoN18 
 
The bulk of both the industry’s total assets and loans (more than 90 per cent for both) 
belongs to the four main commercial banks that have been operating in the industry for a 
long time relative to the other two specialised banks mentioned earlier. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 
below show the distribution of assets and loans between the banks.19  
 
                                                          
18 The data was obtained from the administrative records of the Statistics Division of BoN through an email by an official of the 
Division, Mr Abiatar Andreas on 15 April 2014 [Available e-mail: abiatar.andreas@bon.com.na]. 
19 Due to the small size of the banking industry, codes (A, B, C and D) are used in this study instead of names of banks so as to 
preserve the confidentiality of individual banks by not making it possible to link specific data to a specified institution. This was 
done after the interview with the Chairperson of the Bankers Association at the time of field work indicated that the manner in 
which the data is presented would matter to the industry as the industry would expect that confidentiality was preserved.  
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Figure 2.5: Bank percentage share in total industry assets 
Source: BoN20 
  
 
Figure 2.5 shows that the biggest chunk of the industry’s assets belongs to Bank B (29.2 per 
cent), while there is only a slight difference between the shares of Bank C (26.8 per cent) 
and Bank A (26.2 per cent). Bank D has the smallest share among the mainstream banking 
institutions (13.0 per cent). As indicated earlier, loans and advances constitute the largest 
portion of the banking industry’s total assets. A noteworthy aspect with regard to bank loans 
in Namibia is the high exposure to individual real estate mortgages. Mortgages made up 
more than half of total commercial banks loans and advances (52.8 per cent at the end of 
2013). This has raised credit risk concerns, although the non-performing loan ratio of the 
banking industry has on average remained below the international benchmark of 4 per cent 
over the past decade. Figure 2.6 below depicts the share of each banking institution in total 
industry loans.21 
 
                                                          
20 The data was obtained from the administrative records of the Banking Supervision Department of the BoN.  
21 These are total loans of the main four commercial banks only, excluding those of the two specialised banking institutions, i.e. 
SME Bank and the microfinance bank (FIDES). 
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Figure 2.6: Bank percentage share in total industry loans 
Source: BoN22  
 
 
The structure of shares of commercial banks in total industry loans resembles that in assets, 
with Bank B taking up the largest share and Bank D the smallest share. There is however a 
huge difference between the portions held by Bank C (31.6 per cent) and Bank A (23.1 per 
cent) compared to the closeness observed in their shares to total assets. In terms of 
liabilities, total industry deposits, which constitute the main liability portion, have seen 
tremendous growth over the period 2004–2013. At the end of 2013, the deposits of the 
banking industry amounted to N$73 486.5 million, an increase of 316.7 per cent from the 
level recorded at the end of 2004, when it was only N$17 636.2 million (Figure 2.7). They 
represent 60.9 per cent of the GDP. 
   
                                                          
22 The data was obtained from the administrative records of the Banking Supervision Department of the BoN. 
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Figure 2.7: Banking industry deposits and growth 
Source: Statistics Division of the BoN23 and researcher’s calculation for growth 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 below shows the distribution of deposits among the banking institutions. The 
distributional structure of the value of deposits is similar to that in assets and loans, where 
Bank B holds the majority of deposits and Bank D the smallest. The differences are however 
not too significant, especially between those for banks A, B and C. 
 
                                                          
23 The data was obtained from the administrative records of the Statistics Division of BoN through an email by an official of the 
Division, Mr Abiatar Andreas on 15 April 2014 [Available e-mail: abiatar.andreas@bon.com.na]. 
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Figure 2.8: Bank percentage share in total industry deposits 
Source: BoN24  
 
Although sound and well capitalised, as indicated above, the Namibian banking industry is 
highly concentrated and lacking competition. According to the September 2013 Financial 
Stability Report of Namibia (BoN, 2013b), the industry’s estimated measure of concentration 
through the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index has ranged way above 2 000 points over the years, 
which is considered highly concentrated (Figure 2.9). The standard is 1 000 points at which 
a system or industry would be considered competitive.  
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Figure 2.9: The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for the Namibian banking industry 
Source: BoN (2013b) 
                                                          
24The data was obtained from the administrative records of the Banking Supervision Department of the BoN. 
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Figure 2.9 shows that the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (representing the level of the market 
concentration for the banking industry) of Namibia amounted to 2 734 points at the end of 
2013. In fact, it has been fluctuating in the range of 2 680 and 2 734 points over the period 
2009–2013. These figures show a highly concentrated and uncompetitive Namibian banking 
industry, given they are way above the desirable level of a 1 000 points, at which a system 
or industry would be considered competitive, as mentioned earlier. This state of affairs is 
attributable to the fact that the four major commercial banks (FNB Namibia, Standard Bank 
of Namibia, Bank Windhoek and NedBank Namibia) dominate the banking industry. 
According to the September 2013 Financial Stability Report of BoN (BoN, 2013b), the four 
banks account for almost 100 per cent of the total assets and deposits. There is therefore a 
lack of competition, which has, at times, led to speculations of the presence of bank 
collusion in Namibia. Feasibility (2010: 7) posits that the big four banks “behave like 
oligopolists, each with some market power, but unwilling for the most part, to compete on 
prices”, as evidenced by their sustained profitability.   
 
The highly concentrated status of the industry is undesirable, given the negative impact that 
it might have on the savings mobilisation process and channelling of resources to investors. 
Competition would lead to greater transparency, diversification and expanded product 
offering. In fact, Ikhide (2000) indicates that given the high levels of profitability of the 
Namibian banking industry and the fact that most of the existing firms were producing at the 
falling portion of their average cost curves, the industry could still accommodate more 
banking firms without necessarily compromising industry profitability. In line with this finding, 
according to the country’s current Financial Sector Strategy 2011–2021, “attracting new 
foreign financial institutions could provide a competitive stimulus that the country so much 
needs and spur innovation in products and practices” (Republic of Namibia, no date: 18). 
   
2.3.2.2 Conclusion on the structure of the banking sector 
  
From the discussions in the above section, it is clear that the banking industry has evolved 
over time. The sector is well capitalised, relatively developed and profitable. The sector has 
however been very concentrated and has lacked competition, given the low number of 
banking institutions, where the longstanding ones (four banks) have been dominating the 
sector. The lack of competition and a highly concentrated status of the industry are 
undesirable, given that these issues may have a negative impact on the savings mobilisation 
process and channelling of resources to investors as well as impede transparency on the 
side of the banks and the diversification of product and service offerings. In the context of 
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this study, this situation is considered to have the potential of hampering the outreach by 
banks, as they may not necessarily see the need to enhance their outreach and therefore 
exclude some segments of the population from their services. Whether this has been the 
case in Namibia or not is evidenced in Section 2.4 of this chapter.    
 
2.3.2.3 The structure of the non-banking financial sector 
 
The non-banking financial sector of Namibia boasts a relatively high number of diverse 
institutions and intermediaries compared to the banking industry. As at the end of 2012, 
there were 18 long-term and 14 short-term insurance companies, 121 registered pension 
funds, 41 investment managers, 12 unit trusts, 275 micro-lending institutions, 11 medical aid 
funds, 3 friendly societies, 1 stock exchange and 6 registered stockbrokers that intermediate 
between investors and the stock exchange (NAMFISA, 2013). As in the case of the banking 
sector, the non-bank financial sector also has strong links to South Africa in that most of the 
institutions are subsidiaries of South African companies. The NFSS 2011–2021 envisages 
having these companies locally incorporated.   
 
With the exception of the stock exchange that has remained one ever since its establishment 
in 1985, the sector has grown bigger in terms of both the number of institutions per sub-
sector and assets. The total assets of the sector had grown significantly to N$149.7 billion by 
the end of 2012 from only about N$906 million at the end of 2004. At that level, they 
represented 139 per cent of the GDP (BoN, 2013b). Following below is the detailed 
information on each of the non-bank financial industries, with the exception of the 
microlending industry, which is discussed under a separate section (Section 2.3.2.7). 
 
(a)  The pension funds industry 
 
The pension funds industry consists of both public and private institutions. Namibia has a 
high number of registered pension funds. At the end of 2012, there were 121 active 
registered pension funds, covering 289 689 members (NAMFISA, 2013). It is the biggest 
industry of the non-banking financial sector, in that the bulk of the total assets of the non-
banking financial sector (N$85.8 billion) belongs to the pension funds industry (NAMFISA, 
2013). This amounts to approximately 80 per cent of the GDP and as such, Namibia is 
among the countries with the highest rates of pension assets ratio to GDP in the world.  
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The Government Institutions Pension Fund (GIPF) is the major contributor to the pension 
assets by approximately 70 per cent. These assets have been finding their way out of the 
country, i.e. the country has been a net exporter of capital for many years, mostly through 
institutional investors. As illustrated in Figure 2.10 below, capital outflows reached a peak of 
N$10 417 million in 2007 before they reduced to N$4 639 million at end of 2013. The 
continuous flows of capital out of the country have not boded well with the level of 
investment needed by the country to develop its own economy. In the quest of curbing 
capital outflows and to spur local investment, government amended the regulatory 
requirements relating to institutional investors in 201325 to compel long-term insurers and 
pension funds to invest a portion of their assets in the domestic economy. Regulations 28, 
15 and 29 therefore require pension funds and long-term insurers to invest a minimum of 35 
per cent domestically, of which 1.75 per cent should be in unlisted local investments.     
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Figure 2.10: Capital outflows over the period (1990–2013) 
Source: Statistics Division of the BoN26  
 
 
                                                          
25 The regulations became effective at the beginning of 2014. 
26 The data was obtained from the administrative records of the Statistics Division of BoN through an email by an official of the 
Division, Ms. Angelina Landsberg on 16 April 2014 [Available e-mail: angelina.landsberg@bon.com.na]. 
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(b) The insurance industry 
 
The insurance industry consists of a long-term (or life insurance) and short-term component 
as well as insurance brokers and a re-insurer. Eighteen long-term insurance companies and 
one re-insurance company were in existence at the end of 2012 in Namibia. During the 
same period, the industry’s assets amounted to N$31.6 billion (NAMFISA, 2013), accounting 
for 29.6 per cent of the GDP. According to the regulator, the industry is well capitalised, with 
coverage ratio of surplus assets (3.8 in 2012) way over the required capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) of 1.5 per cent (NAMFISA, 2013). Despite this good performance, the FinScope 
Namibia 2011 Survey found that 64 per cent of individuals in Namibia have not used long-
term insurance products or services.   
 
Feasibility (2010) found that three life insurance companies (Old Mutual, Sanlam and 
Metropolitan) dominated the long-term insurance industry, accounting for more than 80 per 
cent of total industry assets. The same study also found the existence of cross-holding 
between these companies and banks, in that Old Mutual had a majority shareholding in 
Nedbank; Capricorn Holdings, who is the majority shareholder of Bank Windhoek, owned 
shares in Sanlam; while FNB had majority shareholding in Metropolitan. According to the 
study, the cross-holdings could encourage bundling of products between related firms, which 
may not always benefit the consumer.  
 
There were 14 short-term insurers at the end of 2012, one re-insurer, as well as 121 
insurance brokers and 395 insurance agents. The assets of the short-term insurance 
industry totalled N$3.0 billion at the end of 2012, compared to N$1.5 billion at the end of 
2008 (NAMFISA, 2013). From premiums and claims, it is clear that the bulk of the short-term 
industry is in the form of vehicle, personal and fire insurance. Three companies (Mutual and 
Federal, Santam and Hollard) were found to dominate the short-term industry (Feasibility, 
2010), with these companies also having strong links with South African short-term 
insurance companies in terms of shareholding. One of the smaller short-term insurers, Legal 
Shield, which is a subsidiary of the Trustco Group, was owned by various Namibian interests 
(Feasibility, 2010). As in the case of long-term insurance, the FinScope Namibia 2011 
Survey found that usage of the short-term insurers’ services has also remained low.  
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(c) Medical aid funds  
 
According to the 2013 annual report of the non-bank financial institutions regulator, there 
were 11 registered medical aid funds in Namibia, with a total membership of 162 471 at the 
end of 2012 (NAMFISA, 2013). The same report shows that total membership consisted of 
68 389 principal members, 3 460 pensioners and 90 622 dependents, while net member 
contributions amounted to N$1.9 billion at the end of 2012 and claims stood at N$1.7 billion, 
or 89.2 per cent of contributions. The above membership numbers imply that only 42.1 per 
cent of all employed Namibian people were principal members of a medical aid fund in 2012, 
while only 24 per cent of the Namibian population were covered by a medical aid fund. It 
follows then that the healthcare for the rest of the population (more than 70 per cent) is 
either funded personally or by government (NAMFISA, 2013).     
 
(d) Unit trusts 
 
The unit trust industry in Namibia has also evolved and grown tremendously, especially 
during the post-independence era. Registered unit trust companies increased to 12 at the 
end of 2012, compared to only a few before independence (NAMFISA, 2013). Within a span 
of five years, total funds under the management of these institutions reached N$32.1 billion 
at the end of 2012, from N$23.5 billion at the end of 2008 (NAMFISA, 2013). The bulk of the 
funds (76.8 per cent) were invested in money market instruments, for which the sources are 
depicted in Figure 2.11. Natural persons were the main source, followed by companies and 
unit trust schemes, in that order.    
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Figure 2.11: Sources of assets under management (per cent) 
Source: NAMFISA (2013) 
 
 
(e) Investment managers 
 
Investment managers play the role of investing and managing resources on behalf of other 
financial institutions discussed earlier (i.e. pension funds, long-term and short-term insurers, 
medical aids and unit trust schemes) as well as companies and households. At the end of 
2012 there were 41 investment managers in the country, with total assets or total funds 
under management amounting to N$109.4 billion (NAMFISA, 2013). This is a significant 
increase when compared to N$75.8 billion four years back (in 2008). The bulk of the funds 
under management belongs to pension funds (57.2 per cent) followed by unit trusts (24.0 per 
cent) and long-term insurance (14.8 per cent) in that order, as depicted in Figure 2.12. 
Medical aid funds, companies and natural persons are among those with the lowest assets 
managed by investment managers, as also shown in the same figure. 
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Figure 2.12: Sources of assets under management (per cent) 
Source: NAMFISA (2013) 
 
 
(f) Stock exchange 
 
Namibia only has one stock exchange, called the Namibian Stock Exchange (NSX) and 
licensed in terms of the Stock Exchanges Control Act (Act No. 1 of 1985). Securities listed 
on the NSX comprise dual-listed South African companies and primary-listed Namibian 
companies, with the dual-listed portion dominating (see Table 2.1 below). Dual-listed 
securities constitute more than 99 per cent of the total market capitalisation of the listed 
securities on the NSX (NAMFISA, 2013). The overall market capitalisation of the NSX was 
N$1.41 billion in 2013 compared to the local market capitalisation of N$18.73 million (Table 
2.1).  
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Table 2.1: NSX local and overall market 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Local market (N$ million) 
Market capitalisation 5 720 7 126 7 782 9 304 11 057  18 729 
Listed securities 7 7 7 7 7 8 
Liquidity (%) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 
Overall market (N$ million) 
Market capitalisation 741 625 1 047 527 1 178 257 1 148 879 1 357 247  1 407 654 
Listed securities 29 33 33 33 33  34 
Liquidity (%) 1.24 0.85 0.66 0.29 0.30 0.39 
 
Source: NAMFISA (2013), NSX for 2013 data and researcher’s calculations for liquidity 
 
The NSX has been characterised by low levels of liquidity. This has been a result of 
insufficient available trading instruments in the market, which has led to most investors in 
Namibia adopting a buy-and-hold strategy (Republic of Namibia, no date). This situation has 
been ascribed to the need for investors to comply with regulatory local investment 
requirements of 35 per cent of their total assets, referred to earlier in this study. Furthermore, 
only a few local companies are listed on the stock exchange, with the number of listings 
having remained constant over the years, although there has been a recent listing as 
presented in Table 2.1 above. The national bourse has been working on a strategy that 
aims, among other things, to improve the situation in terms of addressing the need for a 
critical mass of stock issues and trade to create an efficient and liquid stock exchange. In 
this regard, the NFSS 2011–2021 (Republic of Namibia, no date) is advocating for the 
encouragement of state-owned enterprises to issue more bonds as well as enticing more 
companies to list on the stock exchange.  
 
(g) Private equity and venture capitalist funds 
 
In Namibia, the private equity and venture capital industry is still in its infant stages of 
development, although some operations of this nature have been ongoing in the country. At 
the time of writing this research, there were fewer than ten private equity and venture capital 
companies operating in the country as revealed by a study commissioned by Business 
Finance Solutions in 2012 (BFS, 2012). The same study indicates that the oldest private 
equity fund in the country (Stimulus Investments Limited) was established in 2004 and is 
listed on the Namibian stock exchange. It has mainly invested in well-established 
companies, i.e. those with the number of employees ranging between 10 and 100 people 
(BFS, 2012).   
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Another significant fund in the unlisted investment space is the Development Capital 
Portfolio of the GIPF, established in 1996, and which was the first initiative of unlisted 
investments that made direct investments into some local enterprises. GIPF committed 
some N$660 million to this portfolio (GIPF, 2010). The Development Capital Portfolio 
registered some positive experiences with its investments, such as those in two commercial 
banks (Bank Windhoek and FNB), and some in the real sector of the economy that brought 
about the establishment of entities that have delivered excellent returns and have become 
exporting entities. The scheme however also suffered significant losses, which led to its 
termination in 2003 (GIPF, 2010). The GIPF has recently reinvented and established another 
unlisted investment portfolio to the tune of N$2.3 billion in the form of a functional model of 
managing and investing local savings in the real economy (SAIS, 2013). According to a 
Southern Africa Innovation Support (SAIS) study that looked at the local providers of venture 
capital, private equity and angel funding in Namibia (SAIS, 2013), only approximately N$800 
million of this portfolio has so far been invested into the market, and although the portfolio is 
biased towards infrastructure and/or property development, it is expected to leave a positive 
mark in terms of creating and supporting the private equity and venture capital funds in the 
country. It has so far caused the creation of and has supported a number of fund managers 
and funds that are structured as venture capital, private equity and specialised funds. The 
rest of the private equity and venture capital funds entered the market in later years, i.e. they 
were established between 2010 and 2013, the earliest of them being the Namibia 
Procurement Fund and VPB Namibia Growth Fund, which were established in 2010. These 
were yet to fully establish themselves in the market. 
 
Overall, while the need for private equity is believed to be rife in the country especially for 
financing start-up projects and feasibility studies (Republic of Namibia, no date),27 
awareness and knowledge of these funds has generally remained low, while the fear of 
giving up ownership and control through the exchange of equity capital for shares has also 
contributed to small businesses not venturing into calling up these much-needed funds to 
grow their businesses. There seems to be renewed efforts in this area, with investigatory 
studies28 on the need and approach being carried out in the country. 
 
                                                          
27 The NFSS has identified a need for funds that provide investment capital by way of equity risk capital into private sector 
companies. 
28 Business Finance Solutions undertook a study on the need for venture capital in Namibia in 2013 undertaken by the Institute 
for Public Policy Research (IPPR), while the Development Bank of Namibia also commissioned a study in 2014 under the 
NFSS to investigate the need for a national risk-financing facility in Namibia. 
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2.3.2.4 Conclusion on the structure of the non-banking financial sector    
 
The above has shown that the non-banking sector consists of a diverse spectrum of 
institutions, offering different products and services, although dominated by a few big 
players, especially the insurance industry. It was also evident from the above structure that 
the sector has strong links to South Africa, with most of the companies being subsidiaries of 
South African companies. Like the banking sector, the non-banking sector is also well 
capitalised, posing a high coverage ratio of surplus assets than is statutorily required. 
However, it was observed that the venture capital and private equity funds industries, which 
would be more beneficial for microfinance development by investing in MFIs, are still small 
and developing. There is therefore a need for raising more awareness about the existing few 
and the importance of the type of funding they offer, so that more qualifying entrepreneurs 
can make use of those.  
     
2.3.2.5 Public finance institutions 
 
The country also has a few specialised government-funded financial institutions, mostly 
developmental-related for purposes of funding economic activities specific to their respective 
mandates, as discussed below.  
 
(a) The Development Bank of Namibia  
 
The Development Bank of Namibia (DBN) was established in 2004 through an act of 
Parliament (the DBN Act, Act No. 8 of 2002) with the aim to contribute to national economic 
development through the financing of various types of economic enterprises, projects and 
activities. Government’s expectation, as per the mandate expressed under Section 5(1) of 
the DBN Act of 2002, is that carrying out the mandate will increase economic activity in the 
country, which will lead to improved social welfare and quality of life of the citizens. 
Information on the corporate website of DBN at the time of undertaking this research 
revealed that the DBN provides finance to both the public and the private sector (including 
emerging entrepreneurs and SMEs) for start-ups and expansions, equity deals, bridging 
finance, enterprise development finance, trade finance, SME finance, public–private 
partnerships, public sector infrastructure, local authorities as well as bulk finance to 
microfinance providers (DBN, no date).  
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The bank had total assets of N$2.4 billion at the end of 2013 financial year, a loan book of 
N$1.7 billion and recorded a profit of approximately N$104 million (DBN, 2013). The bank 
has been placing emphasis on financial sustainability and this has at times led to criticism in 
terms of whether or not enough efforts were being devoted to its developmental role and 
whether or not it is over-compensating for risk, which might in the process compromise its 
developmental mandate, especially to the SME sector. Further criticism of the bank was 
related to the turnaround time of loan applications (over two weeks on average), which is 
considered too long, a situation that the DBN has indicated (on several occasions during its 
public engagements) to aim to improve on.  
 
The DBN has however been very active in the SME sector, in terms of both financing and 
providing other non-financial services and support. Loans provided to the SME sector 
ranged between N$250 000 and N$3 million and were repayable over a maximum period of 
five years, while interest rates on the loans as well as collateral were determined on a 
project-to-project basis (FinMark Trust, 2011). There has been more emphasis on 
introducing relevant products for the SME market, which saw the introduction of the tender-
based financing instrument through which the bank assists SME entrepreneurs allocated 
with government tenders without working capital.  
 
According to information obtained from its 2010 annual report, the DBN also has a 
microfinance support framework where it extends loans to organisations that provide 
microcredit. It also has an innovation fund, covering loans up to N$50 000 for innovative 
ideas. In addition to direct financial services, the DBN supports a number of local service 
providers that provide training and mentorship to emerging entrepreneurs (DBN, 2010). It is 
however understood that with the establishment of the SME Bank in 2010, DBN is planning 
to reduce its SME-financing activities to concentrate on financing larger developmental 
projects and allow the SME Bank to play a more prominent role in that space. 
 
(b) The Agricultural Bank of Namibia  
 
The Agricultural Bank of Namibia (AgriBank) was established by the Agricultural Bank of 
Namibia Act, Act No. 5 of 2003, as amended. According to Section 4 of the Act, AgriBank 
has the mandate to lend to individuals, companies or financial intermediaries for the 
development of agriculture and activities related to agriculture. As such, AgriBank provides 
loans for agricultural- and fisheries-related economic activities, including to small-scale 
farmers. It finances the entire value chain, from land acquisition, production inputs and 
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harvesting to transporting, processing and marketing of the products (AgriBank, 2011). 
Available information showed that the bank had an asset base of N$1.5 billion and a loan 
book totalling N$1.6 billion at the end of 2011 (AgriBank, 2011).  
 
Information on its corporate website showed that AgriBank had different funding products in 
place, including a loan guarantee fund (AgriBank, no date). The guarantee fund was initially 
only set up to guarantee co-operatives loans in order to have access to finance, but was 
redesigned later to include the small-scale farmers on the green scheme29 to facilitate their 
access to finance. The bank planned to develop a comprehensive agro financing scheme 
with the aim to develop products across the value chain with a special focus on small-scale 
farmers in the non-title deed areas (i.e. communal areas) where collateral is a challenge. 
The bank also serves as the delivery channel for government’s Affirmative Action Loan 
Scheme for the agriculture sector, under which loans are issued to previously disadvantaged 
farmers at special repayment provisions, with the aim of assisting them to become 
successful commercial farmer (FinMark Trust, 2011). 
 
Among the qualifying criteria for loans is that loans are granted against security of fixed 
property (mortgage bond) or any other acceptable form of security, such as fixed deposits 
investments and surrendering value of policies (FinMark Trust, 2011). As such, the bank’s 
outreach to the poor has been criticised by stating that what is acceptable as security are all 
the things that the poor do not possess, and therefore they do not qualify for loans. 
 
(c) The National Housing Enterprise  
 
The National Housing Enterprise (NHE) was established in 1993 by the National Housing 
Enterprise Act (Act No. 5 of 1993) with a mandate to finance housing and provide for the 
housing needs of Namibians, especially affordable housing for the low-income category of 
the population. In order to fulfil that mandate, NHE provides loans and develops low-cost 
housing for individuals in the low- and middle-income brackets. Loan sizes vary according to 
affordability, calculated at 25 per cent of household income plus housing subsidy, or at 20 
per cent in the case of prospective clients without a housing subsidy (FinMark Trust, 2011). 
NHE housing loans are capped at a maximum of N$550 000, with a loan repayment rate of 
prime minus 1 per cent over a repayment period of between 20 and 30 years (BoN, 2011b). 
The NHE further applies strict qualifying criteria similar to commercial banks (FinMark Trust, 
                                                          
29 The green scheme project of government involves the irrigation projects alongside the Kavango and Zambezi rivers in the 
Kavango and the Zambezi regions of the country, respectively. 
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2011), and which have at times made access difficult for the poor. Prospective clients are 
required to provide proof of income, such as a payslip and/or bank statement, while those 
who are self-employed are to provide audited financial and bank statements as well as a 10 
per cent deposit of the value of the house (FinMark Trust, 2011). 
 
Since its establishment until 2010, the NHE delivered over 8 000 houses, an average of just 
above 400 houses per year (BoN, 2011b).30 This is well below the required delivery of 1 200 
houses per year to achieve the country’s Vision 2030. There is therefore a huge backlog in 
the provision of houses in Namibia. Factors attributed to the NHE not delivering according to 
expectations are mainly of structural nature, including the lack of available serviced land and 
complex land development and registration procedures. Other identified factors include high 
real estate prices and housing finance costs relative to incomes, as well as an increase in 
the costs of building materials (BoN, 2011b). The BoN Annual Symposium of 2011 dedicated 
to issues relating to the housing sector revealed that these factors have created a wide 
affordability gap that hinders low- to middle-income housing provision. The housing backlog 
has led to government introducing a mass housing project launched by the country’s 
president in 2013, activities of which have since been ongoing in most of the regions of the 
country. 
 
(d) NAMPOST Savings Bank  
 
The corporate website of NAMPOST Holdings reveals that its subsidiary, the NAMPOST 
Savings Bank, was founded in 1992 when its holding company became a commercialised 
entity in that same year (NAMPOST, no date). The FinScope Namibia 2011 Survey revealed 
that NAMPOST Savings Bank has over 400 000 account holders. It offers relatively low fees 
and flexible account-opening requirements and has been expanding rapidly, opening on 
average 4 500 new accounts per month (FinMark Trust, 2011). It has been leveraging on the 
135 post offices of its mother company, through which it serves its clients (FinMark Trust, 
2011).  
 
In comparison with commercial banks, the 135 branch networks of NAMPOST compares to 
119 branches for Bank Windhoek, 126 branches for FNB, 82 branches for Standard Bank 
and 57 branches for Nedbank Namibia (FinMark Trust, 2011). Bank Windhoek and FNB 
have almost the same number of branches as NAMPOST, but their geographic focus is 
                                                          
30 The 2011 Annual Symposium of the BoN focused on issues related to housing in Namibia. 
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much narrower, with 36 and 49 banks respectively in the capital region, compared to 22 of 
NAMPOST (FinMark Trust, 2011). It can be deduced from the above that NAMPOST has 
been investing far more than commercial banks in reaching a broader set of customers. Of 
the 42 per cent expansion in total bank branches between 2007 and 2012, commercial bank 
networks only contributed 7 per cent, while the rest was attributed to NAMPOST’s branch 
expansion (FinMark Trust, 2011). 
 
In addition to offering savings accounts, NAMPOST Savings Bank also offers other services 
such as money transfers, account payments, telephone and municipal bill payments, 
payments for insurance and pension premiums, utility bills payments, salary and wage 
services and collection for selected loans (FinMark Trust, 2013). The fact that it can offer 
certain product such as tax-free interest rate savings products, which commercial banks are 
not able to offer, has been viewed by other market players as an advantageous position for 
the Savings Bank, and those have called for the need for a level playing field, arguing that 
the Savings Bank should also be regulated as a banking institution. While the Savings Bank 
is not involved in lending activities, it introduced micro loans in 2010 through its subsidiary, 
PostFin, which forms part of the microlending industry discussed later in this chapter under 
Section 2.3.2.7 and in Chapter 7 of this study.  
 
2.3.2.6 Conclusion on the structure of public finance institutions 
 
From the above outlined activities, it is clear that public finance institutions have made 
strides in their respective areas. While this is the case, financing challenges still remain, 
especially for SMEs in accessing credit, including small-scale farmers. Their less-than-
optimal delivery can be attributed to many factors, including the fact that their credit facilities 
are in certain instances subject to strict terms and conditions, as illustrated above, especially 
in the case of the NHE, and like commercial banks, their loans are also subject to collateral. 
Furthermore, all these institutions have a limited outreach, given their representations in only 
some of the administrative regions of the country. For example, at the time of writing this 
research, the DBN was only represented in three of the fourteen regions of the country, 
AgriBank in seven regions and the NHE in five regions. There is therefore a need to increase 
the geographical presence of these institutions so as to provide easier access to services by 
local people in the regions. 
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2.3.2.7 Microfinance institutions  
 
CGAP31 (2006: 1) defines microfinance as “financial services for the poor”, i.e. it views 
microfinance as the provision of financial services to low-income people and the poor. This 
definition essentially refers to enabling the poor to have access to financial services. CGAP 
(2006: 6) posits that:  
 
Access is not only about having a bank account, but also about the convenience of and 
safety of the account and whether the services are fairly priced, meets the needs of 
customers and are offered by a solid institution that will be around over a long haul to 
help its customers manage their financial lives.  
 
Inherent in this definition are elements relating to the availability of quality and safe financial 
services and products that are affordable to the poor, and that are offered by sustainable 
financial institutions. Although different authors may have defined microfinance in different 
ways, the elements highlighted above are evident in almost all of those definitions. Hence, 
this thesis took into account those important elements as it determined the structure of the 
microfinance sector of Namibia and assessed its status in the ensuing sections and 
chapters.  
 
Various types of institutions offer microfinance around the world. These include NGOs, 
cooperatives, credit unions, commercial banks and some government-owned institutions. 
Most of these types of MFIs have also been prevalent in Namibia, albeit in relatively small 
numbers, as will be evident from the information below. However, to be able to better 
understand the current status of the Namibian microfinance sector, one needs to have a 
background of its origin and how it has evolved. This section therefore first provides an 
overview of the emergence of microfinance activities in Namibia so as to pave a way for the 
analysis of its current status. The essence of doing this was to determine whether or not the 
same institutions or organisations were still in existence at the time of undertaking the 
research (which would give a sense of whether or not MFIs have been sustainable), whether 
or not there has been growth in the sector as well as whether or not there was a difference in 
type between the current and early-years microfinance activities and providers. 
 
                                                          
31 This is a member-based organisation, which brings together bilateral, multilateral and private donors as its members and is 
therefore a global resource centre for microfinance standards, operational tools, training and advisory services.  
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2.3.2.8 The evolution of microfinance activities in Namibia 
 
The emergence of microfinance activities in Namibia can be said to have been a result of the 
unavailability of financial services for the majority of the country’s population, especially 
those who were living in the underdeveloped rural areas and small towns, both before the 
country obtained its political independence in 1990 and just after independence. The 
commercial banks existing in the country at the time were only serving a small section of the 
population especially in terms of the provision of credit, as they were mostly dealing with the 
more affluent clients and businesses (Republic of Namibia, no date). The root cause of this 
situation was the discriminatory policies of the apartheid system in place at the time (i.e. 
prior to the country obtaining its political independence), which neglected certain groups of 
the population – a situation that resulted in a skewed distribution of the country’s income 
among its population, discussed earlier in the chapter, as well as pervasive poverty, 
especially in the informal sector. This situation begged to be salvaged, hence the birth of 
microfinance-related activities in the country.  
 
During the initial stages of microfinance-related activities in Namibia, which were mainly in 
the form of providing credit to micro entrepreneurs and small businesses, donors and NGOs 
were mostly the drivers of these activities, although other institutions such as public finance 
institutions32 and commercial banks also became involved. According to information from 
Tonin, Dieci, Ricoveri, Foresi and Hansohm (1998), donors, in conjunction with NGOs, 
started setting up various loan schemes in Namibia as far back as the 1980s, mainly aimed 
at financing developmental and welfare activities.  
 
Tonin et al. (1998) point to the following as having been some of the prominent donors and 
NGO-owned microfinance projects at the time: (1) Okutumbatumba Hawkers’ Association, 
established in 1989, which catered for street hawkers in Windhoek; (2) a Hanns Seidel 
Foundation-sponsored Institute of Management and Leadership Training, which initiated a 
Revolving Credit Fund in 1994 as a pilot scheme for credit provision to small enterprises in 
Namibia; (3) the Lisikamena, which used to operate in the Kavango region (in the 
northeastern part of the country) and used to provide credit through two loan schemes, 
namely the Individual Loan Scheme that started in 1994 and the Micro Loan Scheme 
implemented in 1996; (4) the Community Small Enterprise Development Agency established 
                                                          
32 Public finance institutions that were involved at the time are the Development Fund of Namibia (DFN), which was initially 
established before independence in 1987 as the Development Fund of South West Africa, and the Namibia Development 
Corporation (NDC), established in 1993.   
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in 1995,33 which, through a Savings and Credit Scheme (named Ngaturitunge Pamwe),34 
provided credit to micro and small businesses operating in Windhoek and its outskirts of 
Katutura; (5) the Adult Skills Development for Self-Employment set up by the Ministry of 
Basic Education and Culture in 1996 with the assistance of an Italian NGO, Comitato 
Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli, and the European Commission, and that intended 
“to link Namibia’s education system with efforts to create a favourable environment for job 
creation and self-employment in the country” (Tonin et al., 1998: 25); (6) Limbandungila, a 
credit scheme established in 1996 by a London-based NGO called Co-operation for 
Development, which targeted female entrepreneurs in the informal market of the Oshakati 
town in the northern part of Namibia; (7) the Lihepurura Kavango Trust, a five-year 
programme, with an end period of 1997, implemented by Oxfam Canada through the NGO 
Canada Namibia Cooperation (Canamco) in the Kavango region and which was aimed at 
“improving the quality of life of the rural poor in the region by providing the necessary 
assistance to increase agricultural production and build cottage industries and co-operatives 
in the region” (Tonin et al., 1998:30); (8) Koshi Yomuti,35 established in 2002 as a 
microfinance pilot project with the sponsorship of FIDES AG (Switzerland), the Namibian 
Department of Trade and Industry and GTZ (the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit) (now GIZ, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), 
and which used to operate only in the north central underserved regions of the country; and 
(9) a microfinance arm of Project Hope, a USAID-sponsored welfare-oriented NGO 
established in 2005 that focused on assisting women who took care of orphans and 
vulnerable children, with the objective of enabling them to participate in economic activities 
and improve their standard of living. 
 
From the above listed donor-sponsored and NGO-owned microfinance projects, it is clear 
that the activities were mainly location-bound, i.e. targeting to serve a specific group of a 
community (such as women) in a specific locality (mostly a town). Another notable aspect is 
the fact that the NGO schemes were more women-biased schemes, and this could suggest 
that women were considered more as welfare enhancers then men. In general, these 
schemes were characterised by low default rates, which could be ascribed to the normal risk 
mitigation strategies and strict control measures exerted by the respective donors that 
sponsored the schemes. 
 
                                                          
33 This was initially established in 1991 and operated under a different name as the National Job Creation Service. 
34 This is translated in English as ‘let’s develop ourselves together’ 
35 When translated in English this means ‘banking under the tree’.  
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In terms of government-owned institutions, the NDC, established in 1993 by statute (the 
Namibia Development Corporation Act, Act No. 18 of 1993) to replace the First National 
Development Corporation, which existed before the country obtained political independence, 
used to operate four schemes in the 1990s, namely the SME scheme that provided loans in 
the range of N$1 000 to N$200 000, a start-up scheme for loans of up to N$80 000, the 
Small Builders Bridging Fund and a Tenants’ Aid Fund (Tonin et al., 1998). According to 
Tonin et al. (1998), the loan fund for the SME scheme amounted to approximately N$5 
million, which made it the largest informal lender to the SME sector at the time. Further, the 
DFN, which was initially established before independence in 1987 as the Development Fund 
of South West Africa, had a loan portfolio of N$56 million. Its objectives had the overall 
essence of engaging in activities that would promote Namibia’s economic and social 
development through the allocation of finance to needy entrepreneurs, financing defined 
projects to ensure the fund’s sustainability, providing technical assistance and training in 
development-related activities and assisting with the implementation of approved projects. 
The fund operated an SME lending scheme in conjunction with commercial banks (Bank 
Windhoek, FNB and the then Commercial Bank of Namibia) in terms of the disbursements 
and collection of loans, while the fund itself assessed applications and made allocation 
decisions (Tonin et al., 1998). The scheme, which also had a bias for women (i.e. 85 per 
cent of the disbursed loans went to women), ceased operating and its capital went to 
establish the DBN in 1994, an institution that has also continued to play a role in the SME 
sector, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2.  
 
The 1990s also saw the involvement of some commercial banks in the provision of 
microfinance-related loans in Namibia. They either operated jointly with some of the NGOs 
and/or public finance institutions, as is evident from the above discussion, or developed their 
own products to enter the market. In terms of own initiated activities, the FNB launched a 
scheme in 1993, operated jointly with the Northern Namibia Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia and the Finnish International 
Development Agency, but it terminated the scheme in 1998 due to a very high default rate 
(Tonin et al., 1998). The bank later began to actively develop its own SME financing 
products and has since been one of the active players in SME financing.  
 
Standard Bank of Namibia also started a SME pilot scheme in 1996, which targeted sectors 
such as manufacturing enterprises, carpentry, small take-away shops, mobile shops and 
bakeries (Tonin et al., 1998). In 2012, the bank also launched an SME financing product 
called SME quick loans to increase its participation in that sphere (Diza, 2013). The then 
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Commercial Bank of Namibia participated in credit schemes for SMEs funded by 
international donors and the government of the Republic of Namibia, as mentioned earlier, 
while NedBank Namibia’s participation in the microfinance sector was through the 
acquisition of a microlender called the Finance in Education Pty Ltd in 2002 and another 
scheme called NedLoan, which was deregistered later (Tonin et al., 1998). Bank Windhoek 
entered into partnership with the now defunct Small Business Credit Guarantee Scheme of 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which was set up in 1999 to provide financial assistance 
to new and existing entrepreneurs that lacked collateral for accessing credit (Tonin et al., 
1998). The bank actually became the pioneer in setting up an independent SME branch 
later, which was still in existence at the time conducting this study.   
 
In summary, what is noteworthy from the above discussion on early-day microfinance 
activities in Namibia is the fact that most of the schemes were donor-sponsored NGO MFIs 
that ceased to operate after donors pulled out. This gives a hint that they were donor-
dependent and not sustainable schemes. Further, most of those schemes were jointly 
operated by NGOs and commercial banks and/or parastatals and commercial banks. While 
such cooperation also took place in the country at the time of this study, it was on a much 
reduced scale, as will be evident in later discussions. This could be because most 
commercial banks have in recent years also entered the microlending business by either 
establishing separate microlending branches/institutions or creating units within their banks 
that are dedicated to offering credit to SMEs. It is the view of the researcher that the early-
day schemes laid the foundation and raised awareness with regard to the need, approach 
and methods regarding microlending or microfinancing, and this example may have 
culminated into the creation of the schemes prevailing in the country.     
 
2.3.2.9 The current setup and status of the Namibian microfinance sector   
 
The current microfinance sector in Namibia can be categorised into deposit-taking (or 
savings-mobilising) and non-deposit-taking (or credit-only) MFIs. The structure consists of 
one deposit-taking microfinance bank, some smaller savings-mobilising MFIs (NGO-based 
MFIs), savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and savings and credit associations 
(SCAs),36 some public finance institutions that provide financial services to SMEs, as 
                                                          
36 SACCOs are associations where members put their savings together into a common pool of money, which is then used to 
provide loans to the members. SCAs do the same, except that they are normally smaller than SACCOs, mostly operating at 
grassroots, village level. Allocation of benefits to members is often on a rotation basis, and are then referred to as ROSCAS, 
(rotating savings and credit association) (Besley, Coate & Loury, 1990). 
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discussed under the public finance institutions section above, and non-deposit-taking MFIs. 
The non-deposit-taking MFIs mainly comprise of legally regulated and supervised 
microlenders (classified by the Regulator into pay-day lenders and term lenders) that include 
subsidiaries of commercial banks. 
 
While a full account of the operations of each of the above-mentioned categories is provided 
in Chapter 5 of this study, which is dedicated to appraising the current microfinance 
landscape of Namibia, suffice it to summarise here that the industry is, as sketched above, 
relatively small and undeveloped when compared to what happens in other countries around 
the globe, especially in Asia, but also even in sub-Saharan Africa. As stated above, a full 
account of the existing MFIs and activities are discussed in Chapter 5.  
  
2.3.2.10 Financial sector regulators and supervisors 
 
The Namibian financial sector regulatory system consists of the BoN, i.e. the central bank of 
the country, established in 1997 by the Bank of Namibia Act, Act No. 15 of 1997, which 
regulates the banking sector, and the Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority 
(NAMFISA), established by the Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority Act, Act 
No. 3 of 2001, which regulates the non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs). To fulfil their 
regulatory mandate, both the BoN and NAMFISA perform on-site and off-site supervisory 
activities, aimed at ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements. Worth mentioning is 
the observed close cooperation between the two regulators in that they undertake joint on-
site supervision at times on matters of mutual concern, while preserving their separate 
mandates. The researcher considers this as a positive aspect, especially given the fact that 
there exists cross-shareholding between banks and non-banking institutions that requires 
consolidated supervision. A detailed account of the state of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework is part of the subject matter of Chapter 6 of this study. It is however important to 
mention at this stage that the financial sector regulatory environment has been considered to 
be generally conducive for business (IMF, 2006).   
 
In the case of other financial institutions that are not regulated by neither the BoN nor 
NAMFISA, such as the public finance institutions listed under Section 2.3.2.5 above and the 
SACCOs, they are governed by their respective establishing acts and/or are supervised by 
the line ministries under whose custody they have been placed. NGO-owned MFIs are also 
monitored and supervised by the relevant ministries, depending on the nature of their 
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activities, while they in addition do some reporting to other authorities (such as the central 
bank) as may be required, on matters such as those related to external funds inflow. 
 
2.4 THE PERFORMANCE OF NAMIBIA’S FINANCIAL SECTOR 
 
As indicated earlier under this chapter, the Namibian financial sector is considered as 
relatively developed, especially when measured against those of most other sub-Saharan 
African countries, excluding South Africa. There is a good and efficient financial services 
infrastructure as revealed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through the Namibia 
Financial System Stability Assessment in 2006. Following below is an assessment of the 
sector’s performance and its implications for the economy.  
 
2.4.1 Financial sector performance  
 
This latest assessment of the country’s financial system stability by the IMF concluded that 
the banking sector is mature, very profitable and well capitalised (IMF, 2007). Presented in 
Figure 2.13 below are the return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and the net 
interest margin (NIM) for commercial banks in Namibia during the past decade (2004–2013). 
On average for the past ten years, the ROA and ROE have been approximately 2 per cent 
and 21 per cent respectively, while the NIM has been approximately 4 per cent (Figure 2.13). 
These ratios compare well with those for other southern African countries, especially those 
with which the country shares membership in the regional trading and monetary area blocks 
such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA). For example, a comparison of Namibia’s bank performance ratios to countries such 
as Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland for the year 2011 shows a competitive 
situation for Namibia, although they have been outperformed by Botswana and Lesotho in 
respect of ROE and by Lesotho in respect of NIM (Table 2.2)37. The ratios are also 
favourable when compared to the sub-Saharan region averages of 1.9 per cent (ROA) and 
16.3 per cent (ROE). Important to mention, though, is the fact that these high ratios, 
especially the NIM, could be a reflection of the high concentration in the banking industry 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
                                                          
37 The ratios are from the 2013 World Bank Financial Development and Structure Database (World Bank, 2013a) 
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Figure 2.13: The performance of the Namibian banking sector (per cent) 
Source: BoN annual reports for 2009–2013 
 
Table 2.2: Comparison of Namibian bank performance to selected countries, 2011 
(per cent) 
  
ROA   
(%) 
ROE  
 (%) 
 
NIM 
(%) 
Botswana 3.2 39.9 5.8 
Lesotho 2.7 29.6 6.3 
Namibia 3.3 23.5 6.1 
South Africa 1.1 15.8 2.8 
Swaziland 2.8 17.8 5.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.9 16.3 7.1 
 
Source: World Bank (2013a) 
 
Another important indicator of the performance of the financial system is its depth. 
Ahokpossi, Ismail, Karmakar and Mesmin Koulet-Vickot (2013) indicate the importance of 
deeper financial systems with wider access to credit for the promotion and support of 
entrepreneurship, social mobility and broad-based economic growth. The level of financial 
depth is therefore an important measure of the extent to which the financial system is able to 
broadly and efficiently supply financial services. Measured in terms of the ratio of private 
sector credit to GDP, the depth of the Namibian financial system, as shown in Table 2.3, 
increased to an average of 48.8 per cent during the last five years of the last decade 
compared to an average of 48.1 per cent during the first five years of the last decade. The 
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average ratio for the past ten years was therefore 48.4 per cent. Noticeable from the table 
below is the declined ratio in the year 2008 (that actually started in 2007), which is reflective 
of the impact of the global financial crisis that was prevailing during that period. Overall, 
however, the ratio compares well with other countries in the region, e.g. the ratio for sub-
Saharan Africa stands at 38.7 per cent.    
 
A comparison to some countries in the sub-region,38 such as those in SACU and the CMA, 
yield the same results. Namibia’s financial depth compares well with that of Botswana (23.7 
per cent), Swaziland (22.5 per cent) and Lesotho (10.9 per cent), although it is way below 
that of South Africa (150.7 per cent), which is the biggest economy in the sub-region. A 
similar picture is painted when financial depth is measured in terms of the ratio of broad 
money supply (M2) to GDP. However, much still needs to happen in the country if it is to 
reach the levels of developed economies, to which it aspires in its Vision 2030. For example, 
the ratio of private sector credit to GDP averages at 100.1 per cent for East Asia and 103 per 
cent in the developed economies (IMF, 2013b). 
 
Table 2.3: The financial depth of Namibia 
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Private 
sector 
credit as % 
of GDP  47.4 49.4 48.5 47.8 47.2 49.3 49.5 49.0 47.2 48.8 48.4 
M2 as % of 
GDP39 37.1 37.6 41.7 39.8 41.7 65.9 64.4 64.9 55.6 56.8 50.6 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations from BoN data40 and IMF (2013b)  
 
The importance of the financial depth of a country has been emphasised in literature. The 
IMF World Financial Development Report (IMF, 2013) confirms that financial depth has a 
strong statistical link to long-term economic growth and poverty reduction. Beck, Levine and 
                                                          
38 The ratios for these countries have been derived from the 2013 Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank. 
39 Financial depth can also be estimated by expressing broad money supply as a ratio of GDP. The results for Namibia using 
this measure also compare well to other countries in the region.  
40 Data on money supply (M2) and GDP were obtained from the administrative records of the Statistics Division of BoN through 
an email from the responsible official of the Division, Mr Abiatar Andreas on 15 April 2014 [Available e-mail: 
abiatar.andreas@bon.com.na].  
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Loayza (2000) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007), as cited by Beck (2006), posit 
that countries with higher ratios of private sector credit to GDP experience higher GDP per 
capita growth and faster rates of reduction in the headcount and the share of population 
living on less than a dollar a day, i.e. they experience a faster rate in the reduction of 
poverty.   
 
2.4.2 Contribution of the financial sector to the economy 
 
Measured by the share of financial intermediation to GDP, the Namibian financial sector 
currently accounts for 3.5 per cent of total output. In terms of employment creation, the 
Namibia 2012 Labour Force Survey showed that the sector was only able to employ 
approximately 2 per cent of the total labour force of the country, as shown earlier in Figure 
2.2. The country’s Vision 2030 expects the contribution of the financial sector to the 
economy to be approximately 6 per cent on average in order to meet the requirements of the 
country.   
 
On an industry level, the pace of growth in commercial bank lending to the private sector has 
slowed to 14 per cent in 2013 from 18.4 per cent registered ten years ago (see Figure 2.14 
below). In relation to the GDP, credit to the private sector increased from 47.4 per cent in 
2004 to 48.8 per cent in 2013 – an average of 48.4 per cent over the period 2004–2013. 
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Figure 2.14: Annual growth in credit to private sector (2004–2013) 
Source: Statistics Division of the BoN41  
 
 
The above situation is not desirable, especially when considering the sector’s capacity. 
Commercial banks’ ability to lend, as measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, 
has been 12.4 per cent on average over the last decade (2004–2013) and an average of 
approximately 15 per cent for the period 2009–2013. A comparison of these ratios to some 
selected countries reveals those for Namibia to have been comparable to, for example, that 
of the biggest economy in the southern African region, South Africa, which stands at 
approximately 16 per cent for the period 2009–2013. In addition, Namibia’s ratio is higher 
than those of other countries in regions such as Asia, such as Malaysia, an economy that 
                                                          
41 Data on money supply (M2) were obtained from the administrative records of the Statistics Division of BoN through an email 
from the responsible official of the Division, Mr Abiatar Andreas on 15 April 2014 [Available e-mail: 
abiatar.andreas@bon.com.na]. 
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has made significant strides in the provision of access to finance,42 which registered a ratio 
of approximately 12 per cent during 2006–2011. The above indicates massive lending 
capacity for Namibia, which has not been utilised fully. For instance, previously 
disadvantaged low-income people and SMEs have remained insufficiently served as access 
to financial services has been limited in Namibia, as will be evidenced by the discussions in 
Section 2.4.3.  
 
The non-alignment of the lending capacity of the system with the actual lending that has 
taken place in the country could have led to the observed massive capital outflows 
discussed earlier in this study, as the banks found themselves with access funds at their 
disposal, and this created a financing gap locally in terms of access to finance. This could be 
an indication of some weaknesses and/or inefficiencies in the financial system, given that 
literature portrays evidence of the relationship between a sound financial intermediation 
process and efficiency in the banking system (e.g. Horward & Haynes, 2001; Kenny & Moss, 
1998; Vittas, 1991 as cited by Aikaeli, 2008). It therefore becomes important to look at the 
efficiency level of Namibian commercial banks and other relevant aspects that might explain 
the prevailing situation. Measuring bank efficiency gives an indication of whether or not 
unnecessary costs are being made in bringing products to the market (Bikker, 2010). 
Falkena et al. (2004: 38) cited by Ncube (2009) explain, “if a few players dominate the 
market, they may be sheltered from competitive forces and may use rule‐of‐thumb rather 
than best practice methods”.  
 
Information from the BoN indicates bank cost-efficiency ratios for the period 2009–2013 to 
have ranged above the international benchmark of 50 per cent, as depicted in Figure 2.15 
below. In fact, for 2013 and 2012, the cost-efficiency ratio of the banking industry was 55.7 
per cent and 56.6 per cent, respectively (BoN, 2013a). Given the fact that a lower ratio (of 50 
per cent) is preferred (i.e. the lower the ratio, the better), it can be deduced that commercial 
banks in Namibia have been operating inefficiently. This inefficiency could be a result of the 
dominance of the industry by the four main banks43 and therefore the lack of competition44 
that was alluded to earlier in Section 2.3.2.1 of this chapter. 
  
                                                          
42 Malaysia was ranked number one in the world for three consecutive years (2009–2011) in the area of ‘getting credit’ in the 
World Bank Doing Business reports for the period 2009–2011. 
43 The four major commercial banks (FNB Namibia, Standard Bank of Namibia, Bank Windhoek and NedBank Namibia) 
dominate the banking industry. 
44 According to the September 2013 Financial Stability Report of the BoN, the four banks accounts for almost 100 per cent of 
the total assets and deposits. 
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Figure 2.15: Bank cost-efficiency ratio in Namibia (per cent) 
Source: BoN (2013a)  
 
Another weakness identified in the Namibian financial system, which has rendered its 
intermediation role ineffective, is the insufficient financial instruments currently available to 
serve the market. In their Country Strategy Paper for 2014–2018, the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) identified a lack of appropriate and innovative finance products (such as 
microfinance) and instruments as among the key factors limiting access to finance in 
Namibia (AfDB, 2014). This finding is in line with the call by the NFSS 2011–2021 to the 
financial sector to devise more innovative products to meet the different needs of the 
country. Product offering by the current banking system in Namibia has been insufficient, as 
commercial banks had for a long time broadly engaged a similar business of offering 
commercial banking services. Products such as deposits, transmission services and loans 
and advances have been on offer to businesses and corporates, the private sector and 
standard retail customers from households (mainly those in regular employment or who have 
a steady income). It is however worth noting that in recent years, the regulating authority has 
introduced changes to the banking law to encourage the opening of diversified banking 
models. 
 
A further identified weakness relates to the cost of financial services in the country, as 
evidenced by the findings of the FinScope Namibia surveys of 2007 and 2011 and the study 
on user fees and charges for financial services in Namibia and their effect on the access of 
the poor and the MSME to those services, which was commissioned by the Ministry of 
Finance in 2010 and undertaken by Feasibility (Pty) Ltd. It is also evidenced by the spread 
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between the lending and deposit rate, which has been evidently very wide over the period 
2004-2013, as shown in Figure 2.16 below.  
 
 
Figure 2.16: Interest rate spread of the Namibian banking industry (per cent) 
Source: Statistics Division of the BoN45 
 
Both the FinScope surveys and the study on user fees and charges by Feasibility cited 
above regard the high cost of financial services as among the key contributors to financial 
exclusion46 in the country. To illustrate this fact, Feasibility (2010) used an analysis based on 
the nominal cost and income of an individual earning N$3 500 and another earning N$1 750 
to determine the affordability of financial services in terms of share of income. They 
considered this to be a more useful benchmark than just the nominal price. Their findings 
pointed to the fact that in Namibia, the cheapest, simplest offerings for transaction bank 
accounts ranged between 0.5 per cent and 3 per cent of the gross monthly income of an 
individual earning N$3 500 and between 0.9 per cent and 6 per cent of one earning 
N$1 750. Based on past studies that suggested a benchmark of a 1 per cent or 2 per cent 
share of income as an indicator of an acceptable cost of a basic transaction account and by 
applying the 2 per cent rule, the study concluded that those Namibians with an income of 
N$3 500 were theoretically served with the current offerings if the profile of account usage 
reflected their transactions needs.  
                                                          
45 Data on money supply (M2) were obtained from the administrative records of the Statistics Division of BoN through an email 
from the responsible official of the Division, Mr Abiatar Andreas on 15 April 2014 [Available e-mail: 
abiatar.andreas@bon.com.na]. 
46 The FinScope Namibia 2011 Survey has estimated the exclusion rate at 31 per cent, a reduction from 51.7 per cent 
estimated in 2007, but viewed by the NFSS as still high, and expects it to reduce further to 26 per cent by 2021 (Republic of 
Namibia, no date).  
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The study however found that there is far lower access for those earning N$1 750 or less, 
i.e. it is not affordable for that category of people (Feasibility, 2010). This implies that the 
majority of the population who are poor and low-income earners cannot afford financial 
services in Namibia. This situation has led to the country embarking on a banking fees and 
charges reduction programme, which has been implemented under the framework of the 
National Payments System Vision (NPSV) 2015 driven by the BoN. This process has seen 
the introduction of a basic bank account (BBA) by all commercial banks as well as an 
elimination of cash deposit fees, which have been identified as among the constraints to 
financial inclusion in the country, for low-income people with earnings of N$2 000 per month 
and small businesses with a turnover of N$1 million or less per year (BoN, 2013a).  
 
In the case of the non-banking sector, although its performance has been generally 
satisfactory, the main weakness nonetheless relates to the fact that the capital market is 
underdeveloped. The stock market is characterised by low liquidity due to a lack of trading. 
There is also a lack of instruments in the market. Available instruments include shares listed 
and traded on the stock exchange, listed government stock and bills, debentures and bonds 
issued by state-owned enterprises (Republic of Namibia, no date). These have been viewed 
as insufficient, and the sector has been called to devise more innovative products to meet 
the different needs of the country, including those of SMEs. The insufficient availability of 
financial instruments referred to earlier has caused investors to adopt a ‘buy-and-hold’ 
strategy, resulting in an underdeveloped secondary market for bonds (Republic of Namibia, 
no date). In actual fact, the NFSS indicates that almost no trading takes place in this market. 
There is consequently a need for a critical mass of stock issues and trade to create an 
efficient and liquid stock exchange. In this regard, the NFSS is advocating for the 
encouragement of state-owned enterprises to issue more bonds and enticing more 
companies to list on the stock exchange. 
 
2.4.3 The state of access to financial services in Namibia 
 
From the finance-growth nexus it is clear that finance is important for growth. It follows 
therefore that access to financial services is important. A savings account provided to 
individuals will enable accumulation of funds in a secure place over time, access to credit 
enables them to borrow funds and strengthen their productive assets, access to 
mechanisms that facilitate transactions such as electronic transfers of regular remittances 
can reduce risks for households, while access to insurance can also minimise the negative 
impacts of shocks on future income (Ellis, Lemma & Rud, 2010). Further, access to credit is 
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important for firms to finance their working capital and investment (CAF, 2011). As such, 
access to financial services is a key factor in economic development and social welfare 
(CAF, 2011). It is for these reasons that improving access to financial services has become 
an important policy objective, especially in the developing world (Ghalib & Hailu, 2008). 
 
In Namibia, access to financial services has remained limited, especially for previously 
disadvantaged low-income people and SMEs, as mentioned earlier. The high cost of 
services mentioned earlier, coupled with the limited outreach of commercial banks, as 
illustrated under Section 2.4.4, has left certain areas (especially the rural areas) of the 
country unserved. Figure 2.17 depicts the latest survey results on access to banking 
services in Namibia. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Access to financial services: Banked and unbanked population 
Source: FinMark Trust (2011) 
 
The above figure shows that while 62 per cent of the Namibian economically active 
population is banked, approximately 35 per cent47 is not served by banks. This is however a 
reduction from 51 per cent registered in the previous FinScope Survey of 2007. While this is 
clearly an improvement in the banked population between 2007 and 2011, it is important to 
note that access to finance in Namibia does not necessarily represent credit usage, but 
mainly deposits (FinMark Trust, 2011). For instance, the results indicate that 64 per cent of 
                                                          
47 The FinScope Namibia 2011 Survey has defined this to include those that are informally served. 
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the population has access to a formal savings account and the survey attributes this to 
significant outreach efforts by the Namibian postal service, NAMPOST, through the 
introduction of its smart card48 during that period.  
 
The survey found only 13 per cent of the population having had access to a formal loan, 
while informal sources (including family and friends and informal institutions) were found to 
be the main source of borrowing for 19 per cent of Namibians. The remaining 68 per cent did 
not have access to any form of borrowing whatsoever (FinMark Trust, 2011). A similar 
situation is revealed with regard to insurance products and services, in that 64 per cent of 
Namibians were found not to have used any insurance product or services before, hence 
non-coverage of their risk. This is not an ideal situation, as access to savings and credit as 
well as non-credit services is important for an effective financial inclusion process.  
 
The survey further found the unserved to be mainly those residing in the rural areas, typically 
the low-income people and the poor. Figure 2.18 shows that 76 per cent of the urban 
population in Namibia is banked, compared to 51 per cent of the rural population. In terms of 
the unbanked population, 45 per cent49 of the rural population is unbanked, compared to 33 
per cent in the urban area. 
 
 
Figure 2.18: Access to financial services: Urban and rural banked and unbanked 
Source: FinMark Trust (2011) 
                                                          
48 This is a savings card introduced by Nampost in 2010/2011, through which even pensioners have been receiving their 
monthly pensions. 
49 This includes the informally served. 
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The above shows the disparity levels at which the Namibian banking sector serves the 
different income groups and different parts of the country, i.e. those in urban areas get 
served better (receive better coverage) than the low-income people of the rural areas. 
 
Namibian small businesses have also remained insufficiently served, despite their identified 
importance to the economy.50 A 2012 study of registered SMEs, commissioned by Business 
Finance Solutions and carried out by the IPPR to assess the market demand for private 
equity and venture capital among SMEs in Namibia, found business owners having 
perceived access to finance as a serious constraint to grow their companies and that the 
cost of finance is particularly high. It further revealed that only approximately 36 per cent of 
respondents had used bank loans as starting capital while approximately 76 per cent had 
used own savings and the remainder used borrowings from family and friends (BFS, 2012). 
The 2014 IMF Financial Access Survey also uncovered a similar situation, namely that in 
Namibia both outstanding commercial bank loans to SMEs and outstanding SME deposits 
with commercial banks amount to only approximately 1 per cent of GDP (IMF, 2014). This is 
a persistent situation considering that in 2010 the annual symposium of the BoN, which 
focused on SME development, reported the share of formal and informal businesses that 
had not been able to access finance from the financial sector during 2008/9 to have been 
very high at above 50 per cent (see Figure 2.19).  
 
The symposium also revealed at the time that the informal businesses who managed to 
access finance sourced it mainly from friends and relatives, as is evident from Figure 2.19. In 
fact, the symposium concluded that a lack of access to finance was the key constraint that 
had hampered the development of the Namibian SME sector. Other key challenges 
highlighted were access to land and the cost of utilities.  
 
 
                                                          
50 The importance of the SME sector to an economy is a generally accepted notion, as it has been proven empirically. In 
Namibia, the contribution of SMEs to the GDP is estimated at between 10 and 20 per cent. Although there is no official estimate 
of the contribution of SMEs to the GDP in Namibia, various reports have made references in that range. 
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Figure 2.19: Formal and informal businesses accessing finance during 2008/9 (per 
cent) 
Source: Adapted from BoN (2010b) 
 
The low access to financial services by Namibians has been ascribed to a lack of collateral 
and limited effective demand for financial services due to low incomes as a result of high 
poverty (28.7 per cent) and unemployment (27.4 per cent) (AfDB, 2014; FinMark Trust, 
2011). Moreover, the collateral requirements by banks for lending has limited the 
participation of previously disadvantaged people and SMEs in the system, given the lack of 
assets to pledge to the banks for loans. Furthermore, the country’s land tenure system, in 
terms of which all communal land belongs to government, has not made it easy for 
inhabitants who hold leaseholds, as trading of land is not allowed and therefore land or 
properties built on it cannot be pledged as security.51 These challenges have caused high 
expectations by the Namibian public for the recently established SME Bank to play a 
meaningful role in financing SMEs. This however remains to be seen once the bank has fully 
operated in that space. The researcher is of the view that the outcome might not fully align to 
expectations in the end, given that this bank, which is considered a specialised SME Bank, 
is licensed as a full commercial bank, just like all other existing commercial banks, and its 
focus is not entirely on the SME sector. Given this status, and the competition it presents, 
the bank might find itself operating based on the same principles as conventional 
                                                          
51 The 2012 annual symposium of the BoN, which focused on the theme of unlocking the economic potential of communal land, 
found the tenure security or its absence in rural areas to have been a major constraint to accessing finance from banks. 
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commercial banks without necessarily granting special treatment to SMEs. There is also a 
possibility of the bank being lured into financing more large-scale businesses rather than 
small businesses and avoiding financing a large number of SMEs that are generally viewed 
as inherently risky. This situation is not ideal, as it constrains the capacity of the SME sector 
to make a meaningful contribution to the economy. As Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) 
posit, countries that provide a supporting, enabling environment, including easier access to 
finance, are the ones that experience entry and growth of small firms. SMEs have the 
potential to contribute to the GDP and growth and significantly expand the well-being among 
Namibia’s low-income communities.  
 
Further, in the context of Namibia’s insufficient economic growth (averaging below 5 per 
cent) and prevailing high unemployment (Republic of Namibia, 2012), SMEs become 
particularly important as a source of employment and a strategic avenue to increase 
domestic economic activity and enhance economic growth. There is therefore a need for 
Namibia to engage deliberate efforts geared towards the support of its SME sector with the 
aim of overcoming the barriers to finance for entrepreneurs. 
 
2.4.4 Commercial banks’ coverage and outreach 
 
When looking at bank branch coverage, a similar situation is revealed, i.e. branch coverage 
is in favour of urban areas. By the end of 2013, the total number of bank branches and 
agencies in the country stood at 178, a remarkable increase from only 85 at the beginning of 
2004 (BoN, 2009; 2013a). This shows the continued relevance of brick-and-mortar branch 
banking in Namibia and may imply that Namibia has experienced an increased presence of 
commercial banks in its regions. The bulk of these branches are however in cities and 
towns, i.e. the distribution is highly skewed in favour of urban areas, as represented by the 
blue circles in Figure 2.20 below. This could actually explain the FinScope Namibia 2011 
Survey finding of a higher rate of access to finance in urban areas relative to rural areas 
discussed earlier.  
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Figure 2.20: Traditional brick-and-mortar banking coverage 
Source: Adapted from a BAN (2011)52 
 
Table 2.4 below shows a comparison between Namibia and selected countries of the 
southern African sub-region (specifically other SACU53 member countries) in terms of the 
                                                          
52 This was presented at the Financial Inclusion Advisers Programme for Namibia, a workshop held on 21–22 February 2011 in 
Windhoek and co-hosted by the BoN and Bank Negara Malaysia, under the theme “Coordinated policy making towards 
financial inclusion in Namibia”. Although the data are for 2011, no substantial difference with the current situation is expected, 
especially no significant shift between urban and rural coverage.    
53 SACU is a customs union made of five countries, namely South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. 
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outreach of commercial banks through bank branches and other payment infrastructure or 
facilities, such as automated teller machines (ATMs), during 2013.54 It is clear from the 
table55 that there are areas where Namibian banks are underperforming in their outreach to 
potential depositors, consumer loan clients and SME loan clients. For example, Namibia and 
Botswana boast the smallest ratio of bank branches per 1 000 square kilometres and the 
second-smallest ratio (to Botswana) in terms of ATMs per 1 000 square kilometres. 
However, Namibia has the highest ratio when it comes to bank branches per 100 000 adults 
and second-highest to South Africa in terms of ATMs per 100 000 adults. Although not 
depicted in the table, available data also reveal that Namibia’s ratios of loan accounts per 
1 000 adults lags behind those of Botswana and South Africa.  
 
Table 2.4: Outreach of commercial bank branches relative to population 
 
  Namibia Swaziland  Lesotho 
South 
Africa  Botswana 
Commercial bank 
branches per 1 000 km2 0.22 2.73 1.58 3.07 0.22 
Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 
adults 12.70 6.16 3.70 10.34 9.34 
ATMs per 1 000 km2 0.92 11.16 4.71 18.40 0.69 
ATMs per 100 000 adults  52.63 25.18 11.02 61.88 29.38 
      
 
Source: IMF (2013a) 
 
The situation in terms of inadequate banking coverage has largely remained the same to 
that prevailing ten years before this research was undertaken. A study on the viability of 
commercial bank branches conducted by the BoN in 2004 found that Namibia had the 
second-best banking density ratio (number of people to a bank) in the SADC region, though 
this could have been mainly because of a very small population of just over two million 
people. It found that its ratio of 456 704 people per bank was second only to Botswana’s 
ratio of 322 000 people per bank. It however found that the country’s people to bank branch 
ratio of 20 074 people per branch was the lowest banking density ratio in the sub-region 
(BoN, 2004b).  
                                                          
54 Data for Swaziland are for 2012, as the latest figures were not available. 
55 Data used in this paragraph are from the IMF 2013 Financial Access Survey. 
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A number of reasons were found by that study to have played a role in commercial banks 
deciding to set up a bank branch in a specific area. These include whether there are 
prospects for profitability, whether or not there is competition, the availability of physical 
infrastructure and buildings, the presence of security, the presence of trained staff and the 
potential transaction volumes. The study concluded that many of the above-listed aspects 
were either absent or available only at a high cost in rural areas, causing the reluctance on 
the side of commercial banks to engage rural areas.  
 
While in recent years innovative initiatives relating to offering branchless banking products 
and services have emerged globally, which is an ideal trend that can enhance the outreach 
by financial institutions, this is still in its infancy in Namibia. The BoN gazetted regulations on 
e-money in 2012 to both promote and facilitate these types of services and products and 
ensure that users of these services are protected at the same time. At the time of writing this 
research, there were four licensed e-money issuers in the country: one commercial bank 
(FNB Namibia) and three non-banking institutions (NAMMIC, MobiPay and NAMPOST 
Savings Bank). This development is positive, as one of the many weaknesses identified in 
the financial system, which has rendered its intermediation role ineffective, is the insufficient 
financial instruments currently available to serve the market (Republic of Namibia, no date).  
 
As new innovative ways of delivering banking services such as e-money products, online 
banking facilities and cellphone banking increase in the country, the need for bank branches 
might reduce going forward. The country has good telecommunication infrastructure, which 
could facilitate such innovative products and services. In fact, some commercial banks in 
Namibia have already begun to invest in electronic banking channels, while there has also 
been an entrance of an e-bank, referred to earlier in this thesis.  
 
The above are all good developments in the country and are steps in the right direction. 
However, given the risk averseness and profit maximisation aim of commercial banks, the 
lack of access to finance of the poor, low-income people and SMEs will take time before it 
changes. Further, the extent at which these initiatives will contribute to financial 
intermediation remains to be observed. As such, the country may need to continue devising 
strategies aimed at finding a solution for SME financing. 
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2.4.5 Conclusion on the performance of the financial sector 
 
From the above, it is clear that the performance of the Namibian financial sector has not 
been optimal, both in terms of its intermediation role and therefore its contribution to 
economic growth and in terms of serving those at the bottom of the societal pyramid and 
SMEs. Overall, while the banking sector has evolved over the years, the presence of the 
unserved and underserved sections of the population has persisted. This will require a 
complete paradigm shift, given the usual profit maximisation motive of commercial banks 
and the profiles of those that are not currently served. There is therefore a gap in the 
financial system, evidenced by the limited bank branch coverage, products and services 
offered by commercial banks, and which has translated into limited outreach.   
 
The same condition applies to the non-banking sector, i.e. not only is the capital market 
underdeveloped and financial instruments limited, but low-income earners’ insurance needs 
have also not been met. Filling this existing gap in the financial system requires the 
emergence and/or entrance of other types of financial institutions with different motives and 
agendas and different financing approaches that are geared to serving those groups and 
segments of the population, such as the MFIs. This will set the sector on a path that would 
ensure it plays its expected role in the economy. 
 
2.5 SOME CURRENT INITIATIVES AIMED AT BUILDING A SOLID, RESPONSIVE 
AND INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
The importance of building a solid and responsive financial system cannot be 
overemphasised, not only because of the increasingly globalised world that comes with 
wider market interactions, but also because of the complexity of local markets as they 
evolve. Threats of the global marketplace have become real, as witnessed by the recent 
financial crisis of 2010, which affected many countries. It is therefore vital for financial 
sectors around the globe to prepare and ensure that they remain effective and responsive to 
the challenges posed by this globalised and liberalised environment (Schmukler, 2004). 
Although the recent financial sector crisis only exerted minimal effects on the Namibian 
economy (mainly because of limited exposure56 to global financial markets), the vulnerability 
that comes with increasingly globalised financial systems of the world requires the country to 
build a solid and resilient system that is ready to withstand crises, should they occur.  
                                                          
56 The control exchange restrictions imposed on Namibia due to CMA membership limit exposure to global financial markets. 
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Moreover, the Namibian financial sector is less optimal given the existence of weaknesses 
identified earlier in this study, including its inability to serve certain segments of the 
population, such as low-income people, SMEs and the poor. The financial system has 
therefore not been fully responsive to the needs of the domestic economy. The study came 
across some ongoing initiatives being implemented by the country aimed at addressing the 
identified weaknesses and building a solid and responsive financial system. The notable 
ones that are relevant to this study are discussed below. 
  
2.5.1 Developing the Namibia Financial Sector Strategy 2011–2021  
 
A review of the financial system in 2008/09 revealed structural weaknesses in the financial 
system as the reason for the sector’s ineffectiveness in addressing the financial needs of the 
economy. This led to the development of the NFSS 2011–2021. Launched in 2012 by the 
Minister of Finance, the ten-year strategy is a roadmap for the development of the Namibian 
financial sector and aims to address the weaknesses identified by the review so as to enable 
the financial sector to play a meaningful role in the development process of the country’s 
economy.  
 
The identified weaknesses include a shallow financial market; limited competition, especially 
in the banking industry; a limited financial safety net; an under-developed capital market; 
inadequate and less effective regulation; limited access to financial services; a lack of 
consumer protection; limited skills; and the dominance of foreign ownership of financial 
institutions (Republic of Namibia, no date). It is in these same areas where reform is being 
affected to achieve the ultimate goal of a more efficient, competitive and resilient financial 
system by 2021. The strategy consequently aims to address the above-mentioned inherent 
weaknesses in the system and assist in the country’s developmental agenda in accordance 
with the development objectives of the country, as contained in the various development 
plans (i.e. the NDP4 and Vision 2030). As such, the strategy expects the following 
outcomes57 presented in Table 2.5 below by the year 2021: 
 
                                                          
57 One of the weaknesses of the strategy is that at the time of its development, there were no baseline data for most of the 
expected outcomes. This had to be worked on later after implementation had already started.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
65 
 
Table 2.5: Namibia Financial Sector Strategy 2011–2021 goals and outcomes 
 
Goal Outcome 
Financial markets deepening 
and development 
An active capital market with the stock exchange local 
market capitalisation reaching 75 per cent of the GDP  
Financial safety nets Having in place appropriate financial safety nets, which are 
currently non-existent in the country 
Financial inclusion o A reduction in the rate of financial exclusion to 26 per 
cent from the baseline of 51.7 per cent in 2007 
o Having in place institutions that provide sufficient 
support to SMEs and offer adequate products, services 
and knowledge 
o An increased national financial literacy rate from the 
recently determined baseline of 42.75 per cent (in 
2013) 
o Having an implemented consumer protection legal 
framework in place 
Localisation of the financial 
sector 
o Increased Namibian ownership of financial institutions  
o Significant representation of Namibians on boards and 
management level of financial institutions 
Skills development in the 
financial sector 
To identify and develop skills needed by the financial 
sector  
 
Source: Republic of Namibia (no date)  
 
It is expected that, if implemented effectively, the strategies devised in the NFSS should 
create a financial system that is effective, efficient and responsive to the needs of the 
Namibian economy. So far within its first four years of implementation (2011–2014), the 
focus has been mainly on aspects relating to regulation so as to create an enabling and safe 
legal environment within which financial activities can flourish; enhancing financial inclusion, 
given that 31 per cent of the population is still excluded from participating in mainstream 
financial systems; as well as enhancing financial literacy so that the country has well-
informed consumers who can serve as their own advocates as they participate in the 
financial sector. 
    
2.5.2 Modernising and strengthening the legislative and regulatory environment 
 
Sparked by the realisation that regulation is an important aspect that can either facilitate or 
derail the progress and effective intermediation of the financial sector, the country has 
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engaged a process of modernising the regulatory environment in the financial sector as well 
as strengthening its capacity in crisis-monitoring surveillance (Republic of Namibia, no date). 
On the legislative and regulatory front, various amendments to legislation and creation of 
new laws for the sector have been taking place. Of relevance to this study are the 
amendments effected to the BIA, Act No. 2 of 1998, as amended, aimed at providing for the 
regulation of microfinance deposit-taking institutions; the amendments to regulations 28 (the 
Long-term Insurance Regulations) and 15 (the Regulations for Pension Funds) as well as 
the introduction of Regulation 29 (Regulations on Investment of Pension Fund Assets in 
Unlisted Investments),58 all of which are aimed at addressing the challenge of capital 
outflows the country has experienced so as to promote domestic investment; and the 
creation of a new Financial Institutions and Markets Bill (FIM Bill) that is to replace a myriad 
of laws applicable to the non-bank financial industry, some of which have been viewed as 
outdated.  
 
The amended regulations 28 and 15 and the introduced Regulation 29 mainly aim to compel 
institutional investors and asset managers to invest a portion (35 per cent) of their assets 
domestically, of which 1.75 per cent should be in unlisted investments. This provides an 
opportunity for existing and potential MFIs to benefit from this statutory requirement and 
expand their businesses with the capital from investors who are seeking to place their 
mandatory local investments. This opportunity flows not only from the fact that MFIs are 
unlisted institutions themselves, but also because of the current small market for unlisted 
investments in Namibia being chased by a massive pool of funds that are being made 
available by the regulatory requirement. It is also the researcher’s expectation that the 
improved and modernised regulatory environment that the FIM Bill aims to create will have a 
positive impact on the regulated institutions through creating an enabling environment.  
 
As indicated earlier in this study, the regulatory environment for the banking sector is 
generally conducive, i.e. commercial banks in Namibia are well capitalised and bank failures 
have been very few.59 Amendments are however being affected to the BIA, as mentioned 
earlier, to, among other things, provide for the regulation of microfinance banking institutions 
in the country and facilitate their development. It remains to be established what the impact 
of these amendments would be on the microfinance industry that the country so much needs 
                                                          
58 Regulations 28 and 15 where issued under the Long-term Insurance Act, Act No. 5 of 1998, and the Pension Funds Act, Act 
No. 24 of 1956, while Regulation 29 was added to existing regulations under the Pension Funds Act, Act No. 24 of 1956.  
59 At the time of conducting this research, only one bank failure occurred in Namibia (the then City Savings and Investment 
Bank of Namibia).  
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to help it address the challenges of poverty and unemployment. The current study aimed to 
get some indication of such impact in Chapter 8. Important questions being posed in this 
regard relate to how the regulation of microfinance banks will affect the growth of the 
industry, whether or not more MFIs will emerge as a result of regulation in this sector, and 
whether regulation will not stifle new MFIs and lending.  
 
2.5.3 Enhancing financial inclusion  
 
In recognition of the importance of financial inclusion (i.e. access to finance) in ensuring 
inclusive economic growth and development, the Namibian government has developed a 
financial inclusion agenda under the framework of its ten-year NFSS. While the NFSS has 
six outcomes, as listed earlier under Section 2.5.1, one of the highlight in its first years of 
implementation has been financial inclusion, i.e. there has been special emphasis on the two 
envisaged outcomes of this goal, namely reducing the rate of financial exclusion to 26 per 
cent from the baseline of 51 per cent in 2007 and having in place institutions that provide 
sufficient support to SMEs and offer adequate products, services and knowledge (Republic 
of Namibia, no date).  
 
The special emphasis on financial inclusion is an attempt to facilitate the availability of 
financial services to the previously disadvantaged groups of the population who have not 
been able to participate in the mainstream financial system (Republic of Namibia, no date). 
This was partly because of Namibia having been a very divided society under the apartheid 
system prior to independence, where some citizens were discriminated against on the basis 
of ethnicity and skin colour to the extent that certain groups, especially those at the bottom of 
the pyramid, have not been able to participate in the financial system. 
 
The situation however also continued even in the post-independence era, as high bank 
charges and fees that have characterised the Namibian banking system alluded to earlier 
have made affordability of financial products and services difficult, especially for low-income-
earning citizens. The collateral requirements by banks for lending purposes also meant that 
previously disadvantaged citizens would not participate in the system, given the lack of 
assets to pledge to the banks for loans. The land tenure system in Namibia, where all 
communal land belongs to government, has also not made it easy for inhabitants who hold 
leaseholds, as trading of such land is not allowed and therefore land or properties built on it 
cannot be pledged as security (Republic of Namibia, no date). The 2012 annual symposium 
of the BoN, which focused on the theme of unlocking the economic potential of communal 
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land, found the tenure security or its absence in rural areas to have been a major constraint 
to accessing finances from banks (BoN, 2012b). 
 
The prevalence of a lack of financial services has been widely recognised by both the 
government-led NFSS referred to above and the voluntary60 Financial Sector Charter, 
discussed below. As such, the country has placed high expectations on the effective 
implementation of these two documents, in the hope that such will ensure that the financial 
sector plays its intermediation role effectively. In particular, the promotion of innovative 
products and services such as e-money advocated by the NFSS could help enhance the 
provision of financial services in the country. The introduction of a BBA by all commercial 
banks in 2012, which does not attract the usual banking fees and charges, has been 
welcomed and is expected to enhance the outreach of banks to low-income people going 
forward. Opening up the banking industry to more competition would also lead to a further 
expanded product offering, including innovative savings and borrowing instruments adapted 
to different needs (Republic of Namibia, no date).  
 
From the above, it is clear that the goal of financial inclusion in Namibia, which relates to 
both access to financial services and products and participation and ownership by the 
previously disadvantaged in the financial sector, is being embraced by the country, because 
it is seen as an opportunity to address the past discriminatory policies and empower the 
previously disadvantaged. MFIs can be an important and relevant part of the financial sector 
in this process of the country striving to enhance financial inclusion, given their lending 
approach and innovative financing methods that ensure the development of products and 
services that are suitable to their clients. This is especially the case as commercial banks 
have not been able to cater for the majority of the previously disadvantaged (who are mainly 
the poor), due to their business approaches being profit-driven (Republic of Namibia, no 
date). The prevailing situation of high levels of unemployment, poverty and income inequality 
renders Namibia a market conducive to the proliferation of microfinance. 
 
                                                          
60 This is a non-regulatory industry charter to which most financial institutions in Namibia are signatories. It has a performance 
scorecard to which the financial sector has committed itself in the quest of reforming itself and enabling it to play a more 
meaningful role in the economy. Implementation is voluntary, but there is an understanding between the industry and 
government that progress being made under the charter will be tracked under the monitoring and evaluation framework of the 
government-led Financial Sector Strategy.   
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2.5.4 Enhancing financial literacy  
 
According to Lusardi and Mitchell (2013), well-informed consumers who can serve as their 
own advocates are one of the best lines of defence against the proliferation of financial 
products and services that are unsuitable, unnecessarily costly or abusive. This is especially 
so because as new financial products and services grow widespread, financial markets 
become increasingly accessible to the small investors and those who did not have access 
before. These categories of the population can therefore be vulnerable to unfair and abusive 
practices and can make uninformed decisions or even lose their hard-earned money if they 
are not financially literate.  
 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2013) give an example of the recent global financial crisis where 
consumer credit and mortgage borrowing had burgeoned, mentioning that people who had 
credit cards or subprime mortgages were in the historically unusual position of being able to 
decide how much they wanted to borrow. This is believed to have contributed to the crisis. It 
follows therefore that efforts to enhance access to financial products and services (i.e. 
financial inclusion) discussed above should be accompanied by those geared to getting the 
users of such services financially literate so as to enable them to make informed decisions.  
 
Users of financial products and services also need to be protected both from possible unfair 
and abusive practices by providers of such products and services and from losing their 
savings and/or investments through appropriate regulatory frameworks. Such consumer 
protection efforts can only be effective in an environment where consumers of such products 
and services are aware of their rights and obligations and are financially literate and able to 
exercise their rights.   
 
It is in recognition of the above facts that the country developed a strategy (the Financial 
Literacy Strategy) in 2012. The aim is to ensure that financial literacy is enhanced in the 
country and a well-informed Namibian society is able to make informed decisions relating to 
financial transactions that are being made available to them through the process of financial 
inclusion (including those provided by MFIs) and are able to exercise their rights and 
obligations towards service providers. A baseline survey conducted in 2013 revealed 
Namibia’s financial literacy level at a low of 42.75 per cent (FLI, 2013), and this information 
will be used to determine whether the programme, going forward, makes any progress. 
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2.5.5  The introduction of a voluntary Financial Sector Charter 
 
The Namibian Financial Sector Charter is a sector transformation charter developed and 
adopted voluntarily by the Namibian financial sector, which came into effect on 1 March 
2009 with the aim of “providing a framework for addressing BBEE [Broad-based Economic 
Empowerment] in the financial sector of Namibia” (NFSC, 2009: 11). The importance of this 
charter lies in the fact that it “constitutes a framework for empowerment and establishes the 
principles upon which empowerment should be implemented in the Namibian financial 
services industry” (NFSC, 2009: 4). As such, this is seen as a vehicle through which the 
sector is to contribute to developing and ensuring an inclusive financial sector in the country. 
In this endeavour, the industry, in acknowledgement of the socio-economic challenges faced 
by the country, has voluntarily committed to a set of ‘transformation agents’ and an 
accompanying scorecard for measuring the achievement of the charter objectives. Through 
this, the financial sector envisages finding itself in a position where it should have achieved 
all goals of its charter by the year 2019 and has therefore developed a framework for 
progress-reporting purposes.  
 
As is the case with the government-led Financial Sector Strategy, access to finance is one of 
the transformation agents, as can be seen from Table 2.6 below. In fact, almost all of the 
transformation areas of the charter are also contained in the strategy, which should give an 
indication that the socio-economic challenges that the country has been facing are being felt 
and recognised at both government and private sector level.  
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Table 2.6: Financial Sector Charter transformation areas 
 
Transformation area Aim  
Human resource 
development  
Equipping current leadership incumbents with appropriate knowledge 
and capacity to drive the transformation of the sector  
Preferential procurement 
and enterprise 
development 
Developing and promoting the sustainability of BBEE businesses to 
foster entrepreneurship in previously disadvantaged communities and 
increase participation of BBEE suppliers to the sector    
Access to and affordability 
of financial products and 
services  
Developing and offering sustainable and affordable financial products 
and services aimed specifically at and appropriate for lower-income 
households 
Ownership and control Promoting economic transformation to enable meaningful participation 
of designated groups in the sector through ownership and control of 
financial institutions so as to achieve substantial change in the racial 
and gender composition of ownership and control 
Empowerment financing  Increasing the sector’s client base from designated groups and 
businesses through promoting and increasing awareness of available 
financing opportunities  
Enterprise development Contributing to ensuring the development of entrepreneurial skills, 
investment and financial market education and business management 
skills for designated groups 
Corporate social 
investment 
Implementing projects that will uplift the standard of living of 
disadvantaged and marginalised communities   
Consumer protection and 
education 
Educating and protecting consumers on issues related to the financial 
sector 
 
Source: NFSC (2009) 
 
Although implementation of some of the commitments has been slow initially, there is high 
expectation on the deliverables of this private sector-led charter, especially given the 
efficiency with which the private sector is normally associated. 
  
 2.6 CONCLUSION ON THE NAMIBIAN ECONOMY AND ITS FINANCIAL SECTOR 
PERFORMANCE    
 
This chapter has provided an overview on the Namibian economy in general and the 
financial sector in particular. It revealed that the Namibian economy has achieved some 
successes since its independence in 1990, such as having created and maintained a stable 
macro-economic environment and having registered positive economic growth rates over the 
years. It also showed that socio-economic challenges have persisted in the form of high 
unemployment, high income inequality and high poverty rates, although some declines have 
been observed in recent years, especially in the unemployment and poverty rates. The 
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chapter further revealed some of the policy-related reforms that have been introduced by the 
country as an attempt to address the challenges, namely the TIPEEG and NEEEF.  
 
In terms of the financial sector, it provided an analysis of the structure and performance of 
the sector. It revealed that quite a number of different types of financial institutions (banking, 
non-banking and other specialised institutions) are operational in the country and that the 
sector is sound, well capitalised and profitable, and has good and efficient financial services 
infrastructure. However, the financial system is considered shallow with an underdeveloped 
capital market, while the banking industry is concentrated and lacking competition, with four 
longstanding banks dominating and two others having joined recently (between the period 
2010–2014). It also found the existence of a Financial Sector Strategy and a voluntary 
industry charter in the country, aimed at reforming the financial sector. Other challenges in 
the system have been identified as the high costs in terms of fees and charges for financial 
services and a lack of diverse and targeted products that have contributed to the exclusion 
of low-income people from participating in the system, as services have been unaffordable 
for this group.  
 
Small businesses were also found to have remained insufficiently served, as the banks 
consider them too risky to finance without collateral and hence a lack of access. High costs 
also compound the situation. Given the importance of the SME sector to any economy, the 
situation does not augur well with the country’s efforts to develop the sector and reduce 
unemployment and poverty.  
 
The above findings clearly show a gap in the outreach of the financial system and the 
banking system in particular. It also makes clear the fact that there are certain categories in 
society, such as the poor and SMEs, that do not fit the ideals of profit-maximising institutions 
such as commercial banks, and that require a different model of financial services other than 
those currently offered by commercial banks. A financing model such as that typically 
followed by MFIs has been empirically proven to serve those categories better. This 
suggests the need for such institutions in Namibia, where the microfinance industry is 
currently small and undeveloped. As stated in Chapter 1, which provided the introduction 
and background of the study, the country has considered creating a regulatory framework for 
MFIs under the BIA (i.e. through amending the BIA) as an effort to spur the development of 
the industry by providing an enabling environment for both consumer protection and investor 
confidence. Part of the primary objective of this study was to determine the likelihood of this 
act leading to the achievement of this intended objective. 
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The following chapter reviewed the literature on financial regulation and supervision, with 
special emphasis on how the aspect of regulating microfinance is analysed in literature and 
what the empirical findings on that front have been. This was necessary to set the context for 
the regulatory impact analysis performed in subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework and the theoretical and empirical literature 
that underpins financial regulation and supervision in the microfinance industry. For 
contextualisation purposes, it begins with a discussion of the literature on the link between 
the broader financial system and the economy, before it touches on the rationale and 
approaches for regulating the system. It then moves to discuss issues relating to the theory 
underpinning microfinance and regulation. In this regard, the link between microfinance and 
the economy is first established, before it engages issues relating to regulating MFIs. It ends 
with a discussion of the empirical findings relating to the aspect of microfinance and 
regulation.  
 
3.1.1  The financial system and economic growth 
 
The link between the financial system (of which MFIs are part) and economic growth has 
been a debatable issue. While some studies have viewed financial development as an 
important driver of growth (King & Levine, 1993; Schumpeter, 1911, quoted by King & 
Levine, 1993), others have either opined that its importance is overstated (Lucas, 1988, cited 
by King & Levine, 1993) or argued that finance follows growth (Robinson, 1952). In 
particular, the causal direction between financial sector development and economic growth 
has been a bone of contention, i.e. there has been ambiguity as to whether financial sector 
development leads growth or financial markets develop as a consequence of economic 
growth, and therefore the question of causality remains unresolved (Dal Colle, 2010).  
 
However, the positive contribution of financial sector development to economic growth 
through banks and equity markets nowadays is a proven hypothesis and has been widely 
tested at the cross-country, industry and firm levels (King & Levine, 1993; La Porta et al., 
1998 and Rajan & Zingales, 1998, cited by Maksudova, 2010). In particular, the financial 
system has been found to play a role in the evaluation of prospective entrepreneurs, 
mobilisation of savings to finance the most promising productivity-enhancing activities, 
diversification of risks associated with innovative activities, and revealing expected profits 
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from engaging in innovation rather than the production of existing goods using existing 
methods (King & Levine, 1993). Through that process, economic aggregates such as 
savings and investments are affected positively, and ultimately so is economic growth. A 
conclusion by King and Levine (1993: 735) follows therefore that “policies that alter 
costliness and efficiency of financial intermediation exert a first-order influence on economic 
growth”. This view is relevant to this study, which sought to ensure evidence-based policies 
through a RIA.  
 
3.1.2 The rationale and considerations for financial regulation  
 
GTZ (1999) quotes Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega (1992: 2) as having defined the term 
‘regulation’ as “a set of enforceable rules that restrict or direct the actions of market 
participants, altering, as a result, the outcomes of those actions”. Implicit in this definition are 
the reasons for regulation, which are mainly to restrict or direct the actions of market 
participants.  
 
The regulation of financial institutions is premised on two broad grounds: the consumer 
protection argument and systemic risk concerns (Gallardo, 2001). The consumer protection 
ground refers to the need to protect depositors’ savings, but also consumers in general from 
exploitative lending and unfair practices by financial institutions. The systemic risk ground 
concerns the possibility that failure by a financial institution would be contagious to other 
institutions and result in the system collapsing (Gallardo, 2001). The aim is therefore to 
protect the financial system from the so-called contagion effect, and financial regulation 
therefore aims to monitor the soundness and stability of the financial system. The above 
have mainly been the justification for regulating financial markets, although the 
considerations for achieving competitive equality among institutions that are engaged in the 
same type of business is increasingly being added to the list as an additional ground. There 
is also moral hazard, which is rather a risk of regulation that often surface in the regulatory 
process. Moral hazard arises as a consequence of consumer protection in that consumers 
would know their deposits are protected and would therefore not take the necessary 
precautions in monitoring their deposits as they would if protection was not available. 
 
Haq, Hoque and Pathan (2008) emphasise the need to protect depositors’ savings, preserve 
their confidence and strengthen the financial system as the basis for prudential regulation of 
financial institutions. With prudential regulation, the aim is the protection of the stability of a 
financial system as well as of deposits, focusing mainly on the safety and soundness of the 
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financial system (Brownbridge, Kirkpatrick & Maimbo, 2002). The process involves reporting 
on some prudentially required aspects by financial institutions to a regulator (government or 
public agency) in an attempt to protect the financial soundness of the regulated institutions. 
This shows that risk mitigation has been at the core of regulating financial institutions 
prudentially. While prudential regulation alone cannot prevent bank failures, it can reduce the 
risk of failure and save depositors from the potential loss of savings.  
 
It is worth mentioning that prudential regulation imposes costs61 on regulated institutions, 
and therefore the dilemma for policy makers is how to exercise the function of safeguarding 
the soundness of the financial system, while still encouraging access to financial services 
Porteous, Collins and Abrams (2010). According to Porteous et al. (2010), the pursuance of 
the objective of encouraging access to financial services may require having in place a 
diversity of financial institutions with different risks and cost profiles, while at the same time it 
is also difficult to supervise numerous diverse entities. They posit that the principle should be 
to avoid burdensome prudential regulation where risk is minimal, given that risk is the basis 
for financial regulation (Porteous et al., 2010).  
 
There are also the non-prudential and the hybrid (i.e. composing aspects of both prudential 
and non-prudential) forms of regulation. Non-prudential regulation would normally involve the 
monitoring and supervising of institutions with the aim of protecting consumers, enabling a 
range of institutions that provide a mix of appropriate products and services and providing 
information to governments to carry out economic, financial and criminal law enforcement 
(CGAP 2012).  
 
Usually, regulation is thought of in terms of state regulation. This need not necessarily be, as 
there are also cases of delegated supervision and self-regulation or internal regulation. A 
delegated supervision system involves an arrangement where the state financial supervisor 
entrusts direct supervision to an outside body, but controls the work of that body (CGAP, 
2003). While state regulation refers to a regulatory system that involves a government 
financial supervisor such as a ministry of finance or central bank, self-regulation refers to a 
system where regulation or supervision is performed by a non-government body that is 
effectively controlled by regulated entities themselves (CGAP, 2003). According to CGAP 
                                                          
61 Although non-prudential regulation also imposes costs, it is not at the same level and scale as prudential regulation would do, 
given that the requirements and/or required reporting under non-prudential regulation is relatively less cumbersome than under 
prudential regulation.   
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(2003), self-regulation is often applied in cases where it is not deemed cost-effective for a 
government regulator to provide direct oversight of certain institutions. For instance, the 
disclosure of matters such as individuals controlling a company does not necessarily need to 
be dealt with by government or its agencies, but may often be largely self-executing and can 
be handled by agencies outside government (CGAP 2003). While the question often posed 
is whether or not self-regulation would ensure as healthy financial intermediaries as state 
regulation would do, it may actually have some benefits in that self-regulated entities get to 
begin a reporting process and conform to basic standards of good practice (CGAP, 2003). 
They can change later to state regulation if the situation so dictates. According to CGAP 
(2003), self-regulation of financial intermediaries in developing countries has not been 
effective in protecting the soundness of the regulated organisations.  
 
Regulators apply the form (between the above forms of regulatory approach) appropriate to 
specific institutions, based on risk considerations. In general, preference has been for a 
situation where government only intervenes to correct market failure (Litan, 2011). This is 
the essence of the traditional public interest theory found in literature. In fact, literature points 
to three broad political economy theories of regulation, the other two being the public choice 
theory (or economic theory of regulation) and regulatory capture (Litan, 2011). These 
theories, which explain experiences in the regulatory area, have a bearing on financial 
regulation.  
 
The public interest theory regards market failure as the reason for regulation, where 
regulation corrects the inefficiency created by the failure (Peltzman, 1989, cited by Guerin, 
2003). It argues that because regulation is needed to fix some market failure in the 
economy, it is imposed in the public interest. Externalities such as pollution, asymmetries in 
information between buyers and sellers, monopoly power, etc. would make good examples 
of where imposing restrictions would be in the public interest (Litan, 2011).  
 
The public interest theory is based on the following three assumptions: that the market is not 
capable itself to fix the market failure when it occurs, that government is capable of fixing 
such failure to ensure optimal efficiency and that the benefits of fixing the market failure 
and/or imposing the regulation to address market failure will outweigh the additional costs 
created by such intervention (Guerin, 2003). According to Guerin (2003), if these 
assumptions are relaxed, it will lead to regulatory failure. He further explains that this theory 
was not universally convincing in the 1960s, which led to the emergence of other two broad 
theories discussed below.  
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The public choice theory, on the other hand, postulates a case where the regulated firms 
want the regulation imposed, mainly because they are to benefit from such an intervention 
(Litan, 2011). The benefits could include the regulation serving as barriers to others who 
might want to enter the same lines of business, thereby preventing additional competition. 
This also explains why firms would normally oppose the introduction and/or removal of 
certain regulations which they perceive would impact their businesses unfavourably (Litan, 
2011). Due to the usual heterogeneous nature of entities even within the same industry 
(either in terms of different line of business, sizes and interests), regulators often land 
themselves in a situation where they have to mediate these varying interests as well as 
those of the consumers (Litan, 2011).  
 
The theory of regulatory capture presents a situation where regulated parties strongly 
influence and determine the behaviour of regulators towards them (Litan, 2011). Regulators 
are viewed to be susceptible to capture for various reasons, including control of information 
by industry, the effects of repeated interactions with regulated entities and career 
opportunities (Posner, 1974, cited by Guerin, 2003). Under this theory, situations can arise 
where regulation benefits one group on behalf of another. 
 
According to Biggar and Heimler (2005: 2), financial institutions globally, especially the 
banking institutions, have been subject to a “non-exhaustive list of regulatory requirements”. 
The list of requirements includes: 1) restrictions on branching and new entry, where entry 
into the banking business or market by foreign banks or subsidiaries is restricted so as to 
insulate them from foreign competition;62 2) restrictions on pricing, where interest rates are 
controlled and/or other controls are imposed on prices and fees; 3) line-of-business 
restrictions and regulations on ownership linkages among financial institutions, where the 
types of business to be engaged by banks are restricted; 4) restrictions on the portfolio of 
assets that banks can hold, such as requirements to hold certain types of securities or 
requirements and/or not to hold other securities, including requirements not to hold the 
control of non-financial companies; 5) provision of compulsory deposit insurance through 
payment of a premium in the form of an expectation that government will bail out depositors 
in the event of insolvency; 6) capital-adequacy requirements, where banks are required to 
take care of their risk to ensure that they will be able to absorb a reasonable amount of loss 
                                                          
62 An example is the Glass-Steagall Act of the USA during the 20th century that prohibited interstate banking and prevented 
banks from trading in securities and insurance, with the intent of preventing banking collapses, but also prohibited state-wide 
branch banking in many cases as small-town bankers ........ to limit their competitors by creating geographic monopolies (Biggar 
& Heimler, 2005). 
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and comply with statutory capital requirements; 7) reserve requirements, which are 
requirements to hold a certain quantity of the liabilities of the central bank; 8) requirements to 
direct credit to favoured sectors or enterprises in the form of either formal rules or informal 
government pressure (sometimes referred to as policy-based lending); 9) adherence to 
special rules concerning mergers, which are not always subject to a competition standard, or 
failing banks; and 10) adherence to other rules affecting cooperation within the banking 
sector, e.g. with respect to payment systems. In the context of the current study, a relevant 
question to ask given the uniqueness of MFIs63 is whether or not they should be subject to 
these same requirements and to the same extent as conventional commercial banks; and if 
they should, how they would be impacted by those requirements.   
 
Moreover, the recent global financial crisis brought about sensitivity towards the dealings of 
financial institutions, resulting in more stringent regulatory approaches (Visco, 2013). This is 
because the crisis revealed the existence of weaknesses in the global regulatory system. As 
such, financial regulators around the globe have become more careful in terms of what 
financial activities they are to allow and this has brought with it changing regulatory regimes 
and has enlarged the list of requirements (Visco, 2013). For example, the review of the 
Basel core principles that culminated into Basel III has brought with it implementation costs, 
and discussions about counter-cyclical capital requirements have also been ongoing. This 
could make it difficult to allow MFIs to engage in innovative ways and come up with different 
products and approaches to serving their clients. What is positive for microfinance from 
these processes, though, is the emphasis on risk-based banking supervision rather than 
compliance alone, as this could reduce the regulatory burden on MFIs, given their activities 
are considered to be less risky to the financial system, as indicated earlier.   
 
In Namibia, regulation places certain requirements and limitation pertaining to the dealings of 
financial institutions. For example, due to these regulatory requirements, commercial banks 
in Namibia have had limited exposure to high-risk or exotic assets as well as limited off-
balance-sheet operations. They also have had limited reliance on foreign funding and limited 
integration with international capital markets. In fact, it has been a regulatory requirement 
under Section 8.1 of the Determinations on minimum local assets issued under the Banking 
Institutions Act, 1998 (Act No. 2 of 1998), that deposits sourced locally can only be used for 
                                                          
63 MFIs are considered as unique financial institutions relative to conventional banking institutions because of the fact that they 
operate in a high-risk environment due to the nature of the clients with whom they deal, typically the poor and/or low-income 
people who mostly have little or no collateral at all. This state of affairs forces them to devise unconventional ways, methods 
and products for serving their clients. MFIs might therefore require special treatment when it comes to regulation.  
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acquiring assets locally and this has limited the scope for banks to venture outside the 
borders of Namibia. These regulatory restrictions seem to have paid off, as the Namibian 
banking system has been relatively resilient to the impact of the global financial crisis (BoN, 
2010). 
 
3.1.3 The microfinance phenomenon: Definition, perspective and approach  
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, CGAP (2006) defines microfinance as financial services for the 
poor. Typically, these people who are clients of MFIs belong to the lower-income segments 
of the population, and are perceived to be risky clients by the conventional banking 
institutions. In addition to the perceived riskiness of these clients, conventional banking 
institutions have generally shied away from serving these clients due to the high operational 
and administrative costs associated with smaller amounts, which these clients require. They 
have therefore concentrated on serving the higher-income-earning people. This has created 
a market for MFIs because poor and low-income people also need financial services. The 
reality is that not everybody might qualify for credit, but all human beings, including the poor, 
are deposit-worthy (WSBI, 2009). This has been proven by the tremendous growth that the 
global microfinance industry has experienced over the years. Through its operations, 
microfinance has managed to empower low-income people by providing them with the 
opportunity to build assets and improve their quality of life. These low-income people have 
proven to be credible clients of the MFIs (WSBI, 2009). 
 
The World Savings Banks Institute (WSBI, 2009) explains that the ability of microfinance to 
contribute directly to people’s economic and social progress by allowing them to invest and 
multiply their scarce assets makes it unique among other economic development initiatives. 
The institutions involved in this type of business are therefore also rendered unique by the 
type of clients they serve and the approach they employ to serve them.    
 
3.1.4 Microfinance and economic growth 
 
Since its birth in the 1970s, the main aim of microfinance has been that of lifting people out 
of poverty and thereby facilitating economic growth. The importance of microfinance can be 
best captured when fitting it into the general finance-growth nexus, where microfinance can 
be presented as an important segment capturing informal intermediation and directly 
contributing to financial sector development (Maksudova, 2010). Maksudova perceives the 
impact of microfinance to economic growth to be through direct and indirect channels. He 
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explains the direct channel to be through poverty reduction, welfare increase and production 
value added from entrepreneurship activities of the poor, and the indirect channel as the 
contribution of microfinance to an increase in liquid liabilities through financial deepening and 
the development of retail banking systems. Figure 3.1 below presents Maksudova’s (2010) 
graphical illustration as a base of the above channels of microfinance transmission. 
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Figure 3.1: The microfinance channels to economic growth 
Source: Adapted from Maksudova (2010) 
 
 
A, B and C in the above figure are the arrows that link microfinance with its external 
environment and ultimately affect economic growth. A is the direct channel that shows how 
microfinance impacts growth through poverty reduction, welfare increase and production 
value added from entrepreneurship activities of the poor, while B and C depict the indirect 
channels through which microfinance impacts growth, when microfinance activities 
contribute to an increase in liquid liabilities through financial deepening and the development 
of retail banking systems. It follows that MFIs are an integral part of the financial system, 
have a role to play in the economic growth of a country through the above-explained 
channels, and are hence participants in the finance-growth nexus.  
 
Despite the above-illustrated important role played by microfinance in the economy, the 
optimality of the MFIs’ operations has been questioned. The important aspect that has been 
Financial sector development 
Bank sector 
Stock market 
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pondered upon is how MFIs can be supported to better perform their role in assisting poor, 
low-income people and SMEs (CGAP, 2012). Increasingly, the need to ensure the 
sustainability of MFIs is being acknowledged (see Gallardo, 2001; Okumu, 2007). It is 
believed that MFIs’ financial sustainability would ensure microfinance systems that can grow 
and provide microfinance services on a permanent basis to the poor. Regulation has been 
identified as among the factors that can facilitate the road to MFIs’ sustainability, in addition 
to protecting consumers (CGAP, 2010).  
 
3.1.5 Financial regulation and MFIs: Is there a case for regulating MFIs? 
 
Internationally, there has been an increasing interest in the regulation and supervision of 
MFIs (CGAP, 2012). Literature also acknowledges at the same time that MFIs are unique 
financial institutions that are distinct from conventional financial institutions. The key 
difference between MFIs and conventional financial institutions has been identified as being 
the difference in their clientele, their risk-handling and management approach as well as 
information advantages across different population groups (CGAP, 2003, CGAP, 2010). 
MFIs deal with low-income and poor people who do not have collateral, and therefore they 
employ innovative ways of serving them, including ways of substituting physical collateral as 
risk-mitigating measures. While MFIs are unique institutions, being an integral part of the 
financial system, as explained, render them susceptible to risks faced by the overall financial 
sector. Risk is the basis for financial regulation, as discussed under Section 3.1.2 above. 
 
The distinct nature of MFIs has sparked a debate on whether or not they should be 
regulated, and if they should, how they should be regulated. There have been arguments for 
and against the regulation of MFIs. Dominating the arguments for regulating MFIs is the 
consumer protection ground of regulation (CGAP, 2010). Proponents have argued that there 
is a need to protect clients of MFIs against unfair or deceptive practices, which might include 
those related to being charged exploitative interest rates, unfair collections and advertising 
(CGAP, 2010). Occurrences such as the Indian microfinance crisis of 2010, which led to the 
country instituting legislation to regulate its microfinance sector, particularly reinforced this 
view. The microfinance crisis experienced by India in that year resulted from the ‘arm-
twisting’ repayment tactics employed by the industry to ensure loan repayments, which led to 
borrowers committing suicides at an increasing rate (Stiglitz, 2014). In its 2010 report on 
financial access, CGAP was of the view that regulating MFIs would improve transparency, 
as they would be required to disclose full, plain, adequate and comparable information, 
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including those on prices and the terms and conditions of their financial products and 
services (CGAP, 2010).  
 
An argument often considered more binding relates to the fact that regulation is frequently a 
prerequisite for taking up savings, and MFIs are increasingly engaging in the savings 
business (CGAP, 2003; CGAP2012). Accepting savings is a deposit-mobilisation process 
and therefore has legal implications in terms of the protection of depositors’ money, which is 
usually a responsibility of a country’s monetary authority (CGAP, 2012). Therefore, when 
MFIs engage in deposit taking, proponents argue, it calls for their regulation. 
 
A further argument for regulation relates to the fact that the increasing demand for MFIs’ 
products and services resulting from the many prospective borrowers (given that poor and 
low-income people are in the majority in developing countries) may render MFIs unable to 
meet their growing funding needs with only their own resources, and that MFIs may need to 
access external finance. It is argued that regulation would enable them to get access to 
refinancing facilities by wholesale financial institutions, as regulated MFIs are considered 
properly constituted and sound. For instance, regulation determines the possibility for MFIs 
to access capital markets and mobilise savings (Goujon, 2009). Van Greuning, Gallardo and 
Randhawa (1998) examined the issue of MFIs and regulation and came to the conclusion 
that the continuum of institutions providing microfinance cannot develop fully without a 
regulatory environment conducive to their growth; without such an environment, 
fragmentation and segmentation would continue to inhibit their institutional transformation. It 
follows that regulation that enhances efficiency and stability will keep the line of funds open 
to the MFIs and facilitate their growth, development and sustainability, which in turn will 
enhance access to finance (Van Greuning et al., 1998). 
 
Critics of the regulation of MFIs have, on the other hand, advanced views relating to the 
possibility of unintended consequences that regulation may have on MFIs and those they 
serve. These include the possibility of regulation creating barriers to the efforts of increasing 
access to financial services and reaching the unbanked segment of the population. This is 
especially true for the case where prudential regulation installs barriers to entry through 
minimum capital requirements and/or cause increased cost of capital, resulting in increased 
transactional costs for the MFIs (Goujon, 2009).  
 
A further concern is that regulation may actually curtail the ability of MFIs to allocate financial 
resources efficiently and therefore has the potential to dampen their development. Although 
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not solely caused by legislation, an example can be made of the collapse of MFI Finansol64 
in Colombia, which was a regulated entity under the banking law of Columbia, as among the 
aspects that provided a basis of questioning whether banking regulation is in fact appropriate 
for MFIs (GTZ, 1999).  
 
There however seems to be a general understanding currently of the nature of MFIs and the 
important role the sector is to play in an economy, i.e. that of filling the gap that exists due to 
market failure.65 CGAP (2012) is of the view that the ability of the market to respond to the 
increasing demand for financial services by the poor depends not only on MFIs developing 
sustainable low-cost ways to provide such services, but also on having an appropriate and 
enabling policy and regulatory environment. It explains that such environment is critically 
important in bringing to poor and low-income people the financial services they need. 
According to CGAP (2012), the question being posed now rather relates to the kind of 
regulation and supervision that will help achieve the intended objectives of increasing access 
to finance. 
 
3.1.6 What would be the appropriate approach to regulating MFIs? 
 
Before the regulatory approach can be decided upon, there are aspects that any country 
considering to regulate MFIs should carefully examine. These include deciding on who (or 
which MFIs) should be regulated, how to regulate them and who should regulate them. 
These are important questions that a country should strive to answer to ensure that an 
appropriate regulation is created. The nature of each of those considerations is discussed 
below.  
 
                                                          
64 The collapse of Finansol came as a result of a crisis it experienced that caused a severe deterioration of its portfolio quality, 
and hence suffered serious loan losses. This resulted from the dual and non-transparent business structure pursued by its 
holding company (Corposol), which lead to undesirable business practices not being picked up early enough by the supervisor 
(CGAP, 2000). 
65 Market failure is defined as “the inability of a market or system of markets to provide goods and services either at all or in an 
economically optimal manner” (Dollery & Wallis, 2001: 9). 
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3.1.6.1 Important considerations: Whom and how to regulate? 
 
From the above discussions, it is clear that microfinance involves a particular set of services, 
providers and customers. As such, there is a need to carefully examine the issues that are 
fundamental to this sector and its regulation that might render them different to conventional 
financial institutions and therefore requiring a different regulatory approach. The immediate 
issue that comes to mind, taking the objective of microfinance into consideration, is the need 
to ensure that any framed regulatory piece for MFIs should balance the objective of 
regulation, which hinges on financial stability, financial integrity and depositor protection with 
the effective financial access objective (CGAP, 2012). It follows that policy makers ought to 
weigh the potential benefits of regulating against the potential barriers to access that might 
result from the cost of compliance and enforcement (CGAP, 2012). For example, most MFIs 
may not be able to meet the onerous reserve and CAR requirements of financial legislation 
(Coetzee, 1998) and therefore might require special treatment.  
 
Another important aspect to take into consideration when formulating regulations for MFIs 
relates to the fact that MFIs operate in a high-risk environment due to the nature of clients 
with whom they deal. These are poor or low-income people who mostly have little or no 
collateral at all, while the business MFIs are involved in is also costly (i.e. they involve high 
transaction costs, etc.). The above facts might therefore require a consideration for 
relaxation of some legal requirements that normally apply to conventional financial 
institutions. At the same time, literature also argues that MFIs may not be too risky for a 
country’s financial system stability, given that their total assets are usually too small to pose 
a risk (CGAP, 2003). This means that the risk profile of MFIs is different. It is also important 
to take into account the different types of MFIs (e.g. credit-only, savings-mobilising, etc.) 
when deciding on whether to regulate them or not, which MFIs to regulate and how to 
regulate them (CGAP, 2003).  
 
The decision on which MFIs to regulate would normally be country-specific, given different 
environments and different types that might be available in different countries (CGAP, 2003). 
It is however still important for every country to look at the characteristics of its MFI 
institutions, e.g. whether they are deposit-taking or only credit extension-related, as well as 
the size and scale of their operations. Roy (2013) quotes work by Meagher (2002) that 
comparatively reviewed the experience of microfinance regulation in developing countries66 
                                                          
66 This study looked at the microfinance regulatory systems of ten jurisdictions, namely Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Uganda and the West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
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that have begun to address the legal and regulatory framework for microfinance, and 
indicates that most of the countries reviewed had found ways to exclude the smallest 
institutions for which regulation makes little sense, through either formal or informal 
exemptions. According to Roy (2013), small informal institutions and traditional rotating and 
credit associations in almost all countries are exempt from regulation. Related to this, work 
carried out by Mushendami et al. (2004) on a regulatory and supervisory perspective to 
promote microfinance institutions in Namibia suggested the need to consider the scale of 
operations and size of a microlender (or MFI) and/or certain categories of such institutions in 
deciding whether to regulate or not so as to minimise regulatory and supervisory burden for 
the bank.  
 
The above highlighted factors are important aspects to consider when determining which 
institutions to regulate. Any regulation constituted without considering them may run the risk 
of defeating the objective of increasing financial access to the poor through negatively 
impacting on the ability of MFIs to serve the poor. For example, some regulatory 
requirements (especially prudential requirements) may be too restrictive and/or may place a 
burden on MFIs as they attempt to comply with the requirements, which may even prove 
difficult to meet, and as a result they may fail in the role of providing access to finance to the 
poor. The challenge therefore becomes how to create a model regulation that will best suit 
MFIs and the interests of the poor, which is the subject matter of the next two sections.   
 
3.1.6.2 Important consideration: What should be the regulatory approach for MFIs? 
 
The decision about which regulatory approach to follow requires consideration for both the 
approach and the type of regulation. In their work that tried to craft a framework for 
regulating MFIs, Van Greuning et al. (1998), as cited by Coetzee (1998) suggested two 
approaches to regulation of MFI operations: internal regulation through governance and 
external regulation by a supervisory agency. It is also possible to have a blended regulatory 
approach consisting of the two regulatory approaches (internal and external regulation).  
  
Coetzee (1998) is of the view that a point of departure would be to differentiate regulatory 
and supervision activities on the basis of the institutional characteristics of financial 
institutions. Accordingly, Coetzee (1998) suggests that self-regulation would be suitable for 
member-based MFIs where most members are involved in the running of the business, while 
complete adherence to legislation and supervision by a regulator and/or supervisor of 
financial institutions would be needed for an MFI where members are not directly involved in 
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running the business. The suggestion is based on the fact that it becomes riskier when 
members are not involved in the day-to-day activities of the MFIs, as their ‘agent’ may 
engage in activities that might threaten the sustainability of the business. An example that 
fits this situation is that provided by Porteous et al. (2010) about an unregulated SACCO in 
Uganda called Front Page Microfinance, which had been run by an ‘agent’ (i.e. manager) 
and had grown rapidly from 238 members in 2005 to 20 000 members in 2007, making 
deposits through 14 branches, with some but not all receiving loans. This rapid growth was 
obtained through aggressive marketing campaigns, including sponsoring social events and 
sports teams, with advertised low-interest and no collateral credit programmes. The view 
back then, according to Porteous et al. (2010), was that Front Page Microfinance had helped 
the Ugandan government to mobilise people to embrace saving and access credit. This 
view, however, changed as Front Page Microfinance’s aggressive growth model showed 
strain by 2007. Members seeking to withdraw savings were denied withdrawal requests, or 
were receiving merely 20 to 25 per cent of their savings balances, until it failed as time 
progressed. While it was not specifically stated in the work of Porteous et al. (2010), it is 
unlikely that members had recovered their money from this failed MFI, given its unregulated 
status.  
 
Van Greuning et al. (1998), as cited by Chiumya (2006), undertook an analysis of MFIs’ 
liabilities that helped them distinguish features of different types of MFIs. They proposed 
self-regulation for MFIs that depend on donor grants and small-scale compulsory savings as 
loan collateral. They proposed external regulation or regulation by a registering agency or 
bank supervisor or securities and exchange agency for those that use commercial paper and 
large certificates of deposit. Cooperatives authority or bank supervision authority is 
recommended for those who depend on members’ money and bank supervision for those 
who depend on savings deposits. They justified the analysis based on the liabilities of MFIs 
as appropriate, given that factors that distinguish between MFIs are mainly on the liabilities 
side and not on the assets side. This could also be a good basis for policy makers to 
consider when deciding on which institutions to regulate.   
 
Literature also points to the fact that when the need for external supervision as well as 
institutions to supervise have been identified, a tiered approach could be followed based on 
the unique features of the institutions and the risk involved (Van Greuning et al. (1998). This 
could be in the form of specifying a microfinance window for regulation and supervision, so 
as to facilitate varying supervision towards MFIs relative to conventional financial institutions. 
It will also help solve the problem of the high capital requirement, which MFIs are not able to 
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meet. As it is argued that total assets of MFIs are usually too small to pose a threat to 
financial stability, a tiered approach will also ensure that regulation and supervision cost is 
proportionate to the risks involved. This is important because for MFIs, cost reduction is 
crucial for expanding their outreach (CGAP, 2012). 
 
Another important consideration should be given to whether regulation will be by existing or 
new legislation (i.e. special window) (CGAP, 2012). While the special window might be 
appealing given the uniqueness of MFIs, it is not preferred for consistency and efficiency, as 
financial regulation may work best when the focus is on activities/functions and not on the 
type of institutions (CGAP, 2012).  
 
3.1.6.3 Which type of regulation to follow: Prudential or non-prudential?  
 
As discussed above, the financial sector makes a distinction between prudential regulation 
and non-prudential regulation. Prudential regulation deals with depositor protection and the 
systemic risks that can be posed by failing financial institutions, while non-prudential 
regulation basically deals with issues related to market conduct to ensure discipline, 
transparency and therefore consumer protection (Vogel & Schulz, 2011). A report by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) that looked at the role of central banks in microfinance in 
selected countries67 of Asia and the Pacific in 2000 states that MFIs are mostly subject to 
non-prudential regulation (Roy, 2013). It indicates that most countries have in place 
processes for registering NGOs, cooperatives and other institutions engaged in microfinance 
that do not usually involve central banks, although cases existed where central banks were 
involved in the registration or licensing of certain categories of MFIs.  
 
As indicated earlier, it is a considered view that most MFIs are not big enough to threaten 
the health of a financial system, although regulation is still needed so that poor customers do 
not lose their savings, especially in the case of DMFIs. It could also be that regulatory 
requirements (especially prudential requirements) may prove difficult for MFIs to meet and 
MFIs might just fail in their role of providing access to finance to the poor in an attempt to 
comply with regulation, as indicated earlier in this chapter. In supporting their finding of a 
negative association between supervision and profitability of MFIs, Cull et al. (2009) refer to 
a notion that profit-oriented MFIs absorb the cost of supervision by curtailing outreach to 
market segments that tend to be more costly per dollar lent and that although MFIs that rely 
                                                          
67 Countries studied were 12 developing member countries of the ADB. These are Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China, 
India, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu and Vietnam. 
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on non-commercial sources of funding and are therefore less profit-oriented do not adjust 
loan sizes when supervised, their profitability is significantly reduced. This might therefore 
affect the extent to which MFIs are able to reach out and serve the poor. Taking these facts 
into consideration, preference is normally for a non-prudential regulatory approach for MFIs 
with simpler reporting requirements than for normal commercial banks (CGAP, 2012).  
 
3.1.6.4 Important considerations: Regulatory challenges and limitations 
 
Various challenges and limitations to regulating MFIs have been identified in literature. 
Pouchous (2012) points to the complex nature of microfinance regulation and supervision, 
and is also of the view that it is very contextual. In some countries there may be numerous 
MFIs and quite often they are too small in size (Pouchous (2012). Regulating and 
supervising them can therefore be a challenge, as the capacity of regulatory and/or 
supervisory authorities might not be enough to handle the numerous institutions (Pouchous 
(2012).  
 
Coetzee (1998) quotes Rock and Otero (1997) in saying that the transaction costs of 
supervising a large number of small institutions are high and can dampen efficient 
supervision. There is therefore reason for weighing the costs and benefits of supervising 
MFIs and a need to identify and set levels for those to be regulated (CGAP, 2012). The cost 
estimation should also include the potential unintended consequences of regulation, 
especially those relating to innovation and competition (Pouchous, 2012). Pouchous (2012) 
cautions that prudential rules and consumer protection should not be blindly extended to 
MFIs, but some specific adjustments have to be effected to capture the specificities of 
microfinance activities. Pouchous (2012) elaborates that this would be necessary for both 
prudential and non-prudential regulation. With regard to supervision, Pouchous (2012) is of 
the view that oversight mechanisms are critical to properly frame microfinance activity, and 
that there are costs involved in doing that. These costs need to be realistically estimated and 
their impact monitored. Ultimately, taking the above highlighted challenges into consideration 
(on the side of both MFIs and the regulator and/or supervisor), regulation and supervision 
have to be proportionate to the risk involved (CGAP, 2012). 
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3.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many studies have been written on the aspect of microfinance and MFIs regulation, and 
country-specific experiences have been reported. Some studies have pointed towards the 
positive impact regulation has had on the growth and performance of MFIs, while others 
have revealed either certain drawbacks or mixed outcomes of MFIs regulation.  
 
Exploring the impact of regulation on 245 of the world’s largest MFIs in 67 developing 
countries using OLS regression, Cull et al. (2009) found a negative association between 
supervision and the profitability of MFIs. They further controlled for the non-random 
assignment of supervision via treatment effects and instrumental variables regressions, and 
found that supervision was associated with substantially larger average loan sizes and less 
lending to women, although not significantly associated with profitability. They viewed this 
pattern to be consistent with the notion that profit-oriented MFIs absorb the cost of 
supervision by curtailing outreach to market segments that tend to be more costly per dollar 
lent, and that by contrast, MFIs that rely on non-commercial sources of funding and therefore 
are less profit-oriented do not adjust loan sizes, or lend less to women when supervised, but 
their profitability is significantly reduced. 
 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) performed another assessment of the impact of regulation 
using data for 114 MFIs from 62 countries (in an empirical model where performance is 
specified as a function of MFI-specific, regulatory, macro-economic and institutional 
variables). It was found that regulatory involvement did not directly affect performance in 
terms of either operational self-sustainability or outreach. They also found less leveraged 
MFIs to be associated with better sustainability, implying that the transformation of MFIs into 
regulated financial institutions may actually not lead to improved financial results and 
outreach. They however also found that MFIs that collect savings reached more borrowers, 
which suggested the potential of indirect benefits from regulation, especially in an 
environment where regulation is the only way for MFIs to access savings. 
 
In Africa, Kassa (2010) assessed the achievements and challenges of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of the microfinance business in Ethiopia and suggested that 
regulation and supervision of MFIs in that country brought many benefits. The benefits 
identified by Kassa include the creation of an enabling environment for the establishment of 
specialised formal financial institutions to serve those previously considered as unbankable 
as well as MFIs being able to offer a wide range of products such as savings, money transfer 
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and other related services to lower-income sections of the population in addition to credit. 
Kassa further refers to regulation having promoted standardisation and transparency in the 
sector.   
 
Okumu (2007) analysed the Ugandan case and found that in the short run, financial 
regulation negatively influenced the outreach of MFIs, but positively affected their 
sustainability, while in the long-term, financial regulation positively influenced both the 
sustainability and outreach of MFIs. One of the key policy issues recommended by Okumu 
and which is relevant to this study pertains to the importance of adequately assessing the 
benefits and costs of legislation before its enactment and to ensure that the benefits 
outweigh the costs in both the short and the long run.    
 
In the case of South Africa, Muganga (2010) assessed whether regulation enabled or 
created barriers to increasing access to financial services and reaching the unbanked 
population in that country. He found that regulation, alongside other macro-economic 
reforms, had played a key role for the state of development of that country’s microfinance 
market. Muganga (2010) is of the view that regulation constituted a facilitator to enhance the 
growth of the industry by setting standards, increasing efficiency and promoting fair 
competition, while strongly protecting consumers. 
 
The results of the study by Chiumya (2006) were not conclusive with regard to the impact of 
the existing regulatory framework on the microfinance sector in Zambia. It observed that the 
lack of regulatory and supervisory attention may have resulted in the growth of the 
microfinance sector, which might not have happened if the sector had been regulated from 
the start. On the other hand, it also found that growth of the industry may have been due to 
the change in government policy and/or the increased interest by the donor community and 
developmental agencies in funding microfinance, rather than any absence of regulatory and 
supervisory attention. The study is further of the view that the development of a vibrant 
microfinance sector is dependent on a number of contextual factors, including high 
population densities, the presence of quality physical infrastructure, a stable macro-
economic environment, monetisation and opportunities for income-generating activity, 
factors which cannot be addressed through the introduction of a regulatory and supervisory 
framework alone. 
 
For Namibia, Mulunga (2010) found a lack of regulation to be one of the main challenges 
that hampered the development of the microfinance industry, and noted that there was effort 
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being made directed at finding a solution. No RIA has however been done on Namibia 
before, and therefore the state of affairs is unknown. 
 
The above are interesting findings, which should have policy makers in those respective 
countries thinking, especially those in countries where undesirable outcomes were 
highlighted. It is clear from this literature review that the evidence of the impact of regulation 
on MFIs is inconclusive, and there is therefore a need to focus on individual country studies, 
given the heterogeneity of environments in different countries. The above is therefore 
evidence of the existence of a gap in the literature, which the current study aimed to fill.   
 
It is also important to mention the fact that the issue of regulation is relatively young in the 
microfinance industry, as evidenced by literature. The observed increasing pressure for 
regulating MFIs has originated from the belief that there is a need for transformation of MFIs 
into regulated financial intermediaries and that regulation would allow them to evolve into 
such institutions, especially the ones that aim to take deposits (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Morduch, 2009; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). This is seen as a way of increasing MFIs’ 
loanable funds (Campion & White, 1999, cited by Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007) so as to 
serve their markets better. It implies that regulating MFIs would lead to increased outreach 
and therefore increased access to finance, i.e. commercialisation of MFIs will enhance 
access, as it guarantees sustainability. Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch (2009), however, 
also caution of the potential trade-offs of regulation in that complying with regulation and 
supervision can be costly, and that any factor that causes costs to rise, including the costs 
associated with complying with prudential regulation, is likely to result in MFIs increasing 
their pricing (interest rates) or loan sizes so as to maintain the same level of profitability. 
When that happens, they argue, MFIs may curtail their outreach, which may lead to the 
exclusion of some potential borrowers. These views and the above varying findings confirm 
the complexity involved in deciding how MFIs should be regulated to ensure that they still 
play the expected role of providing access to finance for the poor and SMEs, and this is 
where RIAs on microfinance become important. Without a RIA on Namibia so far, the 
findings of the current study should provide good insight.  
 
The next chapter outlines the research methods and methodology used in this study that 
aimed to assess the regulatory impact on MFIs and the microfinance sector in Namibia.   
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CHAPTER 4  
THE RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDY 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses the research methods and methodology followed in this study. 
Before outlining the research methods and methodology, it is important to point out that the 
primary objective of the study was the assessment of the impact of regulation on MFIs, as 
indicated in the introduction and background sections of Chapter 1. In other words, the 
impact assessment undertaken by the study was regulatory in nature, i.e. a RIA, specifically 
as it relates to microfinance (i.e. as it relates to financial inclusion). This was done in 
acknowledgement of the fact that the regulator is a decisive actor in financial inclusion 
(Goujon, 2009).  
 
There may be slight differences in approach to the general impact assessment of social 
programmes. The notion of a ‘fit-for-purpose methodology’ has been applied for this thesis, 
which suggests that “there is rarely an ideal type of impact evaluation that can be 
appropriately rolled out in all contexts”, as stated by Garbarino and Holland (2009: 18). For 
example, the starting point for a RIA is the core objectives for regulating in the first place 
(Goujon, 2009). This aspect makes up the core of the RIA framework, as will be evident from 
the below discussions on the methodological approach of this research. Coglianese (2012) 
posits that the appropriateness of any measure is dependent on the purpose of the 
evaluation, which in turn would derive from the purpose of regulation itself, and that what is 
centrally relevant to any evaluation of a regulation is what the regulation aims to obtain. 
 
It is also worth reiterating that the issue of regulation is relatively young in the microfinance 
industry, as indicated in the preceding chapter. As such, there had only been a few RIAs 
conducted outside of developed countries at the time of this research (Staschen et al., 
2012). Therefore, a thorough methodology for assessing regulatory impact on microfinance 
(Staschen, 2010) has not been established. A general RIA existed until Staschen developed 
the Rationale-Objectives-Indicator (ROI), which he successfully applied to Uganda in 2010 
and which earned him a PhD.68  
                                                          
68 Staschen (2010) identified the lack of a “thorough methodology to assess and explain the impact of regulatory reforms in 
microfinance” and used the opportunity presented by new developments at the time in terms of the growth in specific legal 
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4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
The research methodology and approach of this study derived from the objectives of the 
study listed in Chapter 1, namely obtaining an understanding of the nature and state of 
microfinance in Namibia, obtaining an understanding of the regulatory and supervisory 
environment for MFIs and assessing the existing and potential impact of such regulatory and 
supervisory environment on the microfinance sector (i.e. performing an RIA on the 
microfinance sector). To achieve these objectives, the study undertook a survey and held 
interviews with relevant stakeholders in addition to desk research and documentary review. 
The information obtained was used to firstly gain an understanding of the microfinance 
landscape of Namibia (presented in Chapter 5) and its regulatory framework (presented in 
Chapter 6) as a prerequisite for performing the RIAs, and secondly to feed the impact 
assessment processes themselves, presented in chapters 7 and 8. 
 
The impact assessment involved a two-level analysis, namely at micro and macro level. The 
micro level analysis entailed a case study of the only regulated microfinance bank in 
Namibia, which has been regulated by the BoN together with commercial banks under 
conventional banking law since it first obtained its licence in 2010, given the absence of a 
microfinance regulatory framework. The assessment here is therefore an ex-post RIA. The 
use of the case study approach has been often criticised by literature for a lack of rigour and 
not being generalisable. This criticism is especially strong in the case of a single case study 
such as this one. However, despite this limitation, the decision to use a case study for this 
thesis was not only based on the situation of Namibia at the time of conducting the study, of 
having only one regulated microfinance bank, but also on considerations of the advantages 
and benefits that can derive from case study research as well as the strengths of case 
studies alluded to by literature. Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2001) posits that case studies 
are grounded in lived reality and can facilitate the construction of detailed and in-depth 
understanding of what is to be studied, given their restricted focus; hence the detailed 
account of how the MFI was affected as a result of being a regulated institution will 
contribute to greater understanding of the Namibian microfinance sector and its regulatory 
and supervisory environment, i.e. to the research objectives addressed later in chapters 5 
and 6.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
frameworks for microfinance and new research in the area of RIA. He developed the ROI and successfully applied the 
methodology to the case of introducing a special microfinance law in Uganda.  
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With regard to the limitation of case study results not being generalisable, this thesis 
supports the argument by Yin (2003) and Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler (2011) that the 
generalisation of case study results is made to theory and not to populations. Yin (2003) 
further explains that case studies follow a replication logic rather than a sampling logic and 
that case study results can therefore be expected to replicate under similar conditions (i.e. a 
literal replication) and not generalised to the population from which a sample has been 
drawn. Yin posits that the goal with case study research is to expand and generalise theories 
(i.e. analytical generalisation) as opposed to enumerating frequencies (i.e. statistical 
generalisation). Case study research can therefore yield valuable results if a rigorous 
methodological path is followed, including posing careful and thoughtful research questions 
and following a systematic procedure, an approach that the researcher followed.  
 
Based on the above highlighted strengths and advantages of case study research, the 
researcher is of the view that the case study approach is particularly suited to this thesis, as 
it will facilitate a holistic and in-depth investigation of what the impact of regulation can be on 
MFIs in Namibia, using the experience of the regulated microfinance bank. In other words, it 
describes the real-life context in which the regulatory intervention occurred (i.e. the MFI 
being licensed and regulated under the conventional BIA), and provides evidence of what 
can potentially happen when MFIs are regulated under a normal banking institutions 
regulatory framework. The researcher further argues that this case study represents a critical 
case and provides an opportunity to test theory in the case of Namibia, given the desire by 
Namibia to develop its microfinance sector with regulation facilitating that process, as 
alluded to under the background chapter of this thesis, and the fact that it can be possible to 
replicate the results obtained from this case study to the overall microfinance sector by 
detecting patterns that can form a general picture.   
 
At the macro level, the potential regulatory impact of the draft amended BIA (which has 
made provision for regulating MFIs) on the microfinance sector as a whole was evaluated, 
and this constituted the ex-ante RIA part of the study. The specific research methods, the 
data-collection techniques and the data-analysis process employed in addressing the study 
objectives are outlined in subsequent sections.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised in the manner that it first outlines the analytical 
framework for both the micro (ex-post) and macro (ex-ante) assessment, before explaining 
the data-collection techniques for both cases. The rationale is that whatever data were 
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collected and/or data-collection technique was followed needed to fit the objectives of the 
research and the analytical framework.      
 
4.2.1 The analytical framework 
 
The impact assessment was done within the RIA framework. Kirkpatrick (2001) describes 
RIA as a tool that provides a method for assessing the benefits and costs of existing or 
potential regulatory measures. He elaborates that “regulatory impact assessment includes 
both regulatory appraisal and regulatory evaluation, where regulatory appraisal is used to 
describe the ex-ante assessment of proposed new or revised regulations, and regulatory 
evaluation refers to the ex-post assessment of existing regulations” (Kirkpatrick, 2001: 8). 
This was considered an appropriate analytical framework for this thesis, which undertook 
both ex-ante (i.e. regulatory appraisal) and ex-post (regulatory evaluation) impact 
assessments. RIA is however an “umbrella term often used to describe differing 
methodologies aimed at evaluating regulatory impact” (Staschen et al., 2012: 1) and as such 
a selection of a suitable RIA analytical method had to be made for this research. The ROI 
approach developed by Staschen in 2010 referred to earlier was selected and applied to this 
study. The method appealed to the researcher as the best method for the study, mainly 
because it is specifically tailored to microfinance (Stachen, 2010; Staschen et al., 2012) and 
it has been tested on another country already (Uganda), i.e. it was developed specifically for 
conducting impact assessments for financial inclusion regulation, which includes 
microfinance regulation, and which is the subject matter of this study. This was 
complemented by a cost-benefit analysis. The two approaches are discussed in sections 
4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.3. 
 
4.2.1.1 Explaining the process of the ROI approach  
 
Developed on the basis of the public interest theory, which stipulates that financial regulation 
should only be imposed if there is an obvious economic rationale for it, “a ROI assessment 
provides a pragmatic framework through which to conduct an examination of the 
consequences of a policy or regulatory choice(s) and assess the positive and negative 
impacts of existing or potential regulatory measures” (Staschen et al., 2012:1). The ROI also 
advocates the need for regulatory impact to be measured against a benchmark with a clear 
causal link to the rationale for regulation (Staschen, 2010). Staschen et al. (2012) have 
broken up the ROI approach for a particular regulatory intervention into six steps, as 
illustrated below. This study has adopted this approach in its analysis. 
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As a first step, the study identified the main rationale for the regulatory intervention, which 
according to Staschen (2010) is generally market failure. In the case of this thesis, this was 
possible to determine from the policy documents and the draft amendment act (BIA). This 
was followed by a process of defining the public interest objectives linked to market failure 
as a second step.  
 
Staschen (2010) has identified five public interest objectives for microfinance regulation, 
each of which is targeted at alleviating market failures, counteracting their negative 
consequences, or protecting market participants against their negative consequences. 
These are (1) the promotion of the safety and soundness of MFIs, (2) guarding against 
systemic risk, (3) establishing a competitive market, (4) protecting consumers and (5) 
improving access.  
 
The researcher reviewed the related policy documents for Namibia and the specific bill (draft 
amended BIA) to compare and spot any additional objectives that might not have been part 
of the above listed ones, but the process yielded nothing different from the literature. The bill 
specifies two regulatory objectives, namely enhancing access to finance and protection of 
depositors, while some of its provisions also contain elements of the other three objectives of 
promoting the safety and soundness of the MFIs, guarding against systemic risk and 
enhancing competition. The potential performance of the draft amended BIA was therefore 
then assessed in terms of the possibility of it attaining the identified public interest objectives.  
 
The third step was to identify the quantitative and qualitative indicators for use in measuring 
the regulatory impact. The study therefore measured the potential regulatory impact on the 
above listed objectives (i.e. the likelihood of achieving the objectives), using a set of impact 
indicators, which are presented later in this chapter as tables 4.2 and 4.3. The main 
assessment criterion was whether regulation would lead to progress in the indicators and 
therefore achieve the regulatory objectives or not.   
 
The fourth step concerned the actual collection of data on those indicators, while the actual 
measurement of the impact using the indicators then followed as the fifth step. The last step 
was to draw recommendations from the findings of the assessment, which can then be used 
for policy making, as presented in Chapter 9 of the thesis. Table 4.1 below graphically 
presents the above-discussed steps for ease of reference. 
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Table 4.1: Six steps of the ROI approach 
 
1 Rationale 
What is the rationale for the 
regulation? 4 
Collect data (quantitative and 
qualitative) on the chosen indicators 
2 Objectives 
What are the objectives of the 
particular regulation? 5 Assess the impact of the regulation 
3 Indicators 
Which indicators can be used to 
assess the regulatory impact?  6 
Apply the findings to policy-making 
decisions 
Define assessment benchmark Determine impact 
  
Source: Adapted from (Staschen et al., 2012: 1) 
 
 
The above table illustrates that to assess the impact of regulation, two basic issues must be 
addressed, namely defining a ‘benchmark’ against which to measure regulatory success, 
and isolating the impact of regulatory change from other changes in the market occurring at 
the same time, i.e. the ‘attribution’ of regulatory impact, especially in the case of the ex-post 
assessment. This is an aspect discussed under Section 4.2.1.2 of this chapter. The 
benchmark for measuring impact has already been defined by the ROI as being what the 
regulation intends to achieve. Therefore, the benchmark for this assessment part of the 
study was taken to be the degree to which the identified regulatory objectives are likely to be 
achieved.  
 
4.2.1.2 Selection and evaluation of impact indicators 
 
This process differentiated between the ex-ante and ex-post impact assessments as follows:  
 
(a) Indicators for the ex-post impact assessment (i.e. assessment of the impact of 
the existing BIA on a regulated MFI)  
 
As stated earlier, the ex-post assessment involved the use of a case study (a single case 
study) to determine what the impact of the existing regulatory framework (i.e. the existing 
BIA under which DMFIs are regulated) has been on the microfinance sector. The focus was 
therefore on the performance of the MFI and the study used the performance indicators 
adapted from the model developed by Staschen (2010), especially those on which data were 
available, as listed in Table 4.2 below. 
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 Table 4.2: Performance indicators and sub-indicators used for quantitative analysis 
 
Indicator Sub-indicator  Definition 
 
Profitability ROA (%) Profit (loss) from operations after tax/average 
assets 
ROE (%) Profit (loss) from operations after tax/average 
equity 
 
Leverage 
ratios 
Debt to equity ratio (%) Total liabilities/total equity 
 
Capital ratios Capital/asset ratio (%) Total equity/total assets 
 
Portfolio 
quality 
Portfolio at risk (PAR) >30 
days/gross portfolio (%) 
Value of outstanding loan balance with 
payments past due > 30 days (end of period)/ 
value of outstanding loans (end of period) 
 
Access Number of borrowers Number of active loan clients (end of period) 
Total savings Total short-term deposits (end of period) 
Number of savers Total number of clients with savings (end of 
period) 
 
Efficiency Operating expense ratio (%) Operating expense/average gross loan 
portfolio 
 
Liquidity Liquid ratio (%) (Cash and near cash + deposits in banks + 
short-term investments)/total assets 
 
Source: Adapted from Staschen (2010) 
 
 
The process involved examining the annual evolution of each of the quantitative indicators 
as well as analysing the indicators of the qualitative factors. The focus was on changes in 
the impact indicators instead of their absolute levels. The outcomes were then related to the 
regulatory objectives to measure their potential achievement.  
 
The impact indicators were further benchmarked to the scale of the Morgan Stanley 
developed approach for assessing credit risk in the microfinance industry (the Morgan 
Stanley Credit Analysis and Rating Methodology of Microfinance Institutions) to see how the 
MFI compared to others elsewhere. The outcome was also compared to commercial banks 
with whom the MFI has been regulated under the same banking law to further verify the 
aspect of regulatory impact. This addressed the first category of the primary research 
objective of determining the impact of the regulatory framework on the microfinance sector, 
i.e. the ex-post RIA.  
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While the use of the above indicators gave an indication of the changes in the performance 
of the case study MFI over time, an additional important duty of the research was to 
determine the attribution of impact to regulation, especially as this case study assessment 
was an ex-post assessment. This aspect is a key difference between the ex-post 
assessment and the ex-ante assessment, which did not require any attribution of impact.  
 
The aspect of attributing regulatory impact seeks an answer to the question of how to ensure 
that what is observed is attributable to the specific regulation. The emphasis is on the need 
to isolate the impact of a specific regulatory intervention from other changes in the market 
occurring at the same time (such as changes in the macro-economic environment, policies in 
other areas such as tax or even political stability), i.e. controlling for other exogenous 
changes happening at the same time (Staschen et al., 2012). Achieving this, together with 
the measured performance of the MFI (through the performance indicators), helped address 
the first part of the primary research objective of determining the impact of the regulatory 
framework on microfinance. As Coglianese (2012) puts it, to say that a regulation works (or 
has not worked) is to attribute it causally to positive (or negative) changes in indicators. 
 
To isolate the regulatory impact and attribute changes to the intervention, the ROI 
assessment may either use a control group not subject to the same regulatory treatment, or 
identify a structural break caused by the treatment using trend data (Staschen et al., 2012). 
The ideal approach of conducting an impact assessment is actually the use of a control 
group in a ‘double difference’ method, i.e. the difference-in-difference method (Staschen, 
2010). In the case of this thesis, this method would have compared the treated MFI (i.e. the 
regulated MFI) with a non-treated entity/entities), before and after the treatment (i.e. before 
and after it became a regulated entity). However, due to the small market size and hence the 
unavailability of data for a counterfactual (i.e. the treated MFI having been the only true MFI 
with its magnitude and thereby a lack of an identifiable control case) that rendered the use of 
statistical techniques such as regression or correlation analysis impossible, the researcher 
had to adopt an analytical approach that relied on something other than evidence for the 
counterfactual to make a causal inference, i.e. the ‘modus operandi’ method of 
demonstrating causality.  
 
The essence of this method is the ability to demonstrate, through a process of elimination of 
other possible causes, that the treatment caused the outcome (Mohr, 1999). This process is 
possible given the fact that it relies on the idea that each possible cause has a ‘signature’ 
and if the signatures of other possible factors can be proven to have been absent while that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
of the treatment was present, then the cause can be established (Mohr, 1999). The 
approach therefore aspires to establish instances of causality through what is referred to as 
‘physical causation’, i.e. through demonstrating persuasively that a particular kind of physical 
connection took place as opposed to ‘factual causation’ that relies on a counterfactual 
claim69 (Mohr, 1999). The thesis has combined this approach with the structural breaks 
method (in the case of variables where data are available) to form an alternative to the 
difference-in-difference method of impact attribution.  
 
Staschen (2010) refers to structural breaks as a less-demanding method in terms of data 
availability, as time series data are only needed for the treatment group (or in the case of this 
thesis, the treatment case, i.e. the regulated MFI) and that it can be an alternative to the 
difference-indifference analysis when the availability of data is much better for the treatment 
group (or for the treatment case in the case of this thesis). According to Staschen et al. 
(2012), the structural breaks method can be applied provided one is confident that the most 
important change during the observation period has been the change in regulatory 
treatment. They explain that the method requires time series data for quantitative indicators 
and qualitative information for at least a few years prior to the treatment year, and that a 
sudden change in trend (i.e. a structural break) in the defined indictors around the time when 
the treatment occurs can then be attributed to the treatment. Accordingly, they posit that the 
only thing that is of interest is those changes that go beyond normal good business practice 
(e.g. the interest is not in the new software system, which would have been bought anyway, 
but only in those new modules that were needed as a result of reporting requirements under 
the new law). The structural breaks approach is therefore consistent with the physical 
attribution concept and therefore it was possible for the two methods to complement each 
other in this process of attributing impact, especially as the concept of structural breaks can 
also be used for qualitative observations. The outcome of this process is presented in 
Chapter 7. 
 
(b) Indicators for the ex-ante impact assessment (i.e. the assessment of the 
potential impact of the envisaged amended BIA on the microfinance sector) 
 
As noted above, the ex-ante assessment (aimed at determining the potential impact of the 
envisaged regulatory framework on the microfinance sector in Namibia) involves the 
appraisal of the likelihood of achieving the regulatory objectives as listed earlier under 
                                                          
69 The notion of factual causation refers to a relation between statements, truths or facts, as opposed to physical causation, 
which refers to a relation between events in the natural world (Strawson, 1985, cited by Mohr, 1999). 
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Section 4.2.1.1. In this assessment scenario, while the objectives are to indicate the 
direction in which a regulation should aim, they cannot say anything about the amount that 
would be appropriate to achieve (Staschen, 2010). As such, judgement of whether a 
proposed regulation would be successful becomes difficult. According to Staschen (2010), 
this requires that more quantified objectives be specified in terms of a series of indicators 
(quantitative and qualitative), as the achievement of some objectives cannot be measured 
directly with a single variable. Staschen (2010) has therefore identified the main broad areas 
of impact indicators for each of the MFI regulatory objectives alluded to earlier, which this 
thesis has adapted, as presented in Table 4.3 below, as a basis for measuring the likelihood 
of achieving the regulatory objectives. The table also presents the rationale for selecting the 
specific indicator(s) in its last column. 
 
Table 4.3: Impact indicators for each of the MFI regulatory objectives 
Regulatory 
objective 
Type of 
indicator 
Indicator(s) Rationale and remark 
1. Promote the 
safety and 
soundness 
of MFIs 
 Performance 
indicators of 
MFIs 
(quantitative) 
 
- Profitability  
- Portfolio quality  
- Capital   
- Liquidity ratios, etc. 
 
Better performance is first and foremost 
good for the MFIs. However, for cases of 
relatively recent regulatory changes (such 
as Namibia), it might be that the impact is 
not yet showing strongly in the data. 
Hence, institutional changes brought about 
by regulation are valuable indicators for the 
future performance of MFIs. 
Institutional 
changes 
- Ownership 
- Governance 
changes 
- Credit information 
sharing systems, 
etc. 
    
2. Guard 
against 
systemic risk 
Quantitative - The number of 
systemic events 
Occurrence of systemic crises can have 
serious consequences for the sector. The 
number of systemic events can provide an 
indication of the incidence of crises 
spreading from one financial institution to 
another, even if these did not lead to 
sector-wide crises.  
Other indirect indicators can also be used 
to assess the probability of future systemic 
events, as listed below. 
Other indirect 
indicators 
- All indicators for 
Objective 1 above 
- Deposit insurance 
system 
- Lender of last resort 
facility 
The best defence against contagion is 
sound financial institutions (and macro-
economic stability, which lies outside the 
reach of financial regulation) (Carmichael 
(2004:107, cited by Staschen, 2010). 
Therefore, all indicators for Objective 1 
were used as proxy indicators for this 
objective, as well as indicators such as the 
deposit insurance system, which should 
reduce depositors’ incentives to run on an 
MFI and lender of last resort facility, which 
reduces contagion risk through the credit 
channel. 
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Regulatory 
objective 
Type of 
indicator 
Indicator(s) Rationale and remark 
3. Establish a 
competitive 
market 
Indicators for 
market 
saturation and 
structure-
related 
measures  
- Number and volume 
of loans/savings 
accounts  
- Number of branches 
- Concentration ratio 
or Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index 
 
In addition to quantitative indicators that 
measure market saturation and structure of 
the market, institutional changes brought 
about by regulation can be used as indirect 
measures of competition to indicate 
aspects such as increased barriers to 
entry, etc. 
In the case of this thesis, where the 
regulatory framework is yet to come into 
effect, and hence the assessment being 
ex-ante, the focus was more on institutional 
changes. 
 
Institutional 
changes 
- Licensing conditions 
and procedures  
- Openness to foreign 
participation 
    
4. Protect 
consumers 
Quantitative - Number and type of 
consumer 
grievances, and 
redress mechanisms 
employed 
Measured in three core consumer 
protection principles: (transparency, fair 
treatment and effective recourse).  
 
Statutory provisions specifically dealing 
with consumer protection are good 
indicators, as well as financial literacy 
programmes that measured the capability 
of consumers to process information 
offered to them. 
Qualitative - Customer 
satisfaction surveys 
- Changes in 
consumer protection 
regime 
- Consumer 
empowerment and 
financial literacy 
    
5. Improve 
access 
Breadth of 
access 
- Number of clients 
reached  
- Volume of various 
financial products 
- Number of various 
financial products 
sold. 
Access has various dimensions: depth, 
breadth, scope and length of access 
(Schreiner, 2002, cited by Staschen, 2010). 
The number of clients reached is further to 
be broken down by repeat clients and new 
clients. 
 
In the case of this thesis, where the impact 
assessment was ex-ante, the focus was on 
the expected direction of impact. The same 
is true for other indicators of improving 
access discussed below (i.e. depth of 
access, length of access and scope of 
access). 
 
Depth of 
access  
- Loan size  
- Geographical reach 
of financial services 
For microfinance, the depth of access 
measures whether or not MFIs are 
reaching poorer clients. 
 
Length of 
access  
- All indicators for 
Objective 1 
 
The bottom line is that an MFI is safe and 
sound; therefore, indicators for Objective 1 
are also indicators for length of access. 
These give an indication of the self-
sustainability of MFIs for long-term survival. 
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Type of 
indicator 
Indicator(s) Rationale and remark 
Scope of 
access 
- Range of products 
offered and their 
characteristics  
Scope of access is defined as the number 
of types of financial contracts supplied 
(Schreiner, 2002:596, cited by Staschen, 
2010). For example, if the regulatory 
change allows MFIs for the first time to 
introduce savings services, this should lead 
to a substantial increase in the scope of 
access. 
 
Characteristics include: individual versus 
group loans, flexibility of repayment 
schedules, tenor, loan amounts, costs, 
collateral requirements for loans, minimum 
balance requirements, interest paid, 
restrictions on withdrawals for savings and 
transaction accounts, etc. 
 
   
Quality of 
access 
 
- Customer 
perceptions of and 
satisfaction with the 
supply of products 
Customer surveys, such as FinScope 
surveys, social performance or impact 
studies, were the source of information for 
this. 
 
Source: Adapted from Staschen (2010) 
 
This ex-ante assessment on the yet-to-be-implemented regulatory framework (provided for 
under the envisaged amended BIA) is a process-tracing approach without quantitative data, 
hence the focus was on determining the likely impact of the provisions of the envisaged 
amended act on the quantitative and qualitative indicators listed in Table 4.3 above after it 
becomes effective (i.e. on what the direction of impact is likely to be). In other words, the 
focus was on determining whether or not the regulatory requirements are likely to lead to 
progress in the respective indicators and hence the potential achievement or non-
achievement of the regulatory objectives. Essentially, the outcome was then compared to 
the possibility of the same situation occurring without the new regulatory framework for 
DMFIs, as a counterfactual. To firm up the results from the above process and enhance the 
validity of the obtained evidence from the ROI process, the analytical process was 
complemented by a cost-benefit analysis, the rationale of which is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
4.2.1.3 Explaining the process of the cost-benefit analysis 
 
The cost-benefit analysis is a widely used tool in financial regulation analysis that not only 
identifies the costs and benefits incurred during the process of regulation, but also how they 
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are distributed between different stakeholders (Carrasco, 2006). As introduced under 
Section 4.2.1, a cost-benefit analysis complemented the ROI (i.e. the main analytical method 
for this study) in the RIA process. This was necessitated by the fact that while the ROI 
approach would allow for the measurement of benefits of regulation (defined here as the 
progress in the achievement of any of the regulatory objectives), it would not provide 
information on the costs caused by regulation.  
 
The process of regulation incurs costs for market participants, i.e. the regulator, regulated 
institutions and the wider economy, and costs change the behaviour of market participants 
and therefore the achievement of regulatory objectives (Staschen, 2010). Therefore, to 
provide a complete picture of the RIA, the study also attempted to perform a cost analysis 
and identify potential main costs to be incurred by those stakeholders.  
 
Literature has identified the likely costs of regulation to include institutional costs (relating to 
the expenditure of the regulator), compliance costs (incurred by regulated institutions in 
complying with regulatory requirements) and structural or indirect costs that arise as a result 
of market failures (Staschen, 2010). The researcher therefore attempted to identify the 
various provisions of the proposed new microfinance regulatory framework that are likely to 
result in those type of costs and performed an analysis of their expected direction of impact. 
The aim of doing this was therefore not to derive a figure for the net social benefit of the 
regulation, but to list major costs created by individual regulatory provisions. This is because 
the same limitation of not having quantifiable information, mentioned earlier in the case of 
measuring the achievement of regulatory objectives, given it was an ex-ante appraisal, is 
also applicable here.  
 
In an ex-post assessment scenario, quantifiable information on the expenditure of the 
regulator would have been sourced from the regulator (the BoN), while those on the costs of 
regulatory compliance would have been obtained from regulated MFIs. In the current 
scenario, only qualitative information could be collected through interviews with both the 
regulator and MFIs that are potential entrants to the industry once the new regulatory 
framework comes into effect. The identified cost indicators were then compared with the 
benefits derived from the ROI approach, i.e. a cost-benefit analysis was carried out. It is 
acknowledged that there were some limitations in the process of identifying the costs, but 
the researcher is confident that some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. 
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4.3 DATA-COLLECTION METHODS  
 
Appropriate data collection was a significant element of this study. In this regard, a 
comprehensive questionnaire was prepared (see Appendix A) and administered to some 
selected MFIs as well as interviews undertaken with relevant stakeholders to collect the 
necessary data and information. This process took place during the period April 2014 to 
October 2015. The researcher did not follow a random sampling approach, which would 
ideally have been better suited for this study, but employed purposive sampling in that the 
selection of participating MFIs was done on consideration of the size of the local industry 
and the research questions and objectives.  
 
During selection the intended goals and objectives of the regulator for introducing the 
regulatory provisions to regulate MFIs were also taken into consideration, as these provided 
a lead in terms of which MFIs are potential candidates for regulation under the amended BIA 
going forward. As such, the selection process also engaged the regulators and took their 
views into consideration in terms of which type of institutions they are targeting for 
regulation. This was a necessary process to undertake, as confirmed by Garbarino and 
Holland (2009: 20):  
 
Your results (as good and rigorous as they may be) will not feed back into policy if 
government and other stakeholders do not have ownership of the process and the 
results … hence the process of building ownership ... amongst policy makers and 
bureaucrats early and sustainably into the research process is key to ownership and 
traction of the impact evaluation.  
 
Participants in the survey were therefore purposively selected (refer to the next paragraph 
on who they were and why they were selected). The selection of interviewees also followed 
the same approach, i.e. interviewees were selected based on purposive sampling, covering 
executives from regulatory authorities, executives of MFIs, experts on the subject and 
practices of microfinance as well as other relevant stakeholders to the subject matter, such 
as relevant industry associations and policy makers (refer to interviewee list in Appendix D). 
An interview guide was prepared (as presented in Appendix C) to guide the process.  
 
While, inherently, purposive sampling can produce biased findings resulting from the 
selection process because of the fact that participants may be chosen out of convenience as 
the researcher exercises judgement in the selection process, the method can also produce 
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reliable and robust data (Tongco, 2007). Its strength lies in its intentional bias (Bernard, 
2002; Lewis & Sheppard, 2006; Poggie, 1972 and Tremblay, 1957, as cited by Tongco, 
2007). As Tongco (2007) notes, what comes out of the research process depends on the 
research question and objectives of the research, while it is also important to ensure that 
care is exercised in the interpretation of the results such that they are not applied beyond the 
sampled population. In the case of this study, which aimed to determine the potential of 
developing a specific industry (i.e. the deposit-taking microfinance industry) through 
regulation, the researcher believes that the purposive sampling process described above 
has produced reliable findings.  
 
In line with the above explanation, the scope of the MFIs selected and surveyed for the study 
was reduced. As noted earlier in Chapter 2, there are different categorisations of MFIs in 
Namibia. They range from unregulated savings-mobilising MFIs such as NGOs to a 
regulated deposit-taking microfinance bank and regulated microlending institutions (i.e. cash 
and term lenders) and SACCOs. For this thesis, the scope of MFIs survey was limited to the 
categories considered relevant to the aim of the study. Therefore, it only took into 
consideration MFIs that are likely to be impacted (positively or negatively) by the specific 
regulation that is the subject matter of this thesis, i.e. the draft amendment BIA that has 
provided for the regulation of DMFIs. Based on the regulatory objective of facilitating the 
growth and development of the microfinance industry in the country to finance SMEs as well 
as the insight from the regulators on who the targeted institutions are, the focus of the survey 
was on the credit-only microlenders that operate on a term basis in terms of loan repayment 
(eight institutions supervised by NAMFISA).  
 
The survey also focused on the only existing microfinance bank regulated by the BoN to 
provide a picture of the performance of a regulated DMFI, which is the subject matter of 
Chapter 7. As indicated earlier, use was made of both quantitative data and qualitative 
information, i.e. aspects that were found not quantifiable are discussed qualitatively. The 
data sources and collection techniques for the different objectives are discussed in sections 
4.3.1 to 4.3.3 below. 
 
4.3.1 Data collection for understanding the state of the microfinance sector and its  
            regulatory framework   
 
In addition to a desk research and documentary review, data to address these two objectives 
was obtained through a survey to MFIs and interviews with relevant stakeholders. In this 
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regard, a standardised questionnaire was used while semi-structured interviews (with senior 
executives of regulated institutions, regulators, experts in the field of microfinance, policy 
makers as well as other interest groups) and documentary reviews were also undertaken.  
 
The interviews were further recorded on voice recorder (except in the case where 
respondents objected), transcribed and analysed. This process yielded data and information 
including those on the characteristics of MFIs, their legal arrangements, products and 
services offered, performance of MFIs, and perceptions on the current and envisaged legal 
environment. The aim was to gauge information from a cross section of stakeholders and 
use that to address the research objectives.  
 
4.3.2 Data collection for the ex-post regulatory impact assessment (existing    
            regulatory framework on a regulated MFI as a case study) 
 
To make a good case study requires a collection of information from a range of sources 
(Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler, 2011). Blumberg et al. (2011) suggest three methods of 
data collection for a case study, namely interview, documentary review and observation. The 
data required for the case study MFI were those on the performance indicators of this MFI, 
as identified earlier under the analytical framework (under Section 4.2.1.2), as well as 
relevant qualitative information to clarify and back up the data.  
 
The quantitative data were obtained from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) 
Market database (MX, no date), which hosts performance data of MFIs, as this MFI used to 
submit its data to MIX Market. The researcher also obtained reports and annual financial 
statements of FIDES, which provided additional information. Being a staff member of the 
regulatory body, the researcher was also able to obtain insight information from discussions 
with staff in the supervisory department of the regulator involved in the on-site and off-site 
supervision. Qualitative information was obtained through both a survey sent out to the 
regulated MFI and interviews with its staff and other stakeholders involved with the MFI, 
such as board members and regulating authority staff.  
 
4.3.3 Collection of information for the ex-ante regulatory impact assessment 
(amended BIA on microfinance sector) 
 
Information used for this assessment was obtained through the same survey and interview 
processes discussed under Section 4.3.1 that fed the process of understanding the state of 
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the microfinance sector of Namibia and its regulatory framework. Important to mention is that 
the focus here was on MFIs that are potential candidates for regulation under the proposed 
new microfinance regulatory framework (i.e. the draft amendment BIA). In this regard, semi-
structured interviews with senior executives of the MFIs that are potential candidates for 
regulation under the proposed new framework as well as experts in the field of microfinance, 
regulators and policy makers) were conducted.70 As mentioned in Section 4.3.1 above, 
interviews were recorded on a voice recorder, except in the case where respondents 
objected, transcribed and analysed. Being a staff member of the regulatory body that will 
administer the envisaged regulatory framework, the researcher was also able to perform 
documentary/report reviews (such as policy documents, the draft amended bill itself and its 
draft implementing determinations as well as relevant internal correspondences pertaining to 
the discussions that led to the development of the draft amendment BIA) and obtain 
insightful information from discussions with relevant staff.  
 
This process yielded information including that on why the specific proposed approach of 
amending the BIA to provide for the regulation of MFIs was taken instead of any other 
approach, such as creating a specific legislation for MFI regulation, etc., what the objectives 
are for providing for MFI regulation in this form, the legal requirements imposed by the draft 
amendment BIA on MFIs, the expected outcomes of regulating MFIs through the envisaged 
legal environment and the perceptions of stakeholders on the likelihood of achieving the 
intended objectives.  
 
4.3.4 Aligning the data-collection methods and survey design to the research 
objectives 
 
It was ensured that the above data-collection methods employed as well as the design of the 
survey and interview instruments mirrored the research objectives. Table 4.4 below presents 
how the data-collection methods were aligned to the research objectives.  
 
                                                          
70 Due to time limitation and therefore unavailability, three of the identified interviewees requested to respond to questions in 
writing. 
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Table 4.4: Data-collection methods as aligned to research objectives  
 
Research 
objective 
Research method Justification 
 
Obtain an 
understanding of 
MFIs and the 
environment in 
which they operate  
Questionnaire survey, 
in-depth interviews 
with relevant 
stakeholders (such as 
top executives of 
MFIs, BoN & 
NAMFISA employees, 
bankers association, 
microfinance experts, 
etc.) and documentary 
reviews  
The questionnaire survey allowed the researcher 
to gauge information from surveyed entities and 
what the spread of any particular respondent’s 
insight was. Most importantly, it allowed for 
comparison of views collected. In-depth interviews 
provided an opportunity for follow-ups and 
revealed respondents’ insights into the 
environment, challenges and opportunities. 
 
The two methods were then triangulated, so as to 
ensure the corroboration of findings and enhance 
the validity of obtained data/information. 
  
Documentary reviews provided additional facts in 
term of which stakeholder consensus has been 
reached through consultations, etc. 
Research 
objective 
Research method Justification 
Obtain an 
understanding of 
the regulatory and 
supervisory 
framework of 
Namibia 
Questionnaire survey, 
interviews and 
documentary reviews 
The questionnaire survey allowed the researcher 
to obtain vital information from MFIs who were 
also consulted. The questionnaire was structured 
to reflect variables that were of interest to the 
study. The interviews revealed more insight and 
clarity, such as the views of regulators (BoN as 
current regulator of DMFIs and NAMFISA as 
current supervisor of microlending institutions) on 
the regulated and supervised entities and possible 
challenges and opportunities in as far as the 
regulated industry is concerned as well as those of 
experts in the field of microfinance. They provided 
an opportunity for follow-ups. 
 
Assess the 
(potential) impact 
of regulation and 
supervision on the 
microfinance 
sector 
- Ex-ante 
assessment: survey, 
interviews,  
documentary 
reviews 
 
 
 
 
 
- Ex-post assessment: 
survey, interviews, 
documentary review, 
observation   
 
 
ROI assessment and  
cost-benefit analysis  
A survey and the interviews were important in 
providing required information from the selected 
entities to feed the ROI impact indicators. This was 
complemented by other techniques, as listed 
under that section. 
The documentary review process revealed insight 
into the regulatory objectives, etc.   
 
The data-collection techniques listed under the ex-
post assessment section provided data on the 
performance indicators and for statistical analysis. 
 
 
The ROI was useful in the analysis of the collected 
data and evaluation of the performance of the 
existing regulatory framework as well as the 
potential impact of the draft amended BIA. The 
cost-benefit analysis assisted in performing a 
systematic appraisal of the potential costs and 
benefits associated with the envisaged new 
regulation.  
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Apart from the above outlined data-collection methods and techniques, the study also 
benefitted from previous study findings on the Namibian microfinance sector as well as the 
researcher’s personal insight from involvement in the NFSS 2011–2021 as coordinator and 
secretariat, both during the drafting stages of the strategy and the ongoing implementation 
process. 
 
4.3.5 Coding of data 
 
To preserve the confidentiality aspect of data and information collected, some 
data/information obtained from the survey and interviews as well as from unpublished 
documents (such as internal reports and papers) were coded using a simple coding system. 
The principle used in coding the data was that of determining who the source is (institution or 
individual and under what category they fall), what type of information it is (e.g. policy 
document, legislation, unpublished paper), how many documents were obtained falling 
under that category or how many people were interviewed from that specific institution and 
what number was allocated to that specific interviewee or document. The list of coded 
unpublished documents is provided in Appendix E and that for interviewees is in Appendix F. 
 
4.3.6 Ethical considerations 
 
As indicated under Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 above, one of the aspects that facilitated the 
data collection and information gathering for the study was the fact that the researcher was a 
staff member of the regulatory body (i.e. the central bank) that has initiated the creation of 
the envisaged regulatory framework for DMFIs under the BIA amendment bill, and that will 
administer the envisaged act once enacted. As such, the researcher was able to perform 
documentary/report reviews and obtain insightful information from discussions with relevant 
staff. Although this may not be viewed as an impartial research process and therefore may 
be viewed as a potential research bias, the process did not create any conflict of interest in 
the data gathering and analysis, as the information so collected was already in existence, 
created for other purposes and was just used as secondary sources. As such, being an 
insider was rather a mixed blessing, as it helped the researcher to obtain direct access to the 
necessary information and main actors related to the subject of the research.  
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4.4 CONCLUSION ON THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
The overall process of the research involved the following main phases: short meetings with 
some of the selected participants to clarify the objectives and scope of the study, 
administration of the survey questionnaire, desk research including documentary reviews, 
stakeholder interviews, and analysis and report writing. It is clear from the above that the 
study did not perform a regression analysis. However, the researcher believes that the 
methods outlined above have been sufficient to bring some useful conclusions and support 
the arguments to answer the research questions and support the analysis of this thesis. 
 
The following chapter appraised the microfinance sector in Namibia with the aim of obtaining 
a better understanding of the nature and state of regulated MFIs and/or those to be 
regulated under the envisaged microfinance regulatory framework. This was deemed 
important to ensure a meaningful analysis of the impact that was performed under Chapters 
7 and 8. 
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CHAPTER 5 
APPRAISING THE STATE AND NATURE OF MICROFINANCE IN 
NAMIBIA 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter aims to appraise the Namibian microfinance sector (in terms of its nature, 
scope, structure and performance) with a view to address the research question of obtaining 
a better understanding of the microfinance sector in Namibia. It draws on the results of the 
survey, interviews, administrative reports and documentary review. The rest of the chapter is 
organised as follows: Section 5.2 sketches the current setup of the microfinance sector in 
Namibia (using administrative reports and documentary review information) as background 
to the subsequent appraisal of the sector, while Section 5.3 appraises the sector through the 
results of the fieldwork with a view to gaining an understanding of the potential for 
developing it. Section 5.4 presents the implications of the fieldwork findings for designing a 
regulatory framework for the sector, followed by the chapter conclusion in Section 5.5.  
 
5.2 THE SETUP OF NAMIBIA’S MICROFINANCE SECTOR   
 
Microfinance is provided by different types of institutions that can be classified into formal, 
semiformal and informal (Srnec, Divišová, & Svobodová, 2008). Van Greuning et al. (1998) 
categorise formal MFIs into SACCOs, credit unions, incorporated NGOs or windows and 
departments created by commercial banks for small businesses; and informal MFIs to 
include ROSCAs, various groupings that pool members’ savings for loans, village banks and 
money lenders. Most of these categories also prevail in Namibia, i.e. there have been 
formal, semiformal and informal microfinance providers and/or profit- and non-profit-seeking 
MFIs in the country. The focus of this thesis was on the formal or registered institution 
component of MFIs, given its emphasis on regulatory matters. The current formal 
microfinance sector of Namibia can be categorised into deposit-taking or savings-mobilising 
and non-deposit-taking (or credit-only) MFIs. Informed by administrative reports and 
documentary review information, the structure and performance of each of these categories 
are discussed below. The aim is to provide an overview of the current setup of the sector 
before appraising its state, performance and potential for further development in subsequent 
sections. 
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 5.2.1 Deposit-taking or savings-mobilising microfinance institutions 
 
At the time of conducting this research, there was only one deposit-taking microfinance 
banking institution in Namibia, which until the end of August 2014 was called FIDES Bank 
Namibia (FIDES), but was taken over by the Trustco Group Holdings Limited and is now 
called the Trustco Bank Namibia Limited (BoN, 2014). FIDES was granted a license by the 
BoN in 2010 after having been a microfinance pilot project called Koshi Yomuti71 since 2002 
(FIDES, 2010). Before it was licensed, Koshi Yomuti used to operate only in the north 
central, underserved regions of the country, where it managed to demonstrate that savings 
and loans village associations can be sustainable even in low-density rural areas (FIDES, 
2010). The need for licensing therefore followed the successful operations as a project and 
the extent at which savings were being mobilised (FIDES, 2010).  
 
Being a specialised microfinance bank, FIDES had been viewed as the only ‘true’ MFI 
operating in Namibia; providing a comprehensive package of microfinance products and 
services, including microloans and microsavings products to empower micro and small 
entrepreneurs. It had further developed a micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) 
facility offering, lending to established micro-enterprises, and kept its focus on the low end of 
the market (FIDES, 2010). This comprehensive package and offering are not only in line with 
the desirable definition of microfinance outlined earlier under the literature chapter, but also 
augurs well with the type of offering advocated by the country’s Financial Sector Strategy 
(i.e. the need to have MFIs serving SMEs).  
 
The total assets of FIDES stood at approximately N$40 million, while it had close to 13 000 
active borrowers at the end of 2012 (FIDES, 2012). Its gross loan portfolio was 
approximately N$32 million at the end of that period. More than 70 per cent of the loan book 
comprised of loans to micro entrepreneurs through loan and savings associations, with the 
remaining portion belonging to SME borrowers (FIDES, 2012). The majority of loans were in 
rural areas (85 per cent), with 13 per cent in peri-urban areas and 2 per cent in urban areas 
(FIDES, 2012). Through its primary savings product “Step-Up Savings,” the bank had 
managed to grow its savings portfolio to approximately 50 per cent of its loan portfolio 
(FIDES, 2012). Discussions with relevant stakeholders (i.e. those attached to the new bank 
and regulators) in this regard seemed to suggest that the new bank may not strictly follow 
the exact model and approach of FIDES going forward.  
                                                          
71 Koshi Yomuti can be literally translated as meaning ‘banking under the tree’.   
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The other forms of savings-mobilising MFIs are the registered SACCOs and NGO-
sponsored MFIs. Their common characteristics relate to the mobilisation of savings from 
their members and allocation of credit to the same. In Namibia, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Forestry supervises SACCOs. The Ministry has created a division, called the 
Division of Cooperative Development (DCD) to regulate and supervise the activities of these 
institutions, in accordance with the Co-operatives Act, Act No. 23 of 1996. The information 
provided by the Ministry showed that there were more than a hundred registered 
cooperatives in Namibia, of which only five can be referred to as pure SACCOs that were 
operational at the time of writing this research. Others were multipurpose cooperatives,72 
involved with production activities in different sectors of the economy, mainly in agriculture 
and manufacturing. Financial information on the SACCOs were scant, with available data for 
most of them being outdated. In addition, some registered SACCOs had been dormant. 
Table 5.1 below shows the number as well as the membership and savings status of 
registered SACCOs in Namibia at the time. 
 
Table 5.1: Registered savings and credit cooperatives in Namibia 
 
 
Name of co-operative Members 
Savings 
balance (N$) 
Status 
1 
Nantu-Likwafela Co-operative 
Ltd 
29 73 513.12  Active 
2 
Kwamashi Savings & Credit 
Cooperative Ltd 
11 694.94  Dormant 
3 
Windhoek Savings & Credit 
Cooperative Ltd 
7 28 220.00  
Newly registered 
and active 
4 Credo Co-operative Ltd 73 Unknown  
Due to delay in 
audit 
5 
Khorixas Savings and Credit 
Co-operative Ltd 
20 Unknown  Dormant 
6 
Okatunda ka Haudano 
Savings and Credit Co-
operative Ltd 
123 86 724.66  
Newly registered 
and active 
Total 263 189 152.72  
  
 
Source: Directorate of Cooperative Development of the MAWF73 
 
 
                                                          
72 Members of these cooperatives sell surplus produce and use the income generated to save and have access to credit. 
73 This information was provided by Mr Ruben Isak during the interview on 7 August 2015 [Available e-mail: 
RubenI@mawf.gov.na]. 
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As the name postulates, SACCOs mobilise savings and provide credit to their members. 
Currently, existing ones are mainly executing this function to rural-based members and are 
playing a role in addressing the socio-economic needs of their members. By law (Section 
2(4)(a) and (b) of the BIA) SACCOs may only have a membership of up to 20 people, but as 
can be seen from Table 5.1, some of them have not complied with this provision. They have 
however complied with the requirement of not exceeding a total of N$500 000 mobilised 
savings.  
 
SCAs also exist in Namibia and as with SACCOs, they are also subject to the same Co-
operatives Act, Act No. 23 of 1996 administered by the DCD. SCAs are relatively smaller 
voluntary associations of mostly people at grassroots, village level that operate as self-help 
groups and where members benefit (Besley et al., 1990). Benefits to members can actually 
also take effect on a rotating basis. Besley et al. (1990) identified two main forms of 
ROSCAs, namely a random allocation approach and a bidding approach. They explain that 
in a random allocation approach members put a fixed amount of money into a pot for each 
period of the life of the ROSCA, lots get drawn and the pot is randomly allocated to one of 
the members at a time, with the process repeating itself in the following periods, but 
excluding previous winners every time until each member has received once. At that point, 
the group either gets disbanded or begins over again (Besley et al., 1990). The bidding 
approach on the other hand follows a process whereby priority of who gets the allocation first 
is based on who bids the most in the form of a pledge of higher future contributions to the 
association or one-time side payments to other members (Besley et al., 1990). The DCD 
indicated that there was actually only one registered SCA in Namibia that had transformed 
into a SACCO due to volumes. 
 
According to the DCD staff members to which the researcher spoke, the role of the DCD in 
Namibia was mainly to register and supervise the SACCOs and SCAs, audit their financials 
from time to time and provide training on the basic book-keeping principles74 – an approach 
that has raised questions of the safety of members’ savings. The mandate of the Ministry is 
however to prudentially regulate them, though according to the Ministry, this has proven not 
possible due to both a lack of capacity and the absence of regulatory rules and guidelines. 
The DCD further revealed that the Ministry had attempted to obtain experts to design the 
regulatory rules, but the exercise was found to be very expensive, and that it will continue to 
investigate affordable ways of coming up with the prudential regulatory rules. It is worth 
                                                          
74 This information was revealed through an interview with an official from the DCD, (Mr Ruben Isak,, held on 7 August 2015 
[Available e-mail: RubenI@mawf.gov.na].  
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noting that literature finds the aspect of prudential regulation to be a complex one that needs 
careful consideration, as effective prudential regulation, especially for smaller institutions, 
can be costly and difficult (CGAP, 2006). It argues that small and remote financial institutions 
such as savings and loan cooperatives and member-owned financial cooperatives may likely 
not be effectively supervised. The researcher is therefore of the view that the DCD in 
Namibia should take these facts into account going forward and make an informed decision 
on the best approach for treating SACCOs.   
 
A review of the emergence of microfinance in Namibia done in Chapter 2 showed that 
donors and NGOs have played a role in sponsoring MFIs in Namibia. In addition to having 
initiated Koshi Yomuti, discussed earlier, the Namibia Housing Action Group/ Shack 
Dwellers Federation of Namibia (NHAG/SDFN) that has microfinance activities incorporated 
into their overall welfare programme, also exists in the country. A close look at the 
documents on the operations and activities of the SDFN revealed that, as a member of 
Shack Dwellers International, SDFN was initially a member-based network of housing 
schemes established in 1998 for purposes of providing low-cost housing to the low-income 
people living in shacks and rented rooms or those without any accommodation, but later 
engaged in operating a savings scheme and a loan facility called the Twahangana Loan 
Fund (NHAG/SDFN, 2010/11). Through this loan facility, the SDFN provides funds to the 
poor for income-generating activities in addition to those provided for building houses and 
other services, and the organisation keeps separate financial accounts for each of those 
activities (NHAG/SDFN, 2010/11). Information availed by the organistion shows that it had 
disbursed a total of N$3.3 million on income-generating loans for 1 925 members.75 An 
interview with the organisations’ regional coordinator76 revealed that in order to participate in 
the scheme, potential members are required to form savings groups, which would then 
enable them to borrow as a group, i.e. the organisation applies the group-lending approach 
discussed earlier under the literature review chapter.77 According to information provided by 
the NHAG/SDFN through the survey, the organisation has representation in both rural and 
urban areas and has achieved significant outreach in terms of savings (reaching a value of 
N$14.5 million in 2013), which has in turn enabled it to disburse loans to its members.  
 
                                                          
75 Information was provided through an e-mail received on 20 June 2015.  
76 An interview with the regional coordinator, Mr Heinrich Amushila, was held on 11 November 2014 [Available e-mail:  
hanhag@iway.na. 
77 The group-lending approach refers to a process whereby loans are disbursed to group members instead of to individuals 
(Kodongo & Kendi, 2013).   
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Most of the other donor-sponsored organisations that also engaged in microfinance-related 
activities in earlier years have either stopped their microfinance activity (for example Project 
Hope, which used to provide small loans to women taking care of orphans and vulnerable 
children for emergencies and income-generating purposes) or closed shop (such as the 
case of Canamco Namibia and Lihepurura that were operating in the north-eastern region of 
the country, but also similar others in other regions), mostly at the time of donors 
withdrawing their presence in Namibia.  
 
5.2.2 Non-deposit-taking microfinance institutions 
 
The non-deposit-taking MFIs mainly comprise legally supervised credit-only microlenders 
that include units and/or branches of commercial banks. Regulated and supervised by the 
non-bank regulator, NAMFISA under the Usury Act, Act No. 73 of 1968, microlenders have 
grown in number, reaching 289 institutions by 2014 from 275 in 2012 (NAMFISA, 2015), and 
are scattered in urban centres all over the country. Two of these institutions belong to two 
commercial banks (namely Bank Windhoek and Nedbank Namibia), which created 
separately run entities (BW Finance and Nedloans, respectively, although the latter has 
been deregistered recently). Although commercial banks are registered under the BIA and 
regulated by the BoN, these separate entities fall under the supervision of the NBFI 
supervisory authority (i.e. NAMFISA) and not the BoN, as is the case with all other 
microlending institutions. There is an established association for microlenders in Namibia 
(called the Namibia Microlenders Association), which looks after the interest of its members.  
 
According to NAMFISA, microlenders are further classified into pay-day lenders (i.e. those 
lenders whose loans are repayable over a 30-day period) and term lenders (i.e. whose loans 
are repayable in equal monthly instalments over a period of up to 60 months) (NAMFISA, 
2015a). Pay-day lending institutions are set up by private individuals who provide cash loans 
out of their retained earnings to help salaried individuals to smooth their consumption needs 
(Adongo & Stork, 2005). At the time of writing this thesis, NAMFISA revealed that the 289 
microlenders referred to above include a total of eight term lenders that also mostly lend to 
salaried individuals [UP/P/2/1]. Therefore, the difference between the two categories lies in 
the repayment period, as lending by both of these categories is salary-backed. According to 
NAMFISA (2015a), approximately 209 402 borrowers made use of the services offered by 
microlenders for the period ending 31 December 2012, of which 46 per cent were civil 
servants. Microlending actually constitutes the bulk of lending activity in Namibia in terms of 
volume.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
 
The increased microlending activity has caused considerable controversy in the country. The 
institutions involved are considered exploitative because they are viewed as charging 
exorbitant interest rates78 and mainly lend for consumption purposes. They have been 
referred to as ‘loan sharks’ at times despite the fact that those licensed under the Usury Act 
have to comply with the applicable interest rate caps imposed by that act. In fact, information 
collected through the interviews (as will also be evident later in sections 5.3.5.3 of this 
chapter) revealed that policy makers viewed consumption lending as not being in line with 
the type of lending that would assist the country in its developmental efforts.79 There has 
however also been counterarguments to this from other corners of the country that 
consumption lending too is a necessity that is complementing the income of low-income 
people in times of need, thereby contributing to the Namibian economy in that sense. This 
argument is supported by CGAP (2012), which states that while microcredit clients engage 
in productive activities, their loans are not used only for business purposes, but also for non-
business purposes, such as consumption smoothing and financing of social, medical and 
educational expenses. This notwithstanding, the expressed objective of the NFSS 2011–
2021 is on building MFIs that can lend for entrepreneurial (productive) purposes.  
 
The fact that this type of microlending only caters for salaried individuals has also been 
viewed as not auguring well with the country’s goal of microlending for poverty reduction and 
employment creation through financing micro and small-scale entrepreneurs advocated by 
the Financial Sector Strategy. In terms of the strategy, this goal would be achieved through 
the country developing a solid base of ‘real’ MFIs, as these would better serve the poor and 
small-scale enterprises.  
 
Non-deposit-taking public finance institutions such as the DBN and AgriBank have also been 
providing loans to small businesses, as discussed in Chapter 2, which provided detailed 
activities of these institutions. The government of Namibia, however, took a decision in 2015 
to streamline the public finance activities so that the DBN can move out of that space and 
concentrate on big-scale projects going forward, and so that the recently established SME 
Bank can be the only state-owned financial institution serving the general SME sector,80 
                                                          
78 Most pay-day loans are offered at a benchmark rate of 30 per cent per month in accordance with the Exemption Notice 
requirements (UP/P/1/1).  
79 The Financial Inclusion Council (which comprises of ministers whose ministries are economic-issues related and chaired by 
the prime minister), a committee that oversees the implementation of the NFSS, has expressed this view at several meetings, 
at which the researcher has been serving as secretary.   
80 This is insightful information, as at the time of this research, the researcher was a board member of the DBN, which was 
requested to implement this decision, and the issue was also widely reported on by the media.  
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while AgriBank continues to serve those in the agricultural sector. Work on investigating the 
best way of implementing this decision was ongoing at the time of preparing this research 
report. However, the impact of the recently established SME Bank on the SME sector 
remains to be observed going forward. 
 
5.2.3 Observation on the current setup of the microfinance sector in Namibia 
 
From the above discussion on the current status of the microfinance industry in Namibia, it is 
clear that the Namibian microfinance industry is relatively small and undeveloped, especially 
when compared to what happens in other countries around the globe, especially in Asia, but 
also even in sub-Saharan Africa, where the industries are big in terms of average loan 
amounts disbursed and loan book size. For instance, in neighbouring South Africa, some 
leading MFIs have been disbursing larger amounts of loans, e.g. the Blue Financial 
Services, a leading MFI in product innovation that has disbursed loan amounts of 
approximately N$15 00081 (Calvin & Coetzee, 2009) compared to the average of N$1 000 
disbursed by pay-day lenders and N$13 000 by term lenders [UP/P/2/2]. Further, the 
majority of what is referred to as MFIs in Namibia are the pay-day lenders that lend to salary-
based individuals and especially for consumption purposes. The situation does not augur 
well with the type of MFIs envisaged by Namibia through its Financial Sector Strategy 2011–
2021 and which the country wishes to see developing to better serve the poor and SMEs. 
Therefore, this requires the country to lay a foundation of solid microfinance as opposed to 
the current state. It is for this reason that this thesis sought to establish the role regulation 
can play in the process of laying such foundation, i.e. the thesis aimed to determine whether 
or not regulation will help to institute real MFIs in Namibia. 
 
5.3 UNDERSTANDING THE POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPING THE NAMBIAN 
MICROFINANCE SECTOR: INSIGHT FROM THE FIELDWORK 
  
5.3.1 Introduction  
 
Based on the background of Namibia having taken a decision to develop its microfinance 
sector, especially the deposit-taking microfinance industry to finance SMEs, as discussed 
earlier, this section aims to determine the potential scope for developing such an industry in 
Namibia.  
                                                          
81 The Namibia dollar is pegged one on one to the rand. 
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As noted in the previous section, there are different categorisations of MFIs in Namibia. They 
range from unregulated savings-mobilising MFIs, such as NGOs, to a regulated deposit-
taking microfinance bank and regulated microlending institutions (i.e. pay-day and term 
lenders) and SACCOs. For this thesis, the scope of the MFI survey was limited to the 
categories considered relevant to the objective of the study, i.e. determining the potential 
impact of regulation under the amended BIA on the development of the microfinance sector, 
which was the primary subject matter of this thesis. In this regard, the study was therefore 
confined to MFIs that are likely to be impacted by the envisaged amended BIA, i.e. those 
that have been identified as potential entrants to the deposit-taking industry (which are 
essentially credit-only term-lending institutions) and the one existing DMFI, although the 
details of the regulatory impact on this DMFI will be discussed in Chapter 7, which is solely 
dedicated to it as a case study. Essentially, the aim is to establish whether the proposed 
regulatory provisions will facilitate the intended development of the industry, and hence 
contribute to the development of the overall microfinance sector in Namibian. 
  
5.3.2 The targeted and surveyed segment of the sector  
 
As indicated in Section 5.3.1 above, the analysis in this section of the chapter focuses on the 
credit-only term-lending microlenders, i.e. the category of microlenders that provide loans for 
repayment over a period of up to 60 months, while that of the country’s only DMFI is to be 
discussed in Chapter 7. Also as indicated above, these credit-only term lenders are currently 
non-prudentially registered and supervised by the country’s non-banking financial sector 
supervisory authority, NAMFISA. This supervisory approach is in line with arguments 
normally advanced in literature (CGAP, 2012; Chance, 2011) that prudential regulation 
should be risk-based, as complying with prudential regulatory rules can be too burdensome 
for credit-only MFIs.  It is therefore often argued in literature that credit-only MFIs should not 
be prudentially regulated because they are either too small such that even if they should fail 
they would have limited impact on the soundness of the financial system, or because their 
regulatory costs tend to be higher, both in terms of supervisory cash costs for the supervisor 
and supervised and in terms of stifling innovation and outreach (CGAP, 2000). However, as 
they move into the deposit-taking sphere, the classical justifications for prudential regulation 
that include the protection of the financial system and small depositors and/or managing the 
country’s money supply become applicable (CGAP, 2000). It is further becoming 
increasingly clear that the optimal potential of microfinance “lies in a licensed setting 
because it is only that setting that can permit massive and sustainable delivery of financial 
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services to the poor” (CGAP, 2000: 2). This is because when credit is combined with savings 
(allowed by regulation), MFIs can reach a large segment of individuals and SMEs.  
 
In the context of this thesis, the selection to focus on this category of MFIs (i.e. credit-only 
term-lending MFIs) was not only based on the fact that the focus for the regulatory provision 
for MFIs in the amended BIA is on the potential for microlending institutions that have grown 
and therefore have the capacity to become DMFIs, as has been identified through the 
documentary review process, but the researcher also considered the link between term 
lending and the role of credit in economic growth, which ties in well with the earlier discussed 
reason expressed by Namibia for wanting to develop its microfinance sector.  
 
In an article that explains aspects relating to bank capital and liquidity, the Bank of England’s 
third quarterly bulletin of 2013 explains this relationship as follows (2013: 202):  
 
Borrowers frequently need sizable longer-term loans to fund investments, but those with 
surplus funds may individually have smaller amounts and many want swifter access to 
some or all of their money. By accepting deposits from many customers, banks are able 
to funnel savers’ funds to customers that wish to borrow. So, in effect, banks turn many 
small deposits of a short-term maturity into fewer longer-term loans.  
  
From the above it can be deduced that term lending ensures the supply of financing with 
long-term maturities to meet the growing investment needs of the real economy. Moreover, 
the ability to repay a loan over a much longer period accorded to businesses through term 
lending provides an opportunity for businesses to expand their supply capabilities and/or the 
range of their business. Hence, without implying that short-term loans are not important, 
Kpodar and Gbenyo (2010) point to the existence of a theoretical basis for the hypothesis 
that long-term credit fosters faster growth than economies where long-term financing is 
constrained. Therefore, if microloans are provided on this basis to SMEs (which is one of the 
categories targeted by the policy of developing the microfinance sector in Namibia), it can 
make a difference in the operations of SMEs and lead to enhanced economic activities, 
which is good for economic growth. This is the opposite of short-term lending, such as that 
provided by pay-day (30-day) lenders in Namibia that may exert repayment pressure on 
small businesses and constrain their potential. This is because repayment over a long term 
attracts relatively lower monthly premiums than repayment in one month.  
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While term lenders in Namibia do not lend to SMEs currently, this thesis is of the view that, 
in the context of Namibia, they are the potential candidates that can upgrade their scope 
through savings mobilisation and attracting new investment to serve the SMEs sector. This 
is because they have the capacity relative to pay-day lenders as demonstrated by their 
current average loan amount of N$13 000 compared to N$1 000 of pay-day lenders. They 
are therefore the potential institutions that could be a springboard to the achievement of the 
policy goal of developing the real microfinance sector in Namibia.  
 
The above view on term-lending microlending institutions being potential entrants to the 
deposit-taking microfinance industry was confirmed through the researcher’s engagements 
with financial sector regulators that revealed that they considered this type of MFIs to be the 
relevant institutions that can possibly upgrade and become DMFIs to be regulated under the 
amended BIA. According to them, the natural progression for this type of institutions is to 
become microfinance banks when they have grown and reached a scale big enough for 
such progression.82 They backed up their view by providing examples that two of the term-
lending institutions had already applied to the relevant regulator for licenses under the 
current legal framework, with one of them (Letshego Micro Financial Services [Pty] Ltd) 
having been allocated a provisional license83 already in 2014, while the application of the 
other was still being assessed at the time of writing this thesis.84 Further, a recent 
unpublished document by the regulator of banks also provides insight into which institutions 
the regulatory provision for MFIs in the BIA is targeting. It states the following:  
 
In consideration of the microlending industry that has experienced considerable growth 
in recent years ..., the Bank of Namibia has allowed under the banking law, qualifying 
microlending institutions to take deposits as microfinance banks to expand the scope of 
access to banking and financial services [UP/RD/1/1: 5].  
 
This is evidence that those targeted institutions are essentially the microlending institutions 
that operate on a term basis in terms of loan repayment, as these are the ones that would 
have the capacity to qualify as per their institutional characteristics and sizes. These are 
therefore the appropriate institutions and industry that the researcher has targeted for the 
                                                          
82 This view was expressed during the researcher’s interviews with senior staff in the regulatory authority for microlenders.  
83 Issued for a period of six months, a provisional licence enables the applicant (i.e. the potential bank) to get its house in order 
and to be able to meet all necessary requirements to the satisfaction of the regulatory authority, after which a full license can be 
issued. During the period of provisional license, the license holder is not allowed to conduct banking business. 
84 As the amended BIA providing for the regulation of deposit-taking microfinance banks has not been promulgated yet, the 
licenses are being issued under the current BIA. 
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assessment of what the likely impact of the amended BIA on MFIs would be. The other 
microlending institutions (i.e. pay-day lenders) are small institutions (as per the size of their 
loan books and loan amounts they disburse, noted earlier in this chapter) that will for a 
considerable time remain operating at the level at which they currently are due to a lack of 
capacity to enter into the deposit-taking business. The same applies to the SACCOs, as they 
not only lack capacity (as per the data presented in Table 5.1 above), but also their mandate 
and purpose for existence currently is the welfare of their members, other than profit-making. 
As such, the researcher expects that whatever evidence is established from the targeted 
surveyed group of MFIs (i.e. term lenders) would be even more pronounced for these 
smaller MFIs that were not included in the survey. The outcomes of the survey are 
presented in the next sections together with those from the interviews. 
 
5.3.3 The sample  
 
As indicated under the methodology chapter, a purposive-judgement sampling approach 
was followed in that eight institutions that make up the term-lending industry in Namibia were 
considered relevant and surveyed. Only five of the eight term lenders were willing to 
participate (i.e. only five institutions completed and returned the questionnaire). Of the five 
institutions that participated, two provided data for a period longer than five years, depending 
on the time they had been in business (in fact the establishment period of all these 
institutions falls within the period 2002–2009), two provided data for a period of five years, 
while one only provided for two years, as they were simply not willing to spend time to 
retrieve records from historical documents. All these cases also had data gaps in some of 
the variables requested. This raises the question of the importance placed on data by these 
institutions.  
 
Furthermore, with the exception of one participating term-lending institution whose 
headquarter is based in neighbouring South Africa, four of the institutions are headquartered 
in the capital city of Namibia, Windhoek, and have presence around the country. The head 
offices of these institutions, which in most cases direct decisions on branch operations, 
provided information on their overall operations. For the analysis, the five institutions were 
allocated with simple codes, namely MFI1, MFI2, MFI3, MFI4 and MFI5, so as to ensure 
they are not identified, thereby preserving the confidentiality of their information. 
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5.3.4 Fieldwork results 
 
This section presents findings from the survey of the targeted industry, which assisted the 
researcher to appraise the state and nature of the targeted industry and to determine its 
potential for becoming the springboard for developing the microfinance sector in Namibia. It 
provides information on the institutional and client profiles and characteristics and the legal 
form and ownership of the MFIs, as well as an understanding of their scope of operations 
and performance, including the services and products offered. The survey was 
complemented by interviews with relevant stakeholders85 that were aimed at gauging views 
on aspects such as the understanding of the term ‘microfinance’, thereby establishing what 
microfinance in the Namibian context is, as well as their views on the growth and/or growth 
constraints of the Namibian microfinance sector. The results from the survey and interviews 
relevant for this chapter are presented below.   
 
5.3.4.1 Profile of the surveyed industry  
 
Establishment and legal form: From the survey, it was established that term-lending MFIs 
are all registered companies that fall under the same regulatory and supervisory authority of 
the non-bank financial institutions (NAMFISA). They include the ones that are subsidiaries of 
commercial banks as well, despite the fact that banks fall under the banking institutions 
regulatory authority. This is because the current regulatory framework (Government 
Exemption Notice 189 of 2004 issued in terms of Section 15 of the Usury Act, Act No. 73 of 
1968) requires that banks that want to conduct microloan transactions separate from their 
banking operations need to establish a separate legal entity that would engage in such 
activities. There is only one such entity currently, as the other one has deregistered a few 
years back, as indicated earlier in this chapter.  
As mentioned earlier, participating term-lending MFIs were all established during the period 
2002–2009,86 therefore they are still in a nascent stage. This period falls within the post-
political independence era of Namibia,87 which could suggest a relatively more conducive 
environment for setting up these types of institutions, as they saw an opportunity to fill the 
gap for microloans created by traditional banks that had not been ready to serve this type of 
                                                          
85 Key stakeholders of microfinance as defined by Ledgerwood, Earne and Nelson (2013) include providers of financial services 
(banks, MFIs, NBFIs and their associates), regulators (central banks, financial regulators, consumer protection agencies) as 
well as consumers, individuals and advocacy organisations. 
86 MFI2 was established in 2002, MFI1 in 2004, MFI3 in 2008, MFI5 in 2005 and MFI4 in 2009. 
87 Namibia gained its independence in 1990. 
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market, given their risk-averse nature discussed earlier in this thesis. The political 
environment during the period prior to independence (when the apartheid system was 
practised) would have made it difficult for this type of institution to exist, as the environment 
was more conducive to conventional banking. 
 
Ownership and funding: The ownership aspect is an important issue to examine in the 
context of this study, as it is among the possible factors that would determine the motive for 
an institution wanting to upgrade to a microfinance bank level and whether or not it would be 
willing to align itself with the policy expectation of serving the identified needy market (i.e. the 
poor and SMEs) once it has obtained that status.  
 
Staschen (2010), citing the case of Uganda, is of the view that ownership composition is 
probably the most important determinant for MFIs remaining true to their mission of serving 
the poor. The argument normally advanced in this regard is that when MFIs become 
commercialised (formalised) and start pursuing financial objectives, they would lose sight of 
social objectives, i.e. their mission of providing banking services to the poor by lending very 
small sums to very poor borrowers, as they would now prefer catering for customers who are 
better off than their original customers (Strøm & Mersland, 2010). This situation is normally 
referred to as MFIs experiencing a ‘mission drift’ as they become more commercialised. 
Strøm and Mersland (2010) quote an example by Rosenberg (2007) of the initial public 
offering of Banco Compartamos in Mexico that led to a handful of people making a fortune to 
the tune of US$450 million as among the events that have sparked the fear towards 
commercialisation of MFIs.  
 
However, the issue of whether or not ownership influences the mission of MFIs has been a 
debatable one in the literature. In their study that sought to establish evidence of mission 
drift by analysing 379 MFIs in 74 countries, Strøm and Mersland (2010) found no evidence 
of mission drift in the overall industry. They however found some evidence of possible 
mission drift in individual MFIs that had transformed to profit-seeking, but at the same time 
found that the effect is neutralised if the MFI is more cost-efficient, and they therefore 
recommended that the focus be on reducing an MFI’s costs rather than on the aspect of 
profit making. Further, Mersland and Strøm (2008), in their study on whether ownership 
mattered for the performance and trade-offs in microfinance organisations, found the 
difference between shareholder-owned microfinance organisations (i.e. formal MFIs) and 
non-government microfinance organisations (i.e. semiformal MFIs) to be minimal. This 
reinforces the conclusion, in their earlier study that investigated whether NGOs and 
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specialised MFIs incorporated as shareholder firms differ in bringing along social benefit to 
their clients, that they are more similar than different, and this led to the rejection of their 
hypothesis that NGOs are more socially oriented than shareholder firms. Their findings 
further revealed that the benefit in scale and scope by shareholder firms was not related to 
ownership, but to legal constraints that impede NGOs to mobilise savings (Mersland & 
Strøm, 2007).  
 
The above findings imply that MFIs’ ownership and form of funding is not an impediment to 
the provision of socially oriented financial services. These empirical findings should provide 
some guidance to Namibia in this regard. A key message from the empirical evidence is the 
fact that MFIs that have become more profit-oriented have better depth of outreach in the 
long run and are more sustainable. In fact, Rhyne (1998) and Christen and Drake (2002), 
cited by Mersland and Strøm (2010: 2), suggest that “a more commercialised microfinance 
industry is better able to serve the poorest members of the community, since their profit 
motives lead them to be more efficient and more willing to seek out new markets for their 
loan products”. 
 
In the case of Namibia, the survey found that credit-only term microlenders that responded 
to the survey are either subsidiaries of other regulated non-bank financial institutions (1), 
commercial banks (1) or other registered companies (3). These are in most cases single 
shareholding institutions with own funding, as only one of them (MFI5) has been sourcing 
funds from an international development partner. The researcher’s observation from 
fieldwork results points to the fact that inasmuch as these MFIs have also been serving low-
income salaried people, they have been more profit-oriented than development-oriented, i.e. 
they have had preference for catering for better-off customers (earning a regular income) 
who mainly borrowed for consumption purposes rather than productive purposes. Given this 
fact, and in its effort to have relevant institutions lined up to the policy objective of developing 
a microfinance sector that will serve SMEs and the poor, Namibia might place consideration 
on the ownership of the would-be industry entrants as one of the qualifying criteria to entry, 
and the researcher is of the view that it should do so taking into account the above 
highlighted arguments in literature.  
 
Based on the advocacy by the Namibian Financial Sector Strategy, the issue of localising 
Namibian financial institutions is for instance one of the prominent aspects in the draft 
amended BIA, i.e. financial institutions in Namibia, including DMFIs, are expected to be 
majority-owned by Namibians going forward. The strategy views locally owned financial 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
128 
 
institutions as more “better suited to respond to the country’s needs than foreign owned 
institutions” (Republic of Namibia, no date: 33). While there could be merit in the intent to 
enhance local ownership of DMFIs, the researcher argues that there could be a need for 
some differentiation in ownership rules applicable to DMFIs, especially if the intended 
objective of developing the industry is to be achieved. The proposed differentiation could be 
either in the form of having shareholding limits that are different from those imposed on other 
established and matured financial institutions or industries, or applying some flexibility to 
accord DMFIs a transition period for limits in their shareholder diversification. This is 
because not only would current shareholders of existing MFIs (who are potential entrants to 
the DMFI industry) wish to retain majority shareholding in the institutions they have built, but 
attracting new entrants into the industry might also require incentives. This also becomes 
important when considering the possible new capital and technical expertise that foreign 
investors can bring to the industry, which could be of great help in the process of developing 
the industry. It is therefore important for Namibia to take into consideration the above as well 
as earlier cited empirical evidence as it designs its measures and limits on ownership of 
DMFIs going forward.  
  
5.3.4.2 Products and services offered 
 
Participating MFIs reported that they only provide microcredit. In fact, a documentary review 
revealed that all microlenders (pay-day and term lenders) in Namibia are only allowed to 
extend microcredit and not to take deposits. The reported minimum loan size for the 
responding term lenders are in the range of N$500 to N$2 599 and the maximum between 
N$8 000 and N$50 000. These fall within the statutory requirement of a microloan not to 
exceed an amount of N$50 000, as stipulated in Section 1(a) of the Government Exemption 
Notice No. 189, discussed earlier in this chapter. Their repayment term is up to 60 months, 
also in accordance with the requirements of the same Exemption Notice (Section 1(b) of the 
Exemption Notice).    
 
The fact that these MFIs only provide credit is considered undesirable, because generally 
around the globe MFIs are playing or are expected to play an important role of filling the 
financial services gap for the poor that exists in the economy due to market failure, and such 
a gap also exists in Namibia, as discussed in Chapter 2. This is because poor and low-
income people, like those in more advantageous economic situations, need a variety of 
basic financial services (including savings, insurance, money transfers, etc.) and not just 
credit (CGAP, 2012). In fact, Ledgerwood et al. (2013) argue that going forward, a great deal 
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of the demand from poor people will outstrip that of products and services on which the 
microfinance industry has focused during its first three decades of existence. Accordingly, 
they are of the view that the demand for savings may surpass the demand for loans and the 
demand for general-purpose loans may outstrip the demand for micro-business investment, 
while that for long-term savings, borrowing and insurance is as strong as that for short-term 
savings and loans. As such, providers of financial services (including those in Namibia) are 
expected to develop sustainable low-cost ways to provide such services and respond to the 
demands and needs of the poor.  
 
In view of the fact that the surveyed institutions (together with pay-day lending institutions) 
form the majority in the Namibian microfinance sector, the researcher further argues that it 
would have made a difference on the financial inclusion front, i.e. it would possibly have 
helped reduce the financial exclusion rate that is still a problem in the country,88 if these 
institutions were to offer other financial services as well. Offering credit only as a product 
creates a gap in the financial system referred to above in terms of institutions that would 
provide comprehensive microfinance products and services, including microsavings, micro-
insurance and money transfer services in addition to microcredit. The researcher has noted 
that commercial banks in the country have started to attract small savers through own 
efforts, but also through the statutory-imposed BBA89 introduced by the BoN in 2013, and 
are therefore complementing the very small number of MFIs that provide microsavings 
services in the country, which were discussed in Section 5.2. Micro-insurance, however, 
remains a relatively new concept to the Namibian market.  
 
The survey also found that a fixed interest rate of prime rate times 2 is charged by all the 
surveyed MFIs in accordance with the caps imposed by the Usury Act and its accompanying 
Exemption Notice provisions that regulate them (Exemption Notice No. 189 of 2004), details 
of which are discussed in Chapter 6, which appraises the legal and regulatory environment 
of the Namibian financial sector.   
 
The issue of interest rate ceilings, i.e. the limits on the level of interest rates that financial 
institutions are allowed to charge, such as these caps, is among the debated issues in 
literature, especially in as far as MFIs are concerned. While the argument often advanced as 
justification for the caps is the high cost of loans and possible predatory lending practices 
(i.e. consumer protection), it is also counter-argued that high fees and charges keep MFIs 
                                                          
88 Financial exclusion rate is estimated at 31 per cent by the FinScope Namibia 2011 Survey. 
89 The BBA is developed for low-income earners and the poor and does not attract any transaction fees.  
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afloat (CGAP, 2006) and are needed for their sustainability, especially when considering the 
high transactions cost involved in their lending processes, given the tiny transactions they 
have to deal with and the need for face-to-face interactions with clients as a substitute for 
formal collateral (Helms & Reille, 2004). Imposing interest rate ceilings is therefore said to 
have an effect of making it difficult for MFIs to cover their costs, and this could have the 
resultant effect of either driving them out of the market or even becoming an entry barrier to 
potential MFIs (Helms & Reille, 2004). When this happens, it can lead to a lack of access to 
financial services by poor clients as MFIs retreat from the market due to their inability to 
cover operating costs.90 One good example of this is Zambia, a neighbouring country to 
Namibia, where the recently introduced interest rate limits91 have been reported to not only 
have led to an unintended consequence of constraining the credit sector, but also to 
increased average loan sizes and tenures as MFIs attempt to remain sustainable and 
profitable (Brouwers, Chongo, Millinga & Fraser, 2014). A resulting consequence of the lack 
of access to financial services would be for poor clients to revert to informal credit markets, 
which are even more expensive, such as money lenders (Helms & Reille, 2004), and this 
would have a backward effect on the efforts of enhancing access to finance for the poor, 
low-income people and SMEs. Striking a balance between the above views (i.e. taking the 
cost of credit and the MFI sustainability aspect into consideration) is therefore important. 
What is necessary is for regulators to have an enabling legal environment in which MFIs can 
thrive and which enhances competition so that competition would eventually bring down 
interest rates (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).    
 
Most surveyed institutions also reported on a practice where they offer credit life insurance 
as a condition for providing loans to clients. In this regard, a loan is only extended on 
condition that a client takes out credit life insurance, which can be considered as forced 
insurance. The fact that these institutions provide uncollateralised loans in Namibia can be 
taken to mean that they are using credit life insurance as both a risk-mitigating strategy and 
an additional revenue source, and this could be viewed as unfair towards the borrowers. 
This is because from a consumer protection perspective, conditional selling would be viewed 
as putting undue pressure on clients (who may not be financially literate) to buy unwanted 
products and just end up taking what they are offered, the consequences of which could be 
detrimental. The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS, 2009) states that practices that 
                                                          
90 Helms and Reille (2004) cites research by ACCION International, which found interest rates ceilings in Colombia to have 
repressed the development of commercial microfinance in the country, primarily by discouraging microfinance NGOs from 
transforming into licensed financial intermediaries 
91 Zambia introduced interest rate ceilings for commercial banks in 2012 and for the NBFIs and microfinance sector in 2013, but 
they were removed recently in 2015.  
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restrict customer choice without producing efficiencies for consumers are considered to be 
unfair, if not objectively justified.  
 
There is however vastly increasing literature on the need for micro-insurance to accompany 
microcredit, as it is considered not only to serve as security for the lender, but that the client 
also has huge advantages from being insured. According to Shand and Angove (2013), 
credit life insurance protects the lender against defaults on repayment and provides them 
with an opportunity to earn additional fee income in the form of commission and 
administration fees, while at the same time allowing them to offer a broader set of financial 
products. On the side of the borrower, they assert that it protects the dependents of the 
client from the obligation to repay in the event that the borrower (policyholder) dies and/or 
the borrowers themselves in the event they become retrenched or disabled. Shand and 
Angove (2013) further view credit life insurance as having the potential of playing a 
significant role in supporting access to finance and as a stepping stone to economic 
development across a broad base, given the decreased risk it provides to lenders. They 
further argue that credit life insurance is often the first insurance encounter for low-income 
consumers. In fact, credit life insurance has been reported to dominate micro-insurance 
worldwide, as evidenced by a global insurance scan in the 100 poorest countries by the 
Microinsurance Centre in 2007, which found that 36 per cent of all the insured and 60 per 
cent of life products were directly linked to credit schemes (Roth, McCord & Liber, 2007, 
cited by Calvin & Coetzee, 2009).  
 
In South Africa, a country where micro-insurance has been most prevalent relative to other 
countries in southern Africa, it is estimated that credit life insurance constitutes 40 per cent 
or more of the total formal micro-insurance in the country (Calvin & Coetzee, 2009). An 
investigation by Shand and Angove (2013) that sought to gauge trends in the consumer 
credit insurance market in South Africa from the customers’ perspective found as 
questionable the value derived by South African consumers from credit life insurance and 
concluded that credit life insurance served the interests of the credit provider in the first 
instance.92 They particularly found credit life insurance to be seemingly more expensive than 
life policies available on the open market, and that they limited the ability of consumers to 
exercise freedom of choice for the possible cheapest available option in the market. They 
also found information on credit life insurance to be insufficiently disclosed. While no study 
could be located on Namibia on this issue, the researcher is of the view that similar findings 
                                                          
92 They however cautioned of a limited sample of interviewees and that results cannot necessarily be generalised.  
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could be applicable to Namibia. As such, while some of the literature discussed earlier in this 
section suggest that this product, offered by the surveyed institutions in Namibia as a 
condition for obtaining a loan, may prove to be beneficial to the clients of those institutions 
as well, the above findings on South Africa present good lessons for Namibia. The 
researcher therefore sees the need for Namibia to ensure that regulation on insurance 
programmes for the poor balance the above discussed competing outcome possibilities.  
 
5.3.4.3 Outreach  
 
Most responding MFIs (four out of five) have branches widely spread around the country, 
although most of the branches are in urban areas. Figure 5.1 below depicts the geographical 
presence of surveyed term-lending institutions around the country. It shows that the northern 
part of the country as well as the central, western and eastern parts have been very 
attractive to the responding term-lending MFIs relative to the southern part of the country, 
i.e. fewer term-lending institutions have a presence in the southern part of the country.93 This 
pattern could be a direct result of the fact that the majority of the population of Namibia lives 
in those parts of the country, especially the northern parts of the country, where more than 
60 per cent of the population resides (NSA, 2012b).   
 
Town-wise, there is a concentration of term-lending institutions around the capital city (i.e. all 
five responding term lenders have presence in Windhoek), but other towns are also fairly 
covered, as evidenced by the number indicated next to each town in the map below. The 
distribution is actually similar to that observed geographically, such that the northern towns 
of Rundu and Katima Mulilo, Grootfontein and Otjiwarongo as well as Walvis Bay and 
Swakopmund in the west and Gobabis in the east have the presence of four of the five 
responding MFIs and are therefore in second place to Windhoek. Towns in the southern part 
of the country have fewer representation. This pattern also follows the population pattern in 
that Windhoek is the most populated city in the country, followed by Rundu town in the 
northern part of the country and Erongo (Walvis Bay and Swakopmund) in the western part 
of the country. Towns in the southern part of the country are among the least inhabited in the 
country.   
 
                                                          
93 The northern part of the country is represented by the regions Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshikoto, Oshana, Kavango and 
Caprivi; the central part is represented by the Khomas and Otjozondjupa regions; the western part by the Erongo and Kunene 
regions, the eastern part by the Omaheke region; while the southern part of the country is represented by the Hardap and 
Karas (now called !Karas) regions.  
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  Figure 5.1: Regional presence of surveyed term-lending institutions 
Source: Existing map adjusted with researcher information on presence of term lenders94 
 
The numbers of active clients and outstanding loans are also good indicators of outreach. 
Total active clients reported by the survey respondents (four institutions) amounted to 
approximately 120 795 in 2013, while the number of outstanding loans for three responding 
term lenders ranges between the lowest of 7 708 and the highest of 48 524 over the same 
period, as can be seen in Table 5.2 below. 
 
                                                          
94 New regions have been introduced in Namibia recently, while the names of some old ones have also changed. However, the 
old setup and names have been used here to align to the way availed data are organised. 
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Table 5.2: Outreach of surveyed MFIs (2013) 
 
MFIs 
Number of 
active 
clients  
Number of 
loans 
outstanding  
 
MFI1 23 473    22 585  
MFI2 50 000 N/A  
MFI3 5 642 7 708  
MFI4 N/A N/A  
MFI5 41 680 48 524  
Total 120 795          78 817 
 
Source: Survey results; note: N/A stands for “not availed” 
 
 
The above cited figures are however below the industry reality, as eight term-lending MFIs 
are in the country, while only four institutions provided their data on the number of active 
clients and only three provided data on loans outstanding. Therefore the data represent only 
approximately half of the industry position.  
 
According to NAMFISA, total active clients of the microlending industry was 183 210 at the 
end of 2011 (which is approximately 8 percent of the Namibian population95). These figures 
are relatively comparable to those for MFIs in some countries on the African continent, such 
as Zambia but are significantly lower than for those in much MFI matured countries such as 
Kenya. The number of clients served by the consumer payroll MFIs in Zambia (that operate 
on a similar basis as most of the Namibian microlenders (including some term-lending MFIs) 
totalled 169 949 (Brouwers et al., 2014). In Kenya, the number of active clients of the credit-
only MFIs amounted to 368 740 (AMFI, 2014). Although comparison at this level is generally 
not ideal, given the differences in population, this comparison gives an idea of how Namibia 
is faring in this area relative to other countries in Africa, especially as these surveyed 
institutions are leading in this sector in terms of the value of loans disbursed. Information on 
the repayment rates has not been provided, but the researcher assumed that these 
institutions would have high repayment rates, as most of them receive repayments through 
deduction at source, i.e. deductions are done by employers of clients on salaries. 
 
The survey revealed that this type of MFIs mostly lend to employed and salaried people. 
Four of them (80%) also indicated that they do not require collateral (see Table 5.3 below), 
                                                          
95 The latest available figure on the total population of Namibia is 2 392 000 (NSA, 2012b).  
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as the deduction for instalments are done at source through deduction codes96 to the payroll. 
It was established that these deduction codes are provided by government, suggesting that 
the majority of people covered by these institutions are public servants. This in itself is a 
limitation to outreach, as the unsalaried, self-employed and poor people are not covered, 
which is not in line with the principle of the microfinance concept. Microfinance is defined as 
the provision of small-scale financial services to the poor or the poorest among the poor 
(WSBI, 2009). This definition implies that microfinance has a goal of providing an opportunity 
to these groups of people to become self-sufficient. All participating institutions also 
indicated that they offer consumption loans. It can therefore be concluded that credit 
extended by these types of institutions is meant to complement the monthly income of 
salaried individuals who already are participants in the financial system in one or the other 
way and does not necessarily enhance financial inclusion. As such, the current outreach of 
the term-lending MFIs is also not in line with the aspirations of the country, which aims to 
enhance financial inclusion.  
 
Table 5.3 below presents some key data and information related to the MFIs’ lending 
activities. The responding MFIs have managed to play a role in facilitating access to credit to 
their target segment to the extent represented by the number and value of loans extended 
depicted in Table 5.3. Accordingly, the number of total loans disbursed by these institutions 
stood at 121 413, while the average loan amounts fell between a low of N$4 293 and a high 
of N$20 000. Although this is not a total industry picture, but only a portion of the 
participating credit-only term-lending MFIs, it gives an indication of the scope of activities 
and operations of players in the industry, which is considered as a possible candidate for 
developing the microfinance sector in Namibia. Comparatively, however, these ranges are 
much lower than those reported for neighbouring South Africa, where microlenders provide 
varying loan sizes with maximum sizes of between N$7 000 and N$500 000 (Shand & 
Angove, 2013).  
                                                          
96 Deduction codes are a means through which government facilitates preferential deduction of loan instalments for lenders 
through the payroll of government employees. Only a limited number of microlenders have been allocated such codes based 
on them having met certain requirements by government, such as lending for education purposes. 
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Table 5.3: Key data and information on credit provision of surveyed MFIs (2013) 
MFI 
Number 
of loans 
disburs
ed 
Value 
of loans 
disburs
ed (N$) 
Loan size 
range (min-
max) N$ 
Averag
e loan 
amount 
(N$) 
Lending 
method 
Profile of 
clients (% 
female) 
Operatio
n in rural 
& urban 
areas 
(%) 
Collateral 
required? 
MFI1 22 585  313 mil.  2 000–50 000 20 000 Individual 32.0 
67  
(urban) No 
MFI2 46 000  1.2 bil.  1 000–50 000 16 000 Individual N/A N/A No 
MFI3 4 304 25.9 bil.  500–8 000  4 293 Individual 41.73 N/A Yes 
MFI4 N/A  107 mil.  N/A 6 509 Individual N/A N/A No 
MFI5 48 524 517 mil.  2 599–21 599  12 099 Individual N/A N/A No 
Total 121 413  
 
Source: Survey results; note: N/A stands for “not availed” 
 
Whether or not the term-lending microfinance industry has made an impact, which a 
microfinance industry would normally be expected to make (i.e. poverty reduction), needs to 
be judged based on their target market, which is employed people, mostly government 
employees that are based in urban areas. Based on that, the researcher argues that term-
lending microlenders are not contributing to poverty reduction in Namibia. The fact that they 
do not lend to small businesses also renders their contribution to the development efforts of 
the country questionable.  
 
5.3.4.4 Lending methodology and collateral requirements 
 
In addressing the market failure of credit provision to the poor created through risk-averse 
conventional banking institutions, MFIs around the globe have been providing loans to their 
customers without requiring physical collateral. This has been made possible by employing 
the group-lending approach, where poor borrowers assume joint liability for the loans and 
thereby act as guarantors for each other (Ross & Savanti, 2005). Ross and Savanti (2005) 
cite early work by Stiglitz in 1990 and Varian (also in 1990) as initial literature providing the 
theory behind microfinance and group lending, as this analysed how joint liability may induce 
borrowers in a group to screen each other’s abilities and monitor each other’s efforts, 
thereby alleviating moral hazard problems.97 This is in contrast to the individual or personal 
                                                          
97 Moral hazard here refers to a situation whereby one member’s failure to repay could lead to another doing the same. 
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lending approach, where credit is extended to an individual borrower (Maria, 2009, cited by 
Kodongo & Kendi, 2013).  
 
Empirically, the group-lending approach has been used successfully in the microlending 
programmes of some parts of the world to expand their reach (Kodongo & Kendi, 2013). 
Group lending has been preferred because it is considered relatively of low repayment risk 
when compared with individual lending, which is associated with higher default rates, as 
clients of MFIs are typically low net worth individuals (Kodongo & Kendi, 2013). While MFIs 
also lend to individuals, a study by Kodongo and Kendi (2013), which evaluated individual 
lending and group lending using Kenya’s microfinance data, found high interest rates to 
increase the odds of client delinquency and suggested a graduated scale for charging 
interest rates in which credit is extended to groups first to hedge the repayment risk of firms, 
after which firms can identify individuals within the groups with improved credit risk and 
progressively issue individual loans to those. Further, in terms of the social impact that can 
be made by the two different lending approaches, the outcome of a randomised field 
experiment in rural Mongolia on the comparative poverty impact of group versus individual 
microcredit conducted by Attanasio et al. (2013) revealed a positive impact of group loans on 
entrepreneurship and food consumption, but not of individual loans. The above implies that 
the group-lending approach has enjoyed some superior position to individual lending in 
those countries, although in some other parts of the world different models may have 
dominated. 
 
In Namibia, the survey detected that term-lending microlenders lend to individuals and do 
not do group lending (see Table 5.3 above). This is inconsistent with the group-lending 
methodology followed in countries such as Kenya, discussed above, and other microfinance 
matured economies such as Bangladesh, as a repayment risk-mitigating measure, where 
group members serve as security for the loans, as discussed above. Most of the surveyed 
MFIs have a ‘privileged security’, whereby employers of their clients are collecting loan 
repayments on their behalf from the individuals’ salaries, and they therefore do not need to 
be concerned with collateral issues and/or group lending as security. From the researcher’s 
engagements with the surveyed institutions, it was concluded that the choice to lend on an 
individual basis seems to be simply a preferred business orientation. 
   
While empirical literature cited in the previous paragraph associates individual lending with 
high default rates, this has not been the case for the surveyed institutions in Namibia. This 
could again be a reflection of the advantages of the deduction codes to payroll to which 
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these institutions are ‘privileged’,98 as the repayments by borrowers are directly deducted 
from their salaries. It could also be a confirmation of the assertion by Kodongo and Kendi 
(2013) that both the individual and the group approach to lending has strengths and 
weaknesses, and their quoting of the conclusion by Pereira and Mourao (2012: 101) that 
default risks of MFIs’ credit are not to be generalised, “since they operate in places that are 
geographically isolated and hence their borrowers exhibiting varying characteristics”.  
 
5.3.4.5 Clients 
 
Microfinance has been innately linked with women, i.e. since it started in the 1970s, 
microfinance has been mainly about women and female empowerment (Cumming, 2012). 
Cumming (2012) reveals that an average of 73 per cent of microfinance customers globally 
are female and that 42 per cent of microbanks had declared a conscious biased towards 
women. D’Espallier, Guérin and Mersland (2009) find a conscious gender bias to be 
associated with group-lending methodologies, international orientation, female leadership, 
smaller loans and a non-commercial legal status (which normally includes entities such as 
NGO-owned MFIs). The basis for bias towards women has been the fact that women have 
often demonstrated stronger willingness to pay than men (Armendariz & Morduch, 2007 and 
Phillips & Bhatia-Panthaki, 2007, cited by Kodongo & Kendi, 2013). Unlike NGO-owned 
MFIs, where distribution of loans is female-biased, very few gender-related differences in 
clients could be observed from the results of the industry surveyed by this study. Only two 
term-lending MFIs provided information on gender distribution of their loans. MFI1 reported 
32 per cent of its loans to have been extended to women and MFI3’s loans to women were 
reported at 42 per cent. This clearly shows no female bias on the side of these MFIs, and 
gives an impression that unlike the case of developmental and socially oriented NGO-owned 
MFIs, gender distribution of loans is not a consideration for credit allocation by the majority 
of the credit-only term-lending institutions in Namibia, which again shows that they are less 
development-oriented. Also only one institution (MFI1) was able to make a distinction 
between the rural and urban credit allocation and reported that 67 per cent of its loans 
extended went to urban-based clients (see Table 5.3). This reflects the fact that surveyed 
MFIs (i.e. credit-only term-lending MFIs) mostly lend to town-based salaried people, i.e. their 
selection of clients is based on earning a regular income. This bias towards urban areas is 
inconsistent with what is observed elsewhere, where MFIs normally focus on rural lending, 
given their mission of serving the poor and low-income people. Given that the majority of 
                                                          
98 Only certain businesses are allocated with the salary deduction codes by government based on fulfilling required criteria. 
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Namibians (57 per cent) live in the rural areas (NSA, 2012b), where subsistence agriculture 
is the predominant occupation and poverty levels are high (37.4%), rural lending could have 
made a difference in those areas and help reduce poverty.    
 
5.3.4.6 Industry performance  
 
Efficiency and productivity are key indicators for measuring the performance of any 
institution. Abraham and Balogun (2012) cite work done by Jansson et al. (2003), 
CGAP/World Bank (2003) and Saltzman and Salinger (1998), which has identified efficiency 
and productivity indicators common to the microfinance industry to include the average 
operating expense ratio that gives an indication of their operating costs, cost per borrower 
ratio that shows their cost of maintaining an active borrower, the personnel productivity 
indicator that measures the average borrower per staff member and the portfolio quality that 
shows how vulnerable MFIs are to repayment risk. This section examines the efficiency and 
productivity of the term-lending MFIs based on those indicators where data have been 
provided. It also studies the sustainability of these institutions (both financial and 
operational), which is important for the continued enhancement of access to finance 
(Abraham & Balogun, 2012). Financial sustainability indicators for microfinance include ROA 
and ROE. They, respectively, measure the net operating income as a percentage of average 
total assets that indicates how MFIs use assets to generate profit, and the net operating 
income as a percentage of average total equity, which can be used by investors or 
shareholders to determine the returns on their equity investment (Abraham & Balogun, 
2012). These profitability measurements can therefore be used by investors, operators and 
donors to evaluate the potential viability of an MFI (Abraham & Balogun, 2012); an aspect 
that becomes important to consider in the context of this study that assessed the potential of 
these institutions graduating into DMFIs and may therefore need new investors to come on 
board. The indicators also give an idea of whether or not MFIs have a competitive edge in 
the industry in which they are operating (Jansson, Rosales & Westley, 2004). Further, as 
they are expected to serve SMEs (and the poor), their sustainability is important to ensure 
that they have the capacity to continue serving those for a long time.   
 
The survey results showed positive ROAs for all participating term lenders that provided 
information in this regard (four out of five institutions), which is a good sign for sustainability. 
In 2013, the average ROA for these institutions stood at 5.94 per cent, with the lowest ROA 
of 0.45 per cent belonging to MFI5 and the highest of 12.1 per cent belonging to MFI2. The 
average for sub-Saharan Africa reported by MIX stood at -0.2 per cent in 2010. The average 
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ROE of the surveyed institutions stood at 20.75 per cent, way above that of the overall sub-
Saharan African region reported by the MIX at 2.3 per cent in 2010 and the 10 per cent 
benchmark for a financially healthy position published by the UN in 2013.  
 
Further, the performance of these Namibian term-lending MFIs fares well compared to those 
of Asian countries known to be among the pioneers in microfinance, such as Bangladesh 
and India, for which MIX reports ROAs of -1.3 per cent and 1.4 per cent and ROEs of -7.4 
per cent and 12.0 per cent, respectively. Term-lending MFIs in Namibia are therefore 
generally self-sufficient financially. This situation can partly be reflective of the fact that most 
term lenders have been benefiting from the arrangement to have their repayment done 
through salary deductions, which have provided the necessary security. Jansson et al. 
(2004) argue that the credit methodology, credit terms and markets in which to operate 
selected by institutions directly affect their efficiency and productivity. Table 5.4 presents the 
productivity and efficiency ratios and indicators for the participating term-lending MFIs.   
 
Table 5.4: Productivity and efficiency ratios/indicators of participating MFIs (2013) 
 
  
Average 
operating 
expense 
ratio 
Cost per 
borrower  
(N$) 
Average 
borrower per 
staff member 
PAR>30 
days 
MFI1 6.2 809 0.23 
1 
MFI2 18.1 N/A 0.10 N/A 
MFI3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MFI4 1.67 108 0.21 N/A 
MFI5 11 1114 0.13 3.9 
 
Source: Survey results; note: N/A stands for “not availed” 
 
The above table shows an average operating expense ratio of 9.2 per cent, way below sub-
Saharan Africa’s average of 30.1 per cent reported by MIX in 2010, indicating that the 
operating costs of these institutions are within the tolerable limit. While the high continental 
average operating expenses have been attributed to high staff expenses and high 
transactional costs (MIX/CGAP, 2011 and Orodje, 2010, cited by Abraham & Balogun, 
2012), the institutions surveyed do not necessarily have to endure those costs to that extent, 
given the lending and collection approach that they employ, i.e. loan repayments are 
deducted from clients’ salaries. The average borrower per staff member ratio for responding 
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institutions, a productivity indicator, has been very low at 0.17 per cent, with the lowest (0.10 
per cent) being for MFI2 and the highest (0.23 per cent) for MFI1. These are way below the 
93 for sub-Saharan Africa published by MIX. The low ratios for surveyed Namibian MFIs 
could be a reflection of reduced workload for staff of the institutions, as they are not really 
engaged with the loan-recovery function, as repayment is mostly effected through deduction 
on salaries.  
 
Only MFI1 and MFI5 provided data on the quality of their loan portfolio measured by the 
PAR>30 indicator. MFI1 reported a 1 per cent portion of its loan portfolio being at risk, while 
MFI5’s repayment risk portfolio stood at 3.9 per cent. While these are above the MIX-
reported ratio of 0.4 per cent for India and comparable to 3.4 per cent for Bangladesh, which 
are some of the matured countries in the area of microfinance globally, they are below the 
5.9 per cent for the sub-Saharan Africa region. These relatively low risk ratios are again a 
reflection of an effortless loan-recovery process for term-lending MFIs, which should have 
put management of these institutions in a comfortable position.  
 
Overall, the above findings revealed that the participating term-lending MFIs have performed 
efficiently and productively, and are profitable. The focus on urban salaried people has 
however been a setback to outreach and their contribution to poverty reduction in the 
country is questionable, given that this target market leaves as unmet the demand for credit 
in the rural areas of the country. This situation is identifiable with a funding structure that is 
mainly reliant on own funds, in which these institutions find themselves, in that they tend to 
focus more on well-off employed clients rather than the poor. With regulation allowing them 
to mobilise savings, the scope and breadth of their outreach may increase to also include 
other groups, such as the poor. This should therefore be the motivation for regulating these 
institutions going forward.  
 
5.3.5 Stakeholder views on the Namibian microfinance industry  
 
As indicated in the previous section, part of the fieldwork involved interviews covering 
various qualitative aspects aimed at gauging Namibians’ understanding of the term 
‘microfinance’, thereby establishing what microfinance is in the Namibian context and their 
views on the regulation of MFIs99 as well as on the growth and/or constraints to growth of the 
microfinance sector, in addition to those obtained through the survey.100 This was 
                                                          
99 Views relating to the regulation of MFIs are discussed in Chapter 6.   
100 Views from the sector itself were also collected through the survey. 
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considered important, given the country’s objective of developing the microfinance sector 
and hence the need to establish the extent of clarity among stakeholders on the aspect of 
microfinance and its regulation. The selection process of stakeholders was guided by a 
definition of key stakeholders of microfinance that include providers of financial services 
(banks, MFIs, NBFIs and their associates), regulators (central banks, financial regulators, 
consumer protection agencies) as well as consumers, individuals and advocacy 
organisations provided by Ledgerwood et al. (2013). 
  
As stated in the methodology chapter, interviewees were also purposively selected based on 
the research aim and objectives of the thesis. A total number of 22 stakeholders were 
interviewed, drawn from the microfinance sector itself (i.e. practitioners), regulatory 
authorities, policy and law makers, relevant industry associations (such as the Bankers 
Association of Namibia and the Association of Microlenders in Namibia), other interest 
groups (including users of microfinance services) and experts in the field of microfinance. 
These groups were considered relevant for the research agenda of this study because of 
their experience in the sector and/or their expertise either as practitioners, policy- and/or law-
makers, implementers and enforcers of policy and regulatory decisions, or having close links 
to the sector. They were therefore considered skilled and knowledgeable of the subject 
matter to be able to provide insight into the research. The researcher used a simple coding 
system to preserve the interviewees’ confidentiality so that specific responses would not be 
linked to specific interviewees. However, in some cases specific names are cited, especially 
of those who did not have a problem with disclosing their names. The coding system used 
identifies first of all what category an interviewee belongs to (e.g. MFI, regulator, expert, etc.) 
how many institutions/organisations were involved (e.g. the number of regulating authorities 
or MFIs in that category), how many people were interviewed in that category or institution101 
and what number was allocated to that specific interviewee. Details of the codes, especially 
the first level of the codes, are presented in Appendix F. In order to differentiate between the 
MFIs surveyed (as coded earlier under the sections on survey results) and those to which 
interviewees belonged, the codes for the latter starts at MFI6, i.e. the number following the 
last one used for the surveyed MFIs, which is MFI5. Figure 5.2 below shows the number of 
interviewees per each of these categories.   
 
                                                          
101 Where a category consists of only one institution then the next step goes directly to how many people were interviewed. This 
is especially true for the categories MFIs and regulators which are already split up into individual institutions.  
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Figure 5.2: Interviewees per category (number) 
Source: Researcher’s records 
 
Note: The MFI category includes those who sent in written responses as indicated in Appendix D 
 
 
The ensuing sections present the interview outcomes. Where relevant, and for illustration 
purposes, response quotes that are most representative of the findings are also presented, 
while others can be made available on request.  
   
5.3.5.1 Defining microfinance  
 
In order to ascertain the understanding of the concept of microfinance by Namibians, the 
interviewees were asked to define microfinance. It was noted that the understanding of the 
microfinance concept differed among the participants, depending to a large extent on which 
category or group they belonged to, but also between individuals belonging to the same 
category/group. Experts in the field, those from the regulatory authorities and some 
practitioners (five interviewees in total), provided definitions that are in line with the standard 
definition of microfinance that broadly includes microenterprise lending, microsavings and 
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any other financial services specifically targeted at the lower end of the market and which 
was presented earlier in this thesis. For illustration purposes, some of the definitions 
provided by the interviewees from these categories are quoted in the box below, on the 
specific question posed by the researcher (i.e. the interviewer). 
 
Box 5.1: What is your understanding of microfinance? 
 
“Offering financial services, banking services and lending products for [a] low-income population, with 
strong focus on micro and SMEs” [Exp/2/2(1)] 
 
“It is a concept relating to the provision of finances such as microcredit, microsaving, agricultural 
microloans, money transfer in small sizes to low-income people, including small businesses” 
[MF6/1/(1)] 
 
“Money extended to a natural person or company, but the main aim is the purpose of the loan. Need 
to be for productive purposes (generation of income). But don’t limit it to income generation but even if 
it is for housing purposes. Microfinance also traditionally accepts savings” [Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
 
The researcher observed an association of microfinance with small businesses and start-ups 
only by six interviewees, indicating it is not provided to individuals, as illustrated by some of 
the quoted responses in the box below. This view was mostly held by experts and regulators 
(four), though some practitioners (two) also expressed the same view. It diverges from the 
standard definition in that microfinance can also be extended to individuals who might in turn 
use it to engage in income-generating activity, and not only to small businesses. 
    
Box 5.2: What is your understanding of microfinance? 
 
 
“Microfinance is not for personal loans but is set on financing small businesses - more on a smaller 
scale. It is not for one person but say for a group of farmers, more for upliftment” [MLA/1/1(1)] 
 
“It is for start-ups, near start-ups and small businesses emerging and trying to become businesses” 
[BA/1/1/(1)] 
 
“It is finance for small or micro businesses which normally do not have access to formal banking 
services or finance” [Reg2/3/(3)] 
 
 
Five interviewees, mostly from other interest groups and policy- and law-making fraternities, 
associated microfinance with microcredit only, showing that they did not have a clear 
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understanding of what microfinance is. This could be because microlending provided by 
credit-only microlenders is the dominant activity in the country in this sphere, i.e. this is what 
most people in Namibia get to see and experience. The definitions also therefore diverge 
from the standard definition of microfinance, as it only contains one component of what 
microfinance should be. Quoted below is an example of a response that speaks to this 
finding. 
 
“Dealing in transactions between a lender and a client or beneficiary in small 
loans, especially to low-income people” [PM/2/3/(1)] 
 
5.3.5.2 The Namibian context of microfinance 
 
Only a small number of interviewees (three) believed that microfinance was happening in 
Namibia. The majority of the stakeholders (ten) that responded to this question thought there 
was either little to none happening in that area or that there was confusion about the whole 
issue of microfinance in the country and called for the need to define it and provide clarity. 
The quoted responses in the box below are an illustration of these findings. 
 
Box 5.3: Can you define microfinance in the context of Namibia? 
 
“Except for FIDES, the definition I provided earlier does not apply to Namibia, maybe DBN is doing it” 
[MLA/1/1(1)] 
 
“In terms of financing, microfinance is happening in Namibia, but the component of micro-insurance is 
not there, money transfer is also not there. Most of the current providers are doing microcredit, but 
you also need microsaving and micro-insurance. There are no regulatory instruments or legislation to 
guide the process” [MFI6/1/(1)] 
 
“It is fragmented with very little clear guidelines … not well coordinated … until we have that 
coordinated commitment nothing will happen to SMEs” [BA/1/3/(1)] 
 
“Salary loans to government officials, almost bridging finance, to get them from one month to the next. 
They are not engaged in productive activities” [MFI8/2/(1)] 
 
 
Interviewees who came forth as having a clear understanding of what microfinance is could 
not identify any other microfinance services or products offered in the country, although one 
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of them made reference to the one microfinance bank in Namibia as well as the DBN as 
possible institutions that were doing that. There was also concern raised about the absence 
of an officially determined definition of microfinance in the country (as illustrated in the box 
below), which they thought was causing a lack of clear understanding of what should 
constitute microfinance.  
 
Box 5.4: Can you define microfinance in the context of Namibia? 
 
“The perception in Namibia is that microlending and microfinance is the same, i.e. anything not 
offered by banks, but it shouldn’t be” [Exp/2/2(1)] 
 
“In Namibia microfinance is small still, and is linked to microlending only which is getting small loans 
on an unsecured basis, but microfinance should be linked to social programmes. Namibians thus 
don’t have a clear idea and initiatives of microfinance are little. They only think about consumption 
lending” [Reg/2/3/(2)] 
  
“… currently we are indifferent in terms of what we call microfinance, there is a need for defining 
microfinance properly in the country” [Reg/2/3/(1)] 
 
From the outcomes of the interviews discussed above, it is clear that microfinance in 
Namibia is mostly associated with microcredit only. A documentary review process revealed 
that NAMFISA, in accordance with the Government Exemption Notice of 2004, has a 
definition for a microloan, which is applicable to the microlending institutions it currently 
supervises, i.e. an amount not exceeding N$50 000, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
While the current banking law does not speak to microlending, the draft amended BIA 2015 
(i.e. the Bill) defines a microloan as “a loan of not greater than an amount as may be set by 
the Bank of Namibia by notice in the Government Gazette from time to time”, which implies 
that the definition and/or the level is bound to change from time to time. In this regard, 
Section 10.1 of the current draft Determinations that will enforce the implementation of the 
provisions of the envisaged amended BIA sets the maximum size of a single microloan at 
N$200 000. Discussions with staff in the Banking Supervision Department at the BoN, 
however, revealed the intention to harmonise the two definitions so that a microloan is the 
same whether one takes it from a credit-only microlender or from a deposit-taking institution. 
CGAP (2012: 11) is of the view that “regulatory definitions of microfinance and microcredit 
should be tightly framed to meet specific regulatory objectives and should not simply be 
drawn from general literature on microfinance”. This is a relevant aspect that the country 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
147 
 
should take into consideration in its process of defining what microfinance in the context of 
Namibia should be.  
 
According to CGAP (2012), there is no standard regulatory definition of microcredit or 
microloan that would be suitable for global use, but there are general practical cautions from 
the experience of countries that have crafted their own definitions for a variety of regulatory 
objectives that can be considered. This therefore implies that while this process should be a 
country-specific matter, which should be informed by its peculiar environment, there is a 
need to learn from other countries regarding how they defined their microfinance, especially 
those with similar economic situations. The Microfinance Act 2006 of Kenya and the Micro 
Finance Deposit-taking Institutions Act 2003 of Uganda give an indication of how these 
countries define microcredit and small loans. Kenya defines a microloan in terms of the 
provision of loans to micro or small enterprises and low-income households and receiving 
deposits for on-lending; while GDP per capita is taken into account in defining small loans. 
Uganda defines microcredit by the principle of the principal business of accepting deposits 
and employing such deposits by lending, including the provision of short-term loans to micro-
enterprises and low-income households, usually characterised by the use of collateral 
substitutes, while small loans are constituted as less than 1 per cent of core capital for 
individual borrowers and less than 5 per cent of core capital for group borrowers. These, and 
those of other countries which Namibia may consider as relevant to learn from, should 
provide guidance to the country in defining what should constitute microfinance and a 
microloan. Doing so will clarify the apparent confusion the absence of a clear definition of 
those issues has created among some of the stakeholders, as evidenced by the views of the 
respondents discussed earlier in this section.  
 
5.3.5.3 The role microfinance plays in the Namibian economy 
 
Through the responses provided to the question on the role they thought microfinance was 
playing in the Namibian economy, the interviewees generally held a view that microfinance is 
playing an important role in the economy. Three interviewees (a combination of those from 
the expert category and from the regulatory fraternity), however, qualified that role by 
cautioning on the role microcredit provided by credit-only MFIs that lend for consumption 
purposes (and that were in the majority in the country) was playing in the economy, and that 
they were not lending for productive purposes. This is illustrated by the quotes in the box 
below. 
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Box 5.5: What role do you think microfinance plays in the Namibian economy? 
 
“Yes, they do play a role of filling a gap that the banks haven’t fulfilled, they help the ‘now’ needs 
(emergency loans), for example to take a child to hospital, school fees, etc. A loan where you only 
need a pay slip and no collateral. Statistics show they do play a role, although the average of pay day 
lenders is N$1 000, while for term lender [it] is higher” [MLA/1/1(1)] 
 
“They are playing an important role of enabling people to have access to finance and thus enhancing 
financial inclusion. Thus when regulating, you need to make sure that you [are not] an obstacle to that 
role” [PM/2/3/(1)] 
 
“It is tricky. Individually looked at, they might have a role because they are providing for a need which 
is there. It is a last resort thing and a client can benefit from that. Consumption financing is a problem, 
therefore it is difficult to see the relevance of microlenders. When you have proper specialised finance 
houses such as MFIs which offer microfinance products, they can play a role” [Exp/2/2(1)] 
 
 
Those who were concerned with the extent of consumption-related credit provided by credit-
only microlenders would want microfinance to be directed to productive activities rather than 
consumption, as illustrated in the box below.  
 
Box 5.6: What role do you think microfinance plays in the Namibian economy? 
 
“I want to see it defined as financing for production purposes. If for consumption purposes, then there 
is no end result to it” [Reg/2/3/(1)] 
 
“The availability of funds to entrepreneurs is critical. It doesn't matter how clever you are, if you don’t 
have funds, you can’t do anything. Responsible lending can create economic activity and if you have 
an enabling environment, benefits to the economy are enormous. Currently, the environment is not 
enabling, as it is very difficult to do business in Namibia” [MFI8/2/(1)] 
 
5.3.5.4 Growth of the microfinance sector 
 
Views on whether or not the microfinance sector in Namibia was growing were also 
divergent. While the majority (six) of those who responded to this question thought the sector 
has been growing, especially based on the statistics they picked up from NAMFISA reports, 
a concern was also raised that the lack of a clear definition for the sector posed a limitation 
in determining whether the sector was growing or not (see illustrated answers in the box 
below).  
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Box 5.7: In your view, is the microfinance sector in Namibia growing? 
 
“Yes, it is growing because of people needing overdrafts, etc. because of the high cost of living and 
some wanting to set up businesses. But whether at the pace and level they should be is a different 
matter” [PM/2/3/(1)] 
 
“I am not sure because I am not sure who are the MFIs in Namibia – I only know of Namibia Housing 
Action Group… however more institutions are entering the microlending sector and thus there is 
growth there both in terms of entry and the loan book, approximately 30 new microlenders are 
registered every year. There is no national common understanding of MFIs in Namibia and thus 
everything is lumped in one, including microlenders” [Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
 
What has come out clearly from the interviews, though, is the fact that the credit-only 
microlending industry has been expanding tremendously, with more players having entered 
the market in recent years. To verify this fact, the documentary review process detected that 
in 2014 the industry had 289 institutions (281 pay-day lenders and 8 term lenders), a 
significant increase from only 137 in 2005, and that its book value had reached 
approximately N$2 billion in 2014 (NAMFISA, 2015b). One interviewee was of the view that 
the industry has been growing “because of people needing overdrafts to supplement their 
income due to the high cost of living” [PM/2/3/(1)]. Despite the observed growth, it remains to 
be seen how many credit-only MFIs would venture into entering the deposit-taking 
environment going forward. It will also depend on whether or not some of these microlending 
institutions would be willing to give up the current benefits they are enjoying, in the form of 
exemptions and adjustments to prudential regulation, which were discussed earlier in this 
chapter.   
 
5.3.5.5 Constraints to the development of the microfinance sector 
 
With regard to the question of whether the participants thought there were any constraints to 
the growth of the microfinance sector in Namibia, factors highlighted by stakeholders were 
both regulatory and non-regulatory in nature. Four interviewees highlighted regulatory-
related constraints, including a lack of an enabling legal framework to spur the development 
of the sector. The current legal framework under which the only DMFI was being regulated 
together with conventional banks was viewed as limiting and an obstacle to entry, given it is 
meant to regulate traditional banking institutions. The same was felt applicable to the 
requirements of the Usury Act under which microlenders are being regulated. Also, the fact 
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that Namibia does not have a small claims court and hence no fast way of dissolving 
disputes was cited as a constraint in that there is no mechanism to assist those who are 
lending on an unsecured basis to collect their dues efficiently. The box below provides an 
illustration of these findings. 
   
Box 5.8: Are there any constraints to the development of the microfinance sector in 
Namibia? Please explain your answer. 
 
“There is no enabling regulatory framework, as there is no dedicated legislation for microfinance. 
There is a need for a microfinance bill that makes provision for savings. The current microlending bill 
only caters for microlending” [Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
“The Usury Act is a constraint to entry and thus needs to be removed. We also don’t have a small 
claims court and thus no fast way of dissolving disputes, as the current legal process is too 
cumbersome. If I lend out without collateral, then I need a mechanism to assist me to collect my 
money” [MFI8/2/(1)]  
 
Other sentiments expressed related to a combination of microlending being an unsecured 
business that comes with risks and the stricter requirements brought in by the new 
regulations on deduction codes that stipulate that the total cost of the loan of those to qualify 
for the use of deduction codes should not exceed the prime rate times 2, i.e. the interest rate 
has been capped for those wanting to utilise government’s deduction codes as a debt-
collection approach. See the quote below as an example of the type of responses in this 
regard.  
 
“… because it is unsecured lending. The new regulations on deduction codes 
also make it difficult for any microlender to continue operating, as the risk has 
increased for service providers” [MFI9/1/(1)] 
 
The researcher understood from engagements with relevant staff in the Ministry of Finance 
that these new regulatory requirements are part of the bigger financial inclusion agenda of 
government that aims to facilitate affordable credit to previously disadvantaged Namibians.  
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5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF FIELDWORK RESULTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
SECTOR 
 
In this section, possible implications of the fieldwork and documentary review findings for 
developing the DMFIs in Namibia are discussed. These are issues that need to be taken into 
consideration as Namibia develops its regulatory framework for MFIs in order to ensure that 
it designs an appropriate regulatory framework that can facilitate the development of the 
sector envisaged by policy makers. This is important, especially in view of the fact that the 
country views regulation as an enabler in this process. The key issues identified by this 
thesis are discussed below. 
 
5.4.1 A lack of official definitions of microfinance and microfinance providers 
 
The fieldwork results pointed to the lack of definition of microfinance in Namibia as having 
caused confusion and a lack of understanding among stakeholders. As discussed under 
Section 5.3.5.2, the interviewees were not sure as to which institutions are supposed to be 
MFIs and which not; some associated microfinance with only credit provision, while others 
felt credit-only microlenders are not to be considered as MFIs. Another related concern 
raised by the stakeholders is the lack of distinction between consumption-driven 
microlending and micro-enterprise lending, which they considered to be more 
developmental-focused. They considered providers of micro-enterprise lending as the 
appropriate institutions that should be referred to as MFIs and not those involved in lending 
for consumption purposes, such as those in the majority in Namibia at the time of this 
research.  
 
Considering that the policy objective for wanting to develop the microfinance industry in 
Namibia has been expressed by the country’s Financial Sector Strategy as part of financial 
inclusion and aims to facilitate increased access to micro-enterprise loans and other financial 
services such as microsavings and micro-insurance, it is important for the country to get the 
intra-definitional issue sorted and be able to determine which activities are to be considered 
as microfinance activities and hence which institutions are MFIs and which not. According to 
CGAP (2012: 11), “an appropriate regulatory definition must be based on a clear articulation 
of the country- and situation-specific objectives the regulation is meant to serve”. In the case 
of Namibia, therefore, and in order to design an appropriate regulation and enforce it with a 
financial inclusion objective achieved (through microfinance), regulators need to understand 
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the distinctive characteristics of microfinance, including clients and their needs, products and 
services, and institutions providing those products and services (CGAP, 2012). This will also 
eliminate the current confusion among stakeholders which the researcher observed during 
the interviews, and enable both current and potential industry players to make out what they 
are into and/or getting into. For instance, the aspects of consumer microlending and micro-
enterprise lending should be clarified, i.e. whether both are to be considered as microfinance 
or not.  
 
Furthermore, because of the existence of many institutions that offer financial services to the 
poor alongside products targeting more affluent clients, and not necessarily as a primary 
business activity, there is a need to make that distinction, because often the risks that 
regulation and supervision are intended to address will be different in the context of a 
diversified financial service provider (CGAP, 2012: 6). As such, where banks are involved in 
the provision of microfinance, there should also be a clear distinction between microfinance 
business and pure banking business, such that only the microfinance operations of banks 
should be included in the definition. Currently, any small loan provided by commercial banks, 
regardless of the purpose it is taken for, seems to be considered as microfinance. 
Clarification is necessary to ensure proper monitoring and evaluation of the progress and 
impact made by the sector going forward, in terms of serving the poor and SMEs, a role 
which the country expects these institutions to play.  
 
In the process of defining microfinance, it will be important to learn from other countries’ 
definitions of microfinance and adapt relevant ones to the Namibian situation. For example, 
Uganda under the same Act referred to earlier (the Micro Finance Deposit-taking Institutions 
Act 2003) defines microfinance business as the acceptance of deposits and the whole or 
partial employment of such deposits in the provision of short-term loans to small or micro-
enterprises and low-income households, usually characterised by the use of collateral 
substitutes, such as group guarantees or compulsory savings. The key elements contained 
in all of these examples relate to micro-enterprise lending with the typical characteristics of 
group-lending methodology, collateral substitutes and greater client interaction, as opposed 
to consumer lending, which seemed to dominate in Namibia.      
 
It is however important to note that the microfinance sector is evolving. While microfinance 
initially was about extending loans of small and smallest amounts to the rural poor for 
income-generating activities, it has evolved into a tool for supplying access to financial 
services for the unbanked (i.e. it has become a tool for financial inclusion) in the emerging 
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and developing economies (Ledgerwood et al., 2013; Lützenikirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). 
This has not only come with a widening product range and a changed base for microfinance 
customers, but also with larger average loan sizes and an increased share of finance for 
household needs (for consumption, but also education and medical care) other than just for 
investments. For instance, the share of household needs financing is estimated at an 
average of 25 per cent of MFIs’ total lending volume, though the actual number could be 
higher given that it is difficult for MFIs to control what the loans are actually used for 
(Lützenikirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). There has therefore been an increase in the number of 
those served by the sector, and this has called for a more financially efficient sector. As 
such, the sector has transformed into a more commercialised sector as MFIs seek to be 
sustainable so as to be able to continue providing their much-needed services. Literature 
therefore suggests that the key consideration should be for the definition to be flexible 
enough so as not to deter desirable market entrants and innovation in terms of product 
offering, while at the same time not losing the social purpose and typical clientele of 
microfinance. The above should therefore guide the process of Namibia coming up with its 
definition of microfinance and MFIs. 
 
5.4.2 Interest rate limits  
 
The researcher learnt from the survey and documentary review about the existence of 
interest rate limits that are currently imposed on microlenders based on the Usury Act and 
the Exemption Notice provisions that regulate them. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
issue of interest rate ceilings, i.e. the limits on the level of interest rates that financial 
institutions are allowed to charge, such as the caps imposed by the Usury Act in Namibia, is 
among the debated issues in literature, especially in as far as the case of MFIs is concerned. 
CGAP (2006) quotes the findings of a study conducted by the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry that assessed the impact of imposing interest rate ceilings in countries such as the 
USA, Germany and France, which found that interest rates ceilings had a negative effect on 
low-income people. Despite the fact that the ceilings are meant to protect low-income people 
from high predatory lending practices and excessively high interest rates, the study findings 
revealed that when ceilings are imposed, the choice of loan products offered by financial 
institutions become narrow and less appropriate to the needs of the poorer clients (CGAP, 
2006).  
 
In the case of MFIs, while the argument of the high cost of loans and predatory lending 
practices could be valid and applicable, it is argued that high fees and charges keep MFIs 
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afloat (CGAP, 2006) and are needed for their sustainability, especially considering the high 
transaction costs involved in their lending processes. Further, Helms and Reille (2004) 
argues that imposing interest rate ceilings also makes it difficult for MFIs to cover their costs, 
and this could have the effect of either driving them out of the market or even becoming an 
entry barrier to potential MFIs. When this happens, it can lead to a lack of access to financial 
services by poor clients as MFIs retreat from the market due to their inability to cover 
operating costs. A resulting consequence of this lack of access would be for the poor clients 
to revert to informal credit markets, which are even more expensive, such as money lenders 
(Helms & Reille, 2004).     
 
It is clear from the above that imposing interest rate ceilings might not necessarily be 
advantageous for any of the stakeholders of microfinance (i.e. neither providers nor the 
clients). It is therefore important for regulation to take into consideration both the cost of 
credit and the sustainability of MFIs in determining the optimal interest rate to be charged by 
MFIs. In fact, the job of regulation should be to provide an enabling legal environment that 
encourages entry and enhances competition so that competition would eventually bring 
down interest rates and make credit more affordable for the poor.    
 
5.4.3 Conditional selling  
 
The fieldwork outcome also revealed a practice of term lenders offering credit life insurance 
as a condition for providing loans to clients, i.e. a loan is only disbursed if a client takes out 
such insurance. This could be considered as forced insurance and an unfair practice from a 
consumer protection perspective, as discussed earlier in this chapter. However, the vastly 
increasing literature on the need for micro-insurance to accompany microcredit suggests that 
micro-insurance not only serves as security of the lender, but that the borrower also receives 
huge advantages from being insured. In fact, Shand and Angove (2013) view credit life 
insurance as having the potential of playing a significant role in supporting access to finance 
and therefore a stepping stone to economic development across a broad base, given the 
reduction in risk that it provides to credit providers. The downside, however, lies in the 
evidence of the often associated misselling, misrepresentation, misuse and/or abuse by 
some providers found in some countries such as in South Africa, Australia and the UK. In 
South Africa, Shand and Angove (2013) found credit life insurance to be expensive relative 
to life insurance, with insufficient disclosure while it also offered low value to customers. 
Cases of misleading representations and pressure tactics and harassment used to induce 
consumers to purchase these policies were among the anomalies reported in Australia, 
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while the UK had cases of consumers paying excessive prices for their credit life insurance, 
called Payment Protection Insurance, as well as cases of high pressure and unfair sales 
tactics (Shand & Angove, 2013). These are all factors that can hamper any advantages that 
this type of insurance can have for the consumers. The microfinance regulatory framework 
for Namibia should therefore ensure a balance in terms of having these insurance 
programmes to meet the needs of low-income and poor people, enhancing their affordability 
and accessibility as well as ensuring regulatory compliance in that insurers and/or other 
intermediaries conduct their business honestly and fairly.  
 
5.4.4 Sector performance 
 
The microfinance sector of Namibia was found to be relatively small and undeveloped. In 
terms of performance, though, the outcome of the survey discussed under Section 5.3.4.6 
showed that participating term-lending MFIs have performed well, have been efficient and 
productive and are profitable. However, the focus on urban salaried people has hampered 
their outreach, leading to question marks over their contribution to poverty reduction, as this 
approach has left an unfulfilled demand for credit in the rural areas of the country.  
 
An important aspect to consider going forward, in the spirit of the policy objective of growing 
the sector to address the unmet demand, therefore, is to ensure that the envisaged 
regulatory framework will be an enabler that will boost the sector and lead to its 
development, instead of curtailing its outreach through the process of MFIs struggling to 
comply with the regulatory requirements. It is therefore important for the regulatory 
framework to devise appropriate regulatory provisions that will avoid burdening the MFIs 
unnecessarily.  
 
An approach used by some other countries is to have a tiered approach of regulation that 
has differentiated regulatory requirements for the different tiers of regulated institutions. 
Although the researcher established through interviews with the regulator that this is actually 
the intention with the draft amended act, in that the draft microfinance regulations stipulate a 
differentiated regulatory approach between traditional banks and microfinance banks, the 
researcher argues that it is necessary for Namibia to properly scan its own environment and 
determine what regulatory requirements and approach would be appropriate for its market 
and an enabler for the achievement of its goals.  
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5.5 CONCLUSION ON THE STATE AND NATURE OF MICROFINANCE IN NAMIBIA   
        
This chapter addressed the research objective of understanding the nature and state of the 
microfinance sector in Namibia. Accordingly, it appraised the sector by analysing the survey 
and interview results as well as performing a documentary review, more particularly on the 
component of the microfinance sector found to be the most relevant for the research 
objectives of this thesis, i.e. the credit-only term-lending microfinance industry (and the only 
DMFI). The analysis has made it clear that the microfinance industry in Namibia has evolved 
over the years and is relatively small compared to what is found in other countries in Africa 
as well as in some other regions of the world, such as Asia.  
 
With the exception of the one microfinance deposit-taking bank, an NGO-owned Namibia 
Housing Action Group and a few SACCOs, credit only microlenders (mainly pay-day lenders 
but also a small number of term-lending institutions) dominated the sector. Moreover, most 
of the microlending institutions were urban-based and served the salaried segment of the 
population, which is a limiting factor to outreach. It also became clear from the fieldwork 
results that the largest part of microlending in Namibia was consumption lending, while fully 
fledged MFIs that can offer comprehensive packages of microcredit, microsavings, money 
transfer and micro-insurance were very few. This situation does not augur well with the 
generally accepted role of microfinance that points to poverty alleviation, as the unemployed 
and self-employed are excluded. The scope of microfinance programmes and activities in 
Namibia has therefore not adequately addressed the problem faced by the poor, low-income 
people and SMEs regarding access to finance in the country. There is therefore a need to 
develop an industry of MFIs that will offer comprehensive packages of microcredit, 
microsavings, micro-insurance, money transfer services, etc. for these groups of the 
population.  
 
Identified weaknesses and constraints to the growth of the Namibian microfinance sector 
include the absence of an enabling legal framework to spur the development of the sector, 
with stakeholders citing as examples the limitations to entry exerted by the legal framework 
under which DMFIs were being regulated together with conventional banks, the interest 
rates limitations of the Usury Act and its Exemption Notice under which microlenders were 
being regulated as well as the non-existence of a small claims court, meaning disputes 
cannot be dissolved quickly, and hence negatively impacting the recovery process of credit 
providers, as the current legal processes takes too long. A lack of key skills in the country to 
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drive and manage microfinance was also identified as a constraint, with stakeholders calling 
for the need to build capacity in that area. An apparent lack of a national definition for 
microfinance and therefore confusion around what should be considered as microfinance 
and/or MFI was also observed. The researcher is of the view that any regulatory framework 
aimed at regulating the microfinance sector should first and foremost recognise the need for 
defining the sector, as this will assist in facilitating the process of determining whether 
interventions are appropriately targeted and intended regulatory objectives of the country are 
achieved. This will also ensure the designing of an appropriate and enforceable regulation 
(CGAP, 2012). The fieldwork findings also pointed to the fact that the MFIs in Namibia 
stretched over a diverse spectrum and that different regulators and supervisors regulated 
and supervised them under different acts – a situation which stakeholders believed to have 
caused uncoordinated microfinance activities, but which the researcher found not unique to 
Namibia, as the microfinance sectors of most countries are fragmented and uncoordinated. 
 
The next chapter appraises the nature and state of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework of the Namibian financial sector under which MFIs operate, an exercise deemed 
necessary to obtain a clear understanding of the regulatory and supervisory environment so 
as to provide context for the impact analysis performed under subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 
APPRAISING THE NATURE AND STATE OF THE REGULATORY 
AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR MFIs IN NAMIBIA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses the current regulatory and supervisory framework of Namibia as it 
pertains to the financial sector in general and the microfinance industry in particular. As 
indicated under the research aims and objectives section of this study (Section 1.3), proper 
understanding of the regulatory framework is a pre-requisite for undertaking any meaningful 
impact analysis of such regulation on the MFIs. This chapter therefore addresses the 
research objective of obtaining a clear understanding of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework of the Namibian financial sector under which the MFIs operate. The aim is to 
identify weaknesses, strengths, constraints and/or gaps in the regulatory framework that will 
in turn facilitate the RIA processes of the research. Observations and conclusions made in 
this chapter mainly derive from stakeholder views obtained through the fieldwork (i.e. survey 
and interviews) and from the analysis of documentary reviews of existing administrative 
records and reports. They also draw on the insight from the literature review in Chapter 3.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised in a manner that it first reviews the current legal 
framework for the financial sector in Section 6.2, followed by a discussion of the financial 
sector regulatory and supervisory environment and how it relates to the microfinance sector 
in sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. Section 6.5 looks at the perceptions of stakeholders of 
microfinance regulation as obtained from the fieldwork, while Section 6.6 presents the 
implications of the research findings for the envisaged legal framework. It then summarises 
and concludes in Section 6.7.  
 
6.2 THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR  
 
Before outlining the regulatory environment of the financial sector (i.e. the regulatory and 
supervisory practices in the Namibian financial sector), it is worth highlighting the legislation 
that regulates and governs the activities of financial institutions in the country. In line with the 
distinction of different financial institutions made earlier in Chapter 2, Table 6.1 distinguishes 
legislation into those that established and govern regulated and supervised financial 
institutions, those for public finance institutions and those that have a bearing on the 
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activities of financial institutions (i.e. those that are not necessarily administered by the 
financial sector, but have a bearing on the sector). It is worth mentioning that in addition to 
the primary laws listed in the table, there are also subordinated or secondary laws in the 
form of regulations that regulate financial institutions, while determinations and/or directives 
are also issued in certain instances (see Appendix I) for those relating to the banking sector). 
The establishing acts govern unregulated financial institutions, such as public finance 
institutions.    
 
Table 6.1: Legislation that regulates and governs activities of the financial         
                            institutions in Namibia 
 
Legislation for regulated and 
supervised financial institutions 
Other relevant legislation for 
the financial sector 
Legislation for public 
finance institutions and 
SACCOs 
Bank of Namibia Act (Act No. 15 of 
1997)  
 
State Finance Act (Act No. 31 of 
1991)  
 
Development Bank of 
Namibia Act (Act No. 8 of 
2002) 
Banking Institutions Act (Act No. 2 
of 1998) (amendments to this act 
have been drafted and are 
awaiting Parliamentary approval) 
Public Accountants and Auditors 
Act (Act No. 51 of 1951)  
 
Agricultural Bank of Namibia 
Act (Act No. 5 of 2003)  
 
Payment System Management Act 
(Act No. 18 of 2003) 
Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act (Act No. 29 of 2004) 
National Housing Enterprise 
Act (Act No. 5 of 1993) 
 
Namibia Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Authority Act (Act No. 
3 of 2001) 
Financial Intelligence Act (Act 
No. 13 of 2012) 
 
NAMPOST Act (Act No. 17 of 
1992) 
  
Pension Funds Act (Act No. 24 of 
1956) 
Competition Act (Act No. 2 of 
2003) 
Co-operatives Act (Act No. 
23 of 1996) 
Long- and Short Term Insurance 
Acts (Acts Nos. 4 & 5 of 1998)  
Participation Bonds Act (Act No. 
55 of 1981) 
  
 
Stock Exchanges Control Act (Act 
No. 1 of 1985)  
Building Society Act (Act No. 24 
of 1956) 
Unit Trusts Control Act (Act No. 54 
of 1981)  
Inspection of Financial Institutions 
Act (Act No. 38 of 1984)  
The Usury Act (Act No. 73 of 
1968) 
Friendly Societies Act (Act No. 25 
of 1956) 
 
Source: Regulators and various websites of related institutions 
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As can be clearly seen from the above listed legislation, some of the legislation is archaic, 
dating as far back as the 1950s and 1960s. As such, their relevance has at times been 
questioned, a fact acknowledged by the NFSS 2011–2021. In fact, the NFSS has identified 
the need to revise and/or update, harmonise where relevant and align legislation to 
international best practices.  
 
Some of the listed legislation, such as the Competition Act, the State Finance Act and the 
Public Accountants and Auditors Act, is not under the custody of the financial sector 
regulators per se, but is also applicable and relevant to the activities and dealings of the 
financial sector. It is also worth mentioning that legislation such as the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act and the Financial Intelligence Act, which also cut across all sectors that 
are considered relevant to the achievement of their aims and objectives, has been placed 
under the delegated authority of the BoN by the Ministry of Finance, which is the legal 
custodian. Also, as stated above, some institutions, such as public finance institutions, are 
not regulated, but are governed by their establishing acts listed in column two of the table. 
Following below is an outline of the regulatory environment of the Namibian financial sector 
in terms of the current supervisory and regulatory practices.  
 
6.3 THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR 
 
This section aims to outline the regulatory environment of the financial sector in Namibia in 
terms of current regulatory and supervisory practices. It also aims to highlight the strengths, 
successes, weaknesses, gaps and limitations in the system. The focus is on the two 
regulated sectors, i.e. the banking sector and the non-banking financial sector, including the 
microfinance sub-sector, but some observations are also made about the unregulated 
financial institutions. The aim is to obtain a clear understanding of how MFIs fit into this 
environment. This is important because the activities and outputs of the MFIs would be 
influenced by the legal framework in which they operate, i.e. by the legal environment 
around them.      
 
6.3.1 The banking sector regulatory environment  
 
The BoN prudentially regulates the banking institutions (including one deposit-taking 
microfinance bank) under the BIA (Act No. 2 of 1998), as amended. It conducts on-site and 
off-site examinations to fulfil its mandate. According to the FSA done by the IMF in 2006, 
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which was the latest on the country at the time of preparing this research, the regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks for banking supervision have been broadly satisfactory (IMF, 2006), 
although the assessment report also identified weaknesses in the regulatory system. The 
identified weaknesses include a lack of sufficient knowledge and skills among supervisors as 
well as the inadequacy of risk-based supervision methodologies, the lack of supervision of 
bank holding companies and financial groups, as well as the absence of regulatory 
requirements on market and country risks (IMF, 2006). The crisis-simulation exercise 
performed by the country’s Financial Stability Committee102 with the assistance of First 
Initiatives103 in 2014, which assessed the readiness of the banking sector in a crisis, also 
found the capability of the system to resolve failing banks as unsatisfactory, while the NFSS 
2011–2021 has also identified certain weaknesses in the regulatory system that need 
addressing, such as the limited financial safety nets and a lack of consumer protection.  
 
A review of the BoN annual reports for the period 2009–2014 (i.e. after the IMF FSA referred 
to above) reveals that over the years, the BoN has strived to address the identified 
weaknesses as well as to align itself to international regulatory and supervisory best 
practices. This has seen the regulator amending certain legislation and implementing the 
Basel core principles. Between the years 2010 and 2013, amendments were effected to the 
BIA, Act No. 2 of 1998. The 2010 amendments related to fees payable by banking 
institutions (i.e. annual fees and administrative penalties for non-compliance), while they also 
aimed to enhance the bank’s supervisory powers and scope as well as to augment the 
governance standards in the industry (BoN, 2013a). The amended legislation also 
empowered the bank to carry out consolidated supervision, such that the conduct of bank 
holding companies and subsidiaries now also falls under the purview of the BoN (BoN, 
2013a).  
 
The 2013 amendments were aimed at consolidating the BIA, 1998 and the Banking 
Institutions Amendment Act (Act No. 14 of 2010), as well as to incorporate other necessary 
additional regulatory amendments (BoN, 2013a). The 2013 annual report of the BoN lists 
these to include issues relating to the enhancement of various definitions for purposes of 
clarity and ensure application thereof, prescription for foreign shareholding in banking 
institutions in support of what is envisaged by the NFSS, the prevention and deterrence of 
                                                          
102 This is an inter-agency committee of the country’s two financial sector regulators (BoN and NAMFISA) as 
    well as the Ministry of Finance with an observer status.  
103 First Initiative is an international consultancy firm. 
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illegal financial schemes in the country, ensuring the existence of recovery plans for banking 
institutions and providing for resolution measures of problem banking institutions. These 
amendments were all said to have aimed at enhancing the regulatory system and capacity.  
 
The year 2013 also saw another round of amendments to the BIA, although not promulgated 
yet at the time of preparing this research. These latest amendments were aimed at 
strengthening the supervisory power of the regulator and include the provisions for 
regulating DMFIs (BoN, 2013a). The provision for regulating this type of MFI has been 
sparked by the desire of the regulator to provide an enabling regulatory environment that 
would attract investors’ participation in that industry (BoN, 2013a), which only consisted of 
one institution, and thereby achieve the ultimate goal of the policy makers of developing an 
industry that is able to serve the poor and SMEs better.  
 
The above processes also saw parallel efforts by the regulator to address other weaknesses 
that were identified by the IMF FSA of 2006, such as those related to the lack of sufficient 
knowledge and skills among supervisors and the inadequacy of risk-based supervision 
methodologies, both of which are relevant for microfinance regulation. The BoN has 
implemented a risk-based supervision approach, which is a risk focus supervision process 
that emphasises the understanding and assessment of the risks of regulated banking 
institutions (BoN, 2013a). This is an aspect that is particularly relevant for microfinance, as 
regulating MFIs can be a very costly and burdensome endeavour. In addition, failure by 
MFIs might not necessarily pose any serious damage to the financial sector, given their size 
(CGAP, 2000), as alluded to in the literature review chapter, and hence the need for 
microfinance regulatory approaches and measures that are commensurate with the risk 
involved. The risk-based regulatory approach adopted by the BoN is therefore not only 
beneficial in the current setup, but will also prove to be relevant going forward as the BoN 
engages more in the regulation of deposit-taking microfinance banks.  
 
In order to address the lack of sufficient knowledge and skills among supervisors, the BoN 
embarked upon a process of capacity building for its supervisors, especially in the area of 
microfinance supervision, which has become a new and specialised addition to its regulated 
industry and which requires a complete new set of supervisory skills. In this regard, the 
researcher noted from documentary review that the BoN brought in international consultants 
in 2011, including those from First Initiatives, to train its staff. This exercise also included the 
development of specialised operational manuals and procedures for supervising 
microfinance banking institutions, which were piloted on the one DMFI in the country 
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(FIDES). Some of the staff members were also sponsored to attend specialised microfinance 
courses abroad, such as the international Boulder Microfinance Training Program offered by 
the Boulder Institute of Microfinance in Rome, Italy. The documentary review revealed that 
capacity building has actually been part of a larger effort by the BoN to create a legal and 
regulatory framework attractive to other investors to engage in micro-enterprise lending and 
in other areas of financial inclusion, for which a draft bill was in place at the time of this 
research and in the context of which the primary objective of this thesis was analysed. 
 
6.3.2 The non-banking financial sector regulatory environment  
 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the NBFIs104 are diverse and are as such also 
prudentially regulated by NAMFISA under different legislations (except for microlenders that 
are non-prudentially regulated), depending on the type of institutions and/or the industry in 
which they operate. The main legal instruments are the Namibia Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Authority Act (Act No. 3 of 2001), the Pension Funds Act (Act No. 24 of 1956), 
the Long-term Insurance Act (Act Nos. 4 of 1998), the Short-term Insurance Act (Act Nos. 5 
of 1998), the Unit Trusts Control Act (Act No. 54 of 1981), the Stock Exchanges Control Act 
(Act No. 1 of 1985) and rules and regulations issued by the NSX, the Usury Act (Act No. 73 
of 1968), the Friendly Societies Act (Act No. 25 of 1956) and the Inspection of Financial 
Institutions Act (Act No. 38 of 1984).  
 
The IMF FSA performed in 2006, referred to under the section on banking sector regulation 
above, was also performed on the NBFIs sector. As in the case of the banking sector, a 
number of weaknesses were identified for this sector. The list includes a lack of capacity to 
regulate and supervise all the non-bank financial institutions; outdated laws that are not in 
line with international best practices leading to the existence of gaps in the legal framework; 
a lack of regulatory power in the regulator’s mandate for market conduct regulation and 
supervision; the inability to compile, verify, analyse and disseminate accurate and reliable 
data on the sector; and a lack of systems and skills to compile and analyse data to enforce 
certain supervisory functions (IMF, 2006). The NFSS 2011–2021 has also identified some of 
these weaknesses.  
 
                                                          
104 These include insurance companies (long- and short-term), a re-insurance company, pension funds, asset managers, unit 
trust companies, microlenders, venture capital funds, medical aid funds and the stock exchange. Microlenders are however not 
prudentially regulated, but supervised for market conduct-related issues. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
 
Unlike the case of the banking sector, which consists of ‘uniformed institutions’, the above 
listed weaknesses in the regulatory framework for the NBFIs sector could be a reflection of 
the difficulty and challenges involved in regulating a diverse type and number of non-bank 
financial institutions. However, judging from recent developments, NAMFISA has recognised 
the need to address the identified weaknesses and safeguard clients’ funds with which the 
NBFIs deal. As such, it has embarked upon a reform of the regulatory regime and the non-
bank financial services sector in particular, and has since implemented a number of 
initiatives, including amendments to the laws under its custody. In this regard, the NAMFISA 
Act has been amended to expand the authority’s mandate, increase its powers to supervise 
and improve its governance of institutions (NAMFISA, 2015b), while a draft new Financial 
Institutions and Markets Bill, which aims to consolidate and modernise various related and 
outdated legal instruments into one piece of legislation, is also in place (NAMFISA, 2015b). 
A new microlending-specific bill to regulate microlending activities of the institutions 
regulated by the authority was also being worked on and was at an advanced stage at the 
time of writing this research. This is aimed at enhancing the enforcement capability of the 
regulatory authority, which has been identified as a weakness in the existing legal 
framework. A new Financial Services Adjudicator Bill draft, which will govern the market 
conduct of financial institutions once enacted, was also in place. All these draft bills were yet 
to be promulgated at the time of finalising this research.  
 
The above legislative amendments seem to be a direct response by the authority to address 
the above listed weaknesses identified by the 2006 IMF FSA. For instance, the amendments 
to the NAMFISA Act aim to address the weaknesses relating to a lack of regulatory power in 
the authority’s mandate to regulate and supervise, while the Financial Institutions and 
Markets Bill addresses the issue of outdated laws to fill the gaps in the legal framework, as 
alluded to in the above paragraph. Further, the authority has taken steps in improving the 
weakness relating to the inability to compile, verify, analyse and disseminate accurate and 
reliable data on the sector, in that it has started releasing statistical quarterly bulletins since 
2012 and has been co-producing the country’s Financial Stability Report with the BoN since 
2013. 
 
6.4 NAMIBIA’S FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT AND MFIs  
 
As discussed under the literature review chapter, the history of microfinance globally reveals 
that it has evolved outside a regulatory framework in the form of informal savings and credit 
groups (CGAP, 2006). Accordingly, this environment has enabled MFIs to innovate and 
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engage approaches to the provision of financial services that are distinct from traditional 
approaches of conventional banking. However, while initially microfinance meant the 
extension of traditional micro loans of small and smallest amounts to the rural poor, it has 
evolved into providing financial services for all the unbanked in emerging and developing 
markets, and the process has also involved a widening of the product range, customer-base 
and a change in the way of serving them (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). Microfinance 
has therefore expanded and is growing into a more commercialised industry (Lützenkirchen 
& Weistroffer, 2012), and this has come with risks. As such, the issue of regulation of 
microfinance has been topical in one country after another (CGAP, 2000). The challenge 
faced by policy makers and regulators is how to ensure a healthy financial system while at 
the same time encouraging access to financial services (Porteous et al., 2010).  
 
In Namibia, the BoN has been regulating the only microfinance deposit-taking institution (the 
former FIDES Bank Namibia, now Trustco Bank)105 together with conventional commercial 
banks under the BIA. In this regard, this DMFI is expected to comply with the same 
prudential guidelines, including minimum capital, reserve and liquidity requirements as well 
as other requirements, as conventional commercial banks. This approach of regulation has 
often raised questions as to its appropriateness, as will be evident from the stakeholder 
views presented in Section 6.5 below, given that this institution is a special and unique 
financial institution, namely a microfinance bank. As pointed out earlier, literature points to 
the need for regulation to acknowledge the uniqueness of MFIs and devise regulatory and 
supervisory approaches relevant to their unique characteristics and those of the clients they 
serve so as to ensure their role of providing financial services to the poor is not constrained 
by regulation. Chapter 7 of this thesis assesses what the impact of regulating this MFI under 
the conventional banking institutions regulatory framework (the BIA) has been.  
 
In an attempt to spur the development of the deposit-taking microfinance banking industry in 
the country, Namibia has decided to create a window for regulating those type of institutions 
so as to provide an enabling regulatory environment. In this regard, a draft Banking 
Institutions Amendment Bill, referred to earlier, which aims to provide for the regulation of 
microfinance banking institutions, was at an advanced stage in the legislative process at the 
time of writing this research. Details of its scope as they pertain to that provision as well as 
an assessment of its potential impact on the MFI sector going forward is the subject matter 
of Chapter 8 of this thesis.   
                                                          
105 FIDES was licensed in 2010 and was bought by the Trustco Group in 2014, and is now called Trustco Bank. 
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Microlenders are non-prudentially regulated in terms of the provisions of the Usury Act, Act 
No. 73 of 1968, which prescribes interest rate charges by the microlenders.106 There is also 
an Exemption Notice No. 189 of 2004, which details the rules and regulations for 
microlenders. These are non-prudential regulatory rules with which NAMFISA controls the 
market conduct of microlenders such as those relating to the adherence to interest rate 
caps, transparency requirements and client confidentiality aspects. The Exemption Notice 
allows microlenders exemption from the Usury Act rate of average prime rate times 1.6107 to 
charge an effective annual interest rate of average prime rate times 2 for term lenders and a 
maximum of 30 per cent for pay-day lenders. This exemption has been justified on the basis 
of the nature and risk associated with microlending. Loans that exceed the exemption limit, 
which is set at N$50 000, are subject to the lower Usury Act rate of prime rate times 1.6. The 
implication of this is that if a registered microlender disburses a loan above the threshold of 
the Exemption Notice, such a loan is charged at Usury Act rates and not Exemption Notice 
rates. These differentiated rates have been a bone of contention, especially with commercial 
banks playing in the microlending space having raised concerns of an unlevel playing field.      
 
To fulfil its regulatory mandate, NAMFISA undertakes both post-registration and compliance 
inspections of the microlenders. With post-registration inspections, the regulator verifies 
whether newly registered micro-lenders meet basic requirements, such as those relating to 
office infrastructure, etc. Compliance inspection, on the other hand, aims at verifying 
compliance with the provisions of the Exemption Notice, such as those relating to loan 
agreement disclosure, interest rate charges, collection practices, adherence to confidentiality 
aspects as well as the display of registration certificates. In addition, information provided by 
NAMFISA revealed that it expects microlenders to submit financial and statistical returns on 
a quarterly basis, indicating the loan amounts disbursed, loan thresholds, number of 
borrowers, etc. Due to weaknesses observed in the regulatory framework, which is not only 
lacking enforcement power but is also archaic, NAMFISA indicated it is in the process of 
drafting legislation specifically for regulating microlenders.108   
 
In the case of other institutions that also provide microloans but are not regulated by the 
financial sector regulators (i.e. by neither the BoN nor NAMFISA), and which are mostly 
public finance institutions, NGO-owned MFIs and SACCOs, they are either governed by their 
respective establishing acts (for example the DBN and AgriBank of Namibia) as listed under 
Table 6.1 above, or are supervised by the relevant line ministries under whose custody they 
                                                          
106 The prescribed rate is the average prime times 1.6.  
 
108 This information was revealed during the fieldwork (i.e. during the interview process) by NAMFISA officials. 
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are placed based on the nature of their activities (for example the SACCOs and NGO-owned 
MFIs).  
 
SACCOs are not prudentially regulated, but are supervised by a dedicated division within the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development called the Division of Co-operative 
Development (DCD) under the Co-operative Act of 1996. Due to a lack of capacity, the role 
of the division has been confined to cooperative activity relating to the formation, registration 
and winding-up of activities, with not much focus on the financial activities of SACCOs, i.e. 
monitoring of this industry has been on a limited basis.109 It is only recently when the DCD 
has engaged some basic forms of auditing function of the financial records of SACCOs. The 
fact that SACCOs take savings from their members has raised concerns about the safety of 
members’ savings. In an interview with the researcher, a DCD official expressed the need for 
prudential regulation of these institutions in order to protect members’ savings. According to 
this official, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry had attempted to get in experts to 
design the regulatory rules, but the exercise was not engaged, as it was found to be very 
expensive, and the Ministry intended to continue investigating affordable ways of coming up 
with prudential regulatory rules for the SACCOs. Worth noting, though, is the fact that CGAP 
(2006) finds the aspect of prudential regulation to be a complex one that needs careful 
consideration, as effective prudential regulation, especially for smaller institutions, can be 
costly and difficult. It further states that small and remote financial institutions such as 
savings and loan cooperatives and member-owned financial cooperatives may likely not be 
effectively supervised. The researcher is therefore of the view that the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Forestry in Namibia should take these facts into account going forward as they 
plan to engage a prudential regulatory process for the SACCOs.  
 
An NGO-driven MFI (under the auspices of the Shack Dwellers Federation), the Namibia 
Housing Action Group, which also provides small loans for housing and income-generation 
purposes, is registered with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and is required to 
report on financial statements by the same ministry and the Ministry of Regional, Local 
Government and Housing as well as funding agencies, and to report on donor inflows 
statements to the BoN.110 Being an unregulated member-based organisation that mobilises 
                                                          
109 This information was revealed during an interview with one of the senior staff members at DCD, Mr Ruben Izak, on 7 August 
2015. 
110 This information was revealed during an interview with the regional coordinator, Mr Heinrich Amushila, on 11 November 
2014. 
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savings and extends loans to its members, the interest of stakeholders has been that of the 
safety of members’ savings. 
 
6.5 STAKEHOLDER OBSERVATIONS ON THE REGULATION OF MICROFINANCE 
IN NAMIBIA: FIELDWORK RESULTS  
 
This section presents the views of stakeholders111 obtained through interviews and a 
survey112 (as per the same sample explained in Chapter 5) on how they viewed the state of 
microfinance regulation in Namibia. Key questions posed included whether or not 
stakeholders felt there was a need to regulate MFIs, the risks they thought regulation would 
address and/or the benefits regulated MFIs are to derive from that process, whether or not 
they thought there was a need to distinguish between different MFIs when regulating and 
who they thought the appropriate regulator for the microfinance sector in Namibia should be. 
It also discusses the regulatory constraints being faced by the MFIs, as highlighted by the 
same stakeholders. Outlined below are the questions posed to stakeholders and as was the 
case in Chapter 5, quotes of responses provided that are most representative of the findings 
are also presented for illustration purposes where relevant, while others can also be made 
available on request. 
 
6.5.1 To regulate or not to regulate microfinance institutions  
 
In line with the debates for and against regulating MFIs discussed under Section 6.4 above, 
the question of whether or not MFIs should be regulated was posed to interviewees and 
survey respondents to gauge their views on the issue.  
 
With the exception of one stakeholder from the regulatory fraternity who had mixed views on 
the issue (i.e. he provided a ‘yes and no’ answer), indicating regulation should depend on 
the size of the amounts involved, everybody else (15 participants) who responded to this 
question firmly thought there was a need to regulate MFIs, although the reasons provided for 
doing so varied. Those in the regulatory authority space and experts in the microfinance field 
cited the consumer protection reason, while practitioners (i.e. providers of financial services), 
including those in the conventional banking sector, considered regulation to be necessary to 
                                                          
111 Stakeholders referred to here are the same as defined under Section 5.3.5 of Chapter 5 (i.e. providers of financial services, 
policy and law makers, regulators, local experts in the field of microfinance and other interest groups). 
112 The survey also contained some qualitative questions and hence included in the analysis of this section are the views of the 
MFIs that responded to the survey. 
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provide guidelines and set standards for the industry and to create a level playing field for all 
industry participants. An interesting argument came from one of the regulatory officials who 
felt that if microfinance is extended for productive purposes, there was no need to regulate, 
but if for consumption purposes, then there is a need to regulate those providing it [Reg 
2/3/(1)]. A few other reasons for regulation were also mentioned by interviewees, including 
the need to enforce responsible lending and reduce over indebtedness and that the industry 
involved greed for high returns, which also needs to be regulated. To illustrate these 
findings, presented in the box below are some quoted answers in response to the specific 
question posed by the researcher.  
 
Box 6.1: Should microfinance institutions be regulated? 
“Yes, the principle of banking should be applicable to MFIs too, especially when they are taking 
deposits” [Exp/2/2/(1)] 
 
“Yes, you may still find MFIs that mobilise public savings and thus the need to protect the public” 
[Reg1//2/(2)] 
 
“Yes, a regulated industry provides for fair business practices and credit granting to consumers. It 
creates a level playing field for competitors in the industry and prevents abuse of power” [MFI/2/1/(1)] 
 
“There is a need to ensure that lenders do their homework before lending out money so as to ensure 
their clients repay their loans. Also, the nature of the industry is such that there is a lot of greed in it, 
as people want higher returns and the greed needs to be regulated. Laws that preclude people from 
getting into excessive debt [are] beneficial” [MFI8/2(1)]  
 
“Yes, to avoid overcharging and protecting the clients’ rights” [MFI9/1/(1)] 
 
 
Some caution on how MFIs should be regulated was also provided, especially by 
practitioners (two), but also interest group members (two) and regulators (one), relating to 
issues such as the importance of keeping regulation very clear and simple and differentiating 
MFIs from conventional banks, the need to provide incentives to encourage and assist MFIs 
to serve the people better and the need to appropriately structure regulation, taking their 
activities and risks into account. The researcher found the argument of differentiating 
between MFIs and conventional banks to be in line with what is advocated in literature, as 
discussed under the literature review chapter.  
 
One of the practitioners further felt that regulation should only kick in when an issue arises to 
regulate that specific issue so as to allow things to develop informally first with little control 
and only regulate later so that MFIs are deliberately set up for success first [BA/1/3/(1)]. This 
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view is also not too far from that of CGAP (2000) that regulation can not only cramp 
competition, but also stifle innovation. CGAP (2000) posits that the cramping of competition 
and stifling of innovation by regulation can happen because setting rules for microfinance 
also involves deciding on the kind of MFIs that should be allowed to engage in that business, 
as well as the loan methodologies and what is considered appropriate operating procedures. 
As such, this can draw boundaries to the extent that any other innovation outside those 
boundaries is excluded. The box below quotes some specific views as provided by the 
respondents. 
 
Box 6.2: Should microfinance institutions be regulated? 
 
“Yes but regulation should be structured appropriately, taking their activities and risks into account. 
They should not be regulated the same as banks” [MF6/1/(1)] 
 
“Yes, microfinance institutions should be regulated but the extent of such regulation may be less 
stringent in most areas than the traditional banking institutions” [Reg2/3/(3)] 
 
“Yes, but not over-regulated, it should be for key things. They need to be given latitude to be able to 
do what they need to do. The more you regulate and the more you control, you inhibit innovation. … 
don’t regulate them like commercial banks that are highly regulated” [BA/1/(1)] 
 
Also in line with the views expressed by CGAP (2000) that it would often be best to allow 
certain small institutions to take deposits on the basis that they are providing a necessary 
service, one respondent thought whether or not MFIs should be regulated should depend on 
the risk involved. He explained as follows: 
  
“… if the amounts are small and the impact of that is not big if anything goes 
wrong, then no need to regulate. But also even if the amounts are small but 
more people are involved, then you need to regulate and protect the public” 
[Reg1/2/(2)] 
 
Some other risks and benefits of regulation were also identified upon a follow-up question of 
whether stakeholders thought there were any risks to be addressed by regulation or benefits 
to be derived from regulating MFIs, and hence why they should be regulated. The key risks 
to be addressed by regulation mentioned by interviewees relate to possible loss of public 
funds in the case of DMFIs and therefore the need for regulation to safeguard those, the 
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possible abuse and ‘ripping off’ of clients, and hence the need to regulate the market 
conduct of MFIs as well as guarding against the instability of MFIs.  
 
The key highlighted benefits to be derived from regulating MFIs included the promotion of 
good behaviour on the side of MFIs; that regulation enforces a culture of good governance 
and ensures the existence of appropriate systems in place; that regulation leads to the 
improvement of skills, efficiency and productivity, which enhances the reputation of the 
institutions and is good for investors; and that MFIs can grow and develop in a regulated 
environment. Most of these identified risks and benefits are also in line with the arguments 
discussed in the literature review in Chapter 3 and were mostly raised by those in the 
regulatory sphere, some practitioners and experts, which indicates a comparatively high 
level of awareness about microfinance-related issues among these groups of stakeholders 
who are directly involved with the sector. They could have picked up this understanding from 
training courses and related seminars that these groups would normally be expected to 
undergo compared to other interviewees. See quoted responses in the below box for 
illustration purposes. 
 
Box 6.3: Are there any risks to be addressed by regulation and/or benefits to be 
derived from regulating MFIs? 
 
“The biggest risk is to the customer in terms of their money disappearing and the benefit is that of 
regulation taking care of the risks, as there will be proper systems in place” [Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
“The risk is that they are dealing with third party money. The looser your regulatory framework is or 
the looser it is enforced, the more you find people in the sector who should not be there and stability 
is affected negatively. The benefits relate to the improvement of skills, efficiency, productivity, etc. 
MFIs can grow because of the enabling environment” [Exp/2/2/(1)] 
   
“The risk depends on the activities of the MFIs ... if deposit-taking then there is [a] need to ensure the 
soundness and stability of the MFIs, but if only credit then only regulate the conduct of their 
businesses. The benefit is that of bringing order in the market ... MFIs will keep good behaviours, as 
regulation brings out the best in MFIs by guiding what to do and how to do, investors and customers 
will have confidence to deal with MFIs” [MFI6/1/(1)] 
 
“It promotes prudence in the conduct of the microfinance business so as to ensure stability of the 
financial system” [Reg2/3/(3)] 
   
6.5.2 To distinguish or not between different types of MFIs when regulating 
 
In addition to the above questions on whether or not MFIs should be regulated and why they 
should be regulated, the researcher sought to establish whether stakeholders saw the need 
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to distinguish between the different types of MFIs when regulating them. This was deemed 
necessary to determine the level of understanding in Namibia of the different types and roles 
of MFIs and how they should be treated by regulation. In this regard, responses were mixed. 
Two respondents from the policy-making and regulatory fraternity spheres did not see the 
need for differentiating and either thought that they all fit the definition of microfinance and 
hence no need or that if microfinance is properly defined, there should not be a need to 
distinguish them for regulation. One of the experts in the field of microfinance also did not 
see the need for differentiating the MFIs when regulating them, but for a different reason, 
namely that he believed the playing field needed to be level for all participants (see some 
quoted answers to the specific question posed by the researcher in Box 6.4 below). 
 
Box 6.4: Is there a need to distinguish between different types of MFIs for regulation? 
 
“I don’t see the need for distinction – if microfinance is properly defined then no need for distinction” 
[Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
“I believe that the playing field has to be level for all, it doesn’t matter if it is an NGO, money lender, 
etc. I think the regulation should be the same. The rules should be applicable to all institutions … we 
should have a set of laws for lending and a set of laws for deposit taking” [MFI8/2/(1)] 
 
Those in favour of differentiation consisted of a mixture from classes of stakeholders 
interviewed. Two respondents thought that some MFIs might not need to be subject to a 
uniformed piece of legislation, but felt that the problem in Namibia was that things were so 
fragmented and uncoordinated and that something needed to be done to correct the 
situation.  
 
Some others (four), mostly industry practitioners, expressed that the microfinance industry is 
very different from the classic and traditional banking industry in many ways and believed 
there was a need for a separate regulator for microfinance and saving and loans institutions 
(such as SACCOs). This group therefore argued that there has to be a distinction so that 
every institution or MFI is clear on where they fall and what is required of them. They gave 
an example that it would for instance not be fair to regulate credit-only MFIs together with 
savings or DMFIs because their profiles and motives are different, and that regulation 
therefore should be tailor-made to fit the establishing objectives of the institutions. They 
further opined that categorisation would avoid unnecessary reporting for those who do not 
need to and that as those types of MFIs develop and grow, they could then be formalised by 
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way of regulation. One interviewee from the practitioner group was even of the opinion that 
there should be regulatory differentiation within the credit-only microlenders group in terms 
of whether they were pay-day lenders or term lenders. The specific question posed and 
some quoted answers are presented below to illustrate the findings. 
 
Box 6.5: Is there a need to distinguish between different types of MFIs for 
regulation? 
   
“Yes, they need to be distinguished on the basis of deposit-taking or not, ... what kind of products they 
are allowed to offer, and what kind of capital requirement [is] needed” [Exp/2/2/(1)] 
 
“Yes, everyone will be clear where they fall and what is required of them, regulating credit-only MFIs 
together with deposit-taking is not fair, risk profiles are different. Thus there has to be categories to 
avoid unnecessary reporting” [MFI6/1/(1)] 
 
“Yes because they are different … microfinance is more into development financing while 
microlending is consumption lending. Also, microlenders are differentiated between pay-day lenders 
and term lenders” [MLA/1/1(1)] 
   
“Yes, microlenders have different motives, and lend against own capital, as they grow then they must 
become formalised” [BA/1/1/(1)] 
 
“There is no right answer, … some of them might not need to be subjected to one piece of regulation” 
[Reg1/2/(2)]  
 
The necessity of differentiated regulation for MFIs from that of conventional banks as well as 
among the types of MFIs themselves has been acknowledged in literature, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. This has been on the basis that the fundamentals of the microfinance business 
render them different to conventional banking, while different types of MFIs also have 
different profiles, and may therefore require a different regulatory approach. In addition, 
different MFIs may engage in different activities, such as deposit-taking or savings 
mobilisation or only credit extensions, in which case the focus may shift to determining the 
risks involved in the business of each of these types and determining appropriate regulatory 
measures accordingly. 
 
CGAP (2000) is of the view that while prudential regulation is important for DMFIs, it may be 
reasonable to non-prudentially regulate credit-only MFIs in some situations, i.e. it may be 
reasonable to only require such MFIs to register and produce financial statements as well as 
to be transparent towards clients in terms of providing them with the necessary information. 
This is because the costs of prudential regulation tend to be high, both in terms of cash costs 
to the supervisor and the supervised, and in terms of stifling innovation and outreach 
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(CGAP, 2000). CGAP (2012) further argues that it is better to regulate activity than to 
distinguish regulation based on the type of institutions. The above stakeholder arguments 
are therefore in line with the literature.  
 
6.5.3 Who the regulator of microfinance institutions in Namibia should be 
 
Another question posed to the interviewees is whom they thought the regulator for MFIs 
should be. This was a necessary question in view of the existing various 
approaches/alternatives to regulation that can be applied to regulating microfinance, as 
discussed under the literature review chapter. Stakeholder views were again divergent. Five 
stakeholders, from the policy-making arena, regulatory authorities, MFI practitioners and 
microfinance experts, limited themselves to the current situation and felt that it all should 
depend on the regulatory setup of the country, how MFIs are defined and what they are 
allowed to do. They felt that each of the existing regulators in the country has its own defined 
mandate (e.g. the BoN regulating DMFIs and NAMFISA regulating credit-only microlenders), 
and that as such, MFIs should simply belong to the correct regulator based on what they do. 
These findings are illustrated by the quotes below.  
 
Box 6.6: Who should regulate microfinance institutions and why? 
 
“It depends on how MFIs are defined and what they are allowed to do; each existing regulator has its 
own defined mandate, they should just belong to the correct one” [MFI6/1/(1)]  
 
“Deposit-taking should be regulated by BoN, and those not taking deposits by NAMFISA” [Exp/2/2/(1)] 
 
“It depends on the type of objectives one wants to pursue and thus then decide who is best suited to 
regulate. If not MFI banks, then NAMFISA should because you don’t want duplication and creating 
additional institutions unnecessarily” [Reg2/3/(1)] 
 
“It does not matter as to who (central bank, Ministry of Finance or a separate body) should regulate 
microfinance as long as such institution is credible. What really matters should be tailor-made 
regulations for microfinance institutions” [Reg2/3/(3] 
 
Four others, also a mixture of regulators and practitioners, were of the view that the BoN 
was well placed because microfinance involved the acceptance of deposits and savings. 
Those from the practitioner group further elaborated that the type of business in which MFIs 
are involved is more related to banking than insurance, hence the BoN being the suitable 
regulator for MFIs. They further argued that because the central bank already regulates 
commercial banks, it has acquired the necessary experience and expertise over time and is 
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better equipped to take care of the regulatory function from a prudential perspective. From 
the above arguments it is clear that this category of stakeholders consists of those who have 
a comprehensive view of microfinance, i.e. they consider microfinance to be those who not 
only offer microcredit but also microsavings, etc., as illustrated in the box below. 
 
Box 6.7: Who should regulate microfinance institutions and why? 
 
 
“Bank of Namibia because it involves the acceptance of deposit and savings from the public” 
[Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
“BoN because it is about the acceptance of savings from the public and since BoN already regulates 
commercial banks and have acquired the necessary experience and expertise and are better 
equipped to take care of it from a prudential perspective. Those just floating around need to be 
regulated to protect consumers” [Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
“Bank of Namibia because they are deposit-taking, but also microlenders should be under Bank of 
Namibia because the business is more related to banking than insurance” [MLA/1/1(1)] 
 
 
There are also those who thought it should not be the BoN because it regulates commercial 
banks, and those who thought it should be NAMFISA (2), but one was at the same time 
questioning the capacity and mandate of NAMFISA to do that. They therefore suggested the 
creation of a ‘new institution’ that should be given the specific mandate. This category of 
participants associated microfinance with credit extension by microlenders only. Some of the 
responses to the question are quoted in the table below. 
 
Box 6.8: Who should regulate microfinance institutions and why? 
 
“Not Bank of Namibia because they regulate commercial banks, it should be NAMFISA but they don’t 
seem to have the mandate, no skills and no human resources, thus there is a need to create a new 
NAMFISA with that specific mandate” [BA/1/1/(1)] 
 
NAMFISA because they took on the role of regulating financial institutions. But currently there is a lot 
of confusion in the market regarding the difference between NAMFISA’s role and the Bank of 
Namibia’s” [MFI8/2/(1)] 
 
“In Namibia there are banking institutions and non-banking financial institutions and the law 
distinguishes Bank of Namibia for banks and NAMFISA for microlenders. Thus, the microlenders 
should fall under NAMFISA” [PM/2/3/(1)] 
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A caution that came from one of the interviewees with links to a regulatory institution pointed 
to the fact that while it did not really matter who is decided upon to regulate MFIs, it mattered 
in the end to ensure that whoever the regulator is has the necessary resources and legal 
backing to enforce the function and to provide a comprehensive and effective regulation: 
 
“It does not matter who, but that person must be better placed resource-wise 
and legal-wise and needs to have enforcement so as to have a comprehensive 
and effective regulation” [Reg1/2/(2)] 
 
A study on the review of microfinance regulatory and policy assessment in the SADC region 
(of which Namibia is a member) undertaken by Brouwers et al. (2014) concluded, based on 
the current practice in the region where the trend is to allow for the licencing of non-bank 
deposit-taking institutions, that central banks are the ideal regulators for microfinance, 
especially in the case where microfinance is not defined by the type of institutions that are 
offering the service. It posits that central banks would have the pre-requisite experience and 
skills to carry out both prudential and non-prudential supervision that may be necessary. 
This argument is in line with the view of CGAP (2012), which found the authority responsible 
for commercial banks to be in most cases the best supervisor for depository microfinance, as 
that approach would benefit from existing skills, although additional specialised skills may 
still need to be developed.  
 
However, lessons from an ADB study of 2000 cited in the literature review chapter indicates 
that most countries have in place processes for registering NGOs, cooperatives and other 
institutions engaged in microfinance, which do not usually involve central banks, although 
cases also existed where central banks were involved in the registration or licensing of 
certain categories of MFIs (Roy, 2013). It is also true that certain situations are peculiar to 
specific environments in specific countries, hence the need for Namibia to analyse its 
environment and decide on an arrangement best suited to its environment. As one 
respondent put it:  
 
“It all depends on the regulatory setup of a country. In certain jurisdictions there 
is a single regulatory body housed under the central bank or independently 
outside the central bank. In some other countries there is separation between 
deposit-taking and non-deposit-taking institutions. The deposit-taking 
institutions are regulated by the central bank while non-deposit-taking is a 
responsibility of a separate body” [Reg2/3/(3)]   
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6.5.4 Regulatory and supervisory obstacles for providing financial services in      
            Namibia  
 
The stakeholders were also asked to provide their views on whether they thought there were 
legal and regulatory constraints to the provision of microfinance in Namibia currently. This 
was viewed a necessary question, because as stated under the introductory section of this 
chapter, one of the aims of the chapter was to identify weaknesses, strengths, constraints 
and/or gaps in the current regulatory framework so as to assist with the RIA process 
objective. The key identified areas of concern included a lack of an enabling regulatory 
framework for MFIs, the lack of relevant skills in the country (on both the regulators’ and the 
practitioners’ side) as well as the repayment ability of clients. One of the stakeholders, an 
industry practitioner, raised concern about the fact that the regulator and supervisor for 
banks and DMFIs in Namibia is the same, while these are different institutions. The box 
below illustrates respondents’ identified areas of concern in response to the specific 
question. 
 
Box 6.9: What are the major regulatory- and supervisory-related obstacles for 
providing financial services in Namibia? 
 
“There is no enabling regulatory framework, meaning there is no dedicated legislation for 
microfinance. There is a need for a microfinance bill that makes provision for savings. The current 
microlending bill only caters for microlending” [Reg1/2/(1)] 
 
“There are those created by Government such as the payroll thing. Those people in government 
cannot access our products even when we have better products. Only those with deduction codes 
can access those people. Also the N$50 000 limit or even the new proposed N$100 000 limit is a 
constraint because it does not take the changing buying power into consideration. How regularly can 
you update that?” [MFI10//1/(1)] 
 
“The skills issue is a constraint, also sometimes government procurement in terms of whom they 
source from” [Reg1/2/(2)] 
 
“BoN supervisors had to polish up their skills to be able to supervise these new institutions” 
[Reg2/3/(2)] 
 
 
Addressing the identified areas of concern such as the need for an enabling legal framework 
and building the skills required by the microfinance sector (for both the supervisors and the 
practitioners) would be necessary for the microfinance sector to thrive. However, it is 
important to note that the perception that a dedicated microfinance legislation is required for 
MFIs may not necessarily be the best approach for the sector and for attaining the country’s 
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objectives, especially if not effectively implemented. For instance, dedicated legislation could 
also come with other unintended consequences such as the potential for creating regulatory 
arbitrage in that, depending on how favourable the terms of such regulation are, existing 
institutions and new entrants may manoeuvre their way into qualifying as MFIs (CGAP, 
2012). Those institutions not able to meet certain regulatory requirements (especially 
prudential requirements such as minimum capital requirements in the case of commercial 
banks), may disguise to be licenced under the MFI-dedicated legislation with the aim of 
benefitting from such favourable terms under the dedicated legislation without necessarily 
having the motivation to serve low-income clients effectively (CAGP, 2012). Local factors 
should however determine what approach a country should take (CGAP, 2012). It is 
therefore important for Namibia to carefully assess its own environment and ensure that 
whatever approach is adopted will be effectively implemented so as to avoid the unintended 
consequences. 
  
6.6 IMPLICATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR AN MFI REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK IN NAMIBIA  
 
The stakeholder views presented under Section 6.5 of this chapter as well as the identified 
constraints and other issues noted from documentary reviews have implications for the 
design of any new regulatory framework aimed at governing the microfinance sector in 
Namibia going forward. The key ones considered relevant for the context of this thesis are 
discussed in the ensuing subsections. These are areas of concern that the country should 
consider addressing in order to have an appropriate regulatory framework for MFIs that 
should be able to better facilitate the development of the sector envisaged by policy makers.  
  
6.6.1 To have dedicated microfinance legislation or not  
 
The fieldwork results above pointed to the lack of dedicated legislation for the sector, and 
that this could be the reason why the country does not have a national common definition of 
what microfinance is and who the MFIs are. This, according to the stakeholders, has led to 
the uncoordinated and fragmented state of the sector, i.e. they felt that the current MFIs in 
Namibia stretched over a diverse spectrum and that different regulators and supervisors 
regulate and supervise them under different Acts. The stakeholders therefore called for 
dedicated legislation for the microfinance sector.  
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The researcher did not find the lack of dedicated microfinance legislation to be a unique 
situation to Namibia, as many other countries around the globe are without dedicated 
legislation for the microfinance sector, while their microfinance sectors are also fragmented 
and uncoordinated. According to CGAP (2000), the binding constraint to the growth of 
microfinance in most countries had not necessarily been a lack of a dedicated legislation, but 
a shortage of licensable MFIs. What is necessary for Namibia therefore is to have legislation 
for well-defined institutions and under which MFIs can thrive as well as an enabling 
regulatory framework attractive to new entrants.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, regulators have to consider many issues when creating 
and reforming policies (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Depending on the circumstances of 
the country, a choice can be made between creating microfinance-specific legislation, 
amending existing legislation to make provision for MFI regulation, or do nothing. An 
important first step in this decision process, before the complex task of creating a new 
legislation is engaged, is for the country to determine whether and how the existing sector 
regulation is a barrier to the achievement of the country’s intended objective (CGAP, 2012), 
which in the case of Namibia is the provision of financial services to the poor and SMEs. It 
should also be determined whether there is existence of a critical mass of qualifying 
institutions and which actors are likely to respond to the new legislation (CGAP, 2012), as 
without this, the creation of new and dedicated legislation would not necessarily lead to the 
achievement of this objective. Depending on the findings of the investigation, therefore, it 
may be sufficient to go the route of amending existing law and provide for the regulation of 
MFIs.  
 
According to CGAP (2012: 20), “several countries have built technically sound new 
regulatory windows for microfinance but have seen little response”. These are all important 
aspects that Namibia has to consider in its quest to create an effective microfinance 
regulatory framework. It is also important for the country to decide which MFIs are to be 
regulated, as not all microfinance activities can be regulated. CGAP (2000) recommends 
regulation to be aligned to the risk posed by MFIs. In this regard, the consideration should be 
to avoid burdensome regulations to both MFIs and regulators (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010), but at the same time ensure the ability to regulate effectively.  
 
A further related concern raised by stakeholders was that the perceived lack of a dedicated 
legal instrument for MFIs led to the fact that DMFIs are being regulated under the same act 
as conventional banks and are hence expected to comply with the same prudential 
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regulatory requirements, which affect their operations negatively. This concern is of 
particular interest to this research, given that one of its objectives was to determine the 
impact of regulating a microfinance bank under the BIA together with conventional banking 
institutions (presented in Chapter 7). The results of this investigation are therefore expected 
to either confirm or refute this finding. 
   
6.6.2 Prudential vis-á-vis non-prudential regulation of MFIs 
 
As alluded to in the literature review chapter, one of the considerations for deciding on how 
to regulate MFIs is whether they should be prudentially or non-prudentially regulated. 
Prudential regulation has to do with the protection of the financial system and the safety of 
depositors, while non-prudential regulation deals with issues of consumer protection, interest 
rate limits, transparency and disclosures, fraud prevention, ownership limits, tax and 
accounting-related matters (Christen et al., 2003, cited by Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). In 
other words, while prudential regulation is concerned with the soundness of financial 
institutions, non-prudential regulatory requirements focus on business- or market conduct-
related issues.  
 
Arguments for imposing prudential regulation on banks and other financial intermediaries 
relate to the need to protect public deposits, as banks fund their operations with third-party 
money (CGAP, 2012). The need to ensure the soundness of those institutions is also based 
on the fact that any loss of confidence by depositors in one institution could spread to other 
depositors of other banks and could cause a deposit run, which could then destabilise the 
whole financial system (CGAP, 2012). In the case of MFIs, Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) 
argue that most MFIs do not have the scale where their insolvency could threaten the 
stability of the financial systems in which they operate, although the savings of the poor 
could still be at risk. This then poses the question of whether MFIs should be subject to 
prudential regulation or not. In this regard, CGAP (2012) is of the view that most of MFIs’ 
depositors have very small account balances, and further argues that compliance with and 
enforcement of prudential regulation is usually complex, difficult and costly compared to non-
prudential regulation. Pouchous (2012) echoes this view and posits that there may be 
numerous MFIs in some countries and quite often they are too small in size and that 
regulating them can be a challenge, given that the capacity of regulatory and/or supervisory 
authorities might not be enough to handle the numerous institutions. It follows then that the 
decision to regulate DMFIs should be based on the risk involved, as discussed in the 
literature review chapter. CGAP therefore suggests that in the “absence of extraordinary 
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circumstances, non-depository MFIs should not be subjected to prudential regulation and 
supervision” (CGAP, 2012: 14).  
 
Some form of non-prudential regulation for MFIs is however necessary so as to ensure that 
consumers are protected from abusive and unscrupulous lending practices and that 
customers understand the contracts they enter into as well as their related obligations. This 
type of regulation is also important for the prevention of fraud and financial crime 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).    
 
Although the views from interviewed stakeholders on whether to prudentially regulate 
Namibian MFIs or not were divergent, the general argument on this issue pointed towards a 
differentiated approach, which is in line with the above arguments from literature. The 
majority of interviewees argued that whether to prudentially or non-prudentially regulate 
should depend on the activities of the MFIs, such that DMFIs would need to be regulated to 
ensure their soundness and stability, while in the case of credit-only MFIs, it would suffice to 
only regulate their market conduct (i.e. that non-prudential regulation is enough for those 
types of MFIs). These views are broadly in line with the arguments in the literature cited in 
the above paragraph. As such, what is key for Namibia is to weigh the costs against the 
benefits of supervising and regulating MFIs as well as the risk involved and to identify those 
to be regulated and how to regulate them. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between 
different types of MFIs (i.e. deposit-taking, credit-only, etc.) when deciding on the approach 
of regulation to follow, given the different profiles and mandates of different MFIs. This 
process should also take into consideration the challenge of the complex nature of regulating 
and supervising microfinance prudentially and the cost involved alluded to by CGAP (2012) 
and Pouchous (2012) in the above paragraph, so as not to waste scarce supervisory 
resources and/or saddle MFIs with unnecessary compliance burdens that could result in the 
unintended consequence of constraining the development of the sector. Although Namibia’s 
scale might be relatively small (in terms of the number of MFIs), the above arguments are of 
great importance for the country to take into consideration, particularly given the objective to 
grow the sector and the fact that the regulation of MFIs is a relatively new aspect and the 
country still needs to strengthen its capacity in supervising and regulating such institutions.  
 
6.6.3 Regulating microfinance activity vis-á-vis microfinance providers  
 
While the case of deposit-taking microfinance banks is clear, i.e. they need to be prudentially 
regulated, the question that arises, especially with the other categories of microfinance 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
182 
 
providers, and which relates to the issues of achieving a coordinated approach as well as 
the need to have a level playing field called for by stakeholders, is which of these institutions 
are to be regulated, how and what exactly to regulate. CGAP (2012) is of the view that to 
advance the promotion of a level playing field for access to finance, similar activities should 
be subject as much as possible to similar regulation, regardless of the institutions being 
regulated. This implies that regulating the activity (i.e. following an activity-based regulatory 
approach) is better than distinguishing regulation based on the type of institution.  
 
According to CGAP (2012), this is important not only for creating a level playing field, but 
also to foster competition and reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage, referred to earlier in 
Section 6.5.4. The researcher views this as an important aspect for Namibia going forward, if 
it is to achieve the regulatory objective of developing a real microfinance sector. Considering 
that the policy objective for wanting to develop the microfinance industry in Namibia has 
been expressed by the country’s Financial Sector Strategy as aiming to facilitate increased 
access to micro-enterprise loans and other financial services such as microsavings, the legal 
framework for microfinance that aims to promote such objective should therefore ensure that 
it caters for the microfinance activity instead of only the providers of these special services. 
For instance, while it is necessary to distinguish pure banking business from microfinance 
business, the microfinance operations of conventional banks (to be defined from the purpose 
of such operations) should be included in the determination of microfinance activities in the 
country and be regulated similarly to similar activities offered by non-bank MFIs.  
 
CGAP (2012:18), however, argues that “the ability to regulate activities similarly will depend 
on both the specific regulatory issue being addressed as well as how the different institutions 
are regulated (i.e. under one or many laws)”. This aspect is also relevant for Namibia to 
consider and address, given its current setup where MFIs are regulated by two different 
regulators (DMFIs by the BoN and credit-only MFIs by NAMFISA) under two different laws, 
i.e. the country needs to determine whether there could be a possibility of following the 
activity-based regulatory approach and how that is to be implemented. For example, while 
prudential rules could be based on the type of institution, differentiating them on the basis of 
permitted activities and capital adequacy, non-prudential rules such as those related to 
consumer protection and anti-money laundering and combating financial terrorism could be 
made applicable to all microfinance service providers, regardless of the type (CGAP, 2012). 
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6.7 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter aimed at addressing the research objective of understanding the current 
regulatory and supervisory framework for microfinance in Namibia. This was viewed a 
necessary process to facilitate the RIA for MFIs, reported on in subsequent chapters. From 
the analysis of this chapter, a picture emerged of the existence of a financial sector 
regulatory framework with emphasis on both prudential and non-prudential regulation, 
supported by two regulatory authorities (the BoN and NAMFISA) that have the necessary 
instruments to collect information about the sector and enforce regulatory provisions.  
 
There is a clear distinction between the regulation and supervision of the banking sector and 
that of the NBFIs in Namibia for which each of the two financial sector regulatory authorities 
are respectively responsible. It is also clear that the system is still evolving, especially in as 
far as the regulation of the new and special area of microfinance is concerned. At the time of 
the conducting the research, the deposit-taking microfinance industry comprises one DMFI 
that is regulated by the BoN together with normal banks under the BIA Act No. 2 of 1998, as 
amended, an approach that surveyed and interviewed stakeholders criticised. The basis for 
regulating credit-only micro-lenders is currently the Usury Act No. 73 of 1968 and the 
Exemption Notice issued by government, which allow lenders registered with NAMFISA to 
charge interest rates and other fees over and above the usury limits. As this is not a law that 
established microlending institutions, a gap in terms of the authority effectively enforcing 
regulatory power has been identified and is in the process of being addressed by the 
relevant regulatory authority at the time of the fieldwork for this research.  
 
The need for regulating MFIs as well as the appropriateness of the current regulatory 
approach was tested through the survey and stakeholder interviews. Most engaged 
stakeholders saw the need for regulating MFIs for various reasons, but mainly for consumer 
protection purposes, especially in the case of deposit-taking and savings-mobilising MFIs, 
and also to bring order in the sector and enhance the sustainability of the institutions. 
However, the stakeholders raised concerns about a lack of a dedicated legislation for 
microfinance activity in Namibia which, in their view, led to the existing DMFI being regulated 
under the same regulation as normal banks as well as the fragmented treatment of MFIs, 
which they saw as the cause for a lack of understanding about what microfinance is and who 
the MFIs in Namibia is. They therefore called for a coordinated approach to the microfinance 
sector in the country as well as a clear definition of MFIs to address the seemingly current 
state of confusion. In this regard, the researcher is of the view that what is needed is a 
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microfinance regulatory framework that would ensure effective regulation and supervision, 
taking lessons from other countries and the country’s specific regulatory objectives into 
consideration. In this regard, the proposed amendment BIA providing for the regulation of 
DMFIs and the envisaged microlending should go a long way in enhancing the regulatory 
and supervisory framework for MFIs in Namibia once they become effective, although it is 
not yet known to what extent there would be harmonisation of key aspects between these 
two pieces of legislation. For example, while the draft implementing determinations of the 
amended BIA [UD/L/2/1] suggest a microloan extended by DMFIs to be an amount not 
exceeding N$200 000, the draft Microlending Bill [UD/L/2/2] proposes the maximum for a 
microloan extended by credit-only microlenders to be N$100 000. Harmonising common 
aspects of microfinance, such as the definition of microcredit, MFI, etc., is important, as this 
will help address some of the above-cited concerns raised by stakeholders engaged by this 
study.  
 
The chapter also identified the need for capacity building in microfinance regulatory and 
supervisory skills, given that this is an area that is relatively new to the country. This is key 
because in the end, the effectiveness of regulation lies in its enforcement.    
 
Now that the state and nature of both MFIs and the regulatory environment they operate in 
has been determined in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, Chapter 7 below assesses the impact 
of regulation and supervision on microfinance in Namibia through the use of a case study, 
which is a first stage in addresses the primary of determining the impact of regulation on 
MFIs in Namibia.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE IMPACT OF REGULATING AND SUPERVISING MFIs: A CASE 
STUDY OF A REGULATED MFI 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter seeks to determine the impact of regulation and supervision on microfinance in 
Namibia. It does that through assessing the experience of an MFI that became a regulated 
entity, under the current regulatory regime (the BIA), together with conventional banks, as a 
case study. The chapter is therefore a first step of addressing the primary research objective 
of determining the impact of regulation and supervision on the Namibian microfinance sector 
(i.e. an ex-post assessment at a micro level), which will be looked at further at a macro level 
in Chapter 8 through performing an ex-ante RIA of the envisaged amended act.  
 
At the time of fieldwork (during April 2014 to October 2015), the case study MFI was the only 
MFI licensed by the BoN under the BIA113 (BoN, 2014). The intention with this case study 
was to explore the regulatory impact of having this MFI regulated on the same terms as 
conventional banks. The findings of this exercise should serve as validation of whether or 
not regulation and supervision actually achieves the objectives that were cited in the 
literature review chapter as justification for regulating and supervising MFIs. These include 
the promotion of financial system stability, consumer and/or depositor protection, improving 
MFIs’ performance standards, enhancing investors’ confidence in the institution and thereby 
increasing funding opportunities, and ensuring the effective use of public and/or investor 
funding.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 gives a background to the case 
study MFI in terms of its establishment, ownership structures, services and products offered 
and the lending methodology employed. The case study MFI’s experience as a licenced 
entity is sketched in Section 7.3, while Section 7.4 contains an analysis of the regulatory 
impact on the MFI. Section 7.5 presents the chapter conclusion. 
 
                                                          
113 Due to non-existence of a regulatory framework for DMFIs, this MFI had to be licensed under the normal regulatory 
framework for conventional banking institutions.  
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7.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY   
 
Koshi Yomuti (translated in English as ‘banking under the tree’) was established as a 
microfinance pilot project in 2002, in the form of a private company/NGO with a share 
capital, registered under Section 54(1) of the Companies Act of 1973. The project was 
sponsored by FIDES AG (Switzerland), the Namibian Department of Trade and Industry and 
GTZ (now called GIZ). It used to operate only in the north central underserved regions of the 
country, where it demonstrated that savings and loans village associations can be 
sustainable even in low-density rural areas (FIDES, 2010).  
 
Lending was on a group basis, while loans disbursed used to range between N$500 and 
N$20 000, with a repayment on small amounts having been done on a weekly basis (FIDES, 
2010). With a repayment rate of 99 per cent, Koshi Yomuti grew considerably over the years 
and became the largest MFI in terms of outreach and client base. By 2004, it had 
established 57 groups (FIDES, 2010) and this increased further to 65 by 2009. Given its 
successful operations and the extent to which savings were being mobilised, Koshi Yomuti 
was granted a license on 1 February 2010 by the BoN under the BIA, Act No. 2 of 1998, as 
amended, and became FIDES. It therefore transformed from a project to a public company 
limited by share capital, as required by the BIA of 1998. 
 
FIDES was established by four shareholders at the time, namely Swiss Microfinance 
Holding, which is the investment arm of the FIDES Group (32,67%); Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau of Germany (24,90%); Investisseur et Partenaire pour le Développement, 
which is a private company owned by European entrepreneurs (22,45%); and 
Volksvermogen (16,67%), a Belgium-based investment company (FIDES, 2010).  
 
Being a specialised microfinance bank, FIDES has been viewed as the only ‘true’ MFI 
operating in Namibia, providing a better package of microfinance products and services, 
including microloans and microsavings products, to empower micro and small entrepreneurs 
compared to microlenders that offer only lending. It had further developed an MSME facility 
offering lending to established micro enterprises at the time of becoming a microfinance 
bank and had kept its focus on the low end of the market, as it used to do while it was still a 
pilot project, with women entrepreneurs being its largest client base (FIDES, 2010). Its plan 
to offer micro-insurance had to be suspended on request of the regulator to sort out a few 
issues, including the pricing structure. FIDES’s product offering is not only in line with the 
desirable definition of microfinance outlined earlier in this thesis, but also augurs well with 
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the type of offering advocated by the country’s Financial Sector Strategy, i.e. having MFIs 
serving SMEs to enhance economic activities and employment creation.  
 
Information from the FIDES 2012 annual financial statement revealed the total assets of 
FIDES to have stood at approximately N$40 million, while it had close to 13 000 active 
borrowers at the end of 2012. Its gross loan portfolio was approximately N$32 million at the 
end of that period. More than 70 per cent of the loan book comprised of loans to micro 
entrepreneurs through loan and savings associations, with the remaining portion belonging 
to SME borrowers. The majority of loans were in rural areas (85 per cent), with 13 per cent in 
peri-urban areas and 2 per cent in urban areas. Through its primary savings product ‘Step-
Up Savings’, according to which clients were allowed to deposit an amount of their choice on 
a weekly or monthly basis, FIDES had managed to grow its savings portfolio to 
approximately 50 per cent of its loan portfolio.  
 
A review of FIDES’s 2010 annual report revealed the information provided below. Collateral 
for loans (called ‘Step-up Lloans’) was in the form of a joint and several guarantee provided 
by the solidarity groups, called the ELO (‘Loans and Savings Association’ in Oshiwambo) 
groups.114 Each group had its elected committee members. As additional security, each 
borrower had to deposit 6 per cent of the loans acquired into a guarantor fund account at 
FIDES, where it earned interest, and this could be withdrawn after full repayment of the loan 
and if there was no default115 in the specific ELO group. Further, there were community 
workers who used to visit clients on a weekly basis and dealt with group committee 
members. MSME loans, on the other hand, were fully secured with guarantors and pledges 
of assets in addition to loan officers visiting clients regularly (FIDES, 2010). Through this 
process, the bank managed to have a good repayment ratio and low PAR, as will be shown 
in the analysis section later in this chapter.  
 
In addition to its head office, which was based in Ongwediva, FIDES had three branches (in 
Ondangwa, Oshakati, Oshikango) and four satellite offices (in Outapi, Okahao, Okongo and 
Omuthiya) also in the northern regions of the country (FIDES, 2010). As part of its plan to 
expand its operations to other regions of the country, it opened a branch in the capital city 
                                                          
114 These are village associations which FIDES used as its main outreach channel. Each ELO had board/committee members 
with whom the community workers of FIDES (called Avenelo) would directly deal on a weekly basis to reconcile loan 
repayments and/or savings deposits that have been made at one of the FIDES branches or via NAMPOST Savings Bank 
(FIDES, 2010). 
115 If a loan is in default, no new loan is extended to the group and the individual guaranty funds may be activated (FIDES, 
2010). 
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Windhoek (specifically in a suburb called Katutura). However, the operations in the city 
turned out to be not as successful, as the branch ran into financial problems and had to be 
closed later.  
 
7.3 FIDES’S EXPERIENCE AS A LICENCED MFI 
 
This section looks at the experience of FIDES as a licensed MFI. As indicated under the 
introduction section, FIDES transformed from Koshi Yomuti, a microfinance project that used 
to provide savings and credit services to mostly the rural population in the far northern region 
of Namibia, after the project demonstrated that the provision of rural financial services was 
feasible and could become sustainable (FIDES, 2010). Despite being a microfinance-
oriented bank, FIDES was licensed under conventional banking law due to the absence of a 
legal framework for licensing deposit-taking microfinance banks. As such, FIDES was 
subject to the same prudential and non-prudential regulatory requirements as conventional 
banking institutions. These will be discussed below as background information to the RIA 
reported on in subsequent sections of this chapter. Where relevant, the expected effect of 
the regulatory requirements (as drawn from the literature) is also highlighted to serve as a 
base for such assessment.      
  
7.3.1 Prudential regulation 
 
As discussed in the literature review chapter of this thesis, prudential regulation is aimed at 
maintaining the financial solvency and soundness of regulated financial institutions (banks, 
in this case), and consequently at protecting depositors’ funds and maintaining stability of 
the financial system. While literature advocates for adjusting these standards for MFIs to 
align them to the risks posed by MFIs as well as to minimise compliance costs, FIDES was 
broadly subject to the same prudential standards as normal banks. The key prudential 
requirements are outlined below. 
 
7.3.1.1 Minimum capital requirement 
 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) describes the minimum capital 
requirement as the amount of start-up capital expenditure that investors need to contribute 
as equity in order to set up the bank infrastructure and operate successfully. In Namibia, this 
amount is set at N$10 million for commercial banks by Section 28(1) (a) of the BIA Act No. 2 
of 1998. This means that FIDES had to ensure, first and foremost, that it fulfilled this 
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requirement in order to be licenced. At the time of the licence application, FIDES’s 
authorised and paid-up capital was N$15 million (FIDES, 2010), compared to the statutory 
requirements for banks of N$10 million. This was achieved after shareholders had agreed to 
subscribe to additional shares (FIDES, 2010). From this it can be deduced that meeting the 
minimum capital requirements was not a problem for FIDES and did therefore not constitute 
an entry constraint.  
 
The required minimum capital is however in contrast to the lower initial capital requirements 
considered appropriate for MFIs by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its 
Guidelines on Microfinance Activities and the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, based on the limited complexity, scope and size of the operations of these 
institutions, especially in rural areas (BIS, 2010). Given that the afore-mentioned 
characteristics are also inherent for FIDES and the fact that its operations were mostly in 
rural areas, a lower minimum capital requirement could have been considered applicable to 
FIDES had it not been licensed under the banking institution law and had there been a 
microfinance-specific regulation in place. It can therefore be said that, as an MFI, FIDES 
found itself in a disadvantageous position because of this undifferentiated situation which it 
had to endure.  
 
7.3.1.2 Capital adequacy requirement  
 
Namibia is a Basel II regime, i.e. in 2010 it adopted the Basel II Capital Adequacy 
Measurement Principles, an international standard for measuring the capital position in 
banking institutions (BoN, 2011). While the CAR for commercial banks in Namibia stood at 
10 per cent of the risk-weighted assets, as prescribed by Section 9(c) of the BoN’s 
determinations on capital adequacy (BID5), an interview with one of the regulatory officials 
revealed that the regulatory authority does consider the size and extent of the business 
plans or models and prospective growth plans of new entrants when determining the levels 
of capital expenditure needed for banking operations, i.e. it can in absolute terms determine 
a precautionary higher level of capital amount when the situation so warrants [Reg2/3/3]. As 
a commercial bank licence holder, FIDES, a microfinance bank, was initially required to 
comply with the capital adequacy standard for conventional banks, i.e. 10 per cent of its risk-
weighted assets. This however increased to 15 per cent two years after licensing, i.e. 
effective from 31 May 2012 (FIDES, 2011). The increased capital ratio was a requirement of 
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the regulatory authority116 and in line with what is stated above, this higher rate is a reflection 
of FIDES’s business model and a measure aimed at safeguarding the operations and 
sustainability of the institution, especially at the time when the bank had rapid credit growth 
and escalating losses [Reg2/3/3].  
 
While not prescribing a specific CAR for MFIs, the Basel Core Principles of Banking 
Supervision117 (see Appendix I) advocates for a tailoring approach, indicating areas where a 
higher CAR could actually be applied to MFIs. The Core Principle on CAR states that when 
setting an appropriate CAR for MFIs, the nature of microfinance risk, the size and 
constituents of capital of MFIs should be considered (BIS, 2010). This therefore implies 
differentiated capital requirements for conventional banks and MFIs. The expected resultant 
effect of a stricter CAR is that of reducing the amount of funding available for lending 
(Staschen, 2010). The researcher therefore sought to establish FIDES’s experience in this 
regard during the RIA, reported on later in this chapter. In other words, the researcher 
sought to determine how the relatively high CAR might have influenced its lending.  
 
7.3.1.3 Reserve requirements  
 
In Namibia, banks are required to maintain an amount equal to 1 per cent of the average 
total liabilities (deposits) to the public, i.e. the minimum reserve requirement that was also 
applicable to FIDES is 1 per cent, although the central bank can vary this from time to time 
to achieve desired monetary policy objectives [UP/PD/2/2]. While it may be a necessary 
requirement, as it covers a bank’s liabilities and is hence a depositor protection mechanism, 
the profiles of depositors of MFIs such as FIDES are normally smaller relative to those of 
conventional banks, given that they serve less affluent clients.  
 
CGAP (2000) argues that most of the clients of MFIs are in a net debtor position most of the 
time and therefore the risk to them in the case of an MFI failing is relatively low. As such, 
there is more need for depositor protection and therefore a requirement for reserve 
requirements in the case of conventional banks than in the case of FIDES. This requirement 
also has the effect of having idle money that could have been utilised for more business 
                                                          
116 This was also revealed by one of the regulatory authority officials [Reg/2/3/1] during an interview with the researcher at the 
time of fieldwork on 2 April 2014/15. 
117 These are international standards under the framework of the Bank of International Settlement that guides setting of 
requirements for regulatory and supervision purposes. 
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activity such as lending. FIDES could therefore have been disadvantaged by having to 
comply with the requirement.  
 
 
7.3.1.4 Portfolio quality and loan loss provisioning requirements  
 
Commercial banks in Namibia are subject to the loan classification and provisioning criteria 
depicted in Table 7.1 below. Licensed under conventional banking law, FIDES too had to 
comply with these requirements. 
 
Table 7.1: Loan classifications and provisioning requirements 
 
Number of days overdue  Classification  Minimum provision  
  
Up to 89 days in arrears Pass/Acceptable 1% 
90–119 days in arrears Special mention 2% 
120–209 days in arrears Substandard 10% 
210–389 days in arrears Doubtful 50% 
390 or more days in arrears Loss 100% 
 
Sources: UP/RD/2/1 
 
In terms of portfolio quality, the regulatory authority monitors the PAR, that is more than 90 
days (i.e. PAR>90), of regulated institutions. Literature considers portfolio quality as the 
primary risk in MFIs and argues that because microfinance loans are typically short-term, 
small amounts that are repaid in frequent intervals, their loan portfolio is more prone to quick 
deterioration due to delinquency, which causes the need to quickly and accurately identify 
the risk posed by past due loans and for a robust manner in which MFIs portfolios are to be 
dealt with (BIS, 2010). In fact, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision advocates for 
the loan classification system and provisioning approach, which accounts for the number of 
days of non-performance of loans and missed repayments, applying the PAR>30 and 
PAR>90 of the gross portfolio principle.118 In this regard, the committee recommends an 
application of a conservative provisions schedule for MFIs relative to conventional banks that 
starts early and migrates faster to high risk levels.  
 
                                                          
118 This refers to PAR>30 and PAR>90, which are calculated on a gross portfolio, i.e. taking into account all the outstanding 
principal balances of all of the MFI's outstanding loans, including current, delinquent and restructured loans. 
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The same committee further recommends prudent loan write-off policies and procedures to 
also form part of the portfolio quality management. The fact that FIDES was expected to 
operate on conventional banks’ provisioning schedule could therefore be viewed as having 
been beneficial, as it did not have to endure the stricter provisioning requirements advocated 
for MFIs. However, this could also have disadvantaged FIDES to a certain extent, given the 
nature and characteristics of its loan portfolio that needed to conform to the provisioning 
standards recommended for MFIs. The impact assessment performed later in this chapter 
gives an indication of how the situation was with FIDES’s loan portfolio quality. 
 
7.3.1.5 Liquidity requirements  
 
The minimum liquid assets ratio for banks in Namibia, as stipulated in the Determinations on 
Minimum Local Assets (BID-6) issued under the BIA, Act No.2 of 1998, as amended, and 
which has been applicable to FIDES, is 10 per cent. Literature considers the dynamics of 
asset and liability management in MFIs as justification for a tailored approach, and argues 
that MFIs may have more limited access to funding sources than traditional banks, and 
therefore a higher minimum liquid assets ratio should be considered as ideal for MFIs (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; CGAP, 2009).  
 
Commonly in most countries, these ratios are in the range of 15 per cent to 20 per cent for 
MFIs (CGAP, 2009). It follows then that FIDES Bank Namibia as an MFI was subject to a 
lower liquid asset ratio than is normally the case for MFIs, which could be taken as an 
advantage of being regulated under the conventional banking institutions law. However, it 
might not have augured well with the fact that as an MFI, FIDES’s liabilities were very liquid, 
while its funding sources were limited relative to commercial banks that rely on other market 
sources of liquidity. The RIA undertaken later in this chapter have provided an indication of 
the developments in the liquidity position of FIDES and how that have affected the bank’s 
ability to meet its repayment obligations, during the period of its existence.  
 
7.3.1.6 Requirements on large and unsecured exposure limits  
 
With the aim to restrict the extent of credit exposure of banks to a single or group of related 
borrowers in relation to their capital, Namibia imposes 30 per cent capital funds for a single 
party as well as an aggregate limit of 800 per cent of all large exposures, i.e. loan amount 
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equalling 10 per cent of the bank’s capital funds.119 This allowable exposure limit of 30 per 
cent is considered too large for an MFI when compared to other jurisdictions. For example, 
in Uganda, limits of 1 per cent of core capital for individual borrowers and 5 per cent for 
group borrowers are applied to DMFIs, relative to 25 per cent of total capital for banks 
(Staschen, 2010). The large allowable exposure limit (30 per cent) actually provided an 
opportunity to FIDES to shift to serving more affluent customers than its target market if it 
wanted to, i.e. it could have caused a ‘mission drift’ for FIDES, especially when considering 
that as holder of a commercial bank licence FIDES was not confined to microloans.  
 
Limits are also set on Namibian banks to prevent concentration of credit exposures to certain 
industries or geographical locations. Being an MFI-oriented institution, the question that 
naturally arises is how feasibility and practical these exposure limits have been for FIDES, 
given its focus on a specific target market. In fact, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, in its Guidelines on Microfinance Activities and the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision, has acknowledged that the fact that MFIs focus on serving specific 
geographical areas where poor people reside would make such restrictions, coupled with 
industry limits, most impractical for MFIs. However, in the case of FIDES, the researcher 
understood that these exposure limits did not have any impact on its business, as its credit 
policy capped the maximum loans extended at a level that never reached the 10 per cent 
limit of the capital funds to be considered a large exposure [Reg2/3/(2)].  
 
7.3.1.7 Loan file documentation  
 
Strict loan file documentation requirements are applied to commercial banks in Namibia. In 
this regard, banks are to keep formal documents on their borrowers, such as financial 
statements, business plans, proof of business registration and/or ownership, etc. This 
requirement was also applicable to FIDES. According to literature (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2010; CGAP, 2012), loan documentation is a challenging aspect for 
microfinance businesses. This is because unlike conventional banks, the economic status 
and low skills and literacy levels of their clients do not allow MFIs to collect this formal 
documentation as part of their loan-appraisal process (CGAP, 2012). Instead, they use 
alternative ways for loan-application appraisals, including the evaluation of household cash 
flows, appraisal by group members, interviews with village leaders, etc. As such, the loan 
                                                          
119 These limitations are set by the Determinations on Exposures to Single Borrowers, Large Exposures and Concentration Risk 
(BID-4) issued by the BoN in Government Gazette No. 290 of 6 November 2009. 
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files of MFIs would normally contain limited information, typically relating to a loan 
application; a customer’s identity document; loan appraisal, including household cash flow; 
customers’ previous repayment performance; approval by a loan committee or manager; an 
execution note; an amortisation table, etc. (CGAP, 2012). It is because of this challenge that 
most regulators would normally waiver the strict loan documentation requirements that are 
otherwise applicable to banks and allow flexibility for MFIs. This flexibility could however not 
be applied to FIDES, being a holder of a commercial bank license, and therefore FIDES 
found itself in a disadvantaged position. 
 
7.3.2 Non-prudential regulations 
 
Non-prudential regulation concerns the regulation of how regulated entities conduct their 
business, with the objective of licensing the entities, achieving reporting and institutional 
transparency and consumer protection. As such and as discussed under the literature review 
chapter, non-prudential requirements are often equally applied to all types of financial 
institutions, including banks and deposit-taking and lending-only MFIs.  
 
FIDES has been subject to the same non-prudential regulations as banks. CGAP (2009) 
suggests to have specific requirements for MFIs that take into account their characteristics 
(i.e. scale of business and inherent risks) and argues that what is important is that the 
required reporting, details of submissions and the frequency thereof should aim to minimise 
the cost burden on MFIs. The researcher endeavoured to establish the details of the non-
prudential regulatory requirements on FIDES, as discussed below. 
 
7.3.2.1 Licensing  
 
As stated, FIDES, a microfinance bank, was licenced under conventional banking law, and 
hence had to conform to conventional banking requirements. However, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision actually emphasises the need to tailor the licensing criteria to the 
type and size of MFIs, instead of literally applying the criteria for banks. In fact, BIS (2010) 
suggests a tiered licencing framework and flexible entry rules. It further advocates for a risk-
based licensing approach in order to reduce the burden on supervisory resources. It 
therefore recommends that regulators should take cognisance of the systemic significance of 
MFIs and develop an approach that is proportional to the systemic risk they pose.  
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The above suggested differentiation could unfortunately not be applied to FIDES, given the 
lack of a specific regulatory framework for DMFIs in Namibia and hence this MFI had to be 
licenced under the normal banking institutions legal framework and was expected to comply 
with regulatory and supervisory requirements for normal banks. 
 
7.3.2.2 Reporting and institutional transparency  
 
To ensure the increased accuracy of information and protect consumers, commercial banks 
in Namibia are subject to reporting and information disclosure procedures. Licensed under 
the same law with commercial banks, FIDES was required to adhere to the same reporting 
requirements and information disclosure as normal banks, as stipulated under the BIA of 
1998. In this regard, information from the survey pointed to the fact that FIDES was 
expected to provide its financial statements, audited accounts, cash flow projections, donor 
inflows statements and operational manual.    
 
Reporting and compliance generates costs, which can depress the profitability of an 
institution (Staschen, 2010). The type of information collected, the level of details and 
frequency of reporting that MFIs are subject to should naturally differ from those of 
conventional banks so as to lessen the cost burden on MFIs as well as not to stifle their 
profitability and development (CGAP, 2009). In the case of FIDES, reporting took place 
monthly, quarterly and yearly, depending on the nature of information required. Information 
collected from the company indicated that the same frequency of reporting is also their 
preferred frequency. They however complained about the many reports required, often on 
data that are not applicable to an MFI, and recommended that a set of well-formulated 
reporting should be developed specifically for the MFI. The researcher sought to get some 
some indication in the ensuing sections on whether or not the reporting process has had an 
impact on FIDES and in what manner.   
 
7.3.2.3 On-site inspections  
 
As is the case with commercial banks, on-site supervision of FIDES was done once every 
year and those were informed by the off-site inspections. With off-site supervision, the 
regulator received returns on a monthly and quarterly basis, which gave an indication of 
where the company was in terms of capital, liquidity, etc. (basically seeking to determine 
compliance with the requirements discussed under Section 7.3.1 above). As such, and 
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depending on the findings of the off-site reports, supervisors could engage on-site 
supervision on an even more regular basis.   
 
FIDES was also subject to detailed external audit standards like conventional banks. In fact, 
some of the interviewees viewed this process to be the most significant cost resulting from 
regulation in terms of audit fees that the company had to incur, as one interviewee put it:  
 
“We had too many compliance to do, and compliance was expensive, but this 
was paid by the donors and thus that did not cause the failure of FIDES” 
[MFI8/2/(1)]  
 
Notwithstanding the above statement, the researcher was still interested in finding out 
whether compliance with external audit standards were overbearing on this MFI. This is 
especially so because the regulatory goal should be that of safeguarding the sustainability of 
FIDES without depending so much on donor funds. As such, the researcher sought to 
determine (as part of the RIA) whether or not the type of regulation FIDES was subject to 
was able to further that sustainability course. 
  
7.3.2.4 Requirements relating to consumer protection  
 
The BoN places a strong emphasis on the protection of consumers. In this regard, regulated 
institutions are required to disclose and be transparent about their fees and charges to the 
extent that such are displayed in the branches of commercial banks as well as on their 
websites. This is a form of both consumer protection and ensuring that clients are able to 
analyse, compare and make informed choices through the use of availed information.  
 
As a regulated entity, FIDES was required to comply with the above-stated requirements. 
Further, in 2012, the BoN developed guidelines for consumer protection, the principles of 
which were later used to guide commercial banks in developing an industry Code of Banking 
Practice. In addition, the central bank issued guidelines and procedures for laying customer 
complaints against practices of commercial banks to the BoN, which were launched together 
with the code in the same year. It also created a functional unit to specifically deal with 
customer complaints. These guidelines for laying customer complaints and available redress 
mechanisms have also been applicable to the clients of FIDES, i.e. they have had the same 
avenue for laying complaints. This is positive, because consumer protection is considered a 
key element in the provision of financial services to the poor, given their low financial literacy 
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and therefore their vulnerability to abuse and unfair treatment. They should therefore be 
accorded protection against predatory lending practices, misinformation and over-
indebtedness. The law should also require confidentiality and security of customers’ data by 
MFIs, as it is required of banks. At the time of the fieldwork, the Complaints Unit at the BoN 
revealed that no customer complaints had been received in respect of FIDES.  
 
The next section discusses the assessment of the impact of both the prudential and the non-
prudential regulatory requirements, discussed above, on FIDES.  
       
7.4 ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION AND SUPERVISION ON FIDES 
 
This section assesses the impact of the regulatory and supervisory framework discussed 
above on FIDES. It does that, firstly, by examining the evolution in performance indicators of 
FIDES from its initial establishment and operating as an unregulated MFI (i.e. as Koshi 
Yomuti) to periods when it was licenced and became a regulated MFI. In other words, the 
regulatory impact is measured by observing changes in the performance indicators of 
FIDES, which, in the absence of client level data, is the most obvious way to measure 
regulatory impact (Staschen, 2010). This is complemented by an assessment of relevant 
qualitative indicators (i.e. collected evidence from information sources such as interviews 
and the documentary review undertaken).  
 
Both the performance indicators and the qualitative indicators are further benchmarked to 
and assessed against the Morgan Stanley approach to assessing credit risk in the 
microfinance industry (see Appendix H for details on the rating scale) that helps to give an 
indication on how FIDES compared to international standards. The impact assessment 
process therefore involves an examination of the annual evolution of each of the quantitative 
indicators (i.e. changes in the impact indicators) and related qualitative information or factors 
as well as how those relate to what is acceptable internationally. Where possible, an 
analysis of the expected impact for the specific performance indicator has been also 
provided.  
 
The aim of this analysis is to empirically establish what impact the regulatory requirements 
under the conventional banking law, discussed in Section 7.3, have had on the operations of 
FIDES and what that meant for the achievement of the regulatory objectives identified under 
the methodology chapter of this thesis, which is the reason why MFIs, including FIDES, are 
regulated in the first place. Hence the interpretation of the results is with reference to their 
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relevance for achieving the regulatory objectives as per the adopted ROI methodology of 
analysis, discussed in Chapter 4. Through this, the researcher sought to establish whether 
or not the regulatory process and approach applied to FIDES had led to enhancing its 
operations, i.e. whether regulation had positively or negatively impacted FIDES’s operations.  
 
As discussed under the methodology chapter, the process of assessing regulatory impact 
involves an impact attribution exercise that will make it possible to show that the observed 
developments (changes) were indeed taking place because of the institution being regulated 
in the manner that it was regulated, i.e. the need to be able to isolate regulatory impact from 
other factors that could potentially have impacted the observed outcomes.120 The researcher 
also did this, using the methodology explained below as a restate from the methodology 
chapter for ease of reference.   
 
In the methodology chapter, reference was made to Staschen et al. (2012) having identified 
the ideal approach of conducting an impact assessment to be through the use of the ‘double 
difference’ method, i.e. the difference–indifference method. This method would have 
compared the treated MFI (i.e. FIDES) with non-treated entities, before and after the 
treatment (i.e. before and after FIDES became a regulated entity). However, the small 
market size and hence the unavailability of data for a counterfactual (i.e. FIDES having been 
the only true MFI with its magnitude and therefore a lack of an identifiable control case) 
rendered the use of statistical techniques such as the regression or correlation analysis 
impossible. The researcher had to adopt an analytical approach that relied on something 
other than evidence for the counterfactual to make a causal inference, i.e. the ‘modus 
operandi’ method of demonstrating causality. The essence of this method is the ability to 
demonstrate, through a process of elimination of other possible causes, that the treatment 
caused the outcome (Mohr, 1999). This process is possible given the fact that it relies on the 
idea that each possible cause has a ‘signature’ and if the ‘signatures’ of other possible 
factors can be proven to have been absent while that of the treatment was present, the 
cause can be established (Mohr, 1999). The approach therefore aspires to establish 
instances of causality through what is referred to as ‘physical causation’, i.e. through having 
to prove the existence of a direct physical connection as opposed to ‘factual causation’, as 
explained under the methodology chapter. The researcher combined this approach with the 
structural breaks method (in the case of variables where data were available) to form an 
                                                          
120 This aspect is a key difference between the ex-post assessment and the ex-ante assessment, which does not require any 
attribution of impact. 
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alternative to the difference-in-difference method of impact attribution, as will be observed in 
the ensuing sub-sections. The indicators used are adapted from those identified by Staschen 
(2010), as discussed in the methodology chapter. 
 
7.4.1 Data used 
 
Data for the performance indicators were mainly taken from the MIX121 Market database 
(Mix. no date), a database that compiles information on MFIs and to which FIDES was one 
of the reporting institutions that had provided data for the period 2002–2012, i.e. the period 
before it was licenced (2002–2009) and after it became a regulated entity (2010–2012). 
Although some gaps were observed in the data, MIX data are considered reliable given the 
comprehensive review process they are subject to and the fact that they are cross-checked 
against source documents (such as audits and ratings) and follow international financial 
reporting standards. MIX is also a standard source for MFI performance data, which are 
widely used in academic research, as the data are easily comparable to that of other 
countries and institutions. MIX does however not track data on some of the variables 
required by this study, and as such the MIX data were complemented by that obtained 
through the survey to FIDES and audited financial statements of the entity obtained from its 
annual reports. Qualitative evidence was obtained through interviews with relevant 
stakeholders (employees, board members and regulators) and the documentary review. 
 
7.4.2 The evolution of FIDES’s performance indicators  
 
This section looks at the performance of FIDES over the years, both before it was licenced 
and after it became a regulated MFI in 2010, using selected performance indicators 
discussed under Section 7.4.1 above. These include those relating to areas of profitability, 
capital adequacy, portfolio quality, access, efficiency and liquidity (see Appendix G). The aim 
was to observe the changes that might have occurred in these indicators over the years and 
identify structural breaks in the indicators, if any, while at the same time also performing a 
comparison of this DMFI’s performance to international benchmarks, using the Morgan 
Stanley approach of credit risk assessment in the microfinance industry. 
 
The Morgan Stanley approach mentioned above operates on a scale basis of six levels and 
uses rankings of very good to very poor, with 6 as very good and 1 as very poor (see 
                                                          
121 MIX aims to promote the exchange of information within the microfinance sector and to help create a microfinance market by        
     offering data-collection services, performance-tracking tools, sector comparisons and specialised information services. 
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Appendix H).122 Further, while the issue of impact attribution has been addressed by the type 
of methodological approach followed by this study, the researcher decided to look at the 
developments in some of the performance indicators of normal banks that have been 
regulated under the same act (i.e. on the same basis) with FIDES, where possible, to see 
how the trend has been, just as an additional cross-checking mechanism for regulatory 
impact. The indicators so compared are those relating to profitability, portfolio quality, 
efficiency and liquidity.  
 
7.4.2.1 Profitability 
 
ROA and ROE are two generally used indicators for profitability. As such, these are also the 
indicators that regulators would monitor to ensure the soundness of financial institutions. 
Investors also have interest in these indicators, especially the ROE, as it gives them an 
indication of the growth and safety of their investment. Over the period of FIDES’s existence, 
and except for the two initial years of establishment (2002–2003) when it was still in a pilot 
project phase, these two indicators have consistently been in the negative, i.e. the MFI made 
losses, as can be seen in Figure 7.1 below.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: FIDES’s ROA and ROE 
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
 
                                                          
122 See Appendix G for an exposition of the Morgan Stanley approach of credit assessment. 
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Two profitability indicators show significant changes to have taken place, mostly during the 
year FIDES was licenced (2010) and then throughout the regulatory period. For example, 
the decline in the ROA enlarged by 163.6 per cent compared to 2009 to reach 194.7 per 
cent in 2010. This was a result of the transformation process that involved significant 
expenses and the fact that the regulated entity now had to comply with stricter provisioning 
and write-off rules imposed by regulation for the first time,123 hence a structural break in this 
performance indicator. This accords with the findings by Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch 
(2009a) cited by Staschen (2010) that reduced financial self-sufficiency (an alternative 
measure of profitability) is associated with additional costs of complying with prudential 
supervision.  
 
The decline in the ROA of FIDES however slowed significantly by 111.9 per cent in 2011 to 
reach an ROA of -82.9 per cent and further reduced by -39.4 per cent to reach a level of -
43.5 per cent in 2012. This slowdown in the pace of decline after the treatment year (2010), 
as shown in Figure 7.1 above, can be attributed to regulatory efforts, as one of the duties of 
the regulator is to ensure, through the implementation of various regulatory measures (such 
as the regulatory standards aimed at promoting financial stability and soundness of 
regulated entities), that regulated entities strive to achieve at least minimum levels of 
profitability larger than zero (Staschen, 2010). By registering this improvement, FIDES 
seems to have been on the path to achieving just that. As such, it can be said that regulation 
resulted in progress in this profitability indicator of FIDES. A similar trend was observed in 
the ROE when the decline expanded by 219.5 per cent in 2010 to reach -360.2 per cent 
before slowing by 46.1 per cent in 2011 to reach -314.1 per cent, but further widening again 
by 134.8 per cent to reach a level of -448.9 per cent in 2012. Very small changes averaging 
just about -21 per cent per year were observed in the ROE during the period before 
licencing.  
 
The above improved but consistently negative ROA and ROE of FIDES seem to be a 
reflection of the heavy dependence on equity, which the researcher observed in the availed 
data. The bank had liquid assets coming in as availed by shareholders on several occasions. 
Further, the data reflected an unleveraged situation, i.e. FIDES had relatively little debt as a 
source of funding initially (as a project, i.e. before licencing), except for the sub-ordinated 
                                                          
123 FIDES reported in its 2010 annual report that the operational results of the bank in 2010 had been impacted by heavy 
human investment made to create and implement the comprehensive set of operating procedures at all levels (operations, 
administration, accounting, etc.), and that the vast project encompassed training, follow-up and checking that all administrative 
and accounting procedures for clients’ management were operational and done in conformity with banking regulations. 
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loans that used to be extended in later years by its shareholders as a way of recapitalising 
the company, often on requirement of the regulator. This situation is represented in the low 
debt to equity ratio (i.e. leverage ratio) initially (i.e. before the company was licenced), as 
depicted in Figure 7.2 below, although this picked up significantly later just before and after 
the treatment year (i.e. when it became a regulated institution), as shown in the same figure.  
 
   
 
 
Figure 7.2: Debt to equity ratio 
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
 
The average debt to equity ratio of FIDES was 2.1 per cent during the pre-licensing period, 
but increased to 6.5 per cent during the post-licensing period. The lowest ratio was 0.8 per 
cent achieved in 2010 (the year it obtained a licence), while the highest ratio of 9.9 per cent 
was achieved by the end of the second year after receiving the licence (i.e. in 2012). As can 
be seen in Figure 7.3 below, changes in the debt to equity ratio over the period were actually 
minimal initially, but started widening a year before obtaining the licence and peaking one 
year after that, which signals that the company had huge capital injections to finance its 
operations. The increased ratio during the post-licensing era was a result of increased share 
capital, which came about as a result of the company ensuring that the regulatory 
requirements are met [MFI8/2/2], as discussed earlier.  
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Figure 7.3: Change in FIDES’s debt to equity ratio 
Source: Researcher’s calculation from MIX (no date) 
 
 
A comparison to the developments in the profitability indicators of normal banks that have 
been regulated under the same law with FIDES shows that commercial banks on average 
achieved an ROA of 2.3 per cent per year during the same period (2002–2012). The trend 
has been positive and generally constant, with minimal changes of approximately 0.1 per 
cent per annum, as shown in Figure 7.4 below. The same positive trend is observed in their 
ROE, posting an average of 22.5 per cent over the period, also with only minimal variations 
on a yearly basis, especially from 2004 onwards. These are respectable levels of profitability 
achieved by Namibian commercial banks, and in the same vein as argued for FIDES, 
regulation should have played a role in ensuring these positive results through the same 
channels of impact, such as setting standards and rules of operation, ensuring adherence to 
minimum requirements for capital and portfolio quality, etc. 
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Figure 7.4: Commercial banks’ ROA and ROE 
Source: BoN annual reports 2002–2012 
 
 
7.4.2.2 Capital  
 
As stated earlier, FIDES had low leverage ratios initially, given it made less use of external 
borrowing as an NGO, i.e. it had high capital ratios. This could be a result of the fact that it 
was mainly financed by donors initially when it was a project (and later by shareholders after 
it became a bank). In fact, its capital to asset ratio was declining in the years prior to it 
becoming a regulated entity, i.e. the ratio showed a declining trend up to the year 2009, from 
a high of 47.6 per cent in 2003 to 15.3 per cent in 2009, as shown in Figure 7.5, but shoot up 
significantly by 40.3 per cent in the year of treatment (2010) to reach 55.5 per cent as 
shareholders subscribed to additional shares in that year to meet the licencing requirement, 
as discussed under Section 7.3.1.1. The significantly increased capital to asset ratio in 2010 
can therefore be referred to as a ‘structural break’ in the ratio, which could be ascribed to 
regulation that normally expects regulated entities to conform to the capital adequacy 
requirements, and this was happening to FIDES for the first time.  
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Figure 7.5: FIDES’s capital to asset ratio 
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
The ratio however immediately fell back into a declining mode a year after licensing and 
maintained that trend (Figure 7.5) until FIDES found itself in breach of capital adequacy 
requirements. The bank therefore had to obtain approval by the regulator to operate below 
the minimum required capital adequacy until end of May 2012 (FIDES, 2011). The CAR 
during 2011 and 2012 were 10.4 per cent and 9.2 per cent, respectively, lower than the 
required 15 per cent at the time. The drop in the ratio after 2010 could be a reflection of 
lower magnitudes of shareholder capital injection in 2011 and 2012 relative to 2010. FIDES 
experienced a situation of dwindling capital and the unwillingness by the shareholders to 
continue injecting more capital into the business, which the researcher detected from the 
interviews with the stakeholders, has reportedly led the institution into a ‘crisis’ until its 
takeover in 2014. Specific statements by interviewees are quoted below to illustrate this 
point.  
 
“Shareholders did not have commitment to continue capitalising the bank” 
[MFI8/2/(1)] 124 
 
                                                          
124 One of the former employees of FIDES however argued that this happened only after shareholders had been asked to invest 
capital several times already and they had realised that the loss of their investment was becoming imminent, as the business 
plan was not working out as planned [MFI6/2/1].  
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“Strike and fraud also came in, which also required shareholders to put in more 
and more money, and in the end they gave up” [Reg2/3/(2)] 
 
As discussed under Section 7.3.1.2, FIDES, based on assessment by the regulatory 
authority, was at some point subject to a higher CAR of 15 per cent relative to the 10 per 
cent applicable to normal banks, and this forced shareholder to inject capital into the 
business. Shareholders actually had to subscribe to more shares on three occasions in the 
regulated era (in 2010, 2011 and 2012) to meet regulatory requirements and keep the 
operations going, until they later developed a reluctance to continue pumping more capital 
into the institution.  
 
Contrary to the above experience by FIDES, normal banks in Namibia remained adequately 
capitalised throughout the period (2002–2012), with only minimal changes observed on an 
annual basis (0.1 per cent on average over the review period). This reflects shareholders’ 
confidence in these institutions. Further, no instances of non-compliance with the capital 
adequacy requirements by commercial banks have been reported for the review period. 
During this period, the capital to asset ratio of commercial banks recorded an average of 7.8 
per cent (8.0 per cent before FIDES came on board and 8.1 per cent after FIDES was 
licensed). An interesting observation is the similar increase in year 2010, the year FIDES 
was licensed (Figure 7.6), although this is significantly lower than FIDES’s capital expense 
ratio in that year.   
  
 
 
Figure 7.6: Commercial banks’ capital to asset ratio 
Source: BoN annual reports 2002–2012 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
207 
 
7.4.2.3 Portfolio quality  
 
Regulators are interested in monitoring the quality of the loan portfolio of regulated 
institutions. This is because it gives an indication of the extent of credit risk involved in the 
outstanding portfolio to help them ensure that such does not threaten the stability and 
soundness of regulated institutions. Financial institutions themselves, including MFIs, also 
ought to monitor the quality of their loan books to avoid unexpected losses that can be 
detrimental to their operations and sustainability.  
 
Conventional banking institutions normally monitor the non-performance loans (i.e. loans 
that are overdue by more than 90 days), while the standard used in the microfinance 
industry is the PAR over 30 days (PAR>30), or simply the value of outstanding loans with 
overdue payments of 30 days or more (Arvelo, Bell, Novak, Rose & Venugopal, 2008). In 
this regard, the benchmark for MFIs according to the Morgan Stanley credit risk assessment 
approach is <3 per cent when a portfolio is considered to be of good quality (Morgan 
Stanley, 2008). An MFI with values below this benchmark reflects not only its good recovery 
policy, but also its ability to control the risk (Ayayi, 2011). Contrary to this, a PAR>30 that is 
higher than the benchmark of 3 per cent over time threatens the lending ability of the MFI, as 
fewer funds would be available given the high non-repayment, a situation that would not be 
conducive to the performance of an MFI (Ayayi, 2011).   
 
In general, FIDES had a performing loan portfolio from the initial stages of its establishment 
(i.e. when it was still a project) up to the treatment year. As can be seen in Figure 7.7 below, 
the PAR of FIDES, measured as PAR>30 days, had hovered below 2 per cent on average 
up to the treatment year, implying an excellent loan portfolio quality when measured against 
the Morgan Stanley credit assessment rating benchmark of 3 per cent. This means that the 
portion of FIDES’s loan portfolio that was at risk of being repaid had been very small. 
Although slightly higher ratios than the benchmark were observed for two years within that 
same period (3.3 per cent in 2008 and 3.2 in 2009), this still falls in the second-highest level 
of the Morgan Stanley scale. The ratio further declined during the treatment year to reach 
1.4 per cent and therefore it continued to have an excellent loan portfolio quality. This could 
be an indication of the fact that as a regulated MFI, FIDES now needed to comply with 
regulatory requirements concerning loan-provisioning standards. In this regard, FIDES was 
subject to the same treatment of non-performing loans standards as conventional banks, as 
discussed under Section 7.3.1.4 of this chapter. Accordingly, the MFI was expected to 
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maintain its portfolio quality within those provisioning standards, thereby possibly resulting in 
the good portfolio quality.  
 
The PAR however started increasing significantly by 36.2 per cent a year after the treatment 
year (i.e. in 2011) to reach 40.2 per cent in 2012 (see Figure 7.7 below), which is not only 
way above the benchmark, but is also out of the rating scale of Morgan Stanley, and 
therefore a deteriorating portfolio quality. This could have been triggered by the significantly 
increased number of borrowers during that same period (as will be evident later from 
discussions of the access to finance indicator), partly as a result of the additional branch 
established in the capital city, Windhoek, during 2012. The new branch addition turned out to 
threaten the MFI’s collection process, as the usual group-lending model (with members of 
groups serving as security) that had worked well in the rural setup did not work properly in 
this city environment, as FIDES discovered soon after the establishment of that branch.125 
The new branch was opened during the last quarter of 2012 and by the first quarter of 2013, 
the branch experienced a problem of non-repayment of loans. Theoretically, the very high 
PAR>30 ratio observed after the treatment period should have negatively affected FIDES’s 
lending ability and hence its outreach. The assessment of the financial access indicator in 
later sections did shed light on the real situation of FIDES in this regard. Suffice it to mention 
here that FIDES did experience problems later that led to its takeover.     
 
 
                                                          
125 FIDES’s lending approach was group lending through the ELOs, where committee members used to collect repayments and 
deposit the money into a bank account. The same approach was implemented in Windhoek, but this did not work out due to the 
setup in the city, which is different from the rural area, where everybody knows almost exactly where the other person lives and 
how they conduct themselves, etc.  
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Figure 7.7: PAR>30 days 
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
 
The change from the low level in the pre-regulation era to the high level of loan PAR during 
the post-regulation era of FIDES raises a question of whether or not regulation has been 
effective in monitoring the situation, while it also supports the argument that regulation does 
not necessarily mean that regulated institutions cannot fail. It is also important to note that a 
lower PAR>30 ratio, such as that experienced by FIDES for the most part of its existence, 
could also mean that the institution had been avoiding bad loans on its books and could 
have simply written off those that are delinquent for 30 days or more, a situation that can be 
detected from the write-off indicator of the MFI (Ayayi, 2011). FIDES’s write-off ratios were 
very low in the pre-licensing era, averaging at 0.003 per cent. The unavailability of data, 
however, did not make it possible for the researcher to determine the exact write-off 
condition during the regulated era, but one can assume a relatively higher average write-off 
ratio due to the deteriorated loan portfolio quality and the collection problems experienced by 
the bank as highlighted above.   
 
In the case of commercial banks in Namibia, they recorded a persistent trend of low risk 
portfolio over the period, both before and after FIDES was licensed, as can be seen in 
Figure 7.8. The PAR for one months to less than three months (i.e. PAR>30) averaged at a 
low ratio of 1.1 per cent over the period 2004–2012. A key observation from the comparison 
is that while FIDES experienced a decline in its PAR>30 ratio during the treatment year, the 
average for the commercial banks was increasing in that year (Figure 7.8) and while the ratio 
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for FIDES was increasing a year after its treatment (in 2011), as discussed earlier, that for 
commercial banks was declining, although both showed an increasing trend after that. 
       
 
 
Figure 7.8: PAR>30 for commercial banks 
 
Source: BoN annual reports 2004–2012 data 
 
 
In fact, the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of commercial banks averaged at 2.5 per cent 
below the international benchmark of 4 per cent, depicting a declining trend over the review 
period (see Figure 7.9). Similar to the case of FIDES, the regulatory requirement to maintain 
portfolio quality within provisioning standards should have resulted in a good portfolio quality. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.9: NPL ratio for commercial banks 
Source: BoN annual reports 2005–2012 
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7.4.2.4 Access to finance  
 
This section gives an analyses of FIDES’s performance with regard to providing access to 
financial services and products. Looking at this aspect is important, especially in the case of 
MFIs, for which the belief is generally that they are enhancers of access to financial services 
and products for the poor and small businesses, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. In 
this regard, the researcher also showed during the review of empirical literature in Chapter 3 
that regulation does generally facilitate and enhance the performance of MFIs in terms of 
enabling them to provide the necessary services and products to their target audience. 
Following below is an analysis of some of the access indicators for which data are available 
in respect of FIDES’s performance. As indicated in the introduction section of this chapter, 
the focus is on the changes in the indicators and not absolute numbers. 
 
(a) Number of borrowers 
 
Developments in the number of borrowers are an important aspect to look at in the context 
of this chapter, which assesses the impact of regulation on a regulated MFI. This is because 
when MFIs transform to become commercialised, the process often comes with a shift to 
larger and fewer loans (Christen, 2001, cited by Staschen, 2010). It was therefore of interest 
to the researcher to establish what the experience of FIDES has been.  
 
The number of borrowers served by FIDES increased significantly in the first two years of 
the licencing period, i.e. in 2010 and 2011, by 2 582 and 5 385 borrowers respectively, to 
reach 5 313 and 10 698, respectively. The pace of increase slowed to 1 986 borrowers by 
2012, although it still managed to push the total number of borrowers to 12 684 in that year. 
This is a significant shift from the pre-licensing period (2002–2009), where the increase had 
on average been by only 364 borrowers per year (see Figure 7.10).   
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Figure 7.10: Change in the number of borrowers for FIDES  
Source: Researcher’s calculation from MIX (no date) 
 
The increasing trend in the number of borrowers observed during the post-licensing period 
relative to the pre-licensing period clearly shows a structural break, as depicted in Figure 
7.11 below, and suggests that there has been progress in this indicator of access to finance 
in the post-treatment period. This can be attributed to regulation, because the increase in the 
number of borrowers can be reflective of an increase in the perceived credibility level of 
FIDES being a regulated entity. In the absence of any other observed factor that could have 
caused this significant increase in the number of borrowers around the licenced period, it 
can be attributed to the clients’ increased confidence in this MFI, resulting from the fact that 
it was now a regulated entity and therefore a credible institution to deal with, which is in line 
with the advantages of regulation advanced in literature, as discussed under the literature 
review chapter. This is also in line with findings of international cross-country studies such as 
that of Fernando (2004), cited by Staschen (2010), which showed that regulation had a 
positive impact on the number of borrowers.  
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Figure 7.11: Number of borrowers 
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
(a) Total savings 
 
The same trend observed in the number of borrowers indicator is observed on the savings 
side. Figure 7.12 below shows that FIDES experienced huge jumps in the first two post-
licencing years. Total savings grew remarkably by USD496 076 between 2009 and 2010 to 
reach a level of USD510 040, and further by USD630 081 between 2010 and 2011 before 
the pace of increase slowed down to only USD429 579 in 2012. These increases compare to 
those of only USD1 969 on average per year during the pre-licensing years. Also similar to 
what was observed in the number of borrowers indicator in the year preceding the licensing 
year (2009), FIDES also experienced a significant decline in total savings by N$84 959 in 
that same year, which could still be a reflection of this institution having been preoccupied 
with the final preparation to be licensed in the following year and hence the less-than-usual 
efforts in other activities during that year. The observed trending in the same direction by 
these two variables could be an indicator that savings has been one of the main funding 
sources for lending and therefore what happened to it affected borrowings as well.   
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Figure 7.12: Change in total savings   
Source: Researcher’s calculation from MIX (no date) 
 
 
Figure 7.13 shows that while FIDES used to take savings prior to its being licensed (mostly 
obligatory savings), there was a huge increase in the level of savings during the post-
licensing period. This huge increase in total saving observed around the post-licensing years 
is again a structural break, as can be clearly seen in Figure 7.13 below, and shows progress 
in the total savings indicator, brought about by regulation.  
 
The progress in the savings reflects the fact that as a regulated MFI, FIDES could now freely 
mobilise savings, including voluntary savings, to the extent possible as opposed to the 
statutory limitations it faced when it was an unregulated entity and could only mobilise 
savings to the extent allowed by the regulatory authority.126 This is evidenced by the number 
of savers that increased substantially to 51 966 by 2012 compared to only 899 savers on 
average per year during the period before the license was granted. It is therefore clear that 
FIDES experienced an upsurge in both total savings and number of savers during the post-
licensing period, hence a structural break that can be considered to have been a positive 
regulatory impact on the scope of access. The structural break is therefore a result of the 
increased safety and soundness of the institution brought about by regulation that may have 
encouraged depositors to entrust their savings to FIDES. It is also a result of the removal of 
                                                          
126 Unregulated entities in Namibia can only mobilise savings to the extent allowed by law. 
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the limitation on the mobilisation of deposits made possible by regulation after FIDES 
became a regulated entity. As such, regulation had played a role in the progress of this 
indicator, and shows the extent of FIDES’s contribution to progress in the breadth of access 
to savings. 
    
 
 
Figure 7.13: Total savings  
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
7.4.2.5 Efficiency 
 
Measured by either the operating efficiency or the productivity ratio of the loan officer, the 
efficiency of an entity’s operations is an important aspect to keep track of, given its impact on 
the performance of its business. For example, Staschen (2010) states that portfolio yields 
crucially depend on the efficiency of operations. FIDES experienced fluctuations in its 
operations efficiency ratio (measured as total operating expenses divided by average gross 
loan portfolio), an indication that it could control its costs better in some periods (i.e. periods 
of increasing efficiency), while there were also other periods when it was not successful in 
doing that (i.e. periods of low efficiency). 
 
Regulators would normally also be monitoring the efficiency of regulated entities, measured 
by the operating expense ratio (i.e. operating expense as percentage of the loan value), 
because it can indirectly affect the safety and soundness of the entities. According to 
Staschen (2010), regulation can cause growth of the institution, which leads to larger loan 
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sizes, improved governance, more profit-oriented ownership and more competition, which in 
turn can lead to increased efficiency of operations. He however also cites the cost of 
regulatory compliance as a possible downside, as it can push up the operating expense 
ratio. Figure 7.14 shows a decreasing trend in its operating expense ratio (representing high 
efficiency) during the bank’s fourth and fifth years of operations (2005–2006), but turning into 
an increasing mode (representing low efficiency) from 2007 to 2010. The highest increase 
for the period was recorded in 2010, and this could be attributed to the cost of regulatory 
compliance, given that 2010 was the year in which FIDES was licenced and therefore it 
needed to comply with related regulatory requirements. However, the general declining trend 
during the overall post-licensing period, as observed in Figure 7.14 below, can be a 
reflection of FIDES’s response to regulatory pressure for the institution to ensure efficiency 
in its operations, such as compliance with requirements to have proper information 
management systems and qualified staff in place, both elements that are efficiency 
enhancers.   
  
 
 
Figure 7.14: Change in FIDES’s operating expense ratio 
Source: Researcher’s calculation from MIX (no date) 
 
In comparison to the Morgan Stanley standard, FIDES registered averages of 82.6 per cent 
during the period before it was licenced and 156.0 per cent during the post-licencing period. 
As can be seen in Figure 7.15 below, the highest ratio (264.7 per cent) was recorded in 
2010, followed by 142.5 per cent the year after that. The average for the overall period 
(2003–2012) was therefore 102.9 per cent. The Morgan Stanley rating scale considers a 
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ratio of <20 per cent to be representing the best operating efficiency and anything above 50 
per cent as very poor. The ratios recorded by FIDES throughout its period of existence are 
above 50 per cent (see Figure 7.15 below), and this places it in the ‘very poor’ category. It 
also implies that FIDES had difficulties in controlling its costs, especially during the period 
around its treatment year (i.e. during its transformation period). A significant improvement in 
the ratio (declining ratio) observed after the treatment year (in 2011–2012) could however 
imply that the MFI was achieving gradual economies of scale and that FIDES’s operating 
expenses were declining as the business was expanding.  
 
 
Figure 7.15: FIDES’s operating expense ratio 
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
 
For the period for which data are available (2008–2012), commercial banks in Namibia 
recorded much lower operating expense ratios relative to FIDES (see Figure 7.16). Their 
period average stood at 56.8 per cent, compared to 123.6 per cent for FIDES. The operating 
expense ratio averaged at 56.5 per cent before FIDES came on board (75.0 per cent for 
FIDES) and 57.1 per cent after FIDES was licensed (156.0 per cent for FIDES). A key 
observation of this comparison is the fact that while FIDES’s operating expense ratio 
increased significantly and was the highest in the year it was licensed, that of commercial 
banks decreased significant, as reflected in Figure 7.16 on changes in their operating 
expense ratio. In fact, there has been a consistent declining trend in this ratio for commercial 
banks after 2009, as shown in the same figure. This gives an indication that the banks have 
been consistently striving to lower their operations expenses in line with regulatory 
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requirements, while FIDES, a microfinance bank, has had to struggle with regulatory 
compliance, at least for two years before the ratio fell back to the normal pre-licensing period 
trend in year three of its post-licensing period. 
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Figure 7.16: Change in operating expense ratio of commercial banks 
Source: Researcher’s calculations from BoN annual reports 2008–2012 data 
 
 
7.4.2.6 Liquidity 
 
The liquidity of an organisation, measured through liquidity ratio (liquid assets over deposit 
liabilities), is an important indicator that shows the extent to which an organisation is able to 
meet its payment obligations (Oguntoyinbo, 2011). A low liquidity ratio would signal a 
liquidity problem, i.e. the lack of capacity of the organisation to meet its payment obligations, 
while a high liquidity could also imply that an organisation is being ineffective in managing its 
cash (Arvelo et al., 2008). Regulators therefore have a keen interest in monitoring the 
liquidity levels of regulated institutions. In the case of FIDES, the statutory requirement with 
which it had to comply was to maintain a ratio of 10 per cent.127 The Morgan Stanley ranking 
standard has a scale of >15 per cent being very good and below 3 per cent as poor. 
 
While the data on the liquidity ratio of FIDES were not available, the researcher used those 
for the liquid ratio (i.e. liquid assets as percentage of total assets) to serve as a basic 
indicator. FIDES’s liquid ratio averaged at 10.6 per cent before it was licenced and at 18.2 
                                                          
127 The regulator of banks, requires that banking institutions, including FIDES, maintain a liquidity level of 10 per cent.  
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per cent after it was licenced. This resulted in an overall average of 13.1 per cent over the 
period 2004–2012 (Figure 7.17). Before the MFI was licenced, its liquidity level fell in the 
‘good’ category, i.e. a level 3 ranking on that scale of 6, with the highest ratio for that period 
having been recorded in the initial periods of establishment (29.4 in 2004), which might 
suggest a still-cautious approach taken by the entity as it continued to study the market and 
settle in and therefore not putting cash into profitable use.  
 
After licencing, the ratio moved into the ‘very good’ category on the Morgan Stanley ranking 
(18.2 per cent on average, which is above 15). While the same explanation provided above 
for the situation before the MFI was licensed is applicable here, and while FIDES had 
capacity to repay its current liabilities, there seems to have been a situation where FIDES 
was not able to negotiate with its funding sources (which had been mainly its shareholders 
and donors) to keep on recapitalising the business in its later years of transformation, as 
indicated earlier in this chapter. FIDES was also ordered by the regulator at some point to 
control growth to allow time to develop internal systems commensurate with the expanded 
business (FIDES, 2011) and this could have resulted in the cautious credit-extension 
approach taken by the bank, which led to high liquidity levels.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.17: FIDES’s liquid ratio 
Source: MIX (no date) 
 
In comparison, commercial banks in Namibia have also been very liquid. For the same 
period of review as covered for FIDES for this indicator (i.e. 2004–2012), their liquidity 
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ratio128 averaged at 10.3 per cent and the trend has been fairly constant at those levels, as 
can be seen in Figure 7.18 below. The average liquidity ratio before FIDES entered that 
space was 9.7 per cent and this increased to an average of 11.3 per cent after FIDES came 
on board. This trend is consistent with the developments in FIDES’s ratio discussed above. 
The average liquidity ratio post-licensing (i.e. 11.3 per cent) is however lower relative to 18.2 
per cent for FIDES, which could be explained by the fact that the regulator required FIDES to 
control growth to allow time to develop internal systems commensurate with its expanded 
business, as alluded to earlier.    
 
 
 
Figure 7.18: Liquidity ratio of commercial banks 
Source: BoN annual reports 2004–2012 
 
 
Table 7.2 below presents a summary of the identified impact of regulation on the 
performance indicators of FIDES discussed above. Only indicators where impact was 
observed are listed. 
  
                                                          
128 Although this measure of liquidity is not exactly the same as the liquid ratio used in the case of FIDES, they are both still 
measures of liquidity. 
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Table 7.2: Summary of the impact of regulation on FIDES’s performance 
 
Indicator Impact 
Profitability Reduced losses (measured by ROA) after licensing, which are attributed to 
regulatory efforts that aim to ensure that regulated entities strive to achieve at 
least minimum levels of profitability larger than zero; therefore regulation leading 
to progress in this indicator.  
Capital Highest ratio in the year of licensing, as shareholders subscribed to additional 
shares in that year to meet the regulatory requirement of capital adequacy, a 
situation that continued after that, although at a lesser level, and hence a 
regulatory effect. 
Portfolio quality Declining PAR>30 during treatment year (an excellent loan portfolio quality), as 
FIDES needed to comply with regulatory requirements concerning loan- 
provisioning standards, but very high PAR>30 after treatment year (a 
deteriorating portfolio quality), reflecting other operational problems experienced 
around that period.  
Breadth of access Substantial increase in the number of savers after licencing as a result of the 
increased safety and soundness brought about by regulation, which may have 
encouraged depositors to entrust their savings to FIDES; therefore, progress of 
this indicator and FIDES’s contribution to progress in the breadth of access to 
savings in Namibia.   
Scope of access Huge increases in total savings around the post-licensing years, as FIDES could 
now freely mobilise savings, including voluntary savings, to the extent possible 
as opposed to the statutory limitations faced before licensing; therefore, a 
positive regulatory impact on the savings indicator facilitating progress on the 
scope of access.  
Efficiency Highest ratio during licencing year, which is attributed to the cost of regulatory 
compliance with related regulatory requirements; therefore, a negative impact of 
regulation, although it started reducing immediately after that.  
Liquidity Increased liquid ratio just before and around the licencing period (with the 
highest in the licencing year), reflecting a cautious credit-extension approach 
taken by FIDES, which is ascribed to the regulator having ordered the bank to 
control growth to allow time to develop internal systems commensurate with the 
expanded business.   
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7.4.3 Evidence from qualitative factors   
 
As indicated in the methodology chapter, the researcher also performed an analysis of the 
qualitative indicators (i.e. views from other sources and interviews) to complement the 
assessment of the quantitative indicators in determining what the regulatory impact on 
FIDES has been. The use of relevant qualitative data from various sources, such as 
interview evidence and secondary sources, including internal documents, reports, 
unpublished studies, newspaper articles, etc., is a good complement in this tracing process 
for the assessment of regulatory objectives (Staschen, 2010), as according to the approach 
of process tracing, all information that provides evidence about the achievement of any of 
the regulatory objectives is relevant (Staschen, 2010). Staschen posits that the result is a 
much more refined picture of various impact channels and regulatory impact than would be 
possible with the analysis of only performance indicators. 
 
The focus in this section of the thesis is on the governance of the institution, because it is 
generally acceptable that both sound implementation of good governance practices and 
sustainable financial performance can lead to viable MFIs (Ayayi, 2011), and regulation can 
facilitate that process. The qualitative indicators analysed are adapted from the Morgan 
Stanley Credit Risk Assessment Framework for Microfinance, published in its issue on 
international corporate governance in 2008, and include looking at the company’s strategy 
and business plan, the quality of senior management and the board, operations procedures 
and internal controls, human resource policies and management, quality of management 
information systems and reporting as well as its growth potential. Where possible, the 
relevance to the regulatory objectives is also established.  
 
In his work on selected Vietnamese MFIs, Ayayi (2011) found the MFIs that scored the 
highest grades in management and strategy, systems and reporting, and internal and 
operational controls were the most financially sound. He also found active government 
involvement through constructive regulation aimed at promoting MFIs to be a good signal for 
MFI investors and donors. Studying the developments in those aspects over the period of 
existence of FIDES gave an indication of the extent to which those factors had enabled the 
management teams at FIDES to evaluate their institution’s performance in order to identify 
and correct weaknesses and position the bank in a favourable situation. It also revealed 
whether or not regulation had made a difference or had led to improvements in those factors, 
i.e. whether or not regulation had facilitated a favourable environment for FIDES’s 
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operations. The aim was therefore to validate the results of the assessment of performance 
indicators obtained in the previous section above, thereby broadening the evidence base.  
 
These qualitative indicators were also compared to the Morgan Stanley approach to risk 
assessment systems, where relevant, to see whether or not FIDES was operating in line with 
internationally acceptable best practices. Further, as in the case of performance indicators, 
theoretical expected outcomes for specific factors have been provided where possible. Data 
to inform this analysis were obtained through the questionnaire, documentary reviews as 
well as interviews with stakeholders that were involved with the bank, such as employees, 
board members and regulators. 
 
7.4.3.1 Strategy and business planning  
 
There has been an industry-wide observation that the greatest constraint to the development 
of microfinance in Africa has been a lack of management capacity (CGAP, 2009). As for any 
other business venture, good management can lead to viable MFIs (Arvelo et al., 2008). 
According to the Morgan Stanley framework for credit risk assessment, when analysing the 
strategy and business plan of an MFI, one should look for a clear and achievable strategy 
that contains elements such as marketing, attraction and retention of customers, products, 
branch and geographic expansion, human resource needs and technology enhancement 
(Arvelo et al., 2008).  
 
Information from documentary review and interviews revealed that FIDES had clear mission 
and vision statements that spoke to its existence and intention, and that it had a business 
strategy and has been planning its operations since the beginning of its existence. The 
researcher could trace evidence in this regard from documents such as the annual reports 
that made reference to an action plan for the following year and the MFI having had to 
change business plans at some point, as dictated by situations at hand (FIDES, 2010; 2011). 
The bank also reported on having forecasted a loss in the 2012 financial year as well as a 
continuation of the foreseen growth path to achieve breakeven during the 2013 financial 
year (FIDES, 2011). Interviewed internal stakeholders further confirmed this when asked 
about the existence and effectiveness of the strategy and business planning at FIDES, with 
one of the staff members stating the following:  
 
“Yes, it has been in place from day one, it formed the basis of the licence 
granting by the central bank” [MFI8/2/(2)] 
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At the time of licensing, it announced through the media its intention (i.e. its plan) to expand 
its operations by creating additional branches and hence its client base of micro and small 
entrepreneurs and employing more staff (3 February 2010 Press Release), which shows that 
planning was taking place. In addition, from other documents it became clear that the bank 
had also clearly communicated its plans for market and product development, human 
resource development and institutional development. For instance, it reported in its 2011 
annual report that it had planned to open a new branch in Rundu in 2012, but opted to open 
in Windhoek so as to enter that market and take advantage of the potential it offered before 
its competitors could do so. It had also kept its social mission and commitment alive by 
regularly producing a social performance report as well as keeping track of the progress 
made by its individual clients and publishing those. All of the above examples exhibit the 
existence of elements of strategy and planning and therefore of FIDES having had in place 
tools that were critical to its performance.  
 
The question that arises is whether or not regulation had played any role in the process of 
ensuring the existence of a strategy and business plan of FIDES. While these tools might 
have been in existence since the establishment of the entity, it became binding after 
licensing as a regulatory requirement that regulated entities are to have a viable strategy and 
plan in place, not only at the time of applying for licence but also after licensing, so as to 
guide their business operations and be able to conform to regulatory requirements. This 
requirement was also applicable in the case of FIDES. As indicated earlier in this chapter, 
the BoN could alter some regulatory requirements such as CAR, etc., based on the business 
model and/or performance of the entity. For instance, FIDES’s CAR was increased to not 
less than 15 per cent with effect from May 2012, while the bank was also ordered to control 
its growth and allow time to develop internal systems commensurate with the expanded 
business (FIDES, 2011). All these are regulatory requirements aimed at safeguarding the 
soundness and sustainability of the entity, which the regulator needed to enforce, and 
regulation therefore played a role in directing or guiding the strategy and business plan of 
FIDES.  
 
7.4.3.2 The quality of senior management and the board 
 
According to the Morgan Stanley framework, the strongest MFIs typically boast of 
experienced board members and management teams in the financial and development 
sector and having a cultural understanding of their operating regions. The framework further 
states that management would ideally demonstrate the ability to set balanced goals and 
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achieve them in a timely and cost-efficient manner without compromising portfolio quality or 
community reputation. 
 
One of the regulatory requirements of regulated banks in Namibia is to comply with the ‘fit 
and proper’ test of management and board members running regulated entities. Under this 
requirement, regulated entities, including FIDES, are required to prove to the regulator that 
their management and board members are qualified, both professionally and socially, to hold 
positions in those respective capacities.  
 
FIDES had a team of skilled people, with university degrees, at both senior management 
and board level. Most senior managers were microfinance experts who gained experienced 
over years of service at different management levels in other countries before they came to 
Namibia. At some point, the bank benefited from a ‘donation of services’ that ensured 
payment of salaries of key management (who were international microfinance experts) to 
ensure efficient management and achievement of the bank’s objectives (FIDES, 2011). It 
can therefore be concluded that regulation played a role in ensuring that FIDES had qualified 
and experienced staff and management in place to run its business through the ‘fit and 
proper’ requirement. However, it is the view of the researcher that the fact that top 
management were all expatriates (i.e. FIDES had changed three different managing 
directors during its existence, who were all expatriates) might have been a downside in the 
form of top management not having a cultural understanding of their operating regions. This 
actually also came up during interviews with some of its stakeholders, with one stakeholders 
mentioning, on the question of why FIDES had to stop operating under the same 
management, that a lack of understanding of the market actually existed as one of the 
factors that led to its takeover, as quoted below.  
 
“FIDES had outside people in management, there were too many foreigners 
involved who did not understand the Namibian market” [MFI8/2/(1)]  
  
The extent to which this might have affected the business has however not been measured. 
The researcher also observed some strength in terms of management’s ability to set 
balanced goals and achieve them in a timely and cost-efficient manner. Examples to this 
effect are those detected from the documentary review, such as where FIDES reported in 
2011 that it had to a large extent reached the volumes it foresaw, such that results achieved 
in that year were close to the objectives set (FIDES, 2011). It therefore reflects the quality of 
its senior management and board. 
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7.4.3.3 Human resource management 
 
Managing human resources is critical to any organisation. This is because the performance 
of an organisation depends very much on the capacity of its employees. As such, regulators 
impose a ‘fit and proper’ requirement on the management, board members and key staff of 
regulated entities as one of the key pillars to ensure the safety and soundness of regulated 
entities. This requirement also applied to FIDES when it was licensed. The Morgan Stanley 
framework of credit risk assessment has identified recruitment, training and retention as 
pillars of a robust human resource policy (Arvelo et al., 2008).    
 
FIDES had human resource policies in place, such as policies to retain and improve 
employees’ productivity, incentives and compensation policies with specific quarterly 
bonuses for over-achievements by loan officers based on a number of performance 
indicators, portfolio growth and quality, PAR, etc. [MFI8/2/2]. It also used to conduct 
capacity-building activities for staff, especially for loan officers, as evidenced the following 
reported in 2011: “An important capacity building effort has been provided by the 
management and FIDES support in order to staff the bank rapidly with an important number 
of sufficiently qualified client officers, thus laying the basis for the now engaged growth path” 
(FIDES, 2011). Further, an interview with one of the staff members revealed as quoted:  
 
“Extensive practical training of loan officers guaranteed promotions to 
supervisory positions” [MFI8/2/(2)]  
 
The above indicates FIDES’s commitment to human resources. The same staff member also 
indicated, however, that training for existing and potential middle management was non-
existent [MFI6/2/1]. This can be considered to be a weakness, given the need for every 
organisation, including FIDES, to ensure that all levels of its staff are capacitated to be able 
to deliver on the business plan, especially so for the case of FIDES, which was operating in 
a country where microfinance is a relatively new business area. The Morgan Stanley credit 
risk assessment framework posits that employees at all levels require training once recruited 
and that employees promoted to middle management roles specifically be trained on 
managerial skills. It further advocates for continuous training and monitoring and retention of 
recruited employees. Information on the staff-retention policy of FIDES could not be 
obtained.   
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7.4.3.4 The quality of systems and reporting 
 
“The ability of an MFI to maintain robust systems and provide accurate reports affects not 
only the quality of the information that it provides but also its ability to understand and 
monitor its own operations” (Arvelo et al., 2008). For this reason, organisations normally 
strive to have good accounting, IT and reporting systems in place. Regulators also have 
vested interest in ensuring this happens, because robust systems will facilitate their 
supervisory function over regulated entities. While they may not have this as a specified 
regulatory requirement, the nature of information and processes they require (such as 
audited financial statements and having internal audit functions) influences the type of 
systems regulated institutions would need to have in place. This was the situation that 
FIDES had to live up to as a regulated entity.   
 
FIDES had quality systems (management information systems, information technology (IT) 
systems, loan tracking and accounting systems) in place. This has made it possible for the 
bank to plan for its expansion in outreach and diversification of its product and services, 
which was discussed earlier in this chapter. An interview with a former staff member who 
used to be involved with those issues also pointed to the strong support provided by the 
owner of the IT systems [MFI8/2/2]. The process of data processing and distribution and/or 
transfer between head office and branches was also effective, as they were connected via a 
reliable wide area network with a central server at the head office, which ensured the quality 
and speed of data feed. Further, IT backup was always available [MFI8/2/2]. This situation is 
consistent with the standards advocated by the Morgan Stanley credit risk assessment 
framework that points to the need for automation and integration, among others (Arvelo et 
al., 2008).  
 
In terms of reporting, FIDES used to prepare financial statements from the beginning, as 
evidenced by its ability to submit its data to the Mix Market also for periods before its 
licencing. This could be a demonstration of some of the requirements and/or expectations of 
the shareholders and involved donors even before it became a transformed institution. The 
situation improved further when it became a licensed entity, as FIDES now had to produce 
and release annual audited financial statements prepared strictly in accordance with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards.  
 
It also had an internal audit department for which staff were trained and had a good 
understanding of the MFI’s role for internal control and assurance purposes. The internal 
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control and audit system allowed systematic monitoring and mitigation of risks, as the audit 
plan was 60 per cent field-based, in line with the business model [MFI8/2/2].  
 
A look at the organisational structure clearly indicated the reporting structure of the internal 
audit function to the board audit committee and administratively to the chief executive officer, 
which is a good governance practice. An external auditor was appointed every three years to 
audit the bank’s books and at the time of its takeover, Delloite and Touche, an international 
auditing firm, was its external auditor. These processes ensured good-quality and 
comprehensive reports, as required by the regulatory authority. FIDES’s operation 
procedures and internal controls were also documented and evaluated every six months by 
an internal audit unit for validity and adherence, while procedures were further disseminated 
to staff, who in turn were trained for three months intensively in a classroom setup and 
thereafter on the job [MFI6/2/1].  
 
7.4.3.5 Growth potential 
 
The Morgan Stanley credit risk assessment framework states that regulatory restrictions and 
political climate can have a significant influence on an MFI’s business (Arvelo et al., 2008). It 
suggests indicators for examining the growth potential of an MFI to include the regulatory 
and government involvement, number and density of micro-entrepreneurs and behaviour of 
micro-entrepreneurs towards microloans (Arvelo et al., 2008). It explains by citing examples 
of apex funds specifically created for the microfinance industry as well as priority sector 
quotas, which could ensure that MFIs are able to attract funding, and a regulatory 
environment where MFIs face little or no government interference as good government 
initiatives that can contribute favourably to the development of MFIs (Arvelo et al., 2008).  
 
The establishment of FIDES came at a time when government had recognised the 
importance of MFIs in financing SMEs in Namibia and had resolved to develop the 
microfinance sector through its Financial Sector Strategy 2011–2021. This was also the time 
when FIDES was perceived to be the only ‘true’ MFI in the country. As such, there was great 
interest in FIDES, which led to positive publicity, i.e. the environment was a conducive one 
for FIDES in which to operate.  
 
Government through the DBN also created an apex fund to provide wholesale loans to MFIs 
from which FIDES could have tapped. Further, becoming a regulated MFI was an 
opportunity for FIDES to extend its microfinance activities in terms of both scope and 
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geographically. It would also facilitate the possibility for FIDES to tap into external credit 
sources, which would in turn enable it to further expand its outreach. The expansion in terms 
of creating an additional branch in Windhoek should have been the result of this situation. In 
addition, having operated in the most populous part of the country, i.e. the far northern 
region, the demand for microcredit had been enormous, as evidenced by the growth in the 
number of clients and loans outstanding discussed earlier in this chapter, including in the 
number of micro-entrepreneurs, which gives an indication of the density of micro-
entrepreneurs. The behaviour of micro-entrepreneurs towards microloans was also good, as 
demonstrated in the good repayment and generally low levels of loan PAR discussed in the 
section on performance indicators. These all point to the existence of a high growth potential 
for FIDES. 
 
Table 7.3 below gives a summary of the regulatory impact on the critical qualitative factors 
discussed above.  
 
Table 7.3: Summary of the impact of regulation on qualitative factors 
Indicator Impact 
Business strategy and 
planning 
The bank had an enhanced strategy and business plan that guided 
business operations due to the need to conform to regulatory 
requirements. 
Quality of senior 
management and board 
The ‘fit and proper’ regulatory requirement enabled FIDES to have 
qualified and experienced board and management in place.  
Quality of systems and 
reporting  
The nature of information and process required by the regulator (such 
as audited financial statements and having internal audit functions in 
place) influenced the type of systems FIDES needed to have in place, 
and these in turn led to comprehensive and quality reporting.   
Growth potential Becoming a regulated MFI was an opportunity for FIDES to extend its 
microfinance activities in terms of both scope and geographically, and 
therefore saw the creation of an additional branch in 2012. 
  
There was high growth potential, also facilitated by the existing 
conducive environment created through government’s 
acknowledgement of the importance of MFIs in financing SMEs and the 
policy pronouncement to develop the microfinance sector of Namibia. 
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7.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter presented the analysis of the impact of regulation and supervision on FIDES, 
an MFI licensed and regulated under normal conventional banking law, through the use of 
the ROI method under the RIA framework. While the researcher could not perform 
regression analysis in the process of attributing regulatory impact due to a lack of sufficient 
data and the absence of an appropriate control case, she applied the use of the structural 
breaks method and the physical causal approach, which are both acceptable methods of 
attributing impact, as long as it can be proven that the main happening during the period of 
review was regulation.  
 
The logic of inference used in quantitative research, as explained in the methodology 
chapter, was further applied to deduce impact, i.e. it used the same thinking in discussing 
impact when looking at changes in data/information (i.e. changes in both performance 
indicators and qualitative factors). Further, benchmarking the outcomes to an international 
credit risk rating scale for microfinance (i.e. the Morgan Stanley approach) was also 
performed where possible, and a comparison to developments in the performance indicators 
of commercial banks together with which the MFI has been regulated under the same law 
strengthened and complemented the analysis.  
 
The impact assessment process yielded results that showed the existence of regulatory 
impact on some of the performances indicators of FIDES. It particularly found that regulation 
has generally had a positive impact on the operations of FIDES, as reflected in 
improvements in most of its performance indicators (profitability, capital adequacy, liquidity 
and efficiency) during the post-licensing period, although causality was not too clear in some 
instances.  
 
Regulation has also facilitated FIDES’s significant contribution to Namibia’s efforts to 
enhance access to financial services to poor and low-income people, as reflected in 
substantial increases in the number of savers and borrowers, especially in the rural areas of 
the northern regions where the majority of its operations were based. This performance was 
attributed to the increased safety and soundness brought about by regulation that had 
encouraged depositors to entrust their savings to FIDES, and therefore the institution having 
contributed to progress in the breadth of access to savings in Namibia. Further, as a 
licenced entity, FIDES could now also freely mobilise savings, including voluntary savings, to 
the extent possible, as opposed to the statutory limitations faced before licensing. This led to 
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the observed huge increases in total savings around the post-licensing years and therefore 
regulation having facilitated progress in the ‘scope of access’ sub-indicator. It can therefore 
be concluded from the available analysed data that regulation generally had a positive 
impact on FIDES, as measured by the observed improvements in most of its performance 
indicators. 
  
The analysis, however, also showed that FIDES experienced some operational challenges in 
the later years of its post-licensing era, especially when it opened a branch in the capital city 
where the setup was completely different from the rural and semi-urban areas in which it 
used to operate.  
 
While the above findings are a good indicator of what has transpired at FIDES as a result of 
being regulated under normal banking law, they have to be interpreted bearing in mind the 
limited quantitative evidence that is inherent in a small sample (or in a single case study in 
the case of this thesis), which rendered causality not to be too clear in some instances. This 
was however minimised by the analysis of other qualitative factors analysed as well as the 
presented evidence from interviewees.  
 
Chapter 8 below performs an ex-ante impact assessment of the envisaged amended BIA 
that has made provision for regulating MFIs in Namibia, on the microfinance sector, as a 
second stage of the RIA of this study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE ENVISAGED MFI 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON MFIs 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter reports on the assessment of the potential regulatory impact of the draft 
amended BIA, i.e. the envisaged amended BIA that has made provision for regulating MFIs 
in Namibia, on the microfinance sector. This was therefore an evaluation of the regulatory 
impact at a macro level and constitutes the ex-ante RIA part of the thesis. It is a second 
stage of the RIA of this thesis and complements the case study assessment undertaken in 
Chapter 7 in addressing the research objective of assessing the potential impact of 
regulation and supervision on the microfinance sector of Namibia. 
 
In 2013, Namibia, through its central bank, decided to create a window for regulating and 
supervising DMFIs by amending the BIA, Act No. 2 of 1998, as amended. The amendment 
bill was yet to be promulgated at the time of preparing this research. The assessment here 
therefore is ex-ante (i.e. a regulatory appraisal), which, according to Staschen (2010) is 
possible to undertake through the use of the ‘logic of inference’ approach. King, Keohane 
and Verba (1994: 4), cited by Staschen (2010), posit that the logic of inference used in 
quantitative research can and should also be used in determining qualitative evidence. The 
researcher therefore used this approach of thinking in determining the impact through the 
RIA framework, and specifically through the use of the ROI methodology developed 
specifically for financial inclusion regulatory assessment by Staschen (2010), as explained 
under the methodology chapter (Chapter 4).  
 
To form a basis for the impact assessment, the analysis was preceded by an investigation to 
first understand the rationale of Namibia providing for microfinance regulation and an 
examination of the proposed provisions and requirements of the envisaged amended act as 
it pertains to microfinance banking business and the institutions involved (i.e. MFIs) as well 
as its characteristics and intended objectives. Information/data used in the overall analysis of 
the study are from the policy documents that informed the regulatory provision for 
microfinance, the draft amendment bill itself and its draft determinations as well as the 
fieldwork results collected through interviews and surveys. 
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The rest of the chapter is organised such that the next section (Section 8.2) provides the 
background and rationale for the regulatory intervention, followed by an identification of the 
characteristics and intended objectives of the Namibian microfinance regulatory framework 
in Section 8.3. In Section 8.4 the assessment of the potential impact of the envisaged 
regulatory framework for DMFIs is discussed based on the evaluation of the expected 
achievements of the intended regulatory objectives through the use of identified indicators, 
while Section 8.5 reports on a cost-benefit analysis through an identification of regulatory 
costs and relating those to the benefits identified in Section 8.4. Section 8.6 presents the 
chapter conclusions.   
 
8.2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE REGULATORY INTERVENTION 
THROUGH THE ENVISAGED AMENDED BIA  
 
Given that a large part of the Namibian population, especially the poor and SMEs, does not 
have access to financial services, the country has resolved to develop its microfinance 
sector, especially the deposit-taking microfinance industry, based on the recognition that 
MFIs have the potential to address the needs of those groups of the population. Hence, the 
regulatory provision for microfinance has been designed to provide the necessary legal 
framework for the operation and development of the deposit-taking microfinance industry, as 
outlined in the following policy statement129:  
 
The Bank of Namibia (BoN) seeks to increase access to finance for micro and small 
enterprises (“MSEs”) and low income individuals in Namibia through the development 
and deepening of the Namibian formal financial system by creating an enabling legal, 
regulatory, and supervisory framework for microfinance. [UP/RD/2/1: 1]  
 
Policy makers believe that providing an enabling legal environment through this window will 
complement other efforts of developing the overall microfinance banking sector in Namibia, 
which was underdeveloped, i.e. there was only one operating microfinance bank in Namibia 
(as discussed in Chapter 7) at the time of undertaking this research. Regulators have 
therefore considered this legal framework as providing an opportunity for existing credit-only 
microlending institutions desiring to grow their business activities into deposit-taking and 
other related services [UP/PD/2/1]. In fact, the year 2014 saw a provisional banking 
                                                          
129 The statement was a brief by BoN to the international experts, First Initiatives, who were engaged to assist with drafting the 
regulatory framework for DMFIs in 2011.   
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licence130 granted to one of the microlending institutions (Letshego Ltd) wanting to enter that 
space, albeit also under the normal commercial banking law. Should Letshego succeed in 
meeting the prescribed regulatory requirements by the stipulated time period, it will be an 
important and necessary addition to the deposit-taking microfinance banking industry. This 
process was taking place before the coming into place of the envisaged amended act, but it 
could be argued it is being done in anticipation of the implementation of the new amendment 
act with microfinance-specific provisions that will be applicable to all DMFIs. While it is 
sometimes argued that regulation is in some way supposed to follow the market, which in 
the case of Namibia is clearly lacking, it could be argued that under certain circumstances, 
regulation may also create a market by attracting new players, which in the case of Namibia 
seems to be one of the key objectives for creating the microfinance regulatory window.  
 
The provision for MFI regulation is in a way an acknowledgement of the special nature of 
MFIs and microfinance banks in particular, for which the law (BIA) for conventional banking 
institutions was applicable at the time of drafting this study. The effective uptake of this new 
opportunity, however, will only be observed after the coming into effect of the amended act 
and its regulations/determinations, given that there could be other factors investors would 
consider in deciding to invest in the microfinance banking sector apart from regulation. This 
however does not prevent an appraisal of the likely impact of the envisaged act on the 
sector, hence this study. 
 
8.3 CHARACTERISTICS AND INTENDED OBJECTIVES OF THE ENVISAGED 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR DMFIs  
 
As discussed under Section 8.2 above, the main objective for providing a regulatory window 
for DMFIs in Namibia is to facilitate the expansion of access to finance. The policy statement 
specifically states: “In the context of Namibia, the objective of the proposed regulatory 
framework is to permit prospective and existing MFIs engaged in microlending to mobilise 
deposits” [UP/PD/2/2: 4]. It also aims to prevent regulatory arbitrage and exclude entrants 
into the microfinance space who do not have the desired social objectives [UP/PD/2/1]. As 
such, and with the intention to facilitate the attainment of this objective, the regulatory 
framework has made specific provisions for MFIs, some of which are differentiated from 
those for conventional banking, while some have remained the same to a certain extent, as 
                                                          
130 A provisional license allows the institution to prepare itself to fully meet the requirements of the regulator within a stipulated 
period (i.e. within six months). The researcher was however informed that this period had been extended on the request of the 
applicant to allow more time for preparation. 
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will be evident in subsequent sections. It is important to mention at the onset that while the 
act has (or policy makers have) defined the objectives of the MFI regulatory framework, it 
has in most cases only defined standards and has left the regulator to set the specific rules, 
i.e. the draft determinations by the BoN to this effect have set out specific rules and/or 
provisions.  
 
When studying the provisions proposed in the draft determinations, it becomes clear that the 
main characteristics of the envisaged microfinance regulatory framework hinges on the 
purpose for developing it in the first place. They are clearly an acknowledgement of the 
special nature of the microfinance business in most cases, as is evidenced by the following 
extract from the statement of policy in the draft determinations: “These Determinations set 
out the specialised regulatory requirements for microfinance banking institutions” [UP/D/1/1: 
4]. It is clear from this statement that Namibia has considered DMFIs as special institutions 
that require special regulatory treatment. The regulatory framework has therefore made a 
distinction in the regulatory requirements for MFIs relative to those applicable to 
conventional banks. This is in line with what is advocated by literature, as discussed in the 
literature review chapter of this thesis. Following below is an exposé of the main/key 
provisions of the draft DMFI regulatory framework and how they differ from those for 
conventional banks to serve as background for the regulatory appraisal in subsequent 
sections. 
 
8.3.1 The main regulatory provisions for MFIs under the envisaged amended BIA 
 
This section provides a highlight of the key provisions of the proposed deposit-taking 
microfinance regulatory framework and how they differ from the regulation of normal banks. 
Key to the provisions in the proposed act for microfinance business is the definition of 
‘microcredit’.  
 
CGAP (2009) indicates that there is no universal definition for microcredit and suggests that 
it be defined taking into account specific country socio-economic conditions and the existing 
legal structure. Further, MIX suggests defining microfinance lenders with average 
outstanding loan portfolio not exceeding 250 per cent of their country’s per capita gross 
national income (CGAP, 2009). In line with that, the envisaged legal framework has defined 
microcredit for Namibia and has prescribed the lending methodology and target market. 
Accordingly, a microloan in Namibia has been determined to be a loan not exceeding N$200 
000, which is extended on a group-lending basis to low-income people with no collateral or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
236 
 
security provisions, which allows for short-term and more frequent repayments than 
conventional monthly repayments, while an MFI is one for which the average outstanding 
microloan balance does not exceed N$10 000131 [UP/D/1/1]. 
 
Based on the specific policy objective of facilitating the expansion of access to finance, and 
the desire to prevent regulatory arbitrage by excluding entrants into the microfinance space 
who do not have the desired social objectives, the envisaged legal framework for DMFIs has 
also made a clear distinction between the micro-lending business and the microfinance 
banking business. It is believed that this distinction “will provide for a trade-off between 
maintaining the focus on the excluded portion of society, while allowing for flexibility and 
avoiding concern of enforceability” [UP/PD/2/1: 3]. Policy makers also believe that by 
defining the scope of microfinance banking business, a distinction from conventional banking 
business is made as well as parameters set within which such institutions are to operate 
[UP/PD/2/1]. 
 
Specific prudential and non-prudential provisions have also been proposed. It is worth noting 
that while MFIs will be subject to both prudential and non-prudential regulatory requirements, 
the researcher has observed that the main special provisions are those relating to prudential 
requirements, while the applicable non-prudential requirements are largely the same as 
those for normal banks. The nature and characteristics of these provisions are discussed 
below. 
 
8.3.1.1 Prudential requirements 
 
Prudential guidelines address issues pertaining to minimum capital requirements, capital 
adequacy, permissible activities, asset classification and loan loss provisioning, exposure to 
single borrowers, loan file documentation, and liquid and reserve requirements. A highlight of 
the key special prudential provisions of the proposed legal framework and how they differ 
from the regulation of normal banks is presented in the table below.  
 
                                                          
131 This is less than what term lenders, discussed in Chapter 5, had at the time of this research (i.e. N$13 000). 
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Table 8.1: Key special prudential provisions of the DMFI regulatory framework  
 
Provision132 Requirement for DMFIs Difference to normal banks 
Minimum capital 
requirements 
[Section 28 (b)] 
To be relatively lower than for conventional 
banks (amount not yet specified), although the 
bill also indicates that this will depend on the 
business model of the applicant   
Lower (the requirement for 
commercial banks is N$10 
million)  
Capital adequacy 
requirement 
[Section 13.3 (c)] 
A CAR for DMFIs is set at a higher ratio of 12%  Higher (the requirement for 
traditional banks is 10%) 
Asset classification 
and loan loss 
provisioning 
 
[Section 11.3]  
A range of 1% to 100% and classified into 
categories (pass or acceptance, watch or 
special mention, substandard, doubtful, loss). 
Provisioning is made based on the frequency 
of loan repayment (i.e. less than a month or a 
month and more, etc.) and subject to the 
number of days a loan is outstanding. See 
Table 8.2 below for details.  
Stricter (more frequent and 
over very short-term periods 
than in the case of 
conventional banks, in terms 
of both days and minimum 
provisions) 
Limit on exposure 
to borrowers 
 
[Section 12.1 (ii)] 
 Total exposures to any person or a group of 
related persons of not more than 1% of an 
MFI’s capital funds 
 Aggregate of all large exposures133 not to 
exceed 200% of DMFIs’ capital funds 
Significantly lower (30% in 
the case of normal banks) 
Liquid assets 
requirements 
[Section 12.1 (a)] 
15% of the average daily amount of deposits 
and short-term liabilities to the public for the 
preceding month 
Higher (the requirement for 
banks is 10%). 
 
Source: UP/D/1/1, UP/PD/2/1 and UP/PD/2/2 
 
Table 8.1 above shows that a higher CAR of 12 per cent has been prescribed for DMFIs, 
compared to the 10 per cent for conventional banks on the following justification:134  
 
                                                          
132 The sections indicated are from the draft implementing determinations for the envisaged amended act.  
133 An exposure that individually equals or exceeds 1 per cent of the microfinance banking institutions capital funds. 
134 Justification for each proposed requirement has been provided in the unpublished policy documents coded BONUP/P/2/1.  
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DMFIs have fewer options to raise additional capital, especially during infancy years of 
operations, since it may be overwhelmed with inexperienced management and 
systems, while they generally also have relatively higher administrative costs, 
uncollateralised loan facilities and less diversified loan portfolios, making them more 
prone to contagion effects and rapid deterioration of loan quality and hence the 
precautionary higher ratio requirement [UP/PD/2/1:3].  
 
It is further argued that licensing and regulation of this new type of banks would also prove to 
be a challenging new experience for both the regulator and practitioners, therefore requiring 
a conservative approach [UP/PD/2/1]. The high minimum capital adequacy requirement ratio 
for MFIs is actually in line with what is advocated in literature. CGAP (2009) and BIS (2010) 
are of the view that DMFIs should be subject to slightly higher minimum CAR compared to 
the conventional banks, especially as they have fewer options to raise additional capital 
compared to banks. It argues that capital standards should not be lowered to encourage 
entry of MFIs to the banking landscape because the viability and sustainability of such 
institutions need to be ensured, as it remains an important ingredient for maintaining the 
financial inclusion objective.  
 
Under the envisaged regulatory framework, the regulator will have flexibility to tailor the 
minimum capital requirement for individual DMFIs, taking into account their business model, 
i.e. taking into account the estimated costs of setting up business infrastructure and other 
facilities [UP/PD/2/2]. Critique obtained through the fieldwork was that the high minimum 
capital requirement, such as that currently in existence under the conventional banking 
regulatory framework, was a barrier to entry and an impediment for entities to access the 
mainstream banking environment, as it discouraged investors from entering. Liquidity 
requirements are expected to be higher than for normal banks, i.e. 15 per cent of the 
average daily amount of deposits and short-term liabilities to the public for the preceding 
month compared to 10 per cent applicable to commercial banks.  
 
It can also be seen from Table 8.2 below that DMFIs are being subject to stricter asset 
classification and loan-provisioning requirements than conventional banks, in terms of both 
days and minimum provisions. Provisioning is more frequent and is over more short-term 
periods than in the case of conventional banks. For example, the classification of watch or 
special mention is applicable to loans that are overdue for the period 1 to 15 days for loans 
with a repayment frequency of less than a month and 1 to 30 days for those with a 
repayment frequency of a month or longer, while for commercial banks it is applicable for 
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overdue loans falling within the period 90 to 119 days. Substandard loans for DMFIs are 
those falling within the overdue period of 16 to 30 days and 31 to 60 days for loans with a 
repayment frequency of less than a month and a month or longer, respectively, while for 
conventional banks substandard loans are those that are 120 to 209 days in arrears. The 
same stricter requirements for DMFIs are observed for the other categories of doubt and 
loss. Furthermore, the researcher observed from the draft implementing determinations that 
for loans rescheduled or restructured once, the classification of microfinance loans is set at 
two levels more severe than for normal loans, while those rescheduled or restructured twice 
are to be classified as a loss [UP/D/1/1]. 
 
Table 8.2: Loan-provisioning classifications: DMFIs vs conventional banks 
 
Number of days overdue  Classification  Minimum 
provision   
Loans with a frequency of repayment of less than a month   
Repayments up to date and loan is performing in accordance with 
contractual terms  
Pass/Acceptable 1% 
Repayments overdue 1–15 days  Watch/Special 
mention  
10% 
Repayments overdue 16–30 days Substandard 25% 
Repayments overdue 31–45 days Doubtful 50% 
Repayments overdue more than 45 days Loss 100% 
Loans with a frequency of repayment of a month or longer   
Repayments up to date and loan is performing in accordance with 
contractual terms  
Pass/Acceptable 1% 
Repayments overdue 1–30 days  Watch/Special 
mention  
10% 
Repayments overdue 31–60 days Substandard 25% 
Repayments overdue 61–90 days Doubtful 50% 
Repayments overdue more than 90 days Loss 100% 
Commercial banks   
Up to 89 days in arrears Pass /Acceptable 1% 
90–119 days in arrears Special mention 2% 
120–209 days in arrears Substandard 10% 
210–389 days in arrears Doubtful 50% 
390 or more days in arrears Loss 100% 
CGAP recommendation   
General provision    1% 
1–30 days in arrears  10% 
31–90 days in arrears  25% 
91–180 days in arrears   50% 
Over 180 days in arrears  100% 
Over 1 year in arrears Write off  
Source: UP/D/1/1 for DMFIS and UP/RD/2/1 for commercial banks and CGAP 
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The consideration for the stricter requirements have been the characteristics of the 
microfinance business such as the shorter repayment periods associated with the 
microcredit of MFIs, the fact that loans are unsecured as well as non-performance of 
accounts and rescheduling, which are all different from that of conventional banking 
business [UP/PD/2/1]. Further, the stricter requirement for loan loss provisioning is said to 
have taken into account the fact that microloan portfolios can deteriorate much faster than a 
typical loan portfolio, given that microloans are usually unsecured [UP/PD/2/1]. For this 
same reason, CGAP (2009) actually recommends more aggressive provisioning schedules 
than for normal bank loans, as can be seen in Table 8.2 above. The same table, however, 
also shows that provisioning requirements for DMFIs in Namibia are generally also stricter 
than those recommended by CGAP. The researcher observed that the policy intention of 
Namibia is that the number of categories of special provisioning can be determined at the 
BoN’s discretion to best suit the DMFI market as it develops and is therefore not necessarily 
prescribed in the law, while different provisioning schedules could also be developed for 
micro-enterprise loans with different types of repayment periods and risk profiles. If 
implemented, this approach will be beneficial to the DMFI industry, in that appropriate 
provisioning levels are going to be applicable at relevant stages of the development of the 
industry going forward.  
 
With regards to the single borrowers exposure limit, a significantly lower limit of 1 per cent to 
single person or group of related persons has been set for DMFIs relative to the 30 per cent 
for traditional banks. The policy consideration here has been stated to have been the fact 
that DMFIs typically have a portfolio of small loans, influenced by geographical and sectoral 
concentrations, and that it will therefore not be viable to subject them to the same 
requirement as banks, as it would increase their concentration risk [UP/PD/2/1]. This is in 
line with that advocated by CGAP (2009) and the Basel Committee Guidelines for 
Supervising MFIs. In addition, to set operational parameters for DMFIs, sections 8 and 9 of 
the draft implementing determinations of the envisaged amended act, relating to 
microfinance banking institutions, has specified the permissible and prohibited activities. 
Accordingly, DMFIs are only permitted to engage in activities listed in Table 8.3 below, while 
the same table also lists specified prohibited activities.  
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Table 8.3: Permissible and prohibited activities 
 
 Permissible activities Prohibited activities 
Acceptance of deposits 
  
Opening and operating demand cheque accounts 
Provision of loans, of which at least 
70% of the total number of loans 
must be microloans 
 
Engaging directly or indirectly for its own account or on a 
commission basis, in trade, merchandise, mining, fisheries, 
commerce, industry or agriculture, except in the course of the 
satisfaction of debts due to it for the purpose of carrying on its 
business 
 
Provision of domestic and 
international remittances and funds 
transfers 
 
Insurance underwriting 
 
Provision of insurance services as 
an agent 
 
Acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, in the aggregate, any 
part of share capital of, or making any capital investment or 
otherwise having any interest in enterprises engaged in trade, 
commerce, industry or agriculture in excess of 25% of its core 
capital, except in the course of the satisfaction of debts due to 
it, but in such a case all shares and interests shall be disposed 
of at the earliest reasonable opportunity 
 
Maintenance and operation of 
accounts with banking institutions 
 
Underwriting and placement of securities 
 
Receipt of interest as may be 
agreed between the microfinance 
banking institutions and their clients 
  
Engaging in trust operations 
 
Any other activities as the bank may 
from time to time determine in terms 
of the act 
Taking deposits and lending in foreign exchange 
 
 Purchasing a non-performing or low-quality loan from any of 
the directors, officers or affiliates of the institution or their 
related interests 
 
Dealing in derivatives 
 
Any other activities as the bank may determine in terms of the 
act 
Source: UP/D/1/1 
 
CGAP (2012) supports the principle of having limitations on permitted activities and 
regulation clearly defining what is permitted. It argues that newly licensed MFIs may lack 
experience to manage a full range of banking activities and associated risks.  
 
In line with expectations by literature, loan file documentation required are proposed to be 
lesser than for normal banks, i.e. they exclude certain documentation viewed impractical for 
DMFIs to obtain from their clients. This is therefore a less strict requirement and is in line 
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with that for which CGAP (2012: 30) advocates: “given the size of microloans and nature of 
the borrowers, loan documentation requirements need to be lighter for microcredit than for 
conventional banks”. 
 
The above discussions show that in general, stricter prudential regulatory requirements have 
been imposed on DMFIs compared to normal banks, except for the minimum capital 
requirement, limit on exposure to single borrowers and loan file documentation. 
  
8.3.1.2 Non-prudential requirements 
 
Non-prudential requirements include those relating to licensing, reporting and institutional 
transparency and consumer protection, i.e. they are to direct the business conduct of the 
DMFIs. As alluded to earlier, the applicable non-prudential requirements for DMFIs have 
been largely left to be the same as those for normal banks, but with a slight modification, as 
evidenced below.  
 
According to the envisaged amended BIA, potential DMFIs are to be required to pay an 
application fee at the time of lodging an application for licensing, and if a license is granted, 
an annual fee will be applicable [UD/L/1/1]. The process of licensing involves considerable 
quality checking, including the validity and authenticity of information submitted by the 
applicant, financial status and history of the applicant, the integrity of the applicant and 
competence to conduct microfinance banking business; whether proposed directors and 
officers are fit and proper; as well as whether granting the license would be in the economic 
interest of Namibia (Banking Institutions Bill, 2015). The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision recommends the need to tailor the licensing criteria to the type and size of the 
MFIs instead of applying the criteria used for normal banks. It is also of the view that 
‘ownerless’ NGOs should be prohibited from taking deposits unless they convert their legal 
forms to companies. The committee argues that NGOs lack shareholders to inject additional 
capital in MFIs when a need arises (BIS, 2010). It is not clear from the bill and its draft 
implementing determinations how Namibia intends to address this issue. What is clear, 
though, is that under the existing BIA, Koshi Yomuti, the case study discussed in Chapter 7, 
needed to convert to FIDES before it was licensed, and this requirement gives a hint that this 
may still be the case going forward.         
 
In terms of ownership of MFIs, the draft amended act has placed a restriction on foreign 
shareholding of DMFIs to not more than 55 per cent, as per Section 32(1) (a) and (b). By 
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implication, foreign DMFIs wanting to enter the Namibian market will have to incorporate 
local shareholding of 45 per cent. Given the nature of the microfinance business of not being 
a very profitable business, it may prove to be a challenging requirement for MFIs in terms of 
finding local investors to meet this requirement.  
 
With regard to the reporting requirements, the key principle adopted by Namibia is to 
minimise the cost burden on DMFIs in terms of reporting detailed submissions and the 
frequency thereof [UP/PD/2/1]. For instance, the reporting requirements for DMFIs is such 
that they are to submit all returns relating to portfolio quality and loan loss provisioning on a 
monthly basis, but not later than the 21st day of each month for the prior month, while they 
must also submit all returns relating to liquidity, capital, asset quality, asset concentration 
and any other returns issued in accordance with the envisaged determinations or as the 
central bank may specify in a notice issued under Section 3 of the act [UP/D/1/1]. The 
monthly reporting is also as per the status quo for commercial banks. Views obtained from 
surveyed MFIs (both term lenders and FIDES), however, indicated that they would prefer 
reporting on a quarterly basis, which then implies that the monthly reporting is considered to 
be a burden by MFIs. Based on the same principle of the need to apply a differentiated 
supervision approach between conventional banks and MFIs referred to earlier, and the 
need to still ensure that microfinance banking institutions conduct their business in a prudent 
manner, the researcher suggests an approach whereby, based on the risk involved, only 
certain information deemed critical and that requires regular monitoring is collected on a 
monthly basis, while information not so critical is collected on a quarterly basis, i.e. the risk 
involved should determine what is critical and what is not.       
 
From the above discussions, it can be concluded that the main emphasis of the regulatory 
provision for MFIs under the framework of the envisaged amended BIA is on prudential 
regulation and systemic regulation.135 This is a clear indication that the objective of these 
requirements is to ensure that DMFIs conduct their business activities in a prudent manner 
and implement effective risk-management practices to safeguard the interests of depositors, 
which is typical of financial regulation. The differentiation of some of the requirements from 
normal commercial bank regulation discussed above is in line with what literature advocates.  
There were no differences observed in other aspects such as the publication of the financial 
statements and branch requirements, i.e. the requirements for conventional banks and 
DMFIs are the same. 
                                                          
135 Systemic regulation differs from prudential regulation in that it addresses risks that are of systemic nature to the financial 
system.   
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8.4 ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE ENVISAGED REGULATORY    
            FRAMEWORK ON MFIs 
 
This section reports on the assessment of the envisaged regulatory window for DMFIs with 
the aim of determining its potential impact on the microfinance sector (or MFIs) once it 
becomes effective. This was done through an analysis of the provisions of the draft 
amended act and its draft implementing determinations (regulations), discussed in Section 
8.3 above, and a hypothesis of the likely impact they would have on the achievement of the 
regulatory objectives, i.e. an ex-ante impact assessment. An ex-ante regulatory assessment 
is an appraisal of a proposed new or revised regulation that intends to provide information to 
policy makers on the (likely) impact of such regulation on the target audience (which is the 
DMFIs in the case of this thesis) and hence the provision of microfinance in Namibia. It 
therefore intends to inform the process of policy making. 
 
As discussed under the introduction section of this chapter, the regulatory appraisal of the 
new regulatory framework for MFIs was also done within the RIA framework. Specifically, the 
ROI was selected to be the suitable analytical method under the RIA umbrella, which is a 
method specifically tailored for conducting impact assessments for financial inclusion 
regulation, including microfinance regulation (Staschen et al., 2012). The method was 
developed based on the public interest theory, which stipulates that financial regulation 
should only be imposed if there is an obvious economic rationale for it, i.e. “a ROI 
assessment provides a pragmatic framework through which to conduct an examination of 
the consequences of a policy or regulatory choice(s) and assess the positive and negative 
impacts of existing or potential regulatory measures” (Staschen et al., 2012: 1). The ROI 
also advocates the need for regulatory impact to be measured against a benchmark with a 
clear causal link to the rationale for regulation (Staschen, 2010).  
  
As also explained under the methodology chapter, the ROI methodology has three 
components, namely the rational component, which explains why regulation is necessary 
(which for this study has been explained under Section 8.2); the objectives of regulation 
component, which is to explain what outcome regulation intends to achieve (which have also 
been identified under the same section for this study); and the indicators component, which 
are to measure the extent to which the objectives are achieved (as explained under the 
methodology chapter) and which is the main subject matter of the current section. The 
researcher therefore followed this approach and used the regulatory objectives as a 
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benchmark for measuring the potential impact of the regulation, as will be observed in 
subsequent sections.  
 
The main goal was to produce valid inferences about the regulatory impact of introducing the 
new regulatory provisions for microfinance under the proposed amended BIA, which then 
became the main exogenous or causal variable in this study. It can be regarded as a vector 
of regulatory provisions specified in the envisaged amended BIA and of changes in 
supervisory practices towards DMFIs in Namibia. The outcome of this process was then 
used as indicators of impact for the achievement of the regulatory objectives and ultimately 
for the likelihood of the envisaged amended act facilitating the development of the 
microfinance sector in Namibia. The counterfactual for this is the likely development of the 
sector and achievement of regulatory objectives without the introduction of the new 
amended regulatory framework, and not the status quo before the new regulatory provision.  
 
Typically, impact analyses investigate the changes created in target groups and related 
agents by an intervention (Nghiem, 2012). The researcher therefore aimed to investigate 
potential changes to be brought about by the envisaged amended BIA No. 2 of 1998, as 
amended, on the MFIs and therefore on the microfinance sector of Namibia. 
 
8.4.1 The new regulatory framework and its potential impact on regulatory 
objectives  
 
The model developed by Staschen (2010), which was applied in the impact analysis of this 
study, identified five public interest objectives for microfinance regulation as well as 
indicators (quantitative and qualitative) for measuring each of the objectives, as discussed 
under the methodology chapter. The identified objectives are (1) the promotion of the safety 
and soundness of MFIs, (2) guarding against systemic risk, (3) establishing a competitive 
market, (4) protecting consumers and (5) improving access. As can be seen from this list, 
the two main policy objectives for providing a regulatory framework for MFIs in Namibia 
stated under the introductory section of this chapter (i.e. the promotion of the safety and 
soundness of MFIs and enhancing of access to finance), clearly fall within this list of 
objectives. Some other provisions of the envisaged amended act also link to the other three 
regulatory objectives of guarding against systemic risk, establishing a competitive market 
and protecting consumers, as will be evident in the ensuing sections.  
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The sub-sections below (8.4.1.1 – 8.4.1.5) assess the potential regulatory impact of the 
envisaged regulatory provisions on the above-listed objectives (i.e. the likelihood of 
achieving these objectives) by analysing the expected performance of the relevant indicators 
for each of the objectives (as discussed under each of the objectives). The main assessment 
criterion is whether regulation would lead to progress in the indicators and hence the 
achievement of the objectives or not. In other words, the potential impact of the draft 
amended BIA is being assessed in terms of the possibility of it attaining the said public 
interest objectives. The importance of this within the context of this study was the need to 
determine whether that process would ultimately lead to the development of the 
microfinance sector of Namibia. As stated above, the counterfactual is not the situation 
before the treatment, i.e. the status quo, but the likely development of the sector without the 
introduction of the new regulatory window.  
 
Following below is an analysis of the impact indicators for each of the regulatory objectives 
in relation to the provisions of the envisaged act and its implementing determinations 
discussed earlier. This exercise is an exposition of the expected results for each of the 
regulatory objectives based on the theory relating to microfinance legal frameworks and the 
views discussed in the literature review section of Chapter 4. The process followed was that 
of identifying legislative provisions that could affect the specific regulatory objective, relating 
those to theory and experiences of other countries and determining what should be expected 
for Namibia. 
 
8.4.1.1 Objective 1: The promotion of the safety and soundness of MFIs 
 
The need to ensure safety and soundness of MFIs stems from the fact that failure of 
institutions can have devastating consequences for their clients, the stability of the financial 
sector and the economy as a whole. The promotion of safety and soundness of financial 
institutions, including MFIs, is therefore a necessary regulatory objective pursued by 
financial regulators. The envisaged amended BIA states that it aims, among others, to 
provide for the control, supervision and regulation of banking institutions and microfinance 
banking institutions and to protect the interest of persons making deposits with those 
institutions (Banking Institutions Bill, 2015). In essence, this provision relates to the 
regulatory objective of promoting the safety and soundness of MFIs.  
 
Staschen (2010) has identified indicators for measuring whether or not the objective of 
promoting the safety and soundness of MFIs is achieved. These include determining the 
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impact of regulation on the performance indicators of MFIs such as on profitability, portfolio 
quality, capital and liquidity ratios. In a situation of an already existing regulatory framework, 
the assessment is to be based on the performance of these indicators, but in the current 
situation where the regulatory framework is yet to come into effect and potential regulated 
institutions are yet to enter the regulatory space (i.e. in the case of this ex-ante impact 
assessment), there is no data for measuring the impact, i.e. the performance of the 
indicators. However, it is still possible to infer the likely implications of the regulatory 
provisions on the performance indicators, taking theory and empirical evidence by related 
previous studies into consideration. The premise for this evaluation is that regulation that 
leads to better performance in the indicators is good for the MFIs and the microfinance 
sector. Furthermore, Staschen (2010) posits that institutional changes that would possibly 
stem from certain regulatory requirements, including those related to the ownership and 
governance of MFIs as well as those that would avail credit information to inform MFIs’ 
credit-allocation decisions, are also valuable indicators for the future performance of MFIs. 
This appraisal process therefore also seeks to trace the existence and/or the likelihood of 
those institutions coming into existence. 
 
The provision by the draft amended act for the BoN to regulate DMFIs will prescribe good 
standards of practice by the regulated institutions and ensure the protection of clients’ 
deposits. Having operational rules and guidelines on good standards of practice in place 
(such as those on the minimum capital requirements, minimum performance standards and 
reporting requirements highlighted in Section 8.3) under which DMFIs are to operate is likely 
to enhance the chances of achieving good profitability, portfolio quality and capital and 
liquidity ratios of the DMFIs, which is good for the sustainability of these much-needed 
institutions. The experience of Uganda, as found by Okumu (2007), points to financial 
regulation having positively affected the sustainability of MFIs in the short-run and positively 
influenced both their sustainability and their outreach in the long run, although in the short 
run their outreach was negatively influenced. 
 
Further, the observed relatively high capital levels, strict provisioning and high liquidity 
requirements of this proposed DMFI regulatory framework should also help reduce the 
probability of failure by DMFIs and thereby enhance financial stability. This view was echoed 
by some of the stakeholders interviewed, as illustrated by a quoted response below on the 
question of whether or not they were aware of the objectives of the envisaged amended act 
and whether or not they thought that its implementation would meet the intended objectives: 
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“There are two things to regulation. When you have regulation there is a certain 
degree of confidence created.” [PM/2/3/(1)]  
 
Other provisions of the envisaged act that could also have a bearing on the regulatory 
objective of promoting the safety and soundness of financial institutions are those pertaining 
to the ownership and governance of MFIs. Section 11(1) (d) of the envisaged act requires 
that before authorisation is granted to operate microfinance banking business, the integrity 
and competence of potential owners or experience in relation to that type of business be 
proven, while Section 11(1) (f) requires that the ‘fit and proper’ test be applied to potential 
management teams and board members of the DMFIs. This provision should ensure that 
DMFIs are owned, managed and strategically guided by qualified and skilled individuals 
and/or teams, which in turn should contribute to the safety and soundness of the DMFIs and 
hence to the achievement of the regulatory objective.   
 
Although not stemming from the regulatory provisions of the envisaged act, it is also worth to 
take note of the envisaged initiative that is being investigated concurrently with the draft 
amended act under the framework of the country’s Financial Sector Strategy 2011–2021, 
which should also bring change to the country’s financial sector environment and contribute 
to the enhancement of safety and soundness of financial institutions, including MFIs. 
Investigations of the viability of setting up a deposit insurance scheme for Namibia were at 
an advance stage at the time of drafting this thesis. If found feasible and implemented, this, 
together with the already existing lender of last resort facility and the recently enhanced 
credit bureau system for availing credit information to inform the credit-allocation decision-
making process of lenders, should also help facilitate the attainment of the objective of 
promoting the safety and soundness of financial institutions in Namibia.   
 
It is however also important to caution that regulation does not guarantee non-failure of 
institutions, as even regulated institutions can fail. The collapse of Finansol (a failed 
Colombia MFI) discussed earlier in Chapter 3 of this thesis is a good example. This is, at 
times, a result of non-enforceability of the law that can be due to, among other reasons, a 
lack of regulatory capacity on the side of regulators, which creates lax in compliance on the 
side of regulated entities. It follows therefore that chances of DMFIs’ failure would be 
reduced and financial stability enhanced if the regulatory requirements of the envisaged act 
would be enforced effectively. In other words, if effectively enforced, the new regulation will 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
249 
 
lead to progress in the above discussed indicators136 and hence to the achievement of the 
regulatory objective of promoting the safety and soundness of the MFIs. 
 
A question that arises is whether or not the achievement of the safety and soundness of 
MFIs that would contribute to the development of the microfinance sector would still be 
possible in the absence of the new regulatory framework for DMFIs, i.e. a counterfactual to 
the above situation. It is acknowledged that without this new regulatory window for DMFIs, 
those MFIs wanting to enter the deposit-taking arena would be regulated under the current 
BIA together with conventional banking institutions, as has been the case with FIDES 
discussed in Chapter 7, and that it is a fundamental principle of any financial regulation to 
ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions, including MFIs, as this is actually 
one of the key reasons for financial regulation. However, the researcher argues that by 
differentiating MFIs from normal banks, as observed in Section 8.3 above, the new 
regulatory framework is providing a relatively conducive regulatory environment for MFIs. It 
is also creating an opportunity for MFI tailored and focused supervisory attention, thereby 
widening the probability of ensuring their safety and soundness.  
 
8.4.1.2 Objective 2: Guarding against systemic risk  
 
Under this objective, the focus is on reducing (if not eliminating) the systemic risk. Systemic 
risk in the financial sector refers to risk at the level of the entire financial system (Gauthier & 
Souissi, 2012). When the risk materialises, the fear is that it can have serious consequences 
for the financial sector as a whole.  
 
The recent financial crisis is a good example of a failing financial system and therefore a 
reflection of systemic risk having existed. It has highlighted the need for a better assessment 
of systemic risk (Gauthier & Souissi, 2012). Countries therefore strive to have mechanisms 
and facilities such as a deposit insurance system and lender of last resort in place to ensure 
that this risk is mitigated. A deposit insurance system would reduce depositors’ incentives to 
run on an institution, while the lender of last resort facility would reduce contagion risk 
through the credit channel (Staschen, 2010). Staschen’s 2010 analytical model, applied in 
this thesis, identified these facilities as indirect indicators that can be used to assess the 
probability of future systemic events in addition to assessing the safety and soundness of 
                                                          
136 These indicators are achieving good profitability, portfolio quality and capital and liquidity ratios of the DMFIs, and the 
institutional changes stemming from regulatory requirements related to the ownership and governance of MFIs as well as those 
that would avail credit information to inform MFIs’ credit-allocation decisions. 
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financial institutions alluded to above. He also posits that sound financial institutions are 
actually the best defence against contagion (i.e. against systemic risk). As such, the 
conclusion reached for the regulatory objective of promoting the safety and soundness of 
MFIs above, which pointed to the likelihood of the envisaged amended act enhancing its 
achievement, is also applicable to the objective of guarding against systemic risk, which the 
envisaged act expects to achieve. 
 
The situation in Namibia is such that there has been only one bank failure event, but this did 
not culminate in systemic events despite the existence of links of the failed institution to 
other financial institutions. While literature argues that MFIs are normally too small such that 
their failure may not cause systemic risk concerns, it is also important to note that for MFIs 
the risk might not be systemic, but their failure may lead to devastating consequences for 
their clients. This is because, as Nghiem (2012) argues, the poor only have limited resources 
to draw on in order to cope with and recover from shocks. The fact that the country has a 
lender of last resort facility in place already and has undertaken an investigation into the 
feasibility of setting up a deposit insurance system under the NFSS framework, as 
mentioned earlier, is a step in the right direction. Once the deposit insurance scheme is 
established, the two facilities/schemes should ensure that the country is better prepared for 
possible future events, thereby facilitating the attainment of the regulatory objective of 
guarding against systemic risk. This would especially be the case if the country continues to 
enjoy the macro-economic stability it has been enjoying, as noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
 
What was not yet clear at the stage of writing this thesis, though, was whether or not the 
above-mentioned facilities would also be available to DMFIs once in place. The policy 
document refers to ‘banks’ and it is not clear whether deposit-taking microfinance banks are 
also included. The researcher advocates for the facilities to also cater for the DMFIs for the 
reason highlighted above, i.e. that their failure may lead to devastating consequences for 
microsavers, even if that possibly does not lead to systemic risk. 
 
A counterfactual to this finding is whether or not it would still be possible to achieve the 
objective of guarding against systemic risk in the absence of the new regulatory window for 
MFIs. The researcher argues that without the proposed regulatory framework, most MFIs 
would probably still experience the entry barrier, as seem to have been the case, and would 
therefore not enter the deposit-taking industry. This would have a negative impact on the 
policy objective of developing the microfinance sector, but it would avoid the possibility of 
MFIs creating any systemic risk, as they will not be able to enter that space in the first place, 
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given the entry barrier. The status quo at the time of writing this research, i.e. not having 
DMFIs and/or a DMFI industry as part of the Namibian financial system, would remain. 
  
8.4.1.3 Objective 3: Establishing a competitive market  
 
Competition is considered an important aspect in any market. This is because it is likely to 
benefit customers in many respects, including lower prices in terms of fees and interest rates 
charged. The aspect of competition particularly becomes important in the case of Namibia, 
whose ultimate regulatory goal for providing a regulatory window for DMFIs is the 
enhancement of access to finance, given that affordability is one of the important elements 
when it comes to ensuring access to finance (AfDB, 2014). In this regard, the structure of the 
market matters and information on the number and volume of loans and savings accounts, 
number of branches and the concentration ratio of the market are good indicators (Staschen, 
2010) of the level of competition. Given that the impact evaluation here concerns a newly 
proposed regulatory framework and hence the absence of data to measure aspects of 
market structure and saturation, the assessment of the likely impact was done indirectly by 
considering possible institutional changes and other requirements that might be brought 
about by the provisions of the new regulatory framework.  
 
In order for regulation to achieve the objective of establishing a competitive market, it is 
important that it guards against provisions that would increase barriers to entry. Indicators in 
this respect have been identified by Staschen (2010) to include licensing conditions and 
procedures as well as openness to foreign participation. The draft amended act has placed a 
restriction on foreign shareholding of DMFIs to not more than 55 per cent, as per Section 32 
(1) (a) and (b). By implication, foreign DMFIs wanting to enter the Namibian market will have 
to ensure incorporation of local shareholding of 45 per cent. This provision may be an entry 
barrier for foreign participation, as the requirement to give up such a significant shareholding 
may not sit well with foreign investors. This may in turn lead to fewer MFIs entering the 
sector, thereby reducing the level of competition. This shareholding provision may therefore 
reduce the degree to which the regulatory objective of establishing a competitive market can 
be achieved. On the other hand, the following provision of the draft amended BIA in Section 
79(1) is a good start in this regard, as the central bank will have an opportunity to review this 
in the interest of facilitating a competitive environment:  
 
An agreement relating to the restricting of competition entered into by a banking 
institution or microfinance banking institution or its affiliate or associate must, unless the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
252 
 
parties to such agreement are of the same corporate group, be submitted by the parties 
to the Bank of Namibia for its approval.  
 
With regard to the counterfactual of whether or not the attainment of a competitive market 
objective would be achieved without the introduction of the new regulatory window, the 
researcher argues that the achievement of the competitive regulatory objective would still be 
possible, given the existence of the Competition Regulatory Authority in Namibia that 
watches over anti-competitive activities and conduct.  
 
8.4.1.4 Objective 4: Protecting consumers  
 
Microfinance customers are typically vulnerable to exploitation and unfair treatment by 
lenders, as noted under the literature review chapter. This is because of their normally low 
level of financial literacy. What makes it even worse is the fact that the loss of savings can 
severely impact the welfare of clients of MFIs, given that they cannot afford to lose any of 
their hard-earned income (Nghiem, 2012). This necessitates the aspect of market conduct 
regulation. 
 
As indicated above, one of the aims for amending the BIA stipulated in the draft bill is to 
protect the interest of persons making deposits with banking institutions and microfinance 
banking institutions (Banking Institutions Bill, 2015). Measured in three core principles of 
transparency, fair treatment and effective recourse, consumer protection is therefore one of 
the explicitly stated regulatory objectives of the new act. Staschen (2010) has identified 
indicators (both quantitative and qualitative) to measure the achievement of the consumer 
protection objective. Quantitative indicators include the number and type of consumer 
grievances reported and redress mechanisms employed, while qualitative indicators are 
those relating to views from customer satisfaction surveys, possible changes in the 
consumer protection regime as well as consumer empowerment and financial literacy that 
measure the capacity of consumers to process availed information. 
 
The policy document [UP/PD/2/1] on which the implementing determinations of the draft 
amended BIA has been based states that DMFIs will be subject to non-prudential 
requirements like banks, mainly aimed at regulating market conduct. In this regard, DMFIs 
will be required to be transparent and to disclose information needed by clients to make 
informed decisions. This includes those relating to reporting and institutional transparency, 
consumer protection through contracts, fees and charges, etc. [UP/PD/2/1]. If effectively 
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enforced, these requirements should lead to the achievement of the objective of consumer 
protection. In addition, plans by the sector’s development strategy to create a 
comprehensive consumer protection framework for the financial sector in Namibia, which 
encompasses a financial adjudicating function and which is to be applicable to all financial 
institutions, including MFIs, together with the already ongoing financial literacy campaigns 
spearheaded by a national body (the Financial Literacy Initiatives Secretariat) discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2, also stand to contribute to the achievement of the consumer protection 
regulatory objective.  
 
In terms of consumer empowerment, the consumer protection framework envisaged by the 
NFSS 2011–2021 is expected to put in place guidelines for lodging consumer complaints to 
the financial adjudicator and this should make it easier for consumers to execute their rights. 
All of the above, together with the work on the deposit insurance scheme discussed under 
the objectives of safety and soundness of MFIs and guarding against systemic risk, are 
positive developments that would enhance the achievement of the consumer protection 
regulatory objective in the country. This outcome would also be conducive to the 
development of the DMFI sector, as consumers will deal confidently with their service 
providers.     
 
For the counterfactual of whether or not the attainment of the consumer protection objective 
would be achieved without the introduction of the new regulatory window, the researcher 
argues that the objective would still be achieved in the absence of the new regulatory 
framework, given that most of the initiatives in that regard are being implemented as part of 
the broader financial sector development plan and will not necessarily come because of the 
envisaged new legislation. Therefore, regardless of under which framework the MFIs are to 
be regulated, being financial institutions means that they will have to adhere to the financial 
consumer protection requirements envisaged by the financial sector.     
 
8.4.1.5 Objective 5: Improving access  
 
Given the lack of access to finance in many countries, especially in the developing world, 
access to finance has become an important consideration even in the regulatory sphere. It is 
believed, as discussed under literature review chapter, that providing an enabling legal 
environment could facilitate access to finance, as MFIs will be able to mobilise deposits (i.e. 
external source of funds) and to better serve their potential clients. It is also generally 
acknowledged that microfinance itself can play a role in enhancing access to finance. 
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Against this background, enhancing access to finance becomes an important aspect to 
consider in the regulation of microfinance. In the case of Namibia, improving access to 
finance has been the main consideration for providing a regulatory framework for DMFIs 
through the amended BIA (i.e. it is a regulatory objective), as indicated earlier in this chapter.   
 
In quoting Schreiner (2002), Staschen (2010) states that access has various dimensions: 
depth, breadth, scope and length. He elaborates that for microfinance, the depth of access 
measures whether or not MFIs are reaching poorer clients, the breadth of access refers to 
the number of clients reached and financial products sold, the scope of access refers to the 
range and characteristics of the products offered by the MFIs, while the length of access 
relates to the self-sustainability of MFIs for long-term survival. Also important in the process 
of enhancing access to finance is the quality of access aspect, information on which can be 
obtained from customers through surveys on customer perception of and satisfaction with 
the products offered (Staschen, 2010). All of these are then also the indicators that can be 
used to measure the impact of regulation on the objective of improving access to finance 
(Staschen 2010). In the case of this study, in which the RIA was an appraisal of a yet-to-be-
implemented act and hence the unavailability of data on the indicators, the likely impact was 
measured in terms of whether or not the regulatory provisions under that act are likely to 
lead to progress in the access indicators. A positive regulatory impact would be reflected in 
the improvement of these indicators and vice versa.    
 
Informed by literature, the researcher identified certain provisions of the envisaged 
regulatory framework that can have an impact on the objective of improving access to 
finance, and these are discussed below. In Section 8.3 of this chapter, in which the various 
provisions of the envisaged amendment BIA were discussed, it was observed that lower 
minimum capital requirements for the DMFIs relative to normal banks is anticipated, in line 
with what is advocated by literature as being appropriate given the often less sophisticated 
operations of DMFIs and the smaller loan sizes and hence their typical smaller total assets. 
The lower minimum capital requirement can serve as an incentive in terms of making entry 
affordable to potential DMFIs. This is especially so if it would be pitched at an appropriate 
level that would be supportive of the setup of basic operations and start-up losses of these 
entities (Staschen, 2010). This process should therefore lead to the growth and development 
of the deposit-taking microfinance industry and ultimately the microfinance sector in 
Namibia.  
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The researcher has however observed from documentary review that reasons to amend the 
act include developing new regulations on shareholder limits and foreign ownership so as to 
encourage local participation and ownership of banking institutions, including deposit-taking 
microfinance banks [UP/PD/2/2]. While this is good for this country that has foreign 
dominance in those respects, shareholder limits and foreign ownership restrictions could 
pose problems for MFIs that want to transform into DMFIs from a status such as credit-only 
microlender (i.e. term-lending MFIs) and NGO. For instance, this will mean that credit-only 
term-lending institutions that may currently be owned by single owners (be it local or foreign) 
would now have to give up some of their shareholding as required and this may not sit well 
with some of the investors. This could therefore be a barrier to entry. In the case of the 
existing NGO-owned MFIs that may be harbouring the idea of upgrading to DMFIs, this 
requirement could also be a setback, as they would typically wish to hold a significant 
ownership stake in the transformed DMFI so as to be able to maintain their social mission of 
serving the poor.  
 
It may also prove difficult for NGO-MFI applicants to attract additional and suitable potential 
shareholders, given their limited track record in the for-profit-making arena. This may 
therefore be a barrier to entering the industry, and has the potential of delaying the growth 
and development of the industry and the microfinance sector in general, as well as the 
achievement of the regulatory objective of improving access to finance. Ways should 
therefore be found to mitigate and/or compensate for this potential barrier. For instance, 
policy makers and/or regulatory authorities could consider allowing for and setting a 
transition period for shareholder diversification by DMFIs. 
 
Another provision of the law that can be used to get an indication of whether or not there will 
be progress in the access indicators and hence the achievement of the regulatory objective 
of improving access to finance is that related to the ‘fit and proper’ test of potential 
shareholders. Section 26(8) of the envisaged amended BIA requires that shareholders (i.e. 
those holding 5 per cent or more shares in a banking institution) be ‘fit and proper’ persons 
in accordance with specific criteria to be determined by the regulator. Should the existence 
of the envisaged act be able to lure more entrants with the genuine intention and ultimately 
the commitment to participate in the process of enhancing access to finance for the poor, it 
would succeed in facilitating the achievement of the regulatory objective of improving access 
to finance through achieving progress in the depth and breadth dimensions of access. The 
envisaged act would however have failed in achieving this objective should that condition not 
hold.   
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With regard to the dimension of the length of access that refers to the self-sustainability of 
the MFIs for long-term survival so as to be able to serve the target market (Staschen, 2010), 
the envisaged amended act is likely to enhance the length of access, given it aims to ensure 
the safety and soundness of the potential DMFIs. The link to the length of access indicators 
lies in the fact that a safe and sound MFI depicts the possibility of its self-sustainability and 
hence an indicator of the length of access (Staschen, 2010) as self-sustainable MFIs would 
provide financial services to their target clients on a continuous basis. The findings under the 
regulatory objective of ensuring the safety and soundness of the DMFIs discussed above 
pointed towards positive progress in its measurement indicators and hence the likelihood of 
its achievement. Further, the bill will allow access to deposit mobilisation by the potential 
entrants (i.e. microlenders who are not able to do that now), hence increasing their funding 
sources, and that should lead to their growth, thereby enhancing the length of access. There 
is therefore a likelihood of the act facilitating the achievement of the regulatory objective of 
improving access to finance.  
 
In addition to availability and affordability of financial products and services, the quality of 
products and services is an important element of access. Staschen (2010) identified 
customer perceptions of and satisfaction with the supply of products normally obtained from 
customer surveys as indicators in this regard. In other words, these would normally provide 
information that will give an indication of the quality of products and services.  
 
Namibia has been conducting a FinScope survey137 every four years, starting in 2004, with 
the latest one having been conducted in 2011. The survey has been collecting information 
on the satisfaction of consumers, and if the practice is maintained, the FinScope Survey 
should continue to provide information on the perceptions of and satisfaction of customers, 
although the time intervals between the surveys may need to be reduced to ensure that 
cases of unsatisfactory products and services are addressed quickly. This should therefore 
assist the country in ensuring the quality of products and services offered by MFIs, and will 
hence facilitate achievement of the access goal.  
 
For the counterfactual of whether or not the attainment of the enhancing access to finance 
objective would be achieved without the introduction of the new regulatory window, the 
researcher argues that it would be difficult to achieve. As discussed in the previous section, 
the idea of providing an enabling environment through developing a regulatory framework 
                                                          
137 The FinScope Survey collects information on customer usage of financial products and services as well as the satisfaction 
level towards these.   
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specifically for MFIs was informed by the fact that access to finance was a problem, 
especially for SMEs. The country realised that the business model of MFIs (where non-
traditional collateral methods are used as risk-mitigation measures and non-conventional 
approaches for appraising loan applications are applied, as discussed under the literature 
review chapter) is better suited to serve the poor and SMEs and that there was a lack of this 
breed of institutions in Namibia. Further, the status quo where only one DMFI had been in 
existence is a sign of the existence of some entry-prohibiting factors, which may need 
addressing, as can be illustrated by the quoted interviewee responses below. 
  
“The sector is stagnant because there is no recognition, no incentives and no 
support; and for as long as there is that missing link, we will remain small” 
[Exp/2/2/(2)] 
 
“There is no enabling regulatory framework, and no dedicated legislation for 
microfinance to support growth of the sector” [Reg1/2/(1)]  
 
The new regulatory framework seems to be striving to address these inhibiting factors 
through its provisions highlighted above and the creation of a differentiated legal framework 
for DMFIs. It follows therefore that without the proposed new legislation, the Namibian 
microfinance sector would not be able to develop and a lack of access to finance for the 
targeted groups would continue to be a problem, at least in the short to medium term.  
 
8.5 EVIDENCE FROM A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
 
As stated in the methodology chapter, the cost-benefit analysis is a widely used tool in 
financial regulation analysis that not only identifies the costs and benefits incurred during the 
process of regulation, but also how they are distributed between different stakeholders 
(Carrasco, 2006). The cost-benefit analysis approach therefore complemented the analysis 
of the ROI above in the manner explained below.  
 
While the ROI approach allowed for the assessment of the benefits of regulation (i.e. the 
progress in the achievement of the regulatory objectives), as discussed under Section 8.4 
above, it did not make specific reference to the costs caused by regulation. According to 
Staschen (2010), the process of regulation incurs costs for market participants, i.e. the 
regulator, regulated institutions and the wider economy. Costs also change the behaviour of 
market participants and therefore would impact the achievement of regulatory objectives 
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(Staschen, 2010). Therefore, to provide a complete picture of the RIA, the researcher also 
performed a cost analysis to identify the likely major costs to be incurred by those 
stakeholders. As in the case of the ROI, the cost analysis was done by examining relevant 
regulatory provisions of the envisaged amended BIA and relating those to theory and 
empirical experience of other countries, where possible.  
 
Stakeholder views were further sourced through the survey and interviews to corroborate the 
findings. Views on the likely regulatory and supervisory costs were sourced from the 
regulators, while those on the costs of regulatory compliance were obtained from the 
potential DMFIs and other relevant stakeholders. In the context of this study, and in line with 
the approach taken by Staschen (2010), the aim of doing this was not to derive a figure for 
the net social benefit of the regulation, but to list major costs created by specific regulatory 
provisions. The identified costs were then compared with the benefits derived from the ROI 
approach (i.e. the likely attainment of objectives) and therefore a cost-benefit analysis was 
carried out in that manner. While there were some limitations in the process of identifying the 
costs, the researcher is confident that the study has been able to draw some conclusions, as 
evidenced in the next section. 
 
8.5.1 The costs of regulation 
 
In line with literature (Staschen, 2010), the researcher identified the likely costs of regulation 
to include institutional costs (relating to the expenditure of the regulator), compliance costs 
(incurred by regulated institutions in complying with regulatory requirements) and structural 
or indirect costs that arise as a result of market failures resulting from regulation. These are 
discussed below in the context of the current study.  
 
8.5.1.1 Costs to regulated MFIs  
 
From the regulatory provisions of the envisaged amended BIA and its draft implementing 
determinations discussed under Section 8.3, the provisions relating to licensing, minimum 
capital requirement, CAR, liquid asset requirements, loan portfolio management and 
reporting requirements are likely to result in costs to the potential regulated MFIs, as 
discussed below.  
 
MFIs that decide to obtain a license will have to incur licensing costs initially as well as other 
related costs, such as administrative expenses (i.e. ongoing costs) and transformation costs 
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of designing and setting up new systems as may be required (i.e. start-up costs), followed by 
an annual licensing fee for the period of their existence (i.e. ongoing costs). The flip side to 
the licensing cost, however, is that after obtaining a license, the MFIs will have an 
opportunity to increase their funding source through mobilising deposits, an advantage which 
is not applicable to unlicensed non-deposit-taking MFIs, whose business is restricted to 
lending; hence a potential regulatory benefit in that regard.  
 
In addition, in order to obtain a license, potential MFIs will have to meet the required 
minimum capital requirement (i.e. start-up cost). While this is envisaged to be lower relative 
to that of conventional banks under this new regulatory framework (which is an advantage of 
having the envisaged differentiated regulatory approach for MFIs created by the new 
regulatory framework), the cost will still be real for the MFIs. This is because even for those 
MFIs that might have sufficient funds such that they may not feel the burden of having to put 
down the required minimum capital, it will still be a cost in the sense that the money could 
have continued being used in their normal business processes, if it was not a requirement to 
set it aside for that purpose. Other MFIs may have to increase their capital levels and this 
can be a potential entry barrier should they not succeed in raising the required funds. In 
addition, MFIs will have to incur the opportunity cost of holding liquid non-interest earning 
assets in compliance with the statutory liquidity requirements (i.e. an ongoing cost).  
 
Requiring compliance with minimum capital, CAR and liquidity ratios is, however, 
advantageous to both the MFIs and the financial system in that higher capital levels and 
liquidity will reduce the probability of institutions failing, thereby enhancing their financial 
soundness and the stability of the system. 
 
Further, in terms of the regulatory provisions related to reporting, licensed MFIs would be 
required to submit prudential reports to the BoN on a monthly basis (i.e. ongoing costs). The 
cost of reporting naturally manifest itself in the form of time spent to prepare the reports and 
hence shifting from other business-related activities during preparations as well as the effort 
required (Staschen, 2010). The process may also involve updating and/or improving 
systems such as information management systems so as to adhere to specific reporting 
requirements. Regulated MFIs will also be required to have audited financial statements and 
to publish them, and will hence incur costs in terms of audit fees. In addition, the supervisory 
on-site inspections would also add costs to the regulated MFIs in terms of time spent on 
related activities to enable supervisors to perform their duty as required. All of the above will 
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be additional and ongoing costs, which potential DMFIs will have to incur138 and which may 
result in a considerable expense for them. The benefit, however, may be the fact that 
regulated MFIs will have proper records and accounts in place, which will enable them to 
better monitor their own activities and performance.  
 
Moreover, as part of the ‘fit and proper’ requirement of the regulation, MFIs will likely incur 
high costs related to recruiting relevant qualified management staff to comply with this 
requirement. Having to comply with prudent standards and reporting requirements will also 
lead to increased staff training costs. While these costs, especially training cots, may be 
incurred by microlenders already now, the scale and number of people that would require to 
be trained may differ, as the DMFIs will now be banks that will operate at a much larger 
scale than microlenders. Both of these costs will however benefit the regulated institutions, 
as they will have skilled managers and staff in their employ to drive the business operations, 
which may result in the good performance of the MFIs, and which will be good for the sector 
as a whole. The downside, however, would be the fact that these together with all other 
costs discussed above would normally end up being borne by the customers through 
increased fees and interest rates. 
 
 8.5.1.2 Costs to the regulator  
 
Regulation and supervision also involves costs for the regulator, starting with the planning 
and preparation for the legal framework itself (i.e. the process of establishing the regulatory 
framework) to the actual supervisory process (Chiumya, 2006). In order to execute its role as 
regulator and supervisor of new entrants (i.e. DMFIs), the BoN will incur personnel training 
costs relating to on-site and off-site inspections. It will also incur training costs for staff, 
especially as staff will still be inexperienced in regulating MFIs, which will be a new function 
for them,139 hence the need to capacitate its staff in this relatively new field of supervising 
MFIs (i.e. an additional cost to the regulator). A positive side of having to pass the regulatory 
framework and licence MFIs, however, is that it would facilitate and make it easier to collect 
data on them and monitor developments so as to enhance the achievement of the intended 
policy objectives of having safe and sound MFIs and developing the microfinance sector. 
                                                          
138 Microlenders, who are the potential entrants to the DMFI industry, are not required by their supervisory authority (NAMFISA) 
to have audited financial statements and publish them. They are only required to furnish NAMFISA with quarterly returns and 
annual compliance returns. Therefore, this will be an additional cost to those that will enter. 
139 While the BoN has had an opportunity to regulate FIDES, the case study discussed in Chapter 7, this was done under the 
framework of the conventional banking institutions law, hence the limited experience.  
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8.5.1.3 Other structural or indirect costs  
 
The indirect costs that would result from the above discussed costs to the regulator and 
MFIs caused by regulation are those to be incurred by customers. MFIs are likely to pass on 
their costs to customers in the form of increased fees and charges. However, the positive 
side is that the regulatory provisions of requiring MFIs to be transparent and disclose 
information, including the terms and costs of products and services they offer, as well as to 
publish financial statements would ensure that consumers have access to more information 
and make informed decisions.  
 
In summary, the above discussions have shown that regulation is likely to result in costs for 
the regulator, regulated MFIs and clients of MFIs. It has also shown that for every cost 
identified there is an accompanying benefit. This finding, together with the extent to which 
regulatory objectives are likely to be achieved (i.e. most of the intended regulatory objectives 
would be met), as discussed in the previous section, suggests that the benefits of 
introducing the envisaged regulatory framework would exceed the costs. 
  
8.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter analysed the potential impact of the proposed new regulatory framework under 
the draft amended BIA, which provides for microfinance regulation, on the microfinance 
sector in Namibia. The analysis was done within the ROI regulatory assessment framework 
and this was therefore the second stage of addressing the research objective of assessing 
the impact of regulating and supervising the microfinance sector at a macro level, following 
that done in Chapter 7. Typical of ex-ante RIAs, this was a process-tracing analysis, 
benchmarked on the regulatory objectives of the new framework that are identified based on 
the public interest theory.  
 
It found a greater probability of the envisaged act achieving its regulatory objectives, as most 
of the provisions have demonstrated the likelihood of leading to an improvement in the 
indicators that measured the objectives through the ROI process. The chapter also identified 
the possible regulatory costs to the regulator, regulated MFIs and clients of MFIs. These 
were compared to the benefits obtained from the ROI process so as to strengthen and 
enhance the validity of the results, i.e. a cost-benefit analysis approach was applied. The 
general outcome suggested that the benefits of introducing the envisaged regulatory 
framework would exceed the costs. This implies that the proposed microfinance regulatory 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
262 
 
framework would lead to the achievement of regulatory objectives and therefore to the 
facilitation of the development of the microfinance sector in Namibia.  
 
On the question of whether or not the achievement of the regulatory goals that would 
contribute to the development of the microfinance sector would still be possible in the 
absence of the new regulatory framework (i.e. the counterfactual to the above situation), the 
researcher argued that by differentiating MFIs from normal banks, as observed in Section 
8.3 of this chapter, the new regulatory framework is providing a relatively conducive 
regulatory environment for MFIs. It is also creating an opportunity for a microfinance-tailored 
and focused supervisory attention, thereby widening the probability of ensuring the safety 
and soundness of MFIs. In other words, there is a better chance of developing the 
microfinance sector with the proposed new regulatory window. 
  
Important to note, however, is the fact that in the end what is key would be the degree to 
which regulatory requirements are going to be enforced. In this regard, it is hoped that 
supervisors would have sufficient capacity to effectively supervise the new breed of unique 
institutions that will enter the industry. The experience picked up so far with the regulation of 
FIDES discussed in Chapter 7 should assist in going forward, but more experience and skills 
will need to be developed during the process, especially as FIDES had been regulated under 
normal conventional banking law and therefore supervisors did not really need to 
differentiate the two types of institutions when supervising. There will be a need to learn 
lessons from other countries that have been involved with regulating and supervising MFIs 
as well, while still keeping in mind the unique environment of the country.  
 
The researcher is also of the view that while necessary, regulation alone will not be sufficient 
to attract relevant players, given the structural weaknesses of the Namibian economy, 
discussed in Chapter 2, relating to the size of the market, geographical setup, physical 
infrastructure, etc. Broader policy and reform initiatives, including additional incentives, might 
be required to spur the development of the country’s microfinance sector. 
 
The next and last chapter of this study presents the key findings, conclusions, policy 
implications, limitations of the study and suggests a possible direction for further research.  
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CHAPTER 9 
KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS,  
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study has been conducted on the background that while the emergence of the 
microfinance industry four decades ago has been considered as presenting an opportunity to 
extend financial services to the excluded majority in developing countries, this has come with 
associated challenges. This is especially so because the earlier role of MFIs of ‘credit-
extension only’, which has historically evolved informally, has transformed into a much wider 
role, such that MFIs are now also providing additional services in the form of savings, money 
transfers, etc. This changing role has come with greater responsibility and accountability, 
given the risks involved, including the possibility of loss of savers’ money. It has also 
sparked an increasing interest internationally, in terms of whether or not MFIs should be 
regulated and supervised, and if they should, how that should be done to avoid any 
undesirable impact.  
 
Furthermore, the observed increasing pressure for regulating MFIs has originated from the 
belief that there is a need for transformation of MFIs into regulated financial intermediaries 
and that regulation would allow them to evolve into such institutions, especially the ones that 
aim to take deposits, as discussed in this thesis. The belief is that this would result in 
increased loanable funds of MFIs, which implies that regulating MFIs would lead to 
increased outreach and thereby increased access to finance, an argument that Namibia has 
aligned itself with as the rationale for introducing the proposed microfinance regulatory 
framework.  
 
However, some views in literature caution of the potential trade-offs of regulation in that 
complying with regulation and supervision can be costly and that this may curtail MFIs’ 
outreach, which may lead to the exclusion of some potential borrowers. The above views 
confirm the complexity involved in deciding whether MFIs should be regulated and how this 
should be done to ensure that they still play the expected role of providing access to finance 
for the poor, low-income earners and SMEs. As a result, there has been differing views, both 
for and against the regulation of these institutions. This is where RIAs on microfinance 
become important and hence the assessment on Namibia done in this study, reported in 
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chapters 7 and 8, which aimed to empirically determine the potential impact of regulation on 
the microfinance sector. This was the primary research objective of the study. To facilitate 
the process of the RIA, the researcher had to first obtain and develop an understanding of 
both the microfinance sector to which the envisaged regulation will apply as well as the 
existing legal and regulatory framework for the financial sector (including the microfinance 
sub-sector), discussed in chapters 5 and 6, so as to determine the changes, if any, that 
would be brought about by the new regulatory framework.  
 
This final chapter is organised in a manner that the next section (9.2) provides a summary of 
key findings of the study as they relate to the research objectives, also highlighting their 
implications for theory. A consideration of policy implications resulting from the research 
follows in Section 9.3, while Section 9.4 highlights the study limitations and proposes further 
research areas on the basis of the identified limitations. Section 9.5 concludes the thesis.  
 
9.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY  
 
9.2.1 Understanding the microfinance sector in Namibia  
 
The researcher found that Namibia’s microfinance sector was relatively small and 
undeveloped. With the exception of the one microfinance deposit-taking bank, an NGO-
owned Namibia Housing Action Group and a few SACCOs, credit-only microlenders (mainly 
pay-day lenders but also a small number of term-lending institutions) dominate the sector. 
Moreover, most of the microlending institutions are urban-based and serve the salaried 
segment of the population, which is a limiting factor to outreach. It also became clear from 
the fieldwork results that the largest part of microlending in Namibia was consumption 
lending, while fully fledged MFIs that can offer comprehensive packages of microcredit, 
microsavings, money transfer and micro-insurance were very few. This situation does not 
augur well with the generally accepted role of microfinance that points to poverty alleviation, 
as the unemployed and self-employed are excluded. The scope of microfinance 
programmes and activities in Namibia has therefore not adequately addressed the problem 
faced by the poor, low-income people and SMEs to access finance in the country. A need 
was therefore identified to develop an industry of MFIs that will offer comprehensive 
packages of microcredit, microsavings, micro-insurance, money transfers services, etc. for 
these groups of the population.  
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The study also found weaknesses and constraints to the growth of the Namibian 
microfinance sector. Identified weaknesses include the absence of an enabling legal 
framework to spur the development of the sector, the limitations to entry exerted by the legal 
framework (where DMFIs were regulated under the same law with conventional banks), the 
interest rates limitations of the Usury Act and its Exemption Notice, under which 
microlenders were being regulated, as well as the lack of skills in the country to drive and 
manage microfinance, which called for the need to build capacity in this area.   
 
An apparent lack of a national definition for microfinance and hence confusion around what 
should be considered as microfinance and/or MFIs was also observed. The researcher is of 
the view that any regulatory framework aimed at regulating the microfinance sector should 
first and foremost recognise the need for defining the sector, as this will assist in facilitating 
the process of determining whether or not interventions are appropriately targeted and 
intended regulatory objectives of the country are achieved.  
 
The fieldwork findings also pointed to the fact that the MFIs in Namibia stretched over a 
diverse spectrum and that different regulators and supervisors regulate and supervise them 
under different acts, a situation which stakeholders believed to have caused uncoordinated 
microfinance activities. The researcher found that this was not unique to Namibia, as the 
microfinance sectors of most countries were fragmented and uncoordinated.  
 
The country was however in the process of introducing a regulatory framework for DMFIs 
through amending the BIA, Act No. 2 of 1998, as amended, as well as developing a 
microlending bill to address some of the above-mentioned weaknesses. The introduction of 
the microfinance regulatory window, for instance, was being done following the realisation of 
the need to develop the microfinance industry to address the lack of access to finance by 
individuals and SMEs, i.e. policy makers have considered that regulation would create an 
environment that would entice investors to invest in the microfinance sector. The outcome of 
this policy initiative will either confirm or refute this thinking.   
 
9.2.2 Understanding the regulatory and supervisory environment for MFIs in 
Namibia  
 
From the analysis of this study, a picture emerged of the existence of a financial sector 
regulatory framework with emphasis on both prudential and non-prudential regulation, 
supported by two regulatory authorities (the BoN and NAMFISA) that had the necessary 
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instruments to collect information about the sector and enforce regulatory provisions. There 
was a clear distinction between the regulation and supervision of the banking sector and that 
of the NBFIs in Namibia for which each of the two financial sector regulatory authorities were 
respectively responsible.  It was also clear that the system was still evolving, especially in as 
far as the regulation of the new and special areas of mobile banking and microfinance is 
concerned. There had been only one DMFI that had been regulated under the conventional 
banking law (the BIA No. 2 of 1998, as amended) together with normal commercial banks, 
as indicated earlier. The basis for regulating credit-only micro-lenders was the Usury Act No. 
73 of 1968 and the Exemption Notices issued by government, which allowed lenders 
registered with NAMFISA to charge interest rates and other fees over and above the usury 
limit. As this is not a law that established microlending institutions, a gap in terms of the 
authority effectively enforcing regulatory power had been identified and was being 
addressed through the development of an envisaged Microlending Act, for which a bill was in 
place.  
 
Through the survey and stakeholder interviews, the need was identified for regulating MFIs 
for various reasons, but mainly for consumer protection purposes, especially in the case of 
deposit-taking and savings-mobilising MFIs, and also to bring order in the sector and 
enhance the sustainability of the institutions. This process however also raised concerns 
about a lack of dedicated legislation for microfinance activity in Namibia, which was 
perceived to have led to the fragmented treatment of MFIs and was viewed as the cause for 
a lack of understanding of what microfinance was and who an MFI in Namibia was. As such, 
stakeholders called for a coordinated approach to the microfinance sector in the country as 
well as a clear definition of MFIs to address the seemingly current state of confusion.  
 
The researcher also identified the need for capacity building in microfinance regulatory and 
supervisory skills, given that this was an area that was relatively new to the country.  
    
9.2.3 Determining the existing and potential impact of regulation on the Namibian 
microfinance sector  
 
The assessment of the impact of regulation on MFIs in Namibia was done at both a micro 
level using a case study of a regulated MFI (i.e. ex-post assessment) and a macro level by 
appraising the likely impact of the anticipated microfinance regulatory framework (created 
through amending the existing banking legislation) on the sector (i.e. an ex-ante 
assessment). The researcher used the ROI methodology, which is grounded in public 
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interest theory of regulation for assessing regulatory change, in the analysis of impact. The 
method aided in assessing regulatory impact through an evaluation of changes in 
quantitative indicators and qualitative factors for identified regulatory objectives. The main 
findings are summarised below.  
 
9.2.3.1 The impact of the existing regulation on an MFI (i.e. an MFI regulated under 
conventional banking law  
           
The researcher evaluated the experience of a regulated MFI (FIDES) as a case study 
through an application of the ROI approach of RIA and assessed the impact through an 
evaluation of changes in this MFI’s performance indicators and qualitative information.  
 
The analytical process found that regulation has generally had a positive impact on the 
operations of the regulated MFI. This was reflected in improvements in most of its 
performance indicators (profitability, portfolio quality, liquidity) during the post-licensing 
period, relative to the pre-licensing period. Regulation had also facilitated FIDES’s significant 
contribution to Namibia’s efforts to enhance access to financial services to poor and low-
income people, as reflected in substantial increases in the number of savers and borrowers, 
especially in the rural areas of the northern regions, where the majority of its operations were 
based. This therefore presents evidence that the regulatory objectives (i.e. the intention for 
regulating FIDES in the first place) had been generally achieved. While these findings 
cannot be generalised, they present important lessons for policy making in the area of 
microfinance in Namibia going forward.   
 
As with any research, the above findings are not without weaknesses. A key weakness of 
this assessment is the limited available data. The analytical process of the impact of 
regulation and supervision demands availability of sufficient data. In the case of FIDES, 
while data for its existing period were available, the period that the institution had been in 
operation and hence the period covered in the analysis is relatively short (2002–2013), and 
this rendered the use of regression analysis impossible. This weakness was however 
mitigated by using another rigorous methodology that follows a very systematic approach, 
i.e. the ROI method (as presented under the methodology chapter of this study), which 
ensured a solid evidence base on which other research can build going forward. 
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9.2.3.2 The potential impact of the envisaged microfinance regulatory framework on 
the microfinance sector 
 
The researcher also analysed the potential impact of the anticipated new microfinance 
regulatory framework, created under the proposed Banking Institutions Amendment Bill, on 
the microfinance sector in Namibia. This was a second stage of addressing the research 
objective of assessing the impact of regulating and supervising MFIs on the microfinance 
sector, following that performed on the case study.  
 
The analytical process, also done within the ROI regulatory impact assessment framework, 
involved an analysis of the relevant provisions of the proposed microfinance regulatory 
framework in terms of whether or not they would facilitate the achievement of the intended 
regulatory objectives, taking into account relevant theory and lessons from other countries. 
Qualitative information collected through interviews strengthened the evidence.   
 
The impact assessment process identified some specific provisions of the envisaged MFI 
regulatory framework that are likely to yield undesirable outcomes of the regulation for the 
sector. These include the provision on shareholder limits and foreign ownership introduced 
to encourage local participation and ownership of banking institutions, which may prove to 
be an entry barrier for foreign investors that can bring the much needed technical skills to 
this relatively new sector that still needs to build capacity. The overall finding of the analysis, 
however, pointed towards a greater probability of the anticipated microfinance legal 
framework achieving its intended regulatory objectives, as most of the provisions have 
demonstrated the likelihood of leading to an improvement in the relevant indicators for each 
of the objectives. These were considered to be the potential benefits of Namibia introducing 
the new regulatory framework for microfinance to create a conducive environment for 
regulating MFIs. The accompanying proposed lower minimum capital requirement at 
licensing and other incentives, such as the ability to mobilise deposits, should reduce 
barriers to entry for MFIs and encourage them to enter the industry, and are likely to lead to 
an increased number of entrants in the industry. This, together with the set regulatory 
standards that will ensure the soundness and safety of the MFIs, should positively impact 
the regulatory objective of enhancing access to finance going forward, and hence the 
achievement of the initial policy intention for which the regulatory framework was introduced.  
 
A further analysis of the expected regulatory costs revealed specific possible costs to the 
regulator, regulated MFIs and clients of MFIs. These include supervisory costs and 
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regulatory compliance costs. A comparison of the identified costs to the benefits obtained 
from the ROI process (i.e. to the likelihood of achieving the regulatory objectives), however, 
suggested that the benefits of introducing the envisaged regulatory framework would exceed 
the costs. This implies that the proposed microfinance regulatory framework will lead to the 
achievement of intended regulatory objectives and therefore should facilitate the 
development of the microfinance sector in Namibia going forward. It also confirms the 
general assumption in literature that recognising the uniqueness of MFIs and treating them 
as such can have a positive impact on these institutions and the clients they serve.  
 
As a counterfactual to the above, the researcher posed a question of whether or not the 
achievement of the regulatory goals that would contribute to the development of the 
microfinance sector would still be possible in the absence of the new regulatory framework. 
It was argued that by differentiating MFIs from conventional banks, as observed in the 
studied provisions, the new regulatory framework will provide a relatively conducive 
regulatory environment for MFIs. It will also create an opportunity for microfinance-tailored 
and focused supervisory attention and therefore widen the probability of ensuring their safety 
and soundness. In other words, there is a better chance of developing the microfinance 
sector with the proposed new regulatory window than without.  
 
The above findings are however not free from weaknesses. One weakness of this ex-ante 
regulatory assessment is the fact that it did not perform an appraisal of different options 
normally performed under the RIA framework. Under this framework, the quality of the 
assessment is believed to be enhanced through conducting an ex-ante regulatory appraisal 
of different options, such as a comparison of having a dedicated microfinance legislation, 
integrating microfinance under the general banking law, etc., with the do nothing option (i.e. 
with an option where policy makers decide not to undertake a regulatory reform), and then 
choose the most relevant option with the highest net benefit (Staschen, 2010). According to 
Staschen (2010), the selection of the best option would also involve consideration of a 
number of issues, including the supervisory capacity needed to implement regulatory 
changes, etc. Doing this would have given an indication of the superiority of the alternative 
regulatory approaches, which would be more successful in facilitating the attainment of the 
intended regulatory objectives. This aspect was however outside the scope of this study, 
which followed the ROI approach of the RIA methodology.  
 
In addition, another weakness identified of this ex-ante impact assessment is the fact that 
estimating future impact proved to be more challenging than the measurement of past 
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impact under the ex-post impact assessment scenario, which was performed on the 
regulated MFI case study in this study. This is because the appraisal is on a proposed new 
regulatory framework and hence the unavailability of data to validate evidence. This possibly 
renders an ex-ante RIA less accurate than an ex-post RIA, which uses actual data. Having 
followed a rigorous regulatory impact approach such as the ROI, which is grounded in public 
interest theory, of regulation for assessing regulatory change, as explained in the 
methodology chapter, has however enabled the above findings to offer a good foundation 
upon which further research can be built.  
 
9.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY FINDINGS FOR POLICY  
 
The above findings from the assessment of the impact of regulation and supervision on the 
MFI sector pointed to a general positive impact of regulation on microfinance in Namibia. 
There are however other pertinent findings in this study that are relevant for achieving the 
intended policy and regulatory objective of developing the country’s microfinance sector to 
enhance access to finance, and that should therefore have policy makers in Namibia 
thinking in terms of how to address them going forward. These are those cases that pointed 
towards the likelihood of undesirable outcomes of the regulation (i.e. some of the provisions 
of the envisaged microfinance regulatory framework were found to be potential hindrances to 
the attainment of the regulatory objectives) as well as other issues that emanated from the 
fieldwork. These are discussed below.  
 
9.3.1 Shareholder limits and foreign ownership 
 
The provision on shareholder limits and foreign ownership introduced by the new 
microfinance regulatory framework to encourage local participation and ownership of 
banking institutions, including deposit-taking microfinance banks, was found to be a potential 
entry barrier. The draft amended act has placed a restriction on foreign shareholding of 
DMFIs to not more than 55 per cent as per Section 32 (1) (a) and (b). By implication, foreign 
DMFIs wanting to enter the Namibian market will have to ensure incorporation of local 
shareholding of 45 per cent. While this provision is good for this country that has foreign 
dominance in those respects, shareholder limits and foreign ownership restrictions could 
pose problems for MFIs that want to transform into DMFIs from a status such as credit-only 
microlender (i.e. term-lending MFIs) and NGO. For instance, this will mean that credit-only 
term-lending institutions that may currently be owned by single owners (be it local or foreign) 
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would now have to give up some of their shareholding as required and some investors may 
not be comfortable with such a requirement.  
 
In the case of the existing NGO-owned MFIs that may be harbouring the idea of upgrading to 
DMFIs, these requirements could also be a setback, as they would typically wish to hold a 
significant ownership stake in the transformed DMFI so as to be able to maintain their social 
mission of serving the poor. It may also prove difficult for NGO-MFI applicants to attract 
additional and suitable potential shareholders, given their limited track record in the for-profit-
making arena. This may therefore be a barrier to entering the industry, leading to fewer MFIs 
entering the sector and reducing the level of competition. This may further limit the 
achievement of the regulatory objective of promoting competition and/or establishing a 
competitive market. While there is a possibility of this being mitigated by the provision of the 
draft amended BIA in Section 79(1), as cited in Chapter 8, and the central bank will therefore 
have an opportunity to review such agreement in the interest of facilitating a competitive 
environment, policy makers still need to be aware of this potential risk.  
 
For regulation to achieve the objective of establishing a competitive market, it is important 
that it guards against provisions that would increase barriers to entry. Ways should therefore 
be found to mitigate and/or compensate for this potential barrier, which could delay the 
growth and development of the deposit-taking industry and the microfinance sector in 
general, and in turn the achievement of the regulatory objective of improving access to 
finance. For instance, policy makers and/or regulatory authorities may consider allowing for 
a transition period for shareholder diversification by DMFIs. This will allow them to set up 
shop while luring in potential investors. 
 
Other issues for policy makers to consider in the process of striving to achieve their policy 
objective of developing the microfinance sector of Namibia through the provision of an 
enabling regulatory framework are those that emanated from the fieldwork, as summarised 
below. 
 
9.3.2 To have dedicated legislation for microfinance or not  
 
While stakeholders saw the need for regulating MFIs for various reasons discussed in 
Chapter 6, which addressed the research objective of understanding the current regulatory 
and supervisory framework for microfinance in Namibia, they raised concerns about a lack of 
dedicated legislation for microfinance activity in Namibia and the fragmented treatment of 
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MFIs, which they saw as the cause for a lack of understanding about microfinance in 
Namibia is. In their view, this could be the reason why the country does not have a national 
common definition of what microfinance is and who the MFIs are. They therefore called for 
dedicated legislation for the sector so as to ensure a coordinated approach towards 
microfinance.  
 
The researcher did not find the lack of dedicated microfinance legislation to be a unique 
situation to Namibia, as many other countries around the globe are without dedicated 
legislation for microfinance, while the microfinance sectors of many are also fragmented and 
uncoordinated. Literature revealed that the binding constraint to the growth of microfinance 
in most countries has not necessarily been a lack of a dedicated legislation, but a shortage 
of licensable MFIs. As pointed out earlier, what is necessary for Namibia therefore is to have 
legislation for well-defined institutions and under which MFIs can thrive, as well as an 
enabling regulatory framework attractive to new entrants.  
 
Regulators have to consider many issues when creating and reforming policies and 
depending on the circumstances of the country, a choice can be made between creating 
microfinance-specific legislation or amending existing legislation to make provision for MFI 
regulation (CGAP, 2010). An important first step in this decision process, before the complex 
task of creating a new legislation is engaged, is for the country to determine whether and 
how the existing sector regulation is a barrier to the achievement of the country’s intended 
objective (CGAP, 2010), which in the case of Namibia is the provision of financial services to 
the poor and SMEs. It should also be determined whether there is existence of a critical 
mass of qualifying institutions and which actors are likely to respond to the new legislation, 
as without this the creation of new and dedicated legislation would not necessarily lead to 
the achievement of that objective. As literature revealed, several countries have built 
technically sound new regulatory windows for microfinance, but have seen little response 
(CGAP, 2010). These are all important aspects that Namibia has to consider in its quest to 
create an effective microfinance regulatory framework.  
 
The amended BIA providing for the regulation of DMFIs and the Microlending Bill that was 
being worked on by NAMFISA at the time of preparing this research, should go a long way in 
enhancing the regulatory and supervisory framework for the microfinance sector in Namibia 
once they become effective. It is however not yet known to what extent there would be 
harmonisation between these two pieces of legislation, especially in terms of defining what a 
microloan is and hence who an MFI is, as currently the definition for a microloan differs 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
273 
 
between the two bills. Harmonising common aspects of microfinance, such as the definition 
of microcredit, MFI, etc., is important, as this will help address some of the above-cited 
concerns raised by the sector stakeholders engaged by the researcher.  
 
9.3.3 To prudentially or non-prudentially regulate MFIs 
 
The other relevant issue identified relates to whether to prudentially regulate Namibian MFIs 
or not, on which the general argument from stakeholders pointed towards a differentiated 
approach. The majority of stakeholders argued that whether to prudentially or non-
prudentially regulate should depend on the activities of the MFIs, such that DMFIs would 
need to be regulated to ensure their soundness and stability, while in the case of credit-only 
MFIs, it would suffice to only regulate their market conduct (i.e. non-prudential regulation is 
enough for those type of MFIs).  
 
The above views are broadly in line with the arguments in literature. As such, what is 
important for Namibia is to weigh the costs against the benefits of supervising and regulating 
some MFIs as well as the risk involved and to identify and set levels of those to be regulated 
and how to regulate them, i.e. regulation should be aligned to the risk posed by MFIs. This 
process should also take into consideration the challenge of the complex nature of regulating 
and supervising microfinance prudentially and the cost involved, so as not to waste scarce 
supervisory resources and to avoid unnecessary compliance burdens for MFIs, which could 
result in the unintended consequence of constraining the development of the sector.  
 
The above arguments are of great importance for Namibia to take into consideration, 
particularly given the objective to grow the sector and the fact that regulation of MFIs is a 
relatively new aspect for which the country still needs to strengthen its capacity in 
supervising and regulating such institutions.  
 
9.3.4 To regulate microfinance activity or microfinance providers 
 
Another aspect that is relevant for policy makers to consider is that of whether to regulate 
microfinance activity or microfinance providers. While the case of deposit-taking 
microfinance banks is clear in that they need to be prudentially regulated, the question that 
arises especially with the other categories of microfinance providers, and which relates to 
the issues of achieving a coordinated approach as well as the need to have a level playing 
field called for by stakeholders, is what exactly to regulate. CGAP (2012) is of the view that 
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to advance the promotion of a level playing field for access to finance, similar activities 
should be subject as much as possible to similar regulation, regardless of the institutions 
conducting the activity. This implies that regulating the activity or following an activity-based 
regulatory approach is better than distinguishing regulation based on the type of institution. 
According to CGAP (2012), this is important not only for creating a level playing field, but 
also to foster competition and reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage. The researcher views 
this as an important aspect for Namibia going forward, if it is to achieve the regulatory 
objective of developing a real microfinance sector.  
 
CGAP (2012: 18) however argues that “the ability to regulate activities similarly will depend 
on both the specific regulatory issue being addressed as well as how the different institutions 
are regulated (i.e. under one or many laws)”. This aspect is also relevant for Namibia to 
consider and address, given its current setup where MFIs are regulated and supervised by 
two different regulators (DMFIs by the BoN and credit-only MFIs by NAMFISA) under two 
different laws. The country needs to determine whether there could be a possibility of 
following the activity-based regulatory approach and how that is to be implemented.  
 
9.3.5 Enforcing regulation and supervision 
 
Notwithstanding the above highlighted issues, it is important to note the fact that ultimately, 
what is key would be the degree to which regulatory requirements are going to be enforced. 
In this regard, it is hoped that supervisors would have sufficient capacity to effectively 
supervise the new breed of unique institutions that will enter the industry. The experience 
noted with the regulation of FIDES should assist going forward, but more experience and 
skills will need to be gained during the process, especially as FIDES has been regulated 
under normal conventional banking law. There will also be a need to learn lessons from 
other countries that have been involved with regulating and supervising MFIs, while still 
keeping in mind the unique environment of the country.  
   
The researcher is further of the view that while necessary, regulation alone will not be 
sufficient to attract relevant players to the sector, and that broader policy and reform 
initiatives, including additional incentives, might be required to spur the development of the 
country’s microfinance sector.  
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9.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
A key limitation of the study is the fact that the case study MFI (i.e. FIDES) discussed in 
Chapter 7 had been the only regulated DMFI in Namibia at the time of conducting the 
research. Questions that arise could be why FIDES was the only regulated MFI, and whether 
or not it self-selected into that situation, which then creates selection bias. The problem with 
selection bias is that if found existing, the appropriateness to attributing the outcomes of the 
impact assessment to regulation would be questionable. In this regard, the researcher 
argues that FIDES found itself as the only regulated DMFI due to structural factors, in that it 
was the only DMFI that had the capacity to enter the industry at the time. This is evidenced 
by the findings of an unpublished study that investigated the viability of second-tier banks in 
Namibia, which was undertaken by the BoN in 2005 [UP/P/4/1], which revealed a lack of 
capacity in potential second-tier bank entrants surveyed.140 A further review was undertaken 
by the same institution in 2009, this time focusing on the capacity of some identified MFIs 
that were considered to be potential candidates for second-tier banks [UP/P/4/2]. These 
were the big three MFIs in Namibia identified by the rural microfinance technical committee 
in the country, namely Koshi Yomuti (which later became FIDES), Project Hope and the 
Shark Dwellers Federation of Namibia, all of which were donor-sponsored MFIs. The 
operations of these institutions were reviewed against the key findings of the 2005 study, 
with the aim to evaluate and determine their potential candidacy for consideration as 
second-tier banks. The findings of the review supported those of the earlier study and 
concluded that the demand for second-tier bank status in Namibia remained very low 
[UP/P/4/2].   
 
With the above background in mind, FIDES might have self-selected, but the problem of it 
not being representative of its group may not be applicable in this case, given that there was 
no one else in the first place (i.e. there were no obvious NGOs who were likely second-tier 
bank candidates to enter, as found by the review study). As such, while FIDES’s potential 
self-selection status might not have benefitted from the ideal random selection approach, it is 
                                                          
140 The study defined second-tier banks as small banks that would be subject to less stringent prudential requirements than 
conventional banks, allowed to conduct a limited range of banking activities, allowed to accept deposits from the public and 
extend credit, serving the poor and informal SMEs as their target clients, providing services and products which are suitable for 
their target clientele and will not insist on conventional form of collateral but will consider alternative forms of collateral which 
the poor are able to provide [UP/P/4/1]. 
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considered relevant under the circumstances in which FIDES was finding itself as well as in 
the context of this study. 
 
Notwithstanding the above explanation, the following research ideas are proposed based on 
identified weaknesses of the thesis under sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 above: 
 
The key weakness identified in the findings of the ex-post assessment of the regulated MFI 
(FIDES) relates to the fact that the analytical process of the impact of regulation and 
supervision on FIDES has lacked sufficient data for undertaking regression analysis, while 
from the ex-ante regulatory impact appraisal of the envisaged microfinance regulatory 
framework, the key weakness pointed to the fact that estimation of future impact is more 
challenging than the measurement of past impact. This could be an area for further research 
in the sense that as the new microfinance regulatory framework comes into effect, an ex-
post impact assessment could be undertaken after some years of MFIs having been 
regulated.  
 
Conducting an ex-post regulatory impact study after the implementation of the envisaged act 
and after having a number of institutions entering the industry should strengthen the 
evidence of regulatory impact on MFIs in Namibia by enabling a comparison of results to the 
current study. This could be combined with an appraisal of different options normally 
performed under the RIA (i.e. the options of having a dedicated microfinance legislation, 
integrating microfinance under the general banking law, do nothing option, etc.) referred to 
earlier as another weakness of the ex-ante appraisal by this study, which did not consider 
options to determine the superiority of alternative approaches and choose the most relevant 
options that would be more successful in facilitating the attainment of intended regulatory 
objectives. Further research in this area at the right time would prove to be beneficial to the 
country, as it will add more evidence for policy making as the country continues to strive to 
develop an effective, appropriate and enabling regulatory environment for microfinance. 
  
 9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The aim of this study was to assess the potential impact that regulation would have on the 
MFIs in Namibia. Through an application of the ROI methodology, a review of relevant 
literature, lessons from the experience of other countries and collected quantitative and 
qualitative information from stakeholders (MFIs, regulators, users of MFIs services, policy 
and law makers and experts in the field) and the MIX database, an analysis of an RIA was 
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performed at two levels, i.e. an ex-post level using a case study of a DMFI that has been 
regulated under conventional banking law and an ex-ante level of the likely impact of the 
new draft microfinance regulatory framework envisaged to be implemented in due course. 
The researcher believes that some useful conclusions and arguments have been made to 
answer the relevant research questions of the study and support the analysis, as evidenced 
by the key findings presented above.  
 
The application of the ROI methodology to the case of Namibia has therefore contributed to 
the growing literature on RIA, and provided important insights for the future regulation of 
microfinance, not only in Namibia, but also in other similar countries around the world. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: The questionnaire 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
My name is Emma Haiyambo, a PhD student at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. 
Thank you for your time to help me fulfil my study requirements by completing this 
questionnaire. 
 
The purpose of this survey is to understand the Namibian microfinance industry and the 
impact regulation has and/or might have going forward on the microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) and/or industry as a whole. The information being collected is purely for research 
purposes and ethical issues will be upheld at all times in the dissemination of results.  
 
If the space provided is insufficient for your response to any of the questions, please use a 
separate sheet of paper(s) and attach it to the questionnaire. 
  
Kindly return the questionnaire to me by ……. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Emma Haiyambo 
E-mail: haiyamboe@iway.na , Cell 081 293 0490 
 
 
 
 
 
SURVEY ON MICROFINANCE IN NAMIBIA 2014 
 
A. Details of the institution 
 
1.  Name of institution …………………..………………………………………………… 
2.  Physical address of head office…...……………..……………………….…………. 
3.  PO Box….……………………..………………………………………….………......... 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
294 
 
4.  Tel………………………………..…………………………………………………. 
5.  Fax………………………………..………………………………………………… 
6.  E-mail……………………………..…………………………………….…………… 
7.  Date of creation/formation………………………….……………………………… 
8.  Is your organisation registered?  Yes ( )   No ( ) 
9.  If yes, is it registered as a: 
Society      ( ) 
Cooperative                 ( ) 
Limited company     ( ) 
Sole proprietorship/partnership   ( ) 
NGO                  ( ) 
Other (please specify)………………………………………………….……………. 
 
10. Date registered……………………………………………………………………… 
11. With which agency is your organisation registered? …………………..…………… 
12. If your institution is not solely dedicated to the provision of microfinance services, what is 
the % of portfolio dedicated to microfinance?…………………………………………… 
13.  In which areas does your organisation operate? Please provide both for current, 
previous and future (i.e. planned for next 3 years) 
 
 
 
Period Current 
/Previous/Future  
City/Town/Village Region Number of 
branches 
     
     
     
     
 
B. Regulation of microfinance institutions 
 
14. Does the agency with which you are registered require any reporting? 
      Yes ( )   No ( ) 
15. If your answer in 14 is ‘yes’, what information are you required to report and to whom? 
Please also indicate frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc.). 
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Required To whom Frequency 
Financial statements                   ( )   
Audited accounts                        ( )   
Cash flow projections                  ( )   
Donor inflows/statements           ( )   
Operation manuals                      ( )   
Other (please 
specify):……………... 
  
 
16. Is your organisation currently supervised by any agency for the delivery of financial  
      services?    Yes ( )    No ( ) 
 
17. If yes in 16 above, which agency? 
Bank of Namibia   ( ) 
NAMFISA     ( ) 
Registrar of co-operatives   ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………….. 
 
18. When was the last time the supervising agency contacted you? 
Last month     ( ) 
Last quarter     ( ) 
Within the last six months   ( ) 
Last year     ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………… 
19. When was the last time the supervising agency visited you? 
Last month     ( ) 
Last quarter     ( ) 
Within the last six months   ( ) 
Last year     ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………… 
 
20. When was the last time the supervising agency asked you for information? 
Last month     ( ) 
Last quarter     ( ) 
Within the last six months   ( ) 
Last year     ( ) 
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Other (please specify)……………………………………………………………  
 
21. What information was requested? Please select from the list below. 
Financial statements    ( ) 
Audited accounts    ( ) 
Cash flow projections   ( ) 
Donor inflows/statements   ( ) 
Organisational operations manuals  ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………….. 
22. Do you think the microfinance industry should be regulated? 
      Yes ( )     No ( ) 
 
23. Please explain your answer in 22 above…………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
If your answer was ‘no’ to question 22 above, please go to question 32, and if yes 
proceed to question 24. 
 
24. Who do you think should regulate microfinance institutions in Namibia? 
Ministry of Finance    ( ) 
Bank of Namibia     ( ) 
NAMFISA      ( ) 
Registrar of cooperatives    ( ) 
Registrar of corporations    ( ) 
Donors      ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………….. 
 
25. How often would you prefer the regulator to visit you? 
 Monthly     ( ) 
Quarterly      ( ) 
Yearly                  ( ) 
Other……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
26. In your view, what information should the regulator request from you? 
Financial statements    ( ) 
Audited accounts     ( ) 
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Cash flow projections    ( ) 
Donor inflows/investments    ( ) 
Organisational operation manuals   ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………….. 
 
27. How often do you prefer reporting to the regulator? 
Monthly     ( ) 
Quarterly      ( ) 
Half yearly (2x a year)  ( ) 
Yearly                 ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………….. 
 
28. From your institution’s experience, what are the major regulatory and supervisory related 
obstacles for providing financial services in Namibia?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
29. Does your institution face any major non regulatory and non-supervisory obstacles in the 
provision of financial services? …………………………..…………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
30. What do you think are the likely benefits to the following of the having the microfinance 
      industry regulated? 
 
Government/Regulators………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Microfinance institutions……………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Clients……………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………..………………………………………………………………………………… 
Investors…………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
31. Do you have any intentions to license your organisation after the enactment of the 
amended Banking Institutions Act which is now providing for the regulation of microfinance 
institutions?   Yes ( )   No ( ) 
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Please provide reasons for your answer………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C. Ownership and governance 
 
32. Who owns your organisation? 
NGO     ( ) 
Members    ( ) 
Company   ( ) 
Individuals    ( ) 
Other    ( ) 
33. Has there been any change in ownership from the establishment of your organisation?  
      Yes ( )    No ( ) 
 If yes, please explain………………………………………………………………………… 
 
34. What are your funding sources? Please indicate percentages. 
Donor funds    ( ) ………………%… 
Deposits    ( ) ………………%… 
Commercial loans   ( ) ………………%… 
Government    ( ) ………………%… 
Equity     ( ) ………………%… 
Other (please specify)  ( ) …………………………… 
 
D. Management and staffing 
 
35. What percentage of staff in your organisation is dedicated to the provision of the 
following: 
Financial services………………………………...…………%……. 
Social services………………………………………………%……. 
Other services (please specify)…………………… ………%…… 
 
36. Institution size. Please provide information since the creation of your institution. 
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. 
Total number of staff           
Number of loan officers           
Number of borrowers           
Total number  of loans 
outstanding 
          
Total value of loans 
outstanding 
          
PAR            
Repayment rate           
Total assets           
Number of savers           
Value of savings           
Profit/loss           
Shareholders/members’ 
equity 
          
Liabilities           
Retained earnings           
 
37. What is the total number of loans disbursed to date?……………………………….. 
 
E. Profile of your clients 
 
38. Please provide the number of active clients   
      Total .…………..………. 
      Repeat clients ….….…… 
      New clients ….….…… 
39. Clientele (percentage of total): 
       Female .…………..………%. 
       Urban ….….………………%. 
 
40. How do you select your clients? 
Poverty levels      ( ) 
Gender       ( ) 
Locality       ( ) 
Interest in the programme     ( ) 
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Prior experience in business    ( ) 
Other (please describe)………………………………………………………….. 
 
41. What source of information do you use to select clients? 
Financial statements      ( ) 
Credit histories      ( ) 
Village/community leaders     ( ) 
Friends/relatives      ( ) 
Employers/business people     ( ) 
Credit group selection of eligible members   ( ) 
Other (please specify)…………………………………………………………….. 
 
F. Services offered  
42. What loan products does your institution offer? 
Consumption loans      ( ) 
Loans to repay existing loans     ( ) 
Trade/commercial loans    ( ) 
Agricultural loans      ( ) 
Manufacturing loans      ( ) 
Housing loans      ( )     
Other (please specify)……………………………………………………………… 
 
43. Does your institution provide any other financial services apart from loans? 
Savings       ( ) 
Money transmission      ( ) 
Insurance       ( ) 
Other (please specify)……………………………………………………………… 
 
44. Does your institution provide any training prior to lending?   
           Yes ( )       Duration…………………   No   ( ) 
 
Loan Characteristics 
45. Which is your lending methodology? 
      Group  ( )  Average group size: min.…….. max……. average…… 
      Individual  ( ) 
      Other (please specify)………………………………………………………………. 
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46. How long does it take a client to obtain their first loan after joining? 
      min ….…. max …..… average ….…. 
 
47. Do you require collateral?   Yes ( )   No ( ) 
 
48. If ‘yes’ in 47 above, which from the list below do you accept as collateral? 
Forced savings      ( ) 
Vehicles       ( ) 
Land        ( ) 
Animals       ( ) 
Household goods/furniture     ( ) 
Personal guarantees      ( ) 
Group guarantees      ( ) 
Other (please specify)……………………………..……………………………… 
 
49. If you answered ‘no’ in 47, how does your organisation mitigate risk? 
      ……………………………..…………………………………………………………. 
 
50. Is there a waiting period between repayment and the disbursement of a subsequent 
loan? 
Yes ( )  Duration: min……max…… aver……..  No ( ) 
 
 
51. Loan activity: Please provide the current situation of your loan book 
 Number Outstanding 
balances 
Total   
Individual   
Group   
 
 
52. Loan characteristics 
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 Minimum Maximum Average 
Loan size    
Annual interest 
rates (for 2013) 
   
Loan terms 
(duration in days, 
months or years) 
   
Repayment 
frequency 
   
 
53. Do you give loans to: 
Staff       ( ) 
Board       ( ) 
Their relatives     ( ) 
 
54. Current loans extended by your institution with late repayment (at least 30 days late) 
 Number Balance 
Total   
Individual   
Group   
 
55. When is a loan considered as delinquent? ............................................................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………...……………………. 
56. Does your organisation penalise for early payment or prepayment of loans? 
     Yes ( )      No ( ) 
 
Deposit characteristics 
57. Are clients required to make forced savings?  Yes ( )  No ( ) 
 
58. How much is a client required to save before a loan is disbursed? .......... N$.................. 
 
59. Deposit accounts 
 Number Balance 
Compulsory    
Voluntary    
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60. Annual interest rate on deposit accounts 
           Minimum………………… Maximum…….…….……. Average………..………. 
 
61. Where are clients’ savings kept? …………………………………………………... 
62. Can a client withdraw from forced savings?  Yes ( )  No ( ) 
63. If yes in 62 above, under what circumstances? 
Family emergency       ( ) 
Invest in business       ( ) 
No specific reason       ( ) 
Other (please specify)……………………………………………………………… 
64. Are savings/deposits used for onward lending?  Yes ( )  No ( ) 
 
G. Performance indicators 
 
65. Please also provide information on the variables listed below since the establishment of 
your institution up to 2013. (Where available, monthly data for each year will be very 
useful for this exercise and will be appreciated). 
       
SUB-
INDICATOR  
PERIOD (in years) 
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Return on 
assets (%) 
 
               
Return on 
equity (%) 
 
               
Debt to 
equity ratio 
(%) 
               
Capital/ 
asset ratio 
(%) 
 
               
PAR > 30 
days / gross 
portfolio (%) 
               
Write-off 
ratio (%) 
 
               
Risk 
coverage 
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ratio (%) 
 
Number of 
borrowers 
 
               
Average loan 
size 
 
               
Share of 
small loans 
(%) 
 
               
Share of 
group 
borrowers 
(%) 
 
               
Portfolio 
yield (%) 
               
Total savings 
 
               
Savings to 
loans ratio 
(%) 
 
               
Number of 
savers 
 
               
Average 
savings per 
saver 
 
               
Average 
savings per 
saver to 
average loan 
size 
(%) 
               
Operating 
expense 
ratio (%) 
 
               
Financial 
expense 
ratio (%) 
 
               
Cost per 
borrower 
 
               
Liquidity ratio 
(%) 
               
Liquid ratio 
(%) 
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NOTE: DEFINITIONS OF THE ABOVE VARIABLES: 
 
VARIABLE  
 
DEFINITION 
 
Return on assets (%) -------------------------- 
 
Profit (loss) from operations after tax/ average  
assets 
 
Return on equity (%) ------------------------- 
 
Profit (loss) from operations after tax/ average  
equity 
 
Debt to equity ratio (%) ---------------------- 
 
Total liabilities / total equity 
 
Capital/ asset ratio (%) ----------------------- 
 
Total equity/ total assets 
 
PAR > 30 days / gross portfolio (%) ------- 
 
Value of outstanding loan balance with payments 
 past due > 30 days (end of period)/ value of  
outstanding loans (end of period) 
 
Write-off ratio (%) -------------------------- 
 
Write-offs for the 12 months period / average gross 
 loan portfolio 
 
Risk coverage ratio (%) ---------------------- 
 
Loan loss reserve/ PAR > 30 days 
 
Number of borrowers ------------------------- 
 
Number of active loan clients (end of period) 
 
Average loan size -------------------------- 
 
Gross loan portfolio / Number of active  
borrowers (end of year) 
 
Share of small loans (%) --------------------- 
 
Number of loans with a disbursed loan amount  
< value be determined / number of loans 
 
Share of group borrowers (%) -------------- 
 
Number of active borrowers receiving loans as  
members of a group / number of active borrowers (end of period) 
 
Portfolio yield (%) --------------------------  
 
Interest and fee income from loans / average  
gross loan portfolio 
 
Total savings -------------------------- 
 
Total short-term deposits (end of period) 
 
Savings to loans ratio (%) ------------------- 
 
Total savings / gross loan portfolio (end of  
period) 
 
Number of savers --------------------------  
 
Total number of clients with savings (end  
of period) 
 
Average savings per saver ------------------- 
 
Total savings / number of savers (end of period) 
 
Average savings per saver to average 
loan size (%) 
 
(Total savings / number of savers) / (gross loan  
portfolio / number of active borrowers) 
 
Operating expense ratio (%) ---------------- 
 
Operating expense / average gross loan portfolio 
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(end of period) 
 
Financial expense ratio (%) ----------------- 
 
Financial expense / average total assets (end of  
period) 
 
Cost per borrower -------------------------- 
 
Operating expense / average number of active  
borrowers 
 
Liquidity ratio (%) --------------------------  
 
Liquid assets net of LIF / deposit liabilities 
 
Liquid ratio (%) -------------------------- (Cash and near cash + deposits in banks + short  
term investments) / total assets 
 
H. Respondent details 
 
In order to enable the researcher to follow up on some of the responses, kindly complete the 
section below. This is optional and entirely for research purposes only. 
 
Name of respondent……………………………………………………………………. 
Position…………………………………………………………………………………. 
Tel/fax………………………………………………………………………………...... 
E-mail…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
THANKS FOR YOUR TIME! 
 
 
Note: The questionnaire was adapted from Chiumya (2006), who did a similar study on 
Zambia, as it was found to fit the aim and objectives of this study. 
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Appendix B: Additional qualitative questions sent to staff of FIDES to provide an  
                      indication of what the situation was at the bank  
 
Qualitative indicator Remark 
Management and strategy 
 Quality of senior management and board 
 
 Qualifications of management and board  
 Training of middle management & potential middle managers  
 Promotions  
Strategy and business plan 
 Business plan in place with clear-cut policy required to 
deliver on their promises. 
 
 
 Detailed operational plan covering the activities of each 
branch, market development and branch replication, product 
development, regulatory compliance, human resource 
development, institutional development and industry support 
 
 
 Financial projections in place relating to portfolio growth, 
product diversification and capital structure strategies, 
challenges, strategy development, financial model and 
competitors?  
 
 
 Does the plan also provides an analysis of the institution’s 
resources and capabilities, business system, financial plan, 
assumption and risks? 
 
 
Quality and support from shareholders and network 
 Donors and their role  
 
 
 Other networking groups/bodies 
 
 
Human resources management 
 Human resource policies in place 
 
 Policies to retain and to improve employees’ productivity 
 
 
 Incentives/compensation policies  
 
 
 Use of part-time staff  
 Skilled staff in place  
 Capacity building activities   
Systems and reporting: 
 
Quality of management information system 
 Management information (effective?) 
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Qualitative indicator Remark 
 Information technology systems (IT management information 
system)  
 
 
 Loan tracking and accounting systems  
 
 
Quality and speed of data feed 
 Process of data processing and distribution/transfer between 
head office and branches  
 
 
 Also is it manual or computer assisted? 
 
 
Quality of reports and distribution/analysis of reports 
 Quality of financial statements released 
 
 
 Are they automated or manually produced?  
 
 
 Are financial statements audited? 
 
 
 How often auditors are replaced  
 
 
Operations procedures and internal controls 
 Formalised and updated  
 
 
 Procedures disseminated to staff  
 
 
 Has internal audit department? 
 
 
 Internal auditors trained and has a good understanding of 
the MFI’s role  
 
 
 Internal audit team’s autonomy to apply/define its internal 
controls 
 
 
 An internal control and audit system that allows systematic 
monitoring and mitigation of risks 
 
 
 
Noted: The questions/statements were adapted from Ayayi (2011) 
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Appendix C: The interview guide 
 
1. What is your understanding of microfinance? 
2. Can you define it in the context of Namibia? 
3. Is there a difference between microfinance and traditional banking? 
4. Should microfinance institutions be regulated? 
5. What do you mean by regulation? 
6. Who should regulate microfinance institutions and why? 
7. Are there any risks to be addressed by regulation and/or benefits to be derived 
from regulating microfinance institutions? 
8. Is there a need to distinguish between different types of MFIs for regulation 
depending on their objective (e.g. poverty alleviation, profit maximisation, etc.)? 
9. What role do you think microfinance play in the Namibian economy? 
 
 
Note: The interview guide draws extensively from Chiumya (2006) who did a similar study 
on Zambia 
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Appendix D: List of interviewees 
 
INTERVIEWEE TITLE  DATE  INSTITUTION/ORGA
NISATION 
Mr Festus Nghifenua Director: Economic Policy 
Advisory Services 
15 Apr 2015 Ministry of Finance  
 Mr Penda Ithindi Director: Economic Policy 
Advisory Services 
* Ministry of Finance 
Mr Romeo Nel Director: Banking 
Supervision Department 
9 Jan 2015 Bank of Namibia  
Mr Urbans Karumendu Deputy Director: Macro-
Prudential Analysis 
* Bank of Namibia 
Mr Imanuel Hawanga Principal Examiner (Banking 
Supervision) 
2 Apr 2015 Bank of Namibia 
Ms Rachelle Metzler  Manager: Microlending and 
Credit Agreements 
14 Jan 2015 NAMFISA  
Mr Philip Shiimi CEO 23 Jan 2015 NAMFISA 
Mr Christopher 
Engelbrecht 
Financial Sector Programme 
(Subject Matter Expert)  
 12 Nov 2014 GIZ  
Mr Tom Newton  Managing Partner  
(& Director at FIDES) 
28 May 2015 Grant Thornton  
(also FIDES) 
Ms Hileni Kaifanua Financial Manager  * FIDES 
Mr Iaan Lyenar  Chairperson 10 Nov 2014 Bankers Associations 
of Namibia  
Mr Ronald Weber  Chairperson 4 Nov 2014 The Micro Lenders 
Association of 
Namibia  
Mr Patrick Gardiner General Manager 16 Jun 2015 PostFin  
Ms Mecky Heita Financial Manager 5 Nov 2014 Kongalend 
Mr Ismael Gei-Khoibeb Financial Manager 12 Oct 2015 Old Mutual Finance 
Mr Wilfried Luyanga Project Coordinator 10 Mar 2014 Project Hope Namibia 
Mr Heinrich Amushila  Regional Coordinator  11 Nov 2014 NHAG/ SDFN  
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Mr Ruben Isak Senior Cooperative Business 
Analyst: Division of 
Cooperative Development & 
Regulations 
7 Aug 2015 Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Forestry  
Mr Pintile Davids Director 10 Jul 2015 RISE Namibia 
Mr Michael Gawaseb Director  14 Oct 2015 Namibia Consumer 
Trust 
Hon. Tom Alweendo  Chairperson  
(Also Minister of Economic 
Planning & Director General 
of the NPC) 
16 Oct 2015 Cabinet Committee on 
Trade & Economic 
Development 
(& National Planning 
Commission) 
Hon. Veikko Nekundi Chairperson 
 
* Parliamentary 
Standing Committee 
on Constitution and 
Legal Aspects  
 
Note: * represents those who responded to interview questions in writing due to 
unavailability for a face-to-face interview. 
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Appendix E: List of coded unpublished documents 
Code Author Title  Date  
UP/PD/2/1 Bank of Namibia Policy considerations for the regulatory 
framework for deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions   
16 June 2011 
UP/PD/2/2 Supervision 
Department, Bank of 
Namibia 
Supervision and regulation of deposit-taking 
microfinance institutions 
15 October 2010 
UP/RD/2/1 Supervision 
Department, Bank of 
Namibia 
Recommendations for the reform of Namibia’s 
legal and supervisory framework to better 
accommodate  microfinance  
19 April 2011 
UP/RD/1/2 Bank of Namibia Financial sector achievements over the past 25 
years: Banking sector 
November 2015 
UP/D/1/1 Bank of Namibia Determinations under the Banking Institutions 
Act (Act No. 2 of 1998) 
December 2012 
UP/P/4/1 Supervision 
Department, Bank of 
Namibia 
Viability of second tier banks in Namibia June 2005 
UP/P/4/2 Research Department, 
Bank of Namibia 
Review of the viability of second tier banks in 
Namibia 
June 2005 
UP/P/4/3 NAMFISA Briefing paper: Microlending industry in 
Namibia 
July 2013 
UP/P/4/4 GENESIS for  NAMFISA Determining an optimum interest rate regime 
for microlenders in Namibia  
27 March 2015 
 
UD/L/2/1 
 
Bank of Namibia 
 
Banking Institutions Bill 2015 (Draft) 
 
2015 
UD/L/2/2 Republic of Namibia Microlending Bill undated 
 
Note: The explanation of codes in the table above are as follows: 
UP = Unpublished  
PD = Policy document 
RD = Report Document 
D = Determinations 
P = Paper 
UD = Unpublished document 
L = Legislation 
First level 1 or 2 = One or two document (s) in that category per institution 
Second level 1 or 2 = Number allocate to the document  
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Appendix F: List of codes allocated to interviewees 
 
First level codes Description 
Reg Regulator 
MFI MFI 
PM Policy Maker 
MLA Association of microlenders 
BAN Bankers Association 
LM Law makers 
Exp Expert 
Int Interest group 
 
Note:  
(a) Regulators are further divided into Reg1, Reg2 and Reg3 to indicate interviewees 
belonged to three different regulating authorities. 
(b) MFIs are further divided into MFI6 up to MFI10 to indicate that the 6 interviewees 
belonged to 5 MFIs. The number of interviewees per each of the MFIs are as follows: 
 MFI6 = 1 
 MFI7 =1 
 MFI8 = 2 
 MFI9 = 1 
 MFI10 = 1 
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Appendix G: FIDES’s performance indictors 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Profitability
Return on assets (%) N/A 2.47% -44.77% -33.84% -12.25% -7.34% -20.29% -30.70% -194.74% -82.88% -43.48%
Return on equity (%) N/A 5.61% -95.30% -73.91% -31.84% -19.47% -58.62% -143.59% -360.19% -314.06% -448.88%
Debt to equity ratio (%) 2.22 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.9 1.53 2.52 5.56 0.8 8.66 9.89
Capital ratios
Capital/ asset ratio (%) 31.03% 47.61% 46.54% 45.49% 34.45% 39.53% 28.45% 15.25% 55.54% 10.36% 9.18%
Portfolio quality (Portfolio at risk)
PAR > 30 days / gross 
portfolio (%) 0.00% 0.09% 1.36% 1.26% 0.68% 2.80% 3.33% 3.17% 1.37% 4.00% 40.23%
Write-off ratio (%) N/A 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.82% N/A N/A N/A
Risk coverage ratio (%) N/A 117.62% N/A N/A N/A 79.18% 96.27% 116.48% N/A N/A 48.35%
Access (to loans and to savings)
Number of borrowers 181 391 423 1,096 2,001 3,208 3,231 2,731 5313 10698 12,684
Portfolio yield (%) N/A N/A 50.21% 53.68% 49.89% 50.65% 40.10% 53.02% 15.27% 35.12%
Total savings 178 2,723 2,477 15,336 39,688 90,263 98,923 13,964 510,040 1,140,121 1,569,700
Savings to loans ratio (%)
3.09% 9.23% 7.35% 13.39% 15.46% 20.68% 27.59% 3.44% 48.84% 41.23% 40.58%
Number of savers 
31 107 99 518 1,337 2,436 2,611 49 N/A N/A 51,966
Average savings per saver
N/A 37 25 30 30 37 38 285 N/A N/A 30
Efficiency
Operating expense ratio (%)
N/A 50.10% 133.92% 109.47% 66.14% 55.26% 61.57% 84.88% N/A 142.51% 60.88%
Financial expense ratio (%)
N/A 0.30% 0.56% 0.55% 0.50% 2.65% 2.76% 4.81% 0.80% 3.72% 7.40%
Cost per borrower N/A N/A 104 107 79 74 76 109 N/A N/A N/A
Liquidity
Liquid ratio (%) N/A N/A 29.39% 6.79% 4.82% 5.57% 6.76% 10.27% 22.42% 11.28% 20.80%  
Source: Mix (no date) 
 
Note: N/A stands for not available  
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Appendix H: Morgan Stanley’s credit risk analysis and rating methodology of 
microfinance institutions 
Rating factors Indicator definition Grades 
6 5 4 3 2 1 
Loan portfolio 
 
A1: PAR = (outstanding 
loans with arrears over 30 
days + restructured 
loans)/gross loan portfolio 
<3%   
 
<6% <9% <12% <15% Above 15% 
A2: Write-offs = total loan 
written off over the last 
twelve months/ 
average loan portfolio 
<2%  
 
<3.5
% 
<5% <7% <10% Above 10% 
A3: Size of portfolio = 
gross loan portfolio  
 
>30
0M 
>25
0M 
>10
0M 
>50M >10% Less than 
10M 
A4: Loan loss reserves = 
loss reserves/PAR30 
>85
%  
>75
% 
>65
% 
>60% >55% Below 55% 
Profitability, 
sustainability, 
operating 
efficiency 
 
B1: Sustainability = 
operating income/(financial 
expenses + loan 
loss provisions + loan 
write-offs + operating 
expenses) 
 
>12
0%  
 
>11
5% 
>11
0% 
>100
% 
>90% Below 90% 
B2: Return on average 
assets (ROAA) = net 
income/average 
assets 
>3%  
 
>2% >1% >0% >-2% Below -2% 
B3: Operating efficiency = 
total operating 
expenses/average gross 
loan portfolio 
<20
%  
 
<25
% 
<30
% 
<40% <50% Above 50% 
B4: Productivity = number 
of borrowers/total 
headcount 
>20
0  
>19
0 
>17
0 
>145 >130 Below 130 
Asset and 
liability 
management 
 
C1: Leverage = total 
liabilities/net worth+ 
subordinated debt) 
<5x  
 
<6x <7x <8x <9x Above 9x 
C2: Foreign currency 
exposure = (foreign 
currency debt)/(total 
financial debt) 
<15
%  
<20
% 
<35
% 
<50% 65% Above 65% 
C3: Liquidity = (cash + 
short-term 
investment)/(gross loan 
portfolio) 
>15
%  
>12
% 
>9% >6% >3% Below 3% 
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Rating factors Indicator definition  
Management 
and 
strategy 
 
D1: Quality of senior 
management and board 
 
D2: Strategy and business 
plan (including competitive 
landscape) 
D3: Quality and support 
from shareholders and 
network 
D4: Human resource 
management 
Systems 
and reporting 
 
E1: Quality of 
management information 
systems (MISs) 
E2: Quality and speed of 
data feed 
E3: Quality of reports and 
distribution/analysis of 
reports 
Internal and 
operational 
controls 
F1: Operational 
procedures 
F2: Internal controls 
Growth 
potential 
 
G1: Regulatory 
environment and 
government involvement 
G2: Number and density of 
micro-entrepreneurs 
G3: Behaviour of micro-
entrepreneurs towards 
micro loans 
 
Source: Adapted from Ayayi (2011) 
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Appendix I: Regulations and determinations issued under primary banking laws 
Legislation for regulated 
and supervised banking 
institutions 
Regulations/Determinations/Circulars/Guidelines 
 
Bank of Namibia Act (Act No. 
15 of 1997)  
 
Regulations: 
 Directive on the Minimum Reserve Requirement   
 Credit Bureau Regulations  
 
Banking Institutions Act (Act 
No. 2 of 1998) (amendments 
to this act have been drafted 
and are awaiting 
Parliamentary approval) 
Regulations: 
 Regulations on fees   
 
Determinations: 
 Determination on the Application for Registration as a 
Controlling Company  
 Determination on Minimum Liquid Assets 
 Determination on the Imposition of Administrative Fines 
 Determination on Branches of Foreign Banking Institutions 
 Appointment, Duties and Responsibilities of Independent 
Auditors 
 Determination on Consolidated Supervision 
 Limits on exposures to single borrowers, large exposures and 
concentration risk 
 Measurement and calculation of capital charges for credit 
risk, operational risk and market risk 
 Minimum liquid assets 
 Public Disclosures for Banking Institutions 
 Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
 Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book 
 Minimum Local Assets 
 Localisation of Core Banking Systems 
 Country Risk Management 
 Limits on Interbank Placements  
 Asset Classification, Suspension of Interest and Provisioning  
 Minimum Insurance for Banks 
 Fraud and Other Economic Crime 
 Compulsory Suspension of Cheque Account Facilities by 
Banks 
 Disclosure of Bank Charges, Fees and Commission 
 Appointment, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors and 
Principal Officers of Banks 
 Fees Payable in terms of Section 64(6) of BIA 
 
Payment System 
Management Act (Act No. 18 
of 2003) 
Determinations: 
 Determination on Core Banking Systems   
 Determination on payment instruments   
 E-money Determination- gazetted   
 Determination on Access  
 Determination on Conduct of Card Transactions   
 Determination on the Efficiency of the National Payment 
System   
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Source: BoN (no date)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Determination of CDF and BBA    
 Determination on the Reduction of the Item Limit for 
Domestic Cheque Payments within the Namibian National 
Payment System (PSD-2)   
Correction notice:  
 Determination on the Reduction of the Item Limit for 
Domestic Cheque Payments within the Namibian National 
Payment System (PSD-2 
 
Circular and Guidelines 
 Guidelines for Electronic Money Issuers & Other Payment 
Instrument Issuers   
 Guidelines for an Efficient EFT Debit Order System   
 E-Money Circular   
 Starter Pack - Access and Participation in Clearing and 
Settlement   
Directives: 
 Card Directive 16 April 2008   
 Directive on reduction of cheque clearing cycle to 5 days   
 Directive on the conduct of EFT transactions   
 Early square off Directive Final   
 Sort at Source Directive  
 PSDIR 7-Routing of three debit card bins   
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Appendix J: Guidance on applying the Basel Core Principles to depository 
microfinance  
Pri
nci
ple 
Description Differentiation 
 
1 Objectives, independence, 
powers, transparency and 
cooperation 
Applies equally to supervisors of banks and ODTIs engaged in 
microfinance. 
2 Permissible activities Should be tailored to ODTIs engaged in microfinance in a manner that is 
commensurate with the type and size of their transactions, which may 
differ from banks. 
 
3  Licensing criteria Should be tailored to ODTIs engaged in microfinance in a manner that is 
commensurate with the type and size of their transactions, which may 
differ from banks. 
 
4  Transfer of significant 
ownership 
Applies equally to banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance 
5   Major acquisitions Applies equally to banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance, with isolated 
situations warranting a tailored approach. 
 
6  Capital adequacy Should be tailored to (a) the nature of microfinance risks for all institution 
types, and (b) the size and constituents of capital of ODTIs engaged in 
microfinance. 
 
7  Risk-management process Requires specialised knowledge and supervisory methodologies for both 
banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance. 
 
8  Credit risk Should be tailored in banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance to the 
specificities of microlending. Supervisors should take into account the 
context in which microlending occurs, i.e. as a business line within a large 
diversified bank versus a specialised microfinance organisation in which 
microloans comprise a significant proportion of total assets. Specialised 
knowledge of labour-intensive microlending methodologies is imperative 
for supervisory efficacy. 
 
9  Problem assets, provisions 
and reserves 
Should be tailored in banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance to the 
unique risks of microlending compared to other loan types, particularly with 
respect to loan-provisioning and classification requirements. 
 
10  Large exposure limits Should be tailored in banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance to 
manage the risks in geographic or sector concentrations often observed in 
microloan portfolios 
11  Exposures to related 
parties 
Should be tailored to ODTIs engaged in microfinance. Where governance 
is weak, supervisors may enhance restrictions or prohibitions on related 
party transactions. Conversely, member-owned institutions that are very 
widely held may warrant flexible treatment for loans to non-management 
members. 
 
12  
 
Country and transfer risks Applies equally to banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance 
13   Market risks Should be tailored to ODTIs engaged in microfinance with respect to their 
foreign currency borrowings. 
 
14  Liquidity risk Should be tailored in banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance to take 
into account the unique features of microfinance assets and funding 
liabilities. 
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Source: Adapted from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) 
Pri
nci
ple 
Description Differentiation 
 
15  Operational risk Requires a deep understanding of the distinctive risks and trends in 
microfinance operations – including outsourcing and decentralised and 
labour-intensive credit methodology – in order to adequately evaluate risk 
management and internal controls in banks and ODTIs engaged in 
microfinance. Supervisory tools and analyses may differ for ODTIs 
compared to those used for banks. 
 
16  Interest rate risk in the 
banking book 
Should be tailored in banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance to take 
into account the unique features of microfinance assets and funding 
liabilities. 
 
17  Internal control and audit Should be tailored in banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance to take 
into account that microlending methodologies may require different 
organisational arrangements and controls from those of conventional retail 
banking. Supervisory tools and analyses may differ for ODTIs from those 
used for banks. 
 
18  Abuse of financial services Should be tailored to the risks posed by low-value or low-risk microfinance 
operations undertaken by banks and ODTIs, particularly low-value savings 
products. 
 
19  Supervisory approach Requires specialised knowledge and supervisory methodologies for both 
banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance. Cost and feasibility 
considerations may allow for alternative supervisory arrangements to cover 
numerous small institutions that pose low systemic risk, without 
undermining the supervisor’s ability to gather information and monitor 
different markets. 
 
20  Supervisory techniques Requires specialised knowledge and supervisory methodologies for both 
banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance. 
 
21   Supervisory reporting Should be tailored to ODTIs engaged in microfinance in a manner that is 
commensurate with the type and size of their transactions, which may 
differ from banks. 
 
22   Accounting and disclosure Should be tailored so that disclosure requirements for small ODTIs 
engaged in microfinance are based on supervisory cost-benefit 
considerations. 
 
23  Corrective and remedial 
powers of supervisors 
Requires specialised tools to deal with weaknesses in banks and ODTIs 
engaged in microfinance, as some corrective measures typically used in 
commercial or conventional retail banking will be less effective or 
inadequate for microfinance institutions or activities. 
 
24  Consolidated supervision Applies equally to banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance. 
 
25   Home-host relationships Applies equally to banks and ODTIs engaged in microfinance. 
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